Tài liệu understanding human dynamics doc

This pilot setivity ‘would als provide the opportunity to develop and est intexdisciplinary nd interagency relationships well as mitinational conperatinn RECOMMEND AtION | CongpiNatio aN

Office ofthe Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquistion, Technology and Logistics

Washington, D.C 20313140

Thisrepurtis apmudiet ofthe Defense Skene Board (DSI,

The DSBs fale alsiory eonmites essed w provide independent fice to the Serer of Delense, Sateen, opinions

‘cones, and reommandainns in thisteportdo not newest

‘preset the offi postion ofthe Depistneat of Defense

The DSU Task Foren Understling Huan Dynamics compet

it infemaionsatheringin Huế 2008

Thisreportisuneasifial sd cle lor phhátrdenk,

Table of Contents

Chapter 2 The Importance of Huns Dynan in Future

Chapter 4 tncerigeney and Civil Sook Paticipation, 2 Chapter 5 Education, Tsining and Expense st

(Chapter 6 Seienee and Technology Programs and Investnents 50 Chapter 7 Human Dạnanics Data Biees, Tools, and Pooduets 5Š Chapter 8 Summary and Final Thoughts “ Appendix A Definitions of Culture 7 6 Appendix B Insights from Past Experiences with

“Hunan Dynamics in Military Operations, n

‘Appendix C, Formal Requirements and Perceived Ness 0

Appendix E Computational Modetng for Reasoning

dour the Social Behavior of Humans, 107

Executive Summary

Understanding human dynaniies i an essential aspect of planing for succes aeross the full spectrum of military and national security operations While the ae that “Warfare is political conflict by other

‘means’ is widely recognized, combatants who underestimate the impact

of the human element in miltary operations do s at ther tsk During the Socond Work War and the reconstruction that followed, 98 well 8 during the Cold War, understanding human dynamics was considered esti

4s concopiualiand in ths repo, th torn Shuman dynamics” comprise ine acfons ard inbractane of personal, interpersonal, land socialeortamial facie snd their etocte on behavora (2M Hung dyanics are intuenoes by feel seh as 3eehgRlcg /afgon,pelIet and oulvra, Cu lệ cafed hon

fs the gatieuar nome and babals had by avery human, that Impacts how malduas, groups are spoibtas poraive, bahave andintoact

Although, the U.S miliary belted inereaset is human dynanjes awareness within the curent Iraq and Afghanistan theaters, recent progress has been achieved because of its importance in strategk operational and tactical decision-making The U.S itary tas aso made recent progess in training and sensitizing deployed U.S forees 10 the importance of undercanding human dynamics in dealing sith individual, groups, and societies, There lave been numerous, though mostly uncoordinated, efforts within DoD to manage relevat datahases and provide asociated tools and ealturl advisors To a kegs extent, these efforts recapitulate “lesions leaed and since forgotten” from prior engagomentscapabilties that were permited to kpse and

‘were no longer organic to DoD

Substantial improvements by DoD ate needed in understanding human dynanies In particular, DoD must take a longer-term view and build upon increased capability achieve! in Iraq anc Afghanistan, It

‘st insiutionalize the best of current programs and processes so that

this capability is slo avilable across the full spectruny of military operations including increased emphasis on activides, refered (0 as Phase 0, tht eek to nitigate the ikelinood of armed conte,

To be effective in the long tem, DoD must devdop more coherence in #S effons to enhance human dynaries awareness, Most importantly, capability must be expanded beyond the focus Ÿ curent

‘armed coniiets so that the Department and military servis have the Aexibityto adjus rapidly to events in other places in the work Playing

“catch-up” wil not be a effecive option

The task force believes that opportunites with both near-term and lengterm payotls exis for substantial improvement in tne Following

+ coordination an! leadership

+ interagency and evilinteractions

education traning, and career development

human dynamics advisors

+ science and technology investments

+ dava tools and products

Specitc recommendtions, grouped by the topies listed above, are presented in the balance of this summary, and are detailed in the chapters that folew AIF of the recommendations presented in this por are important for coats the nation is likely to aoe in the next decade or Wo However, four of them should have the highest priority

in the near term, because they provide the foundations chat wl enable all the res These four priority resooumendations se:

Develop a comprehensive strategy

Establish effective oversight

Include speciticallyin upeoming Quadtennial Delense Review (QDR)

4, Increase the “cultural bench”

Coordination and Leadership

‘There isa growing body of DoD investments in knowledge rated

to human dynamis, ranging from data collection and analysis 0 field

support and taining For example each ofthe U.S armed series as

programs underay'to bu củ ta awareness for ability operations,

(0 acquire germane data, and to use communications to enhance

traningand constaion Honeversthisdisparate

set of programs shows sians of duplication as “Over the long term we

‘wel as common shortfalls Te taskforce found

Title evidence of coordination among these

programs or of a Tongrange plan for further {301s persuasion and development and management—either amoag inspiration wore the Services, within a combatant command, Or nghesanaabie fo the

by the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense outcome af the detining

way t0 victory Now miitary otfor's—inose eannat kill ar capture our

Igeotogical struggie of Ine

As no single repository, coordination entity, oth century they aro

‘or management function exists today, the task jyst as inaspe sae ein force ad great dficulty identifying all evant, the 2151 century — anc

‘on-going efforts in human dynamics The task perhaps even moie se force was ako unable to find either a guiding oeone sect Root Coe, strategy, oF individuals oF organizations thai 39299

‘oul identi all the associated effons currently underway or previously

‘conducted by the U.S mifkary, Future detailed asessments of man

‘dynamics initiatives ean build upon survey work currently ongoing in

multiple quarters within DoD However, human dynamics efforts today

appear uneven and duplicative, and lack evaluative measures or even 3

‘common vocabulary

‘There have been successes based on careful attention to cukural

influences on human dynamics: The sory of EI Salvador, summarized

in Chapter 3, isa recent example of “best practices” inthis aplication

“The need for understanding human dynamies will continue to be

important in the foreseeable future, asthe United States interacts with

numerous cultures to achieve naional security goals and objecives

Human dynamics capabilites are critically important for fucure military

missions and engagements and should be treated as such Moreover,

they are often mos valuable in shaping events before hostilities are

underway-—perhaps even preventing hostilities, The Department mus avoid oss of focus and of important eapabiles in this stea when current engagements in Ig and Afghanisan sibsde Asundersnding

