Moral Status Phần 8 doc

Species, ecosystems, and the biosphere canreasonably be accorded moral status, and organisms of species thatare endangered or especially important to the ecosystem ought to beaccorded a

Our capacity for empathy with non-human beings, and even withnon-sentient organisms, prohibits the cruel treatment of any sen-tient being, or the needless destruction of any life form—even aplant or microbe Works of art and other human artefacts, alongwith such natural objects as crystals and unusual rock formations,may be protected for their aesthetic, historical, or cultural value; but

to do this is not necessarily to grant them moral status We may,however, sometimes reasonably decide to grant such status, for in-stance out of respect for the spiritual or religious beliefs of a par-ticular group of people Species, ecosystems, and the biosphere canreasonably be accorded moral status, and organisms of species thatare endangered or especially important to the ecosystem ought to beaccorded a stronger status than their intrinsic properties would in-dicate Finally, families, cities, and countries are communities towhich members may have moral obligations, based upon respect forco-members of the community, and upon morally justified institu-tional arrangements

6.4 The Limited Role of Cultural and Personal Relativity

The multi-criterial account leaves room for some legitimate culturaland personal variations in judgements of moral status However, it

is incompatible with both (1) the ethical relativist view, i.e thatmoral truth is entirely determined by what is accepted by a majority

of people within a given culture or group; and (2) the ethical jectivist view, i.e that moral truth is entirely a matter of individualopinion Individuals can be mistaken in their judgements of moralstatus, and so can cultural and religious traditions The principles Ihave proposed are not universally accepted; yet each is a viable can-didate for general acceptance among reasonable people who sharethe aim of reaching an uncoerced consensus

sub-There is, nevertheless, an important grain of truth in both the tural relativist and the subjectivist views We need to be cautious inevaluating judgements about moral status made by people whosecultures are unfamiliar to us, because judgements that initially strike

cul-us as odd or even perverse may make excellent sense, once the text is better understood The term ‘sacred cow’ is used in the West

con-to refer con-to something that is accorded more respect than is

appro-A Multi-Criterial appro-Analysis of Moral Status 175

176 An Account of Moral Status

priate Yet the refusal of many Indian people to kill cattle is not only

an important religious tenet, but arguably also an economically andecologically sound policy

Individuals within the same society may also make differentjudgements of moral status If the ethical subjectivist view were true,any judgement that any person made about moral status would be

true for that person The multi-criterial account disallows that

ex-treme form of subjectivism, while allowing individuals sometimes todiffer legitimately in their judgements of moral status For instance,moral obligations towards particular animals depend in part uponhuman social relationships with those animals, which are not thesame in all cases, or for all human beings If I am fond of cats, then

it is not absurd for me to feel obliged to feed the stray cat at my door,even though not all persons would be similarly obliged If my neigh-bours abhor cats, they are entitled to ignore the passing stray—butnot to shoot it for target practice The Anti-Cruelty principle ap-plies, regardless of our individual attitudes or emotional responses

6.5 Conclusions

In making judgements about moral status, we must balance a

num-ber of considerations That something is a living organism is a prima facie reason for not harming it, but one that is easily overridden

when it has no other claim to moral status Pathogenic microbesmay normally be destroyed without guilt That an organism is sen-tient provides a reason not to kill it or cause it pain, unless an im-portant human or ecological need is at stake That it is a moral agent

is enough to establish that it has basic moral rights—whatever itsrace, sex, age, species, or planetary origin That it is a sentienthuman being and a member of a human social community is alsosufficient to establish that it has basic rights Social or ecological re-lationships can enhance moral status, but may not depress the status

of any entity below that specified in the Respect for Life, Cruelty, Agent’s Rights, and Human Rights principles Similarly, re-ligious or spiritual beliefs can enhance the moral status of particularentities, but not in ways that are incompatible with these principles.Each of the uni-criterial theories fails, not because it selects a cri-terion of moral status that has no validity, but because no single cri-

