Uhalley_Steve_Space-Arms-Race-Paper

The Chinese Space Program China, too, has enthusiastically taken part in the excitement of space exploration and utilization in recent years and just last year celebrated its own 50th an

A China-U.S Space Arms Race?

Stephen Uhalley, Jr.

The 50 th Anniversary of the Space Age

Three days ago, October 4, marked the 50th anniversary of the successful orbiting of Sputnik I and the beginning of the space age Sputnik was a wake-up call for the United States.1 In the Cold War race for space that was now out of the starting gate the Russians made a remarkably good showing, but the United States won the race decisively and today dominates space

So, 2007 is a special year in the history of the space age The occasion has been

commemorated in many aerospace conferences, pronouncements, publications, and special space launchings We have been afforded ample opportunity to reflect on what has been a fascinating half century of space exploration, of amazing discovery, and of finding imaginative ways to make productive use of space Indeed, all those satellites orbiting overhead have tremendously transformed our lives and our remarkably evolving

understanding of the earth and of the overall cosmos We realize, too, that we have all become critically dependent upon those objects we place in space

In recognition of this exciting yet sobering new reality, aerospace enthusiasts and others have seen this moment in time as propitious not only to reminisce but to thoughtfully plan ahead as well After all, with the passing of the Cold War we are already well into what is regarded as the Second Space Age, characterized as it is by many nations

becoming active in space, not just two superpowers, or perhaps, for a time, a single such power Indeed, we can already imagine a coming global political environment that will have its corresponding Third Space Age In any case, all can see that there is need for planning ahead accordingly, in order to assure that activity in space is conducted

rationally and equitably We all have much at stake

The Chinese Space Program

China, too, has enthusiastically taken part in the excitement of space exploration and utilization in recent years and just last year celebrated its own 50th anniversary in this field.2 It has registered stellar, if prudently measured, achievements in recent years and has passed two especially notable milestones: the first in 1999 with the launching of an orbiting spacecraft; the second, the successful manned missions of 2003 (one astronaut or

1 Although just a footnote here, but germane to the interests of our Association, it will be remembered that

it was Sputnik that prompted passage of the National Defense Education Act, which established area and language study centers at a number of universities This included funds for the newly established Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, of which I was a charter fellow! For years afterward, Chinese studies in the United States benefited immensely.

2 The best book on this program so far is Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program: From Conception to

Manned Spaceflight, New York: Praxis Publishing, 2003 A much more concise account is Marcia S Smith,

“China’s Space Program: An Overview,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 21, 2003 Both sources need updating

taikonaut, for 21 hours in space) and 2005 (two taikonauts, for five days) Appropriately enough, the third milestone was slated for this year, on this special fiftieth anniversary of the space age This will be with the launching of China’s first unmanned lunar orbiting mission, the Chang’e Actually, this was to have taken place earlier this year, although, without explanation, it has been rescheduled for this fall instead

These are all important achievements and they dramatically call attention to China’s significant role in space It further underscores the seriousness of China’s future plans, which include China’s first space walk next year, in 2008, aboard Shenzhou VII, which is

scheduled to launch with three taikonauts aboard A space laboratory is projected by

2015, along with lunar landings, a lunar base, and a mission to Mars These ambitious plans were unveiled at the 22nd National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs in April

2006,3 and outlined more fully in China’s white paper on space activities released in October 2006.4 Further insights into these plans have been revealed subsequently.5

It is worth noting that China’s space activity is not limited to such high profile, headline making events The scope of its space program is both deep and broad China already has its own constellations of satellites, more than forty at present and steadily increasing in number (about ten each year) and sophistication This assemblage includes the

beginnings of the Beidou (or Compass) navigational system that alone will eventually consist of around thirty satellites.6 Beidou will compete with the American Global

Positioning System (GPS), as well as with the Russian GLONASS and the European Galileo systems The Chinese navigation system poses a commercial threat to the latter, which is struggling just to come into being The American GPS, meanwhile, has been available to all, free of cost, and is being upgraded, still free to all

China is getting more and more into the business of making and launching satellites for other countries and actually has expectations of dominating this market eventually The Russians who currently handle forty percent of the lucrative international commercial launch market and who hope to increase this percentage cannot be too happy at this prospect In fact, the Russian space program is lagging at present, although we can expect

a burst of renewal here as well as hard cash and patriotic sentiment levels continue to rise

in a renewed autocratic Russia

Why?