‘human dynamics will contiue oe of utmost importance, i should be speitclly eluded in Ue upcoming QDR

(One opportunity to lear and develop human dynamics eapabilities,

‘unencumbered by the demands of major conflict, would be establish

2 pilot sctvity wain a regional combatant command A pilot activity

‘would offer the opportunity to develop taxes, techniques, and procedures for possible theater engagement, 28 well ts preparation for disister maigation and potential abilty operations This pilot setivity

‘would als provide the opportunity to develop and est intexdisciplinary

nd interagency relationships well as mitinational conperatinn RECOMMEND AtION | CongpiNatio aNp LEADERSILY

«Curren 3)

The Secretary of

snse should + Instruct his sta to develop a comprehensive strategy that builds upon programs now underway in the Army and Meine

‘Comps to assre human dynamics awareness for future stability

‘operations This strategy should als include directives on fucation and traning human dynamies advisors, and knowlege management, as outined below,

Review and determine the best course of agin to establish clfective oversight and coordination of human dynamic activites

+ Ensure that the implications for feree structure and DoD appropriations ofall the recontmendatons of this repom are

‘considered in the upcoming QDR

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should direct a regional combatant commander to develop taeties ceeknigues, and procedures for employing eohanced knowledae of human dnamies ia anticipation of sabiley operations with U.S forces in non-omibatant

roles, cooperating closely with other combatant commands, US, agencies snd non-government organizations (NGOs), as wel as allies tnd host nations

Interagency and Civil Organization Interactions

"Future mitayy challangos cannot be overcame by miliary means alone, and they extn wall beyond the trastonal domain of any

‘ingle goverment apency oF dgparmont Thay reqdi9 oụf {overrment to enoraio wth ny, aghay, nd costa, and wl

‘equire dowing considerably more resources to non-military ingrunents ot natonal power

Secretary of Dolense Fobor M Gates January 28,2008

‘A number of organizations beyond DoD that have expertise and experience in human dynamies of rdevance to fonejgn cultures can and should contibute 10 sagcess These include non-government ongunizations, commercial industry, academia, and) many government

The Under Seereury of Defense for Policy should:

+ Expand Unitied Quest 09 exercises to include vo addtional leams private elor and non-government hamankaian

‘opanizations

* Review commercial approaches 10 human dynamies information collection and analyses to ase relevance 10 the US, government

+ Fund and launch the Center for Global Engagement, recommended in a prior DSB study, to provide a centralized U.S government interagency center for human dynamics

‘oowlede and surge capzcity!

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R) shovlé increase teamwork triHững for mikary members expected f0 work with nongovernment orgiization (NGO) and private sector partners, emphasizing coordination and cooperation skils associated with those partnerships

Education and Training

There has been high payoth for some of the simples, common sense internctions with indigesous populations Mutual respect and courtesies do not take alot of foreig-cuhura raining

“The examples of Army and Marine training eforts that sought to inculete awareness of Ira and Afghan culture in units preparing for deployment to Operations Ira Freedom and Enduring Freedom are laudable The ux of such knowledge by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment Gné ACR) in northern rag, the Marine Corps intligenee tivity, and the ArnyJIEDDO (Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization) program at FL win all proved to be valuable ia the judgment of combs unit conmmanders in hearer

‘The Services are continuing to expand the hursan dynamics content

of education and training euricula a their comers of excellence and scademies, in their professional mary educstion courses, ann basic training They should be supported in doing mow Cultural insensivity ' militarily dysfunctional especially when coupled with indiscriminate violence directed a noncombatants Muay taining should persistently stress disceton in the use of force, This must be done with a clear recognition ofthe tensions between this discretion and effetiveness of combat power

Ae ft Dae Ser Bal Tak Fon Sin Communit, ewer 208,

Ewablishing a separate DoD social science institute would probably

ot contribute much to fostering cultural awareness in the armed services However, a interagency lnning center for preparing teams of {government and NGO representatives for ability operations, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teas, would contribute mach to preparation for fuure engagements Such a center would provide bor

‘xeio-cultual know ledge and human dynamics asuteness It would also fosver interagency parigpation and enable the Army to raum a prime unit (le 18 Brigice Combat Team (1st BCT), 1s Infantry Division (1 ID) co combat operations

RECOMVEND ATION 3, EDUCATION & TRAINING (CHAPTER 3) The Secretary of Defense should instruct his staff to undertake the fllowing

# Initiate imer-departmenul action 10 establish, with

‘congressional support, an Institute for Public Administration Training wah a faculy of military experts, skied engineers, public Safety advisors medics, soeial scientists, and NGO Fepresenatives, asked (1) 0 ast the Services and civil participants witl readiness Tor catastrophe relief and stability

‘operations, and (2) to form and tran mui diSipiary teams for augmentation of any U.S, cottry tem,

+ Invite participation of interagency and NGO representatives in mission readiness exercises, at leas by telephone eonsukaion during planning and in after-aeton review

Diet the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to bring to bear 8 comprehensive set of collaborative services that facie expen discovery, erost-domin security, and

‘commanityereaon to advance the human dynanies capabies

‘and cultural avareness efforts of the armed services and of the Insitute for Pubic Adinistrtion Training

*Suppost the Services in modifying the standant eurrieulum at USS miltary academies as wel as ervice-specifc euriula, to incorporate basic taining in human dynarsies,

Human Dynamies Advisors

DoD personnel that provide scio-culturd expettie, such as Foreign Area Olficers(PAOs), are curtently spread too thin 10 assure slequate consieration of these maters in planning and exeemion However, to offbet this defiet, hoth the Army and the Air Force reported that exch maintsined an extensive network of exper cual consultants The combatant commands also have their own “rolodex files”