Anti-terion can represent all of the relevant considerations Only a criterial account of moral status can incorporate the sound ethicalconsiderations that underlie each of the uni-criterial accounts, whileavoiding the distortions of moral common sense that result from theattempt to make all valid judgements about moral status followfrom a single principle.

multi-A Multi-Criterial multi-Analysis of Moral Status 177

Selected Applications

PA RT I I

The multi-criterial account explains why many common-sensejudgements about moral status are more reasonable than they ap-pear from the vantage-point of any of the uni-criterial theories Itexplains, for instance, why it is appropriate to accord full moralstatus to infants and other sentient human beings who are not moralagents, while denying it to most non-human animals—includingmany whose mental capacities are more impressive than those of ahuman infant It does this by giving due weight to the fact that manysentient human beings who are not moral agents are neverthelessmembers of human social communities Thus, it is important to thewell-being of the community, and in conformance with our naturalsocial sentiments, that their interests be accorded the same impor-tance as those of moral agents In contrast, most animals are notmembers of our social communities, and we do not have that reasonfor according them full moral status.

The multi-criterial account also explains why it is sometimes sonable to accord a stronger moral status to some animals than toothers that are probably just as highly sentient Some animals aremembers of our mixed social communities, and have establishedtrusting and affectionate relationships with human beings Othersbelong to species that are endangered by human activities, and vital

rea-to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the ecosystems of whichthey are part Still others may reasonably be accorded an enhancedmoral status out of respect for their special religious or spiritual im-portance to some people Each of these factors can justify the recog-nition of stronger moral obligations towards animals of certainspecies than could be based solely upon their intrinsic properties.But a theory of moral status must not only agree reasonably wellwith moral judgements about which there is a strong consensus; itmust also help to illuminate issues that are more contentious In the

7

Applying the Principles

following chapters I comment on three controversial topics in plied ethics: euthanasia, abortion, and human uses of animals Mypurpose is not to present completely supported solutions to thesecomplex problems, but to illustrate the ways in which the principlespresented in Chapter 6 can contribute to these discussions Moralprinciples expressed in abstract terms are inevitably subject to mul-tiple interpretations (Think, for instance, of the lack of agreementamong those in the Judaeo-Christian tradition about whether theSixth Commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’, is meant to prohibitcapital punishment, suicide, abortion, violent self-defence, or mili-tary war.) These chapters will at least help to clarify some of the am-biguities in the principles that I have formulated.

ap-7.1 Review of the Principles

Because the principles presented in Chapter 6 will be frequently ferred to in the next three chapters, it will be useful to list them

re-at the outset Notice thre-at the first three principles refer to nestedclasses of entities: living organisms, sentient beings, and moralagents Beings of each class have some moral status based upontheir intrinsic properties Organic life confers only a modest moralstatus; sentience confers a stronger moral status; and moral agency

is sufficient (but not necessary) for full moral status The fourthprinciple expands the community of moral equals to include sen-tient human beings who are not moral agents Finally, the last threeprinciples require the acceptance of special obligations to plants andanimals of ecosystemically important species, and animal members

of our social communities; and permit the acceptance of obligations

to some non-living things that have ecosystemic importance, or thathave special religious or spiritual value to some people

1 The Respect for Life Principle

Living organisms are not to be killed or otherwise harmed, withoutgood reasons that do not violate principles 2–7

2 The Anti-Cruelty Principle

Sentient beings are not to be killed or subjected to pain or suffering,unless there is no other feasible way of furthering goals that are

182 Selected Applications

(1) consistent with principles 3–7; and (2) important to human ings, or other entities that have a stronger moral status than could

be-be based upon sentience alone

3 The Agent’s Rights Principle

Moral agents have full and equal basic moral rights, including therights to life and liberty

4 The Human Rights Principle

Within the limits of their own capacities and of principle 3, humanbeings who are capable of sentience but not of moral agency havethe same moral rights as do moral agents