One can ask why it is that China has gone into space in such a big way After all, much of what is now being accomplished was done decades earlier by two other countries taking

3 By Luo Ge, vice administrator of the China National Space Administration See Leonard David, “China Unveils Ambitious Space Plans at National Space Symposium,” April 5, 2006, in www.space.com/news.

4 See People’s Daily Online, October 12, 2006.

5 In May 2007, China’s State Council approved the 11 th five-year plan on space development Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan stressed that this five-year period (2006-2010) is key to China’s space development, with priority given to manned space flight, lunar exploration, a new launch vehicle, and high-resolution earth

observation Xinhua, Beijing, May 14, 2007 In www.spacedaily.com ,, May 14, 2007.

6 See Kevin Pollpeter, “To be more precise: the Beidou Satellite Navigation and Positioning System, China

Brief, Vol 7, Issue 10 (May 16, 2007): 1-5.

great risks into the unknown with primitive equipment Furthermore, one may wonder why more of China’s treasure trove of foreign exchange reserves might not be better invested in dealing with truly urgent environment pollution concerns that so much

threaten to eventually undermine the country’s developmental progress

There are three main reasons for the space program One is that prowess in space is today’s most evident indicator of great power status; hence to play a major role in this field is an important matter of national pride, and pride for Chinese everywhere Stroking this pride is especially important for the political leadership, as achievements here help offset grave concerns about systemic inequities, corruption, pollution, and stalled serious political reform This is not a motivation to be underestimated

Secondly, China’s leaders, comprised of so many with engineering training, know that a serious space program pays off handsomely It stimulates technological and scientific advances and spin offs, and raises standards of precision throughout industry and society This eventuates in the enhanced value and marketability of manufactures Thus space investment is legitimately and explicitly considered the key technology in China’s drive for comprehensive national strength Such profound commitment, furthermore, presages well for China’s ambition to finally get into the difficult competition of building and selling large commercial aircraft

Thirdly, there is the national security or military consideration This is so important that it

is the military that runs China’s space program A readily mobilized media provides superlative publicity for successes, while shortcomings can be concealed For example,

we learned only two months ago of the deadly threat to China’s first manned mission in

2003 Military control accounts for the program’s opaqueness This also accounts for the diminutive cooperation with others in space, despite the rhetoric There is some

cooperation, particularly with Russia, but with understandable reservations on both sides

In any case, the military’s prominent role precludes more serious international

cooperation

Unfortunately, despite the genuine worthiness of the first two reasons, i.e., national pride and technological advantage, which provide so much good reason for celebration, it was the third factor, the military, that was in the forefront as the 50th year of the space age dawned Thus it was that Beijing came to herald this special global anniversary year in yet another, distinctively memorable way And in doing so, cast a pall over an otherwise exclusively celebratory year

ASAT Test Shock

On January 11 this year China launched a Long March missile aimed at one of its aged weather satellites, named Fengyun 1C, some five hundred miles above the earth, scoring

a direct head-on bulls eye kinetic hit No new technology was involved, but it was no mean feat either, although the targeted satellite had been maneuvered to facilitate the encounter China became only the third nation to conduct such an anti-satellite (ASAT) test successfully, and the first one to do so from ground level The former Soviet Union

and the United States had conducted similar tests decades earlier with weapons already aloft

Curiously, it took almost two weeks for the Chinese government to finally acknowledge the test Then, it provided belated assurances that the event was not a threat to any nation and immediately reiterated its appeal for an anti-weapons space treaty Separately,

China’s defense minister, visiting in Japan, claimed that it was a “scientific” event but that there would be no repetition of the test It was apparent that there was a division within the Chinese leadership on this important issue and the Foreign Ministry, for one, apparently was not informed ahead of time This lack of high level governmental

coordination and the unilateral behavior of the military can justly be regarded as

potentially alarming.7 Perhaps Hu Jintao, a civilian engineer, had little choice but to accede to military pressure in this year that also sees the convening of the party congress, which is to approve his continued leadership for another five years