Somme of the dificulies encountered with resect Lo using adions Inches outdated and instlicient teining of military personnel and key avisors in the area of human dynamics, particularly with respect to cultural studies dynamic neswork analysis and human dynamic models snd simulations ack of altretive eaneer paths For military personne! in the human dynamics ares: and lack of procedures, funding lines, and

‘uomated expert finder lacor for effectively engaging and leveraging expertise in industry and academia

Aealenin, NGOs, ane! commercial operations have considerable experts’ in human dynamics and are strongly motivated to continuously improve their expertise, as they sek 1 help and or sel 10 all fiend and foe alike The Department does not currently optimize use of these capabilties which could augment miliary’ capabilities during operations and offer greater depth of human dynansis understanding Recognizing the importance of such cross-dissplinary imeractions, Secretary Gates i atively working to reussae those who

‘may he reluctant 6 eolaborate With the Department of Defense and 10 build partnerships between DoD and other U.S gpvemment dleparimenss and agencies in order to buid a *whole-of government” solution to challenging nltiiciphinary issues

RECOMMEND ATION 4, HUMAN DyN anaes Anwsons (CHAPTER 3) The Chairman, Joint Chieis of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with advice from the combatant commarids, should direct inereases in the “cultural bench” by factors of thee to five:

‘© Expand curriculum in this area for professional military education

Improve career paths for human dynamics advisors

+ Provide elevint advanced degree education,

Develop innovative processes for reeruiting and rewarding human dysaie expertise,

Increase the nurber of Foreign Avea Oficers and assign them mare effectively,

‘Establish mediom-and long-term requirements for exch

‘combatant command,

USD (PAR) should work with the Services and combatant commands {0 combine and augment the separate pools of available consultants, expert in particular cultures The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration {ASD (NH1) should failitate their connoctvity and collaboration, booth among themselves and with users

Science and Technology Investments

DoD investments in human dynamics knowledge and expabiliy were difficult for the tsk foree to quantify beeause major forts are funded by distributed sources other than research, development, test, and evaluaion (RDTRE) accounts, such aS operations and

‘maintenance, Curent science and technology (S&T) investments appear to be focused principally in four area: (1) language, (2) human and cultural studies, (3) dynanie network analysis and social networks, and (4) human dynamnies computational modeling and simulation,

The technologies and scientific infrastructure for language and seclal networks analysis have she highest degee of theoretical development within DoD, These have povided tools and models at high levels of tecnica readiness—although, im many eases, they have not been feld-tested alequatly On the othe hand, the areas of human snd cultural studies, 25 well as modeling and simulation are fess well developed wahin DoD The task force wsed gap analysis to identify

critica investment areas and recommends such analysis as an important tool 1o id in the development of a roadonap and investment strategy forthe future

‘The task fore’ preiminry anabss ident Key gaps inhuman

<ynamies knowlege that inde:

multi-domain, mutspeaker spoken conversation, tanseription, and translation

+ teeBnologie for extracting knowledge from databases (oF both stricture and unstratused sources) ina way that ca be used

to inform and valiete dynamic network models

automated asessnent of the human tain with emphasis on ltaudes, intlence networks and the effets of sttegie

gaming For visual tnining and mission rehearsal

‘automated sentiment, intemion, decepsion detetion

+ gso-spatal dynamic network analysis andthe combination of reuro-cogntive models an dynamic network analy inthe rea of influence, tides, and bebe

+ open architecture state-of thea platforms for data model, and tool integration

RECOMMENDATION 5.SHENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Invesmaests (CHAPTER 6)

The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) should establish a “portfolio manager” in human dynamies covering areas such as language; socio-cultural, dynamic network analysis; and human dynamies computational modeling and simulation to wack tools, models, data, and experts The resonsibilities of the portfolio manager should include the following:

# Define and develop a road map based on a refined exp vals, coocdinated with users~combatant eommands snd serviees, This roadmap should include a credible ST budget and progam

+ DDR&E should perform an in-depth review of ongoing S&T programs in this area (reguuless of their budget suthories) and ases their potential bssed on data

+ Define and implement s more robust research effort to

‘explore the potential of relevant S&T efforts in eross-cuting hhuman dynamies researc linking dynamic network alysis Findings and madels with direc miliary relevance,

Databases, Tools, and Products

A large number of human dynamics databases exis, but they are independent of each other and have been created for specific elements

of the DoD community: Furthermore, no common formats, toda

or ontology have been established The majority ofthese databases are

ot mintained, fuly populated or interoperable Access is generally limited, and iteration wich these datahases i usvallytalored to the particular users, making them of limited wilityto others

Base social network ands tools within DoD are mature and do not need t0 be reinvented However, insffcient daa analytic tools and modeling sipport are available DoD on social srueture, culture, attzudes, opinion trends beliefs, and behaviors fo enable both tactical and seatepic analyses, Furthermore, the exising human dynamics databases and tools lack irkeropersbilly and employ no standards of metrics For model validation,

Some data, such as those related to trends atitudes, and belies are sithicut to extrad from open source documents, ate proprietary and held by cosporations that conduct polls, or do not evs n regions or at levels of granularity necessary for operations Data needed for models tnd simulation are aot eoutnely collated to enable baselne or tren analysis, of when collected are not shared even among the different Service, let alone with the imtligence community or non-government

2A-Spce apt ofthe OF

The Distributes! Common Ground Station should host she eukural databases for all DoD, a8 well as for partners in the Department of Slate and US AID, bul standards and means will haveto be developed

to govern data entry, sere, and retrieval, a6 well as diseminaton DISA's Defense Connect Ox-Line (DCO) ean provide tools to support both tring for and conduct of military operations caried out among populations DCO could also support paricipation in taining and

‘operations through web conferencing for non-DoD officials and NGO representatives Recent dors such as the Director of National Integence’s"A-Space,” provide a potential design model?