5 The Ecological Principle

Living things that are not moral agents, but that are important tothe ecosystems of which they are part, have, within the limits ofprinciples 1‒4, a stronger moral status than could be based upontheir intrinsic properties alone; ecologically important entities thatare not themselves alive, such as species and habitats, may legiti-mately be accorded a stronger moral status than their intrinsic prop-erties would indicate

6 The Interspecific Principle

Within the limits of principles 1‒5, non-human members of mixedsocial communities have a stronger moral status than could be basedupon their intrinsic properties alone

7 The Transitivity of Respect Principle

Within the limits of principles 1‒6, and to the extent that is feasibleand morally permissible, moral agents should respect one another’sattributions of moral status

7.2 Preview of Chapters 8, 9, and 10

The moral questions raised by euthanasia, abortion, and humanuses of animals force us to clarify both what it means to have therights to life and liberty, and to whom those rights should be as-cribed Each of these issues has complexities that cannot be well ad-

Applying the Principles 183

dressed on any of the uni-criterial theories Chapter 8 deals withquestions surrounding some controversial forms of euthanasia.Some of these questions involve the boundaries of the right to life.For instance, should persons who are permanently comatose, or in-fants who will never become sentient, have the same moral and legalright to life as other human beings? Other questions involve the con-tent of the rights to life and liberty, and the relative weight of theserights when they appear to be in conflict Does one, for instance,violate an obligation to oneself by deciding to hasten one’s owndeath when illness or injury lead one to judge that continued life is

no longer a benefit? How much may others legitimately do to assist

in carrying out such a decision? How much, if anything, may they

do in the absence of a fully voluntary request from the afflicted dividual?

in-In Chapter 9, I consider the morality of abortion Here too, tions arise concerning who or what has the right to life, and aboutwhat having rights to life and liberty entails When, in the course ofits development, does a human individual begin to have a right tolife equal to that of older human beings? Should the line be drawn

ques-at conception, ques-at birth, or ques-at some point between? Should it times be drawn shortly after birth? Are early abortions morally dif-ferent from late abortions, or are all voluntary abortions equallyjustifiable—or unjustifiable?

some-Finally, in Chapter 10 I consider questions involving the moralstatus of animals Do non-human animals have moral rights? Are

we morally obliged to abandon some practices that have long beenwidely accepted, such as hunting animals, rearing them for food andother consumptive uses, or employing them as ‘guinea pigs’ in com-mercial, scientific, or medical research? If not all such uses of an-imals are objectionable, then how can we distinguish those that are?

184 Selected Applications

The term ‘euthanasia’ derives from Greek words meaning ‘a gooddeath’ It normally refers to the act of intentionally causing or help-ing to bring about the death of another being, based upon a rea-sonable judgement that, under the circumstances, death is in thatbeing’s best interest In most cases, the basis for this judgement is anextremely painful and/or severely disabling illness or injury that can-not be cured or alleviated, and that is thought to make continued life

a harm rather than a benefit to the individual

Euthanasia for animals that are dying in pain or disastrously andpermanently disabled is not usually controversial Indeed, when acaptive or domestic animal in such a plight is not humanely ‘put tosleep’, we are likely to suspect a violation of the Anti-Cruelty prin-ciple But when the being in such a plight is human, mercy killing isrendered morally problematic by the strong rights to life and self-determination that human beings have Thus, my discussion willfocus upon the human cases, which are more controversial

Disagreements about euthanasia involve both the boundaries ofthe right to life—to whom it should be extended—and its content.Euthanasia opponents argue that the right to life forbids deliber-ately hastening the death of innocent human beings, even at their urgent request, and in what is thought to be their interest They fearthat any social toleration of euthanasia will undermine the moralstatus of all human beings Their concern is that, if the right to life

is withdrawn from persons whose lives are considered no longerworth living, it may later be withdrawn from many whose lives ob-

viously are worth living.

