Tài liệu thuế quốc tế 2

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MOGel tax Convention:

MeVe-catures of the Update

ECOSOC Special Meeting

Bey Aspect of the UN NGegel

Je Velrlous model souole thc irseias inv te

fesoive tie proviem that UnGer international

ACOMOMNGAN DOU) Le Place Of an Investment/

iWISION) Ol GOOUS OF Services (the Source

COUN =) ana also the residence country~ of the aveston provider can legitimately tax profits from

SsuUCH Investment or provision

itis a problem because most countries tax on Doin

a source and a residence basis — the resulting

double taxation dampens investment, which ts bad for both countries

2À 162/20/2130 9ï rj]= Vì | )2|cJc|2|

2 All clouole tele treeless So5.¢ te) z0 /©)|e[ cịc)LÍc)|=

tel cclile) pl GIÚC LƠ OVCTId|j2IOIHT1O taXIHỢ FIỢÍTLS:

Bey Aspect of the UN NGegel

2 So clollole tevarlon can oo evolelac oy

fesiaence country taxing rights

Bey Aspect of the UN NGegel

2 Uncler evctrecittes, raslclanes counmlas mls:

generally give eroclit for Solifes eotiaiayi eyes

BI 0012 011C LÍC Uý, di101 ay eho osreltelirb dare] r19JfI>

2.926) -10]z) feal QUESTION In MOST treaty negotiations Is

NOW AUCH Of Its taxing rights will the source

country give up (allowing more residual rights to tne resiagence country) ?

* OECD countries tend to be net capital exporters

ana the OECD Model (the other main model)

generally favours the residence country The UN Model favours more retention of source country

'Trlr223/1e)|elaÍe)=Je] [p4 €2e)0141 00/5 Ezb,<<\ | c)r)

OlBISUSIIIC SSi1-12140I

2 Articls a (romero =e ls nite =)

swpaatea ang) Clariiiea

=A Key Concept — the level of economic

3112512211121) footprint required to justify source

country taxation of cea profits under

treaties

= Generally lower/ more readily met under UN

viodel:

- 9O more likely aoubie taxation Is avoided by

source country being allowed to tax and the

resiaence country o7 the taxpayer only having reSidual rignts.

ne soanon AlOWIng Source Couniiym—axaiion

oo) Wiodel — majonty view says same: rules Tor

Wfƒ]2/1]2ƒ 1112) |22UW2] Đi =2©©)ƒ]©)iJ]]© =0ï]9Jz|e|=2J/0|-)0]

IDSIIIGS IHOIEC SOUIT:GCC COUTTLEV T†A4XatLIOTT IT €aS6S

Cƒ s2ƒV]9@21s) aS in) Provision Of Goods

UN WieGael Says the concept of what ts sufficient

PCOnOMIC engagement aliters between goods

anG Services

==shouldn t be obsessed in looking for offices, “bricks

ana mortar etc in particular geographical parts of your country ana examining the connections between

tnose offices

= if services are being provided over a reasonable period

of time in your country — that should be enough.

ne soanon AlOWIng Source Couniiym—axaiion

laxsireatment of Services is a main

cCistingUisnine ehelreletoristic 92.2022 p1 Ÿ p2 ve)

models,

Anumwogger issue than when the UN and OECD

WOGAIS were first built”

ie: OECD Model to at least include expression of

a minority view which reflects tne same sort oj

approacn as in the UN Model

A major project of examining services taxation

in a thorougngoing way Is Underway in the UN

1aX Gommittee.

ATLMbDULION Of Pron

> Ones YOU PEMD = Pa Voll peEhVS (19) z[f01)0|(=) mei

to tt, fo clotorilins trys zliƒ/|©)L|[|V cjí ©)ƒ©j[[( telete tls

source Country Can tax (Articie 7; Business

21401115) -

> OBC) <l9 oreo ie hypoth esising of the PE as if it

Whe ls) vel separave iegale nữ a 1rom the rest of the senterprise , though actually it clearly isnt In

PHeciit means you are treated as though you

Can lend to yourself or pay royalties for yourself

a separate T — generally cant lend to

/Ourseliï et

ATLMbDULION Of Pron

AVOIGS the Giiticully Of aSSUMING hypothetical

flows Witric 2 sirigle focell doehy ciriel relViric| to give clocltigtlo ns fer ethene ies Wid ele eh

HlelVinlg) tS elejele fe) X2 UIOSC DO S:

AVOIGS the Complexity of the OECD Article —a WoAdel Concern that developing couinthes tend Loraisproportionately suffer from complex

=solultions: to perceived problems

Who Snhoula most bear the cosi oi complexity —

surely not those least able to cope with it?