RecONDIENDATION 6, DatABases, Toots, AND PRODUCTS: {CHAPrk 71

The Secretary of Defense should direct his staff to ensure Interoperable databases Actions should include

Review current and historic human dynamics da colection and database efforts for the exters to which they meet mitary need a the tated, operational, and sratepe lev

Design a suitable, distributed enterprise architecture, do allow user-friendly and rapid acess 10 all databases, including the ability 10 share data among various databases in response £0 ser queries, as appropriate

Enforce these standards and promote boy:in from the

‘community sskeholdes inside and outside of Dab

ASD (NID) should consolidate the databases germane to foreign culture and other human-dynamics-rekvant areas into the Distributed Common Ground Staion with appropiate provisions for colleaion, storage, rariva, and disemination a vest kels of security

The Under Secretary of Defense for Polley and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should increase efforts to sollset human dynamics data and prepare these products 50 that information can be mae available to multiple users Actively engige departments and agencies government-wide as well as commercial and NGO resourees and capabilites in the collection and use of data and preparation of products

USD (PAR) should ensure that there is a sulicient endre of individuals with human dynamies astuteness ta interpret the data and products,

Combatant commanders should direct populadon of these databases with regional information, generating requirements foe

‘data collection and for product preparation and evaluation They should provide guidance, support, and resources (eg expertise and data collsction technology) to forces deployed in their ares tor documentation of short-term bistory

Collectively, these recommendations will set the Depavtment on @ path toward enhancing the human dynamics capabilities within the rlitary services, thereby betier preparing cur men and women in uniform for the operational environment of the future where knowledge and understanding of others will be @ ertical aspect of national security

Chapter | Introduction

Aong defense professionals the “War on terorisn”” and American interventions in ry and Afphaniston have returned (6 prominence issues of “human dynamics” “culture.” and “the human erin.” The United Sates faces actual and potential challenges from sedversaries wito difer trom us in significant ways in the human and secial dimension Moreover, in an era in which insurgency” and

“irregular warfare” have once again come to the fore, the US millary realizes that i must aso understand the Inman environment and dynamics inthe entice engageinentspace—including civilians, neutrals, alles and even our own forees Ic is becoming increasingly clear that the requirement for sich underscanding obtaies ot merely duting hostilities bus also during peacetime in onder 1 reduce the likelibood

of armed conflict and during the teanstion to and from hostles,

What is Human Dynamics?

In ths report, human dyeamics is dafnod as the acdons and inieracions of personal, intepersons,, and weia/tortexua faciors andihoietsetson berawora ouicamos Human aynamies aio intuoneed by Retorsaioh ag economies, igen, pales and elie

Understanding “horsan dynamies” entails several things At the

‘most technical level it encompasses the actual or potential application

of phology, sociology, and anthropology, and potentially cogntive Sciences, neuroavience, computer science, and other such ids It aso requies knowledge of “culture”

ssa from the betes rxe ie sn bogs ols ved bythe od ree

4868

Culture is defined hoven as thế eleSon of panicular noms, alos ard customs held by evory human, that Irpacts how inaivduals, groups, and soletosbohave and interac

Every interaction besween an American and another person in the engayement space has cultural overtones Given the compression of the tactic, operational, and strategic level of war—a_ phenomenon encapsulated in the term “the strtegc eorporal”—"eulture™ must be something that everyone in the Defense Department "gots" Soldiers, sailors airmen, and marines who ate oblivious 10 the influence of culture on human dynamies will not undersiand what they are seeing

‘nd will ether miss important signals relevant to conduet of operations

‘or lod their leadership wit irlevant or ersneous information More dlangerousy, actions taken jn ignorance of miscalculation ean rest in mission failure and perhaps lossof lif

Scope ofthe Study

These considerations led the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Acquistion, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)

to direct the formation of this Defense Science Board Task Force on

‘Understanding Human Dyzanies The terms of reference call on this task Fore 02"

+ review efforts to ass cial scuetures, cultures, and behaviors

‘of populations and adversaries

= idestty and assess relevant science and technology investment plansand identify promising new opportunites

© recommend seps 10 accelerate the miliary’ use of relevant knowledge and technologies in omer 40 achieve operational capebillee

Understanding human dynamics is relevant at all levels of national security from the tactical 10 the strategic Nevertheless, ths task foree did not attempt to conduct a defiitve review of the place of human dynamics nthe defense community in alts breadth an depth Rather,

Ít cho to address primarily the consideration of this issue at the Luctial and operational levels It dl not merely to make the ask feasible within the sime alletted, but also because it judged that the challenge of bringing human dyamies understanding tothe taetcal and

‘operational levels was greater than the correqbording callene at the strsiegic level Furthermore, the task force judged that the conclusions reached through this assessment of the tactical and operational eves

‘would largely be dectlyapplicable atthe sraegic level as wel

This task force bounded its work in two other importam ways, First, it did not review any inclligence programs pertaining to hursan dynamics Indeed, most of the programs examined were unease, cond, the task Force excluded from consideration isstes pertaining purely to “Sttegic communication.” because several recent DSB, studies ave dealt in detail with that topic! Nevertheless stategi communication is clearly an endeavor that is profoundly affected by knowledge (or ignorance) of human dynamics and culture For insane, the US matory must also understand tht its ations communicate #8

‘values (sometimes aecurately,somesimes not) tall communities within hie they are deployed This is true scross the fall spectrum of nilitary operations, from before, during ad after use a lethal free 10 the lisibution of humanitarian aid doring disaster mitigation,

Lessons of H

tory Even a cursory review of past wars snd eonficts shows that all rilitary operations have a eriical human dimension, What is perhaps less obvious, is how broadly inluental—and often varant—are the hhussan dynamics that shape the dispostion of the population and character of conflict Past experiences ive shown thit knowing a

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shown that knowing an

enemy may be important

enemy may be important but knowing the populstion and the broader atte space” context may be equillys,