Of course, the test was not a surprise to Washington, which had been aware of previous failed ASAT tests, just as it knew of earlier laser beam attempts to “paint” an American satellite.8 Able observers have warned for years of China’s space weapon interests and possibilities.9 What is surprising is that the Chinese would want to conduct such a test in

the first place, as well as the clumsily provocative way in which they went about it, despite predictable costly consequences

Rationale

Chinese motives, although not officially announced, were made clear enough even before the ASAT test by individual Chinese speaking unofficially For example, in 2005, Hui Zhang, a Chinese space weapons expert at the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, said that Chinese strategists believed that American missile-defense plans pose a great threat to China’s national security in that they could be used to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent and give the United States more freedom to encroach on China’s

sovereignty, including on Taiwan-related issues.10

As is well known, the Chinese have been building their military capability for years They are deeply concerned about American military superiority, something that for all the cash and determination China is unlikely to match head to head for decades Thus Beijing focuses on an asymmetrical response, going for the dominant power’s Achilles’ heel,

7 See Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, “China’s Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About

Decision-Making in Beijing,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007): 2-6.

8 News of the ASAT test was first reported by Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST) on

aviationweek.com on January 17, 2007, with a follow-up print article by Craig Covault in AW&ST, January

22, 2007: 24-25.

9 See, e.g., Larry M Wortzel, “China and the Battlefield in Space,” The Heritage Foundation Web Memo

No 346, October 15, 2003, James A Lewis, “China as a Military Space Competitor,” Center for Strategic

and International Studies, August 2004, and Michael P Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines,” prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 19, 2007.

10 See Martin Sieff, “China ready to counter U.S space plans,” Insight on the News-World, May 23, 2005

( www.insightmag.com , May 24, 2005).

even as it concurrently expands its naval (particularly submarine) and aerospace

capabilities Knowing that American military effectiveness depends on certain space assets, they seek to neutralize these In the event of a military conflict with the United States, possibly over Taiwan, Beijing thus might consider putting out of commission key American satellites, or at least suggest a credible threat that they might do so Obviously, this possibility does now complicate the Taiwan Strait equation, affecting the calculus that determines what Washington is to do if Taiwan is attacked

China’s overall idea, it would appear, is to have a two-pronged approach in dealing with American dominance in space One approach is to develop space weaponry of its own that can be used against American satellites At the same time, it seeks diplomatically to maneuver the United States into a legal framework that would prevent Americans from developing the space assets or weapons necessary for adequate defense At least, this latter prong is rhetorically present, and pushed, even if the Chinese themselves might actually have reservations about having restraints placed on what they might do in space

In this regard, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley Tellis argues: “The importance of space denial for China’s operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power.” Hence, he believes, “Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities.”11

In the event, finding itself in a very awkward situation, the Chinese government has decided not to provide any explanation of the ASAT test, probably because to do so would lead to further uncomfortable questions It also recognizes that silence has its own eloquence It has, after all, made an unmistakable statement regarding its capability to shoot down a satellite, and with greater precision than simply detonating a nuclear device

in space It can be seen, at base, a challenge to American dominance in space, in keeping with a tradition of possessing at least a modest deterrence capability As Eric Hagt has plausibly pointed out, “It was a deliberate and strategic, but also defensive, act.”12

Thus, the making of this bold statement by action was deemed more important than eventually having to deal with the untoward consequences, if these were ever seriously considered to begin with

These consequences include the damage done physically in space, the adverse

implications for the peaceful rise to power line and to China’s credibility generally, and the further complicating of the already complicated U.S.-China relationship

Furthermore, it is likely to provoke a surely unwanted or undesirable reaction that could lead to further American efforts to protect their space assets and determine ways to neutralize the Chinese military in this regard Finally, it will preclude the possibility of taking full advantage of opportunities for American cooperation in space, which might

11 Ashley J Tellis, “China’s Space Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2007, p A15; This view is elaborated upon in his article “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival, Vol 49, No 3 (Autumn

2007):41-72

12 “China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response,” China Security (Winter 2007): 38.

otherwise greatly facilitate the success of the Chinese program and expedite useful collaborative scientific research