siamic Fifkancing

2 Articles TT Cl rireresr)

=oetiaihn | Siamic tihancing issues aaaressea W

=OneJow can ani interest Article apply when

Dispute Setviement

2 Article 25 — tno Webbe ANcjrooront Proseltirs

choleess Wiere tare Is Wo resolutions

— Leave Uprosohysel tislelse icin ys (oa pa [eM ie)

GOMESLIC 1AW)) OF

— Pores 4] oeisionk

D9/U0UaI Agreement Procedure Arbitration — New

Allernadve Art 25 B will include a mandatory

arpitravion Option where put in a bilateral treaty —

sii Within Competent Authority (CA) process

5 70S and CönS öí mandatory arbitration for countries

= requires close consideration in the light of your

own circumstances

ALDILhalion UnGer tne

Unresolved issues arising from the

case submitted to arbitration /f

faxpayer requests

countries

ALDILhalion UnGer tne

UNaWiogdel

UN Model followed

(no arbitration) Issue unresolved _ (mandatory

option preferred binding arbitration)

Unresolved issues arising from the Unresolved issues arising from the

if domestic law can’t solve either CA requests

Differaniess fe) OSS) JJ|e)c|2|

9 JUVr]JJz) ale Tega va Sửa Convention

the le person who

initiated the case ae Art 25B

provides that aren must be

requested by the competent

authority of one of the Contracting states

L \q>

Differaniess fe) OSS) JJ|e)c|2|

POA 20, Unlike the OECD Model

SOnVENHUONH Provision, allows the

Conmmeevent aAUtTHOrities to depart from I4 di4)101-ẢLI011 Gecision if they agree

UØ 0Ø SO Within six months after the

aecision has been communicated to

inem But Doff would need to agree

> inherently optional, so no need for

JECD footnote.

Tre Cnoles?

Vy VOU Might pre1rer 70 arpitration

Ghel less

=SAisiea With the Combination of MAP

ana Gomestic law;

=feel jack of experience in MAP may make

it Nnaraer to succeed In arbitration;

= consider it hard to find arbitrators who IuliY Unaerstana aeveloping country

a

ISSU6S;

Tre Cnoles?

— 93/3 9ƒ zlf©)J0rzIte)r) eles els evreal

etc must go Sore oils 6)©)t|g0j/f1-)-1(z|8ie|

joreigh exchange may be requirea) —

Concern that Mignt Unauly pressure te

==)

= possible concerns that arbitrators may

instinctively identify with more regular

“clients (big countries) ;

— possible criticisms of undue abrogation

Ơi SOVETeigntVˆ

SaGomestc remedies may not solve (in

fact they may be timed-out);

=€ncourages solving within 2 (or 3 for the UN' Model) years;

— you may think third party aspect

actually reduces pressure on you from

Tre Cnoles?

DUUAAYV/ VOU íT110N11 DT.€T€T arDITFation

— 59 Of elf olirelioestectal lel (Rit iifelerefel ory Ia)

91116 SLIG experience and can bea

(onze Of Piformetiorn (30)

E=⁄031rIcl2cl Aftiol3 29,

Sdsicaiy tne same as the OECD Noagel now,

0901159 2l Sirens) SO) drove Wer soos

O#ZIfTTGLI]ZLFW liil)e) 6121p ie)p e|-À(4-)|e])e)|g|ej Lee) L|pÌf 0L -) lgÌ

6211112d.L110 1aX aVÒIiđGance and evasion

IiiiIidS0II11ICT.CITICC IìaKGS GlieaF a purpose of

exchanging information to assist in combating

DOU tax avoidance and ‘tax evasion - useful

as there aoesn t seem to be a consistent use of

nese terms — best to Clarity

Part of a package of measures to help address

abuse (e.g |mproper Use of Treaties discussion in

Commentary to Articie 1, Change to Art 15(9))

Murtuel Assiseiyes ey anliorelrye fe¢ Dots

> New Apticls 27

3 172Iclifior1zl]pi2U2p]L[2) piij|- 2 cj;]-) cc)iJi)i¡/

GOES moO eniorce a revenue juUagment of

amoiner hation

= SIOMmetimes Seen as an exertion of that

Country Ss sovereign power

» Widely recognised that this Is taken

advantage: of to avoid tax obligations.

Murtuel Assiseiyes ey anliorelrye fe¢ Dots

2 Naw ootlorel Article zNows srroresuronle zis iF If Wels

112 COUnLTY Ss OWnh debt There are protections

agelnst zolisg:

aS Oventially USeTUI for Geveloping countries tn

CoMmpating avoiaance and evasion, but with greater

fecognition of the burdens this can place on smaller Geveloping countries - obligations regarding

COntHIbUTION to COStS perhaps Clearer under the UN

IU OGI

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