‘The US military has invested in human dynamics understanding when previously fighting imegular or unconventional adversaies—duting the Butesowing the population Philippine War (once called the Philippine Insurec- and the broaces ‘battle tion) and the Vitnam War, for instance On both Space’ context maybe occasions, the military came to the cultural game late equally 20 and then, when the conflict was over, tured its

back on the subject as part of a conscious effort to put behind an unpleasant experience As former Vice Chief of Saff of the Army, General lack Keane lamented inthe context of Iraq “after the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that had to do with iregular warfare oF insurgency, because # had to do with how we Jost that wan"*

‘The USS entry iato Afghanistan and its ealy victories ever the

‘Taliban were accomplished largely by US Specil Forces working with indigenous tribal forces whose motives and leadership were under- stood, Our military belatedly adapted to the human dynamics needs of the sarin Iraq and the more rooent situation in Afghanistan, But

‘whatever the outcome of these present cont, this knowledge, both

‘of substance and with respect €0 the importance of human dynamics,

‘must not be alowed to slip avay once again The U.S miltary must embrace the fad that human dynamics and war are now and forever inextribly intenwined”

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‘The above messige may appear disheartening o some, but it should

not An understanding of human dynamics does not merely help

prevent the U.S miliary from losing I ca, in fat, help the military

win is Future wars more surely and decisively, particularly asymmetric

‘encounters such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns

may even prevent the United Sates from

having to fight inthe firs pace aoe " human dynamics, must the importance of Understanding tuman dynamics canal note allowed'to stip allow the US itary to work more smoothly Hav 0728 again The

‘with its partners and to mitigate conflicts more U-S military must

effectively Knowle ofthe value sem of an MB"a°8 IN Tac! that actual o potent eompettor helps m daering "Wan eyhamice ane war undesrable behaviors and compeling deinBE ) sauapiyimeasad behaviors Preliminary expeenee with human

tenin apptoaches sger4 that during hostites a commander who

understands the human tern in which his uni is operating wil find

tha unit aubject to less ction, under les force protection the

receiving more inteligence tips ftom the population, and probably

infin lescolatera damage

11 is important that members ofthe American military understand

their own culture andthe ways in which influences harman dynamics

By its very nature, an individua’s culture is largely unconscious

stemming from a collection of beliefs and behaviors the individual

‘often takes for granted without constant reasessment However,

understanding what defines one’s ovwn culture can help one to

understand foreign cultures and vice versa, For example, a member of

the U.S, military may assume that others share his or her belies about

equality” or “democracy.” that a lack of punctuality is a sign of

dieeeget or lơiness and that his or her gpod intentions as an

‘American soldier, sailor, airman, oF marine, are selEevider Often these

Hanson, The Wem Wa of Warne Cas! GrnerNew York, Alf A, Ko

1980) and Cama Doubly 2001: Kenth Posh Ara Wat Mitay Eerie 48191 asks and Crt Lond Bar eR Wan Poy, Non Yor

Unive of Nebraska Pras 22); anon Ly Bate 4 Hiro Ca a hl,

(Booker West Pres 2008,

fate good assumptions AL other times, they are dangerously inappropriate

‘An understanding of human ynamies is important to op- erators and analysts during peacetime as well as wartime For example, culturlly-rocted Alisputes can lead tothe outbresk

of hostilities, which may require the commitment of American forces where none were present before, By the same token, if

‘American forces are present ina foreign country during peace-

‘ime, cutualy insensitive ations

‘words by even one individual can engender hostility and violence

Write it may be pesump-

‘An understanding of human dynamicsis important yous to conclude that there are

10 eperatorsand analysts during peacetime aswell Sorinive and invariant “evens”

been Teamed from past experiences, there are certainly insights that are

‘worth consideration

Awareness of human dynamics facilitates strtegic and taaical

© Teisnecessary to understand and accept that military operations have political objectives and effects

Populations matter as much as fighting forces in determining ilitary success

Continuity of knowledge on human dynamics is esentil, ss personnel change and units rotate, particularly in joint! coalition and protracted operations

‘© Human dynamics: may vary across and within eonflias or

‘operations,

[As Major General (Retired) Robert HH Scales fas so eloquently observed based on past experiences, “Wass are won as much by creating alliances leveraging nonmiltary advantages, reading intentions, building us convening opinions, and managing pereeptions—all these sks demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”

10, Sk, Robt HD Ca Cet Wa” Pris

Chapter 2 The Importance of Human

Dynamics in Future U.S Military

Operations

‘The complexity of the nationd security environment in the early 20° cxntury requires the U.S miliary to anteipate and be fuly prepared

to respond 10 a wide range of contingencies Whether called upon 10

‘conduct limited intewention, iregular warfare, major combat

‘operations, sabity operations, peacetime engagement, humanitarian missions or civil support, each contingency presents the U.S military with significant akltional challenges associated with is proximity to populations A deep understanding of human dynamics will be needed

fo avert armed conflict wherever possible and to effectively and efficiently respond to emerging security conditions

Characteristics of Future Operations

domonstiated botore,

capstone Cones frst ‘portions Jon 2009

increase, the operating space wil be coset to centers of Population, and the need! for information will expand

‘exponentially: Each of these characterises will require

‘extended awareness of the human dimension

‘The national curity environment will he multi- dimensional with strong roots in human dynamics, The operational environment will include the sir, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains, and will be affected by nonmilitary operational variables influenced by local populations Joint planners consider” this environment in terms of six variables, all of which encompass human dynamics to some degree: politcal, nilltay, economic, socal