Compounding the Space Debris Problem

The first and foremost cost of the Chinese ASAT test was its immediate compounding of the problem of accumulating debris in space, a cost not only to the Chinese themselves, but to all who use space This is a little understood but big problem of which the Chinese themselves have been very much aware In recent years China has played a growing international role in dealing with the proliferation of space debris In 2002, for example,

it joined with other concerned nations to suggest voluntary guidelines for debris control This April, Beijing was to have hosted the annual meeting of the advocacy group, known

as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Obviously to avoid

embarrassment, this meeting was postponed

It is worth knowing that for decades already, space experts have feared that eventually a speeding bit of orbital debris (traveling as it does about 17,400 mph, or ten times faster than a bullet fired from a high-powered rifle) will smash a large spacecraft into hundreds

of pieces, commencing a chain reaction, i.e., a slow cascade of collisions that will expand relentlessly, eventually creating genuine chaos aloft There is general agreement in the scientific community that the number of objects in orbit has already surpassed a critical mass, i.e., a point at which a chain reaction becomes inevitable Thus, anxiety regarding this subject had already been mounting

Early this year, the federal list of detectable objects in orbital space (four inches or larger) had reached ten thousand Reportedly, the Air Force Space Command was actively monitoring 14,000 or so objects before the Chinese ASAT test.13 To this worrisome, ever growing number, on January 11, the Chinese added as much as another fifteen percent of space junk in the four inches or larger size range, making this the worst such single episode in space history But the number of yet smaller flying objects and particles from the test may reach as many as two million!14 Much of this debris will remain in space for

many decades.

“Today, next year or next decade, some piece of whirling debris will start the cascade, experts say….It’s inevitable,” claims Nicholas Johnson, chief scientist for orbital debris

at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).15 It is surmised that the chain reaction is destined to begin at some point anyway, but, for sure, China’s newly created fragmentation cloud will hasten its onset

Contradicting the Peaceful Rising (or “Peaceful Developing’”) Line

13 According to Brig Gen C Donald Alston, the Command’s director of space operations In Bill Gertz,

“Beijing space test scattered debris,” The Washington Times, April 10, 2007.

14 According to NASA estimates Tim Johnson, “China missile test littered space with loads of debris,” The

Seattle Times, March 30, 2007.

15 William J Broad, “Space junk may spell doom for pricey satellites,” The New York Times reprinted in the

Marin Independent Journal, February 6, 2007, p A4.

Accordingly, it is likely that this dangerous military test has had some negative effect on China’s peacefully rising line, which itself has come to be called the peacefully

developing line, reflecting a desire to shy away from anything that can be construed as provocative internationally And the test is a less than endearing gesture in the midst of what is seen as a “charm offensive” in the world The heedless endangerment of what is regarded as mankind’s commons in space contrasts jarringly with China’s gestures of genuinely peaceful engagement with the world community It raises questions about China’s status as a positive stakeholder

As Joan Johnson-Freese, a not unsympathetic specialist on China’s space program, put it, the Chinese “should realize that the primary impact of their ASAT test is to have shot themselves in the foot diplomatically.”16Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L Stimson Center, and critic of the Administration’s space policy, conceded that the Chinese test was unsubtle, and very un-Chinese.17And Kevin Pollpeter, who just one day before the test had owned how “China’s space diplomacy thus facilitates its rise as a military power, while enhancing its reputation abroad,”18 now conceded that “China’s test could also undermine its campaign to assuage concerns about its potential rise.”19

There is here a simple matter of trust No one is likely to really approve of how this matter was conducted and is yet being handled by the Chinese government

Consequently, it will be harder for Beijing to sell the usual rhetoric Remember that only three months prior to the ASAT test China had issued its white paper on space activities,

in which it undertook to “protect the space environment, and develop and utilize space resources in a rational manner.”20 And how credible is the repeated assurance from Beijing that it opposes the introduction of weapons into space? Major General James Armor, director of the National Security Space Office of the Department of Defense, is

on record with his view: “The contradictions between China’s statements and its actions raise legitimate questions about the credibility of their declaratory policies, statements, and security commitments.”21

16 Professor Johnson-Freeze is chair of the U.S Naval War College’s National Security Decision Making

Department See her “America’s China Worries – Part I,” Yale Global, February 6, 2007, in

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=8714 She is author of a new study, Space as a Strategic Asset,

New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

17 See William J Broad and David E Sanger, “Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test,” The New

York Times, January 19, 2007.

