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Currency Crisis First Generation Crisis Models Second Generation Crisis Models Third Generation Crisis Models Transmission Channels and Contagion Economic Policy Implications 2.. Cu

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XI Currency Crisis and Debt Crisis

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1 Currency Crisis

 First Generation Crisis Models

 Second Generation Crisis Models

 Third Generation Crisis Models

 Transmission Channels and Contagion

 Economic Policy Implications

2 International Debt Crisis

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1 Currency Crisis

Concept

• A currency crisis is an economic crisis, which triggered

by a sudden devaluation of a free floating currency or by the collapse of an exchange rate peg (as a consequence

of speculative attacks)

• A currency crisis is often linked to bursting bubbles,

financial crisis and economic crises

• The history of economic, currency, and financial crises is

as old as capitalism itself

- England 1720 South Sea Bubble

- Germany 1873 real estate, railway

- The US 1929 stocks (end of the post war boom)

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1 Currency Crisis

Characteristics of Currency Crisis

• Crises are often linked to positive expectation and the

influx of liquidity

• Financial and banking crises: collapse of the banking

sector or the financial system

• Currency and balances of payments crises: speculative

attacks against at exchange rate peg, which

subsequently collapses

• Strong volatilities in markets

• Stock and real estate markets sink

• Large exchange rate fluctuations

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First Generation Crisis Models

Krugman (1979) Flood và Garber (1984) reasons

• Unsound fundamentals (BWS, Latin America)

• Unsustainable economic policies

Characteristics of the crisis

• Structural deficits are monetarized

• Strong growth of money supply

• Increasing inflation

• Rising current account deficits

• Speculative attacks against the peg

• Loss of foreign reserves

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First Generation Crisis Models

Crisis

• When foreign reserves are depleted or the losses are too

large, this causes the central bank to release the peg

• The devaluation destabilizes the financial sector

• Collapse of BWS (1970s) and Latin America

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Second Generation Crisis Models

Obstfeld (1986) va (1994) reasons:

• Psychological factors (multiple equilibria) EMS crisis

• Credibility of economic policy

Characteristics of the crisis

• Political trade-off between fixed exchange rate and a

expansionary monetary policy (growth and employment)

• Investors assume the priority of domestic employment

• Reversal of capital inflows triggers and interest rate

increase, which again endangers employment

• Exchange rate peg loses its credibility

Crisis

• The crisis is triggered by expections of the financial

markets (speculation against the Bank of England)

• The crisis is fundamentally unjustified

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Third Generation Crisis Models

Krugman (1998) Corsetti/Pesenti/Roubini (1999)

• Sound fundamentals

• But with incentives for speculative investment

• Weak financial system and banking sector

Characteristics of the crisis

• Excessive availability of foreign capital (capital inflow)

(overborrowing)

• Excessive credit growth (overlending)

• Due to implicit public guarantees, potential exchange

rate risk is ignored (moral hazard)

• Speculative bubbles in equity and real estate markets

emerge

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Third Generation Crisis Models

Crisis

• Withdrawal of international capital results in bursting

bubbles and the devaluation of the domestic currency

• The currency denomination of foreign credit and term

transformation worsen the crisis

• The Asia Financial Crisis 1997

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Moral Hazard and Overinvestment

Concept

• Moral hazard arise because an individual or institution

does not bear the full consequences of its actions,

• and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it

otherwise would,

• Leaving another party to bear some responsibility for the

consequences of those actions

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Moral Hazard and Overinvestment

Moral hazard and currency crisis

• A fixed exchange rate can suggest that there will be no

currency risk in the future, even if a higher interest level suggest a devaluation

• In case of crisis, the emerging markets‘ banking sector

are bailed out by IMF, which is anticipated

• Implicit guarantees and ignorance of currency risk

contributes to exessive international borrowing and

lending

• This leads to overinvestment

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Transmission Channels and Contagion

Usually a crisis does not remain limited to one country, there

are several transmission channels

Spillovers

• In economically integrated markets

• Imports of the crisis country decline (goods market

channel)

• Loans from other countries are defaulting (asset market

channel)

• Even in economically not integrated countries

• Whose fundamentals data suffer from weaknesses

• A reassessment of fundamentals take place (new risk

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Economic Policy Implication

Flexible instead of fixed exchange rates (Fisher 2001)

• Since currency crises often happened in countries with

exchange rate pegs (soft pegs), the IMF supports

floating exchange rates in emerging markets to deter

speculative capital inflows

• Emerging markets with fully flexible exchange rates have

to deal with strong appreciations and thereby lower real growth in face of strong capital inflows

• Officially, many East Asia countries moved towards

flexible exchange rates, unofficially there is still a strong tendency to stabilize exchange rates (fear of floating)

• Most countries returned to so-called soft pegs (managed

floats)

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2 International Debt Crisis

• Concept

• Characteristics of debt crisis

• Background and origins of the debt crisis

• The emergence of the debt crisis

• The management of the debt crisis

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