‘information, and infrasinuctue,

Full spectrum operations will add to the complexity and

variability of U.S military operations The complexity of full

spectrum operations, as well as deterrence and humanitarian missions

wil be driven in part by an operational environment that,

simultaneously includes elements of conventional war, guerilla warfare,

and terrorism To deter and defeat such challenges the U.S military

‘must have the expeditionary capability to deploy forces any time, any

eogaphy, and for any type of contingency, and to simultaneously

combine offense, defense, and stability operations, often in extended

proximity to populations Coordination and collaboration between US,

departments and agencies, mukinaional parners, and cid authorities

will be eiealto sugcess

nilitry, and economic

spheres continue evolve

at an increasing rate of

speed Increased respon

siveness from US mitary

capabilities will be re-

quired in onder to retain

initiative and to eaptaize

‘on emerging opportunities

Mainaining an avareness

of information, misnfor

‘mation, and communication flows will bean ongoing challenge, adding

to the complexity of US milary operations Non-state actors are

becoming increasingly sophisticated through the use of distibuted

leadership (and sometimes even leaderiess.omganizations) over

networked communications This networked environment will present

a long tem organizational challenge toU.S interets

Military operations wall more frequently occur among populations

Non-kinetic military operations based on engagement will

increase in importance A new concept of srategic deterrence is

emerging in tecms of the theory and practice appropriate to a ange of anticipated state and nontraditional threats Future confi should not

be expected to be resolved by miltary forees alone, but wil require the vordination of diplomtic informational, mittary, and economic efforts tha are conruette and non-laal t will involve inportant slemems of long-term risk mitigation, such as capacity building, humanitarian assistance, expansion of regional frameworks to improve governance, cooperation to enforce the rule of low, and training and suppor ta indigenous forces

Militry operations will more frequently be conducted among populations The range of anticipated contingencies and adversaries will increasingly raguire deployment of US tary forces among populations, rather than isolated across defined etary miliary fines Transitions between lethal snd non-lethal scons will be expected of | small teams operating within these populations The sbility of all US echelons (© distinguish between—and appropristely engage with— edversres, competitors, neutrals, and fviends will requite varying degsees of cross-cultural avareness, competence, and astuteness,

Unitied action wil link joint, interagency, intergovernmental, anẻ muhinaienal capabilities in -new ways The scope and complexity of sisbilty operations, reconstruction, snd_ humanitarian efforts will require the U.S miary 10 operate in partnership with other organizations, both governmental and non-government, Joint U.S rilitary forces wil need to work with aller US government depaiBenS and agencies, ales, non-governmental organizations, contractors, and civilians Achieving eooperation and unity of effort between and among such diverse organizations will be a huss dynam challenge for individuals throughout dll eco

Civil-military cooperation will inerease in importance The civil situation, including civil seeurty and eWvil control, resoration of sential services, support to governance, and support to eoaomie and infrastructure development, will he considered along with offensive snd defense operations In a stesed, falling, or disaster stricken tae, the U.S miliary may need to work with evan agencies of that state to establish hasic capabilites and provide support to the local popeltion,

Information engagement requirements will significantly expand, In an efa where populations are linked by instant

‘commutications, information will aso shape the operational

‘environment Information engagement can communicate critical knowledge, build trus, promote support for US operations, and

influence the perceptions and behaviors of many audiences It places & high premium on understanding the local political, social and economic

situation within an area of operation, It also requires acces to detailed information and trends regarding relevant audiences and their respective cultures, interests and objectives A sophisticated understanding of traditional media (print, radio, and video broadcasting), social media (eg wiki, blogs), collaborative media, aswell

35 influence networks will be necesary for audience understanding,

tracking, and influence Ongoing data collection will be needed to

‘denify emerging isues and opportunities that wil erve as esential underpinnings of U.S government strtegc communication and public cdplomaeyeflorts

Human Dynamics Requirements

Human dynamies astuteness combines cultural, historical and linguistic understanding, with the abilty to work across organizational

lines, both inside and outside the U.S government It recognizes that

the skills of partnership development essential to joi, interagency inergovernmental, and rnulinaional operations will hcome as ecal

to mission accomplishment as those of

‘command and control leadership Military jondera planners, and operators For optimal effectiveness U.S military il need greater human

‘operators wil aso require extended awareness

‘of diplomatic, information, military, economic,

and other elements that underpin the intent, °°2{20000) 200

will and abiliy of both the United Sates and igtionship, ana

Gynamics aptitudes tobe

potential adversaries tò condua military Strategie partnership are

‘operations A deeper understanding of the asimposiant as being atttudes and actions of civilian populations at strong,

home and abroad will also be important

Building and strengthening relationships wit alles, improving ties to

‘emerging partners, and better understanding of petential competitors

| ann, bit Chie of Sal Mu

will be important 8s well As the Chairman, Joint Chiels of Saf has Slated, “Engigement, relationship and strategie partnership are as important as being song"

Findings Relevant 10 Human Dynamies Capabilities

In preparation fr the likely range of foture US mileary operations the folowing cabiles should he enhanced so that Dos kaderstip,

85 well as deployed forces, will possess the nocessary aptitudes, experience, and support (o achieve sucess

A saiaed Toms Joint Publication 1-02), does not chameterize human dynamics in a useful content

‘+ Human dynamics knowledge should be an jategral par of the planning recess and incorporated in developing a portfolio of contingency plans in advance of the nee for such plans

+ Cross-cultural awareness and asmuteness of commanders,

ss well as soldiers, sloes, airmen, and marines can be schieved through chasges in education, raining, foreipa language aquisition, and career development

Os Pstagn Town Ha tng

+ A cadre of on-call human dynamics and civil affsirs experts could provide supplemental knowledge and capacity for contingency planning as well ss for stteaic operational and ‘ectical phases of mission management, These experts would bring in-depth funedonal knowledge, slong with den

‘experience in the aret of concer,

© Non-US military organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations should be Jneluded in the process of collecting and analyzing information fon human dynanies.Inportantly these andtic asets do not have (o be assigned to an inteligence organization,

+ The emphasis should be on human dynamics “products”

in addition to centralized databases and supposed systems Products, as recommended by Colonel H.R McMaster in Ira

‘an be envisioned a thee ves

+ "World view" documents (eg, country handbooks) provide a basc overview of a country, segion, or cure With resect to human dynamics, these documents should include perspectives of factions (bes, cans vilages), fears, sspraions, prejudices, andl bel of foal populations

Micto-history of the region to inchade deep and nano Updated information concerning rivalries, smuggling routes, nature of external support, and other relevant information Language profcieney and eulturl, political, and economic