18 “Competing Perceptions of the U.S and Chinese Space Programs,” China Brief, Volume 7, Issue 1

(January 10, 2007): 1-4.

19 “Motives and Implications Behind China’s ASAT Test,” China Brief, Vol 7, Issue 2 (January 24, 2007):

3.

20 People’s Daily Online, October 12, 2006

(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/12/print20061012_311151.html)

21 In testimony at the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs’ “Weaponizing Space: is current U.S policy protecting our national security?” hearing on May 23, 2007 See: http://nationalssecurity.oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1334.

Nor is the reputation of China’s soft diplomacy helped much by Chinese

misrepresentations of American space policy The United States did announce a new National Space Policy last October, the first such update in ten years This updating of the policy, actually not much changed from previous versions that date back to the

Eisenhower Administration, was issued partly in response to China’s recent successes in space, particularly its manned space program But critics have claimed that the new policy is an effort to weaponize space, or is hostile posturing or another example of unilateralism, accusations that play well in the current atmosphere of elevated anti-American sentiment around the world

Of course, it may not be particularly helpful that domestic critics play on this

interpretation as well In May 2007, for example, Rep John Tierney, chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, spoke of the “aggressive and unilateral” tone of the national space policy.22 Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information,

similarly comes down hard on the national space policy.23

But such negative readings of the national space policy had already been taken to task by leading space specialist and writer James Oberg, for example, who had earlier criticized

the use of misleading material by The Washington Post The newspaper, however, did not

publish his letter to its editor, but it is available online, and reads in part “The genuine and lamentable threat of igniting a ‘space weapons race’ from this and dozens of similar examples, is not from an explicit policy of firmness and deterrence (as exemplified by the new policy) but from careless misinformation and deliberate disinformation…and from careless reporting by news media figures whose professional standards need reviving.”24

Kevin Pollpeter, referred to earlier, had made an enlightening comparison of the most recent American and Chinese space policy documents (which coincidentally had been issued only a week apart in October 2006) He shows how the American text

“detrimentally” increased the visibility of U.S national security concerns, while the Chinese managed to divert attention away from the military uses of its space program.25

Remember, however, that this astute comparison was published just one day before China’s ASAT test!

Ironically, it was on the very day that American Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Robert G Joseph was explaining the new space policy that China conducted its ASAT test.26 Put simply, Joseph was reiterating the point that American space policy seeks primarily “to ensure that we maintain and enable free access to and use of space for peaceful purposes for the United States and all nations of the world – and

22 In his opening statement to the “Weaponizing Space…” hearing, May 23, 2007 Ibid.

23 In her testimony to the “Weaponiizing Space…” hearing, May 23, 2007, Ibid.

24 “Unpublished Letter to the Editor, WP,” December 17, 2006 In

http://jamesoberg.com/12172006postrebuttal-mil.html.

25 “Competing Perceptions of the U.S and Chinese Space Programs,” China Brief, Volume 7, Issue 1

(January 10, 2007): 1-4.

26 Speaking at a Center for Space and Defense Forum in Colorado Springs See

http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/78679/htm

for the benefit of mankind.” It also “mandates the pursuit of programs and capabilities to ensure that our space assets are protected.” This point, itself subject to misinterpretation,

is reassuringly clarified: “by maintaining the right of self-defense, the United States is not out to claim space for its own Our policy is not about establishing a U.S monopoly of space, as some have asserted.”27

Complicating further the complex US-China relationship.