In contrast, many people see no contradiction between thehuman right to life and certain carefully circumscribed forms of eu-thanasia The freedom to hasten one’s death when continued life hasbecome unbearable is arguably itself an important human right It

8

Euthanasia and the Moral Status of

Human Beings

may also be argued that, when a human patient is close to death,and clearly incapable of making a reasoned decision about how best

to die, those who care for the patient should be permitted—withinlimits—to make that decision on the patient’s behalf

The chapter begins by distinguishing several forms of euthanasia

I argue that the human right to life is consistent in some cases with

a decision to hasten or not to delay one’s own death, or that of other human being I also argue that there are cases in which themoral right to life does not fully obtain, because the individual hassuffered either whole-brain death or irreversible brain damage thatprecludes any future return to consciousness In these cases, theTransitivity of Respect principle assumes a more central role inshaping our moral obligations

Before confronting these issues, we need to define some of the termsthat bioethicists have used to distinguish between diverse forms ofeuthanasia First, an act of euthanasia may be characterized as ei-

ther active or passive It is considered active if death is deliberately

caused through such direct means as administering a lethal tion It is considered passive if death is deliberately hastened by theomission of actions that might have prolonged life, such as per-forming cardiopulmonary resuscitation when cardiac arrest occurs,

injec-or administering antibiotics to combat acute infection

An act of euthanasia may also be characterized as voluntary or

non-voluntary It is voluntary if done in response to the uncoerced

request of a mentally competent adult who is aware of the relevantfacts, and has arrived at a reasoned decision It is non-voluntary ifthe individual is so severely mentally or physically disabled as to beclearly unable to express a reasoned preference about the alternat-ives, and others therefore decide on the basis of what they reason-ably take to be in the individual’s best interest

It is important to stress there is no third category of involuntary

euthanasia, i.e that which is done against the will of the individual

It is virtually never reasonable to believe that it is in a person’s terest to be killed or allowed to die against their will Moreover, even

in-if it were reasonable to believe this in a particular case, it would still

186 Selected Applications

be a violation of the right to life to kill a person who does not wish

to be killed, or needlessly to let such a person die The right to life

protects individuals from being killed or allowed to die against their will, when they have done nothing that could reasonably be thought

to justify such violence, or such neglect Killing a person who wantsnot to be killed is not euthanasia, but murder, or some other form

of wrongful homicide For a health professional deliberately to let apatient die by withholding readily available treatment that the pa-tient clearly wants, is at least malpractice, and might sometimes beprosecuted as criminal homicide

Assisted suicide can sometimes be classified as a form of tary euthanasia A person facing a painful death may ask a friend,family member, or health care provider to assist in obtaining ameans of committing suicide If the individual then voluntarily per-forms the action which is the proximate cause of their own death,e.g by taking pills, then this is a case of assisted suicide If the as-sistant acts with the reasonable hope and intention of helping theperson to die well (or in the ‘least worst’ way), then what the assis-tant does is a form of euthanasia

volun-8.2 Voluntary Passive Euthanasia

Voluntary passive euthanasia is unique among these forms of thanasia in that in most jurisdictions it is legal under some circum-stances Mentally competent adults normally have the legal right toreject any proposed medical treatment, even if they are likely to diewithout it, and even if they refuse because they do not want theirlives prolonged There is, in this sense, a legal right to voluntary pas-sive euthanasia The right to refuse medical treatment is not alwaysrespected in practice, and some courts have recognized exceptions to

eu-it.1 Yet few ethicists now argue that medical treatment should be

Euthanasia and the Moral Status of Human Beings 187

1 See Keith Burton, ‘A Chronicle: Dax’s Case As It Happened’, in John D Arras

and Bonnie Steinbock (eds.), Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Mountain View,

Calif.: Mayfield, 1989), 195–9 Some courts have recognized exceptions to the right to refuse treatment, e.g in cases where adult Jehovah’s Witnesses have refused blood transfusion, and in which pregnant women have refused Caesarean sections See Ruth Macklin, ‘Consent, Coercion, and Conflicts of Rights’, in Thomas A Mappes and

Jane S Zembaty (eds.), Biomedical Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 330–6;

and Nancy Rhoden, ‘Cesareans and Samaritans’, in Tom L Beauchamp and LeRoy