‘expertise is require to prepare these products

Short-tcrm operational assessments prepared by units depaning an area 10 sid the incoming units in asesing the sea and for continuity of operations A standard format and

‘content outline should be developed tha includes details of suceesses and expecially of fares in dealing with the populace

+ Education and training are critical to the delivery of useful information on human dynamics:

Language proficiency and cultural awareness are needed 88 Part of the professional miliary eduction process with 2

phased spproach recognizing a service member's rank and

‘operations, a5 the eiialty of the information envizooment is recognized by both adversaries and lis

+ Advances in social, cognitive, and neurological science may offer insights inco human behavier, which academia, the pave sector, the US government, and as allies and

“alVetsties canal be anticipated to explore

+ Enhanced human dynamics atuteness that integrates region specific knowledge with the ability to coordinate snd cooperate sero onganizational lies wil become key to suovessul future

"` tha are joint, imerageney, intergovern-

‘meatal, or mulinational and may als include pubkef prwvate partnerships with evil soc,

The tendining chapters of tis report address these findings and offer recommenciations tha, collectively, wil se the Department on 3 path toward enhancing the human dynanies egpabilies within the nilitary services, thereby better preparing our men and women uniform for the operational environment ofthe future

Chapter 3 Coordination and Leadership

Aer five years in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U-S miltary services

understand the lessons learned by their predecessors engaged in similar

‘operations During operations the host population has to he regarded as

an invalable source of information on adversaries, The community

reds to be treated in a manner that avoids over hostility and ebtains

‘cooperation Force needs to be used with the greatest of discipline

Such an approach serves the traditional American

‘objective beyond armed confi: 10 convert our A determined enemy

‘most bitter enemies int friends and ales seaibedd edn 9 faraign Population, eannot be

In February 2008, General Casey, Chief of Staff eee Tế soi

ofthe Amy, presented to his genera revison of £1017 with aavance Fell Manual 30, Opts, te foreword of which lon G8191 2 states "This etion oF FM, thei update since

September 11 200, i arevolationary depare fom past doctrine I

decries an operational concept where commanders employ offensive,

dense, and sabi or evil support operations simultaeoily ae

piv ofan imerleendent oi force tose, rein, and elo the

fiitive, accepting prot rk Yo erate opotunide to seve

decisive esl

“Doctrine” is best understood as an operative term: what we

collectively believe about the best way to conduet miliary affairs ts

petsistently taught in traning to asure the consensus, whic in combat

facilites cooperation among components of a force For example, US

doctrine has consistently fostered recognition that king prisoners of

war is dysfunctional It isnot only contrary to the Uniform Code and

international norms, but also incites an adversr to do likewise and

negates useful souree of intelligence The previous edition of FM 3-0,

dated June 2001—writen in an era of preoccupation with

“overwhelming force” and “shock and awe"—emphasized daninaton,

‘characterizing land combat as “contact wah the enemy throughout the

12 pase mgt

depth of an operations are raneuver fies, and other elements of combat power intended to defeat ar destroy enemy forces” Idd note, however, that “nd combat normally entails close and continuous contat With noncombatants Res of engagement reflet this”

Use of the word “eontact”to equate to “detest oF destroy” on the fone hand, and to “rules that temper actions toward people of the locale.” on the other hand, failed 10 address the circumstances of current and likely future operations To defeat or destoy an adversary Fhe must first be found, and rules for engagement once we find him (or

he finds us) searely adress the importance of the role the populace could play in the “Finding.” In contrast, the eutrent FM 30 enjoins commanders tg beyond defining “rules of engagement” 10 Imegrating their objectives for the populace imo vei plans snd

‘operations for achieving and sustaining sabity (se iebar, Army Fit Mamal 340,

US land forees have not abvays done wel in such complicated samstances,partculay when the national mood was vengeful as it has been since September 11, 2008 during the global war om tesrorism, Many mary ens have warned against expecting that technology lone will enable elt, specialized units to conttol populations and Kage

‘expanses of land They re right, and the Gulf wars must be regarded

‘san aberration in thatthe population didnot play ax important role in

‘Ameriean operations that were designed to destroy Une Iraqi Ary

ig9<fr mAID354 °On War Leno tobe Lea” Syria S01, tủ 10 sẻ

‘oe! abt mia kssons damn fom histone soy “ha hat and wars

Amy FEilienal30 Etegps

1-11, essen fe oeratond entnmertol fe ufevilsiTbemn venainwrich beaded hemmed est nasties beween maga vila be a enainwhich opeatona gna ae ais or lostrot ony ty th useol net lehalle ul abo, hay quasi of

‘tab ean be enalehed admins Te opeatonlaneanentnl

‘aman a dy figtenng, yscaly and emetnaly racrg one inet eat aredestuton sul fon enitornenalcorsionsceaing

" and angedí 8:arceöaeapos sjsEns 2o ender of aes io

‘pera among ie popula eck ncaa ard noscrban il bemuch ied, laavesaves saw a tnt, epee of

lecalaal ar mit capably, canbe expcid tue te tlrarg of

‘pons ining polfEdl carom, afomakana and ity mess ater cposa adore warsond aw ionment il nud oars hstrcaly inmure mba, relucrg Peconinenal Unied Shles an heii ofmulatonal pron, esptiy in aes n lat fe oporatoralemienren il pba nce aes otra by F 5 8l 080w silbeogtùeleZ gang epee and axcanes vifbe mesures on paaltrs

1-12, The epeatoalenvirmentlloe extemal wit conta cragingcoaitor,slares,patesres, anders leragery a pl operates wilbe required dealwih fe wide invents ange paves cecuing he enicorment einai nes ogarzatoe seg nee lformaton and conmuntators ecole, il mo lrgernavem cbpend cnsiaes oan acces lnhe aecofeptaore ard ety iene TT sera ecomassareplatoms tam which'n mais hescone Ser wll

be ofeut mariain, making operations secury marevinl tan aes

ni, cngE cua dncgigl, atldystalan rorngtl øebs ville presen acting w th fog ofa Such fos ede umantsan