As we all know, China and the United States have a very broad and complex relationship with notable ups and downs Each side derives unmistakable benefit from the

relationship But there are a number of issues that irritate both parties At bottom, there is

a mutual distrust that deters realization of the real friendship that should obtain between our two countries and peoples For its part, the United States has good reason to remain skeptical about a Chinese autocracy that fears serious political reform, that disallows an independent media, and that generally orchestrates a nationalistic climate among its populace that can easily inflame a manipulable anti-American sentiment, even as Beijing greatly increases its military capabilities This is all aggravated by Beijing having

cultivated such patriotic fervor over Taiwan that it becomes politically difficult for China’s leaders to appear soft on the issue

On February 15, 2007, the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies convened a roundtable comprised of China and space specialists to discuss the implications of the Chinese ASAT test Among the key points to come out of the

discussion was the observation that “The extension of U.S.-China competition into the space domain will complicate efforts to build a stable and constructive bilateral

relationship.”28 Yet it is the United States, primarily, that must deal with China’s space warning and growing capability

It is important not to overreact, as Joan Johnson-Freeze quickly cautioned,29 although it is equally important not to escape into denial In any case, even in the United States the reaction has been somewhat muted There has been surprisingly little comment from the Bush Administration directly, undoubtedly because it is so distracted by the war on Islamist extremists and other concerns in or arising from the Middle East, and by its view

of the pivotal importance of Chinese cooperation in resolving the North Korean nuclear weapon issue

Reviving American Concern for Space Security

Even so, there are many who are concerned The net result will be that at the very least the warning has been noted, and American vigilance heightened Accordingly, the

Chinese ASAT test has been called “a gift” in terms of serving as a wake up call, another consequence the Chinese could not have desired Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona), already

27 Ibid.

28 See Phillip C Saunders and Charles D Lutes, “China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications,” INSS

Special Report, June 2007: 1-6

29 “America’s China Worries – Part I,” Yale Global, February 6, 2007.

an advocate for a strong space defense, was quick to stress the need for an appropriate response by the Bush Administration to “the nature and urgency of this threat,” a

response that he had not yet seen One prominent observer (not identified here) exclaimed that China’s test was “a big favor…it activates our attention and capabilities.” There would be many similar responses, as there would be meetings and publications devoted to space matters that would dwell on this untoward development in the following weeks and months

And if there is little apparent overall general public reaction to China’s ASAT test, this is not the situation in the space community where the concern is more evident Lt General Michael A Hamel, commander of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, makes no bones about it: “If adversaries are using space in ways that would threaten American or our forces on the battlefield, we have to be able to disrupt or deny their use

of those capabilities.”30 The latest issue of the American Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics’ Aerospace America features an article suggesting that near space, “our

strategic space shore,” presents a unique and advantageous venue for combating growing threats.31

Jeopardized Space Cooperation

Under the circumstances, opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation in space have been jeopardized, and this is a particularly unfortunate consequence of China’s ASAT test Remember that there had been initiated a notable effort only last year to promote active space cooperation between the two countries This was undertaken despite serious reservations James Oberg, for one, wondered what, in effect, the Chinese would bring to the table and cautioned that “the rationale and tactics for such efforts must be based on reality, on cold-blooded assessments and on hard bargaining.”32 But the prospects for cooperation nonetheless received a boost during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s April

2006 visit to Washington Thus in September 2006, American astronaut Leroy Chiao, who was the first person of Chinese descent to walk in space and to command a space mission, visited China.33 And that same month, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin made NASA’s first official visit to China Among others, he was accompanied by veteran female astronaut Shannon Lucid, who was born in China.34

Outer space is a lonely place For those brave enough to endure the demands of space flight it will always be encouraging to have others similarly positively engaged, sharing the adventure and the excitement of exploration, cooperating in the discovery of new scientific knowledge, and hopefully representing optional or redundancy possibilities that

30 Speaking to the American Forces Press Service’s meeting in April 2007 See Steven Donald Smith, Long Beach, CA, April 23, 2007, in http://www.spacewar.com/reports , April 23, 2007.

31 Edward H Allen, “Our strategic space shore: Opportunities in near space,” Aerospace America

(September 2007): 26-31.

32 “The U.S and China: What ‘Common Ground’ in Outer Space?” Marshall Institute Policy Outlook

(August 2006): 1-9 Oberg is very knowledgeable about the Soviet/Russian space programs and knows well the limitations of cooperation with them.

33 See Leroy Chiao, “Inside Shenzhou Central,” Air & Space (February/March 2007): 28-29.

34 “NASA Administrator Departs China After ‘Rewarding’ First Visit,” NASA News, September 28, 2006

(www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/griffin-china-prt.htm).