Ge, ere and relgeus deere, ardcancl ar urban loan whch

en beconemgor cats olgrviy end haven frpotenal eat The

‘peratonl eniementwilbeinlecomeied ge, andextanely vols

In recent history, tabilty and reconstruction efforts all 109 often have been undercut by instances of cultural jgnorance anc military

‘oppression: undisciplined violence and even barbarism suchas occured

al My Lai in 1968, In 2008, forty years after My Lai, Seertary Gates commented ruefully on more recent dysfunctional behavior of some American troops: “In Iraq and Afghanistan, the heroic efforts and best inentions of our men and women in uniform have at vimes been undercut by a lack of knowledge of the eulture and people they are dealing with every day—societies organized by networks of kin and tribe, where ancient codes of shame and honor often mean a gpod deal

‘more than ‘hearts and minds’ ”

Art, 68 “Modern ware Cultural insensitivity among US forees are not internecine

js neither peculiar to the present conflc, wars, in which the ror hast always been caused by unexpected killing of the enemy is encounters with foreign cutures In 1863, the object

President Lincoln ordered promulgation of fein Abram Lina 1963 General Order Number 100 t0 temper the

propensity of some of his commanders to toler the very sort of disorders that Secretary Gas deplored.”

(On the other hand, American forces have shown that, properly led, sctng in concert with other agencies of the United States and amply resourced, they can sucessfully conduct low-intensity conflia (sabity

‘operation Secretary Gates himself, in a previous office as Deputy Director of Central Itetigence, participated in one such succes, cited approvingly in 1988 by the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy:

“Low intenstyconfi fs] form of conf that is nt a problem just for the Department of Defense In many situations, the

17 Dire Dasa Rap of se Commis 0 a

United Sizes wi need not jut BaD pasonnel and material but Jiplonats al infornition specials sgialluni chemids bankas and economists hykoiogits.crininologsts, Imeteorlogits, and scows of other profesionds Because « many’ Americans ate prefisposed to pessimism abeut our role in| the Thi Word, tis wor pomting to one recent exple of a

US imervention tha, aginst high ockis dị very wel the saving

‘of demeeraeyin EISivador fn 198 it seemed quite posse that the country woult ai to gueifa supported ftom Nicaragua by the Sandinigas and Cubans Many Americns assumes! tat the [Sahadoran] sneriment would soon he toppled by the Communist insurgants Congress severely listed the scatity sistance our government coukl make vad 10 i And yt by

1985 there was a democratic povarament pce in Ei Salvator,

nd Congress became cemited 1 suppesting 4."

By agreement ith the Congress, American military forces om the sound in E! Salvador, other than inviduals assigned (o the Embassy, were limed to 55, These were foreclosed from direct participation in combat, and confined (0 training the Salvadoran armed fores to: (1) limit the abilty ofthe gurillasto move freely hough the countryside

In their depredations, and 2) observe, when interacting with the populace, strict rules for respect of human sights, Those Americans,

‘signed hy the Commander, U.S Souter Command.” were largely drawn fom units of the Amy’ Special Fores that were linguistically and culturally prepared to imsieua and (© motivate Salvadorans,

es Long Ter Ste Pele Regs send ten,

1 5-1, Crsopiar conven ta theo

cnet

support away fom the guerillss This American Ofiieer Candidate School created for the Savadoran Amy a cadre of junior officers Significantly move effective in fed operations and more responsive to American advice Egualy important, the government of Honduras allowed entire units of the Salvadoran Ary to enter thei teritory for the purpose of conducting counter guersila field exereises under the tutelig of American Special Foraes Moreover, units of the US National Guard were invited 10 conduct taining exercises with Honduran troops: buikling roads and bridges recitying water supplies, and practicing medicine." These dls Honduras st new operational standards for Salvadoran and Honduran coramanders

In the foreseen

fuwure, the need for understanding human ddynamies wil continge £0 be inportant as the United ates intertets with numerous foreign cukures to achieve national security goals and objectives U.S military forces wers largely unready for their pos September LT missions, which reached besond com operations, to stability reconstruction, and humanitagan responses—a resul of litle ttemion or investment in past decades 10 retain or improve the nation’s miliary posture in these areas

The Department mus avoid foss of foeus and needed! human dynamies capabilities when current engagements subse, Human dynamics capabilities are not only important for future military engagements but ae equally valuable in shaping events before hostilities are underway—perhaps even preventing hostilities, Today, the mitary departments have many efforts underway o increase the linguistic and cultural understanding of thei forces sil be discussed in mate detail

in ler setions fF this report But these many activities are not well coordinated, nor is there elective depurientavide leadership in this

+ Stobilty operations require human dynamies capabilites and

‘ean sed only with clase collaboration between the Depar ments of Sizte and Defense and among related government

—

© Calta insenstvty is itary dystuetional

DoD and its components are funding different efforts 10 colle yee, and diseminate information relied 0 human dyHamies

However

These ellorts are not effectively tied to an overarching formal

of infotmal DoD requitement

+ Theeffortsoften ae duplicative

RECOMMENDATION # [, COORDINATION & LEADERSHIE

The Seeretary of Defense should

# Inviroct his staf to dewlop a comprehensive srategy that builds upon programs now underway in the Army’ and Meine Corps to assure human dynamics savarenes for Future stability

‘operations "This strategy should also include diretives on education and training, uran dynamics advisors, and knowledge management, as outind below

Review and determine the best course of ation (© establish elfective oversight and coordination of human dynamic

+ Ensure that the implications for free structure and DoD anprapriations of all che recommendations of this repom are corsiered in the upcoming Quodrennial Defense Review The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should direct 3 regional combatant commander 19 develop tacties, techniques, and procedures for employing enhanced knowledge of human dynanies in anticipation of siabiley operations with U.S frees in non-combatant roles cooperating closely with other combatant commands, US agencies, and non-government organizations (NGOs), as wel as alles tnd host nations