See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317304663Strategic Defense, Disamament and Stability: Modelling Arms Race Ph
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Strategic Defense, Disamament and Stability: Modelling Arms Race Phenomena with Security and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties
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Trang 2Jürgen Scheffran
Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability
Modelling Arms Race Phenomena with Security
and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties
Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Marburger Wissenschaftler für Friedens-und Abrüstungsforschung und der Interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppe Friedens- und Abrüstungsforschung an der
Trang 3r
Jürgen Scheffran
Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability
Modelling Arms Race Phenomena with Security and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties
Doctoral Thesis Department of Phys i cs Un i versity of Marburg , FR Germany
October 1989 Granted by the Volkswagen-Stiftung
Trang 4STRATEGISCHE ABWEHR, ABRÜSTUNG UND
des Fachbereichs Physik der Philipps-Unversität Marburg/Lahn
Vorgelegt von JÜRGEN SCHEFFRAN aus Weyerbusch/Westerwald
Trang 5Vom Fachbereich Physik der Philipps-Universität Marburg/Lahn als
Dissertation angenommen am 7.12.1989
Berichterstatter: Prof Dr 0 Melsheimer
1 Mitberichterstatter: Prof Dr W Kerby (Hamburg)
2 Mitberichterstatter: Prof Dr U Albrecht (Berlin)
Die mündliche Prüfung zur Erlangung des Dr rer.nat wurde am 21.12.1989 bestanden
IMPRE SSUM
Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Marburger Wissenschaftler für
Friedens- und Abrüstungsforschung (AMW) und der
Interd isziplinären Arbeitsgruppe Friedens- und Abrüstungsforschung
an der Un ive rsität Marburg (IAFA)
Nr 9
E igenve r lag , IAFA,
Dr Johannes M Becker, Wilhelm Röpke-Str 6 G, Zi 21, 3550 Marburg
Druck: Un ive rsitätsdruckerei Marburg
Einband: Druckerei Mauersberger, Marburg
Titelgraphik: Helga Kern
Marburg 1989
ISBN 3-8185-0042-8
30,- DM
Trang 6Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 English Summary • • •
1.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung ( German Summary)
1.3 First Quotes •
1.4 Preface a.n.d Acknowledgements 1.5 Introductory Survey •
2 Qualitative Results and Conclusions 2.1 Abstract
2.2 Introduction • •
2.3 Requirements and Assumptions of the Arms Race Model 2.4 Qualitative Description of the Model Elements
2.5 Model Applications and Results • • • • • •
2.5.1 Conditions for Transition Stability 2.5.2 Analysis of the SCX Model • •
2.5.3 Simulation of the SCX Model •
2.5.4 Specifi.c Stability Aspects of the Strategie Forces 2.5.4.1 Offense
2.5.4.2 Defense
2.5.4.3 Offense-Defense Mix 2.6 Critical Rema.rks 2 7 Short Summary
3 Survey of the Quantitative Model Elements 3.1 Description of the SCX Model •
3.1.1 The Ba.sie Model Variables
3.1.2 The Basic Dynamic Equations
3.1.3 Verbal Description of the SCX model 3.2 Measures of Security a.nd Crisis Stability • • 3.2.1 Offense Capability an.d Damage -
3.2.2 First Strike and Second Strike Measures 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.2.5 3.2.6 3.2.7 3.2.8 3.2.9 3.2.10 3.2.11 The Strategie Cases • • • • •
Parameters of the First and Second Strike Ca.pabilities • • •
Probability of Survival for Different Defense Operation Modes • • Transition Stability in the Defense Domain •
Uncertainty and Perception • • •
Defensive Vuhterability and Survivability •
The Deterrence GaIIl.e • • • • •
Definition of the Strategie Security Function
Game Theoretic Measures of Crisis Stability • • •
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Trang 73.3 Aspects of Arms Race Stability
3.3.1 Decision Rules
3.3.2 Time Delays
3.3.3 The Security-Cost Coefficients
3.3.4 Cost-Effectiveness
3.3.5 Measures of Arms Race Instability
3.4 The Baseline Parameter Set
3.5 Basic Figures
3.5.1 The Defense Domain
3.5.2 The Offense-Defense Vector Space
3.6 Alphabetical Parameter Listing
3.7 Abbreviations
4 Political and Strategie Aspects of Strategie Defense
4.1 From the ABM Debate to SDI
4.2 Strategie Aspects of Strategie Defense
4.2.1 US Government Positions and Strategie Stability
4.2.2 The Defense Analytic Community and the Transition Concept
4.2.3 US Congress and the Role of Arms Control
4.2.4 Soviet Positions and the START Negotiations
5 Stability in Seeurity Poliey and Arms Control
5.1 General Perspectives on Stability
5.2 Levels of Stability in Security Policy and Arms Control
5.3 Dimensions of Crisis Stability
5.3.1 Survivability a.nd Retaliation
5.3.2 Transition Stability and Vulnerability
5.3.3 Payoffs, Probabilities, and Incentives
5.3.4 Uncertainty, Perception, and Complexity
5.3.5 Other Dimensions of Crisis Stability
5.4 Dimensions of Arms Race Stability
5.5 Arms Control, Disarmament, and Stability
6 Models on Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability
6.1 Introduction
6.2 A Survey on Strategie Stability Models
6.3 Some Critical Remarks on Modelling
7 Mathematical Description of Strategie Warfare
7.1 Characteristics of the Strategie Capabilities
7.2 The First Strike and Second Strike Capabilities
7.2.1 The Two-Strike Scenario
7 2.2 First strike
7.2.3 Second strike
7 3 The Ma.thematics of Counterforce
7.4 Measures of Defense Performance
7.4.1 Basic Definitions
7 4.2 Interceptors and Defense Capa.bility
7.4.2.1 Simultaneous Multiple Defensive Shots
Trang 87.5.1 Uniform Defense (UD)
7.5.2 Discriminating Semipreferential Defense (SPD)
7.5.3 Complete Preferential Defense (CPD)
7.5.4 Complete Preferential Attaclc (CPA)
96
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100
8.1 Measures of Strategie Security 101
8.1.4 Game Theoretic Assessment of Strategie Security 107
8.1.4.3 The Expected Probabilities 108 8.1.4.4 The Expected Values 109
8.2 Measures of Crisis Stability 112 8.2.1 Stability of the Strategie Cases 112
8.2.3 Defensive Vulnerability and Survivability 115 8.2.4 Uncertainty and Perception Variance 117
8.2.4.1 Basic Considerations 117 8.2.4.2 First-Strike and Second-Strike Uncertainties 118 8.2.5 A General Eramework for Stability - First Considerations and Examples 120
8.2.5.1 The Basic Characteristics of Stability 120 8.2.5.2 Examples for the Stability Eramework 122
9.1 Problem Description and Summary 124 9.1.1 The Stability Regions in the Defense Domain 124 9.1.2 Necessary Conditions for 'n:ansition Stability 126 9.1.3 Role of Uncertainties 128 9.1.4 Some Figures
9.2 Minimal Distan.ce between Exponential Functions
9.2.1 The Contact Problem
9.2.2 The Minimal Coordinate Distance and the Conditions of Contact
9.2.3 The Minimal Cross Distance
9.3.4 The Symmetrie Case
9.3.5 Transition Stability Under Uncertainties
9.3.6 Transition Stability and Defense Survivability
Trang 910 Models of Arms Race Phenomena
10.1 Qualitative Considerations on the Armament Dynamics
10.2 Selected Arms Race Models
10.2.1 The Richardson Model
10.2.2 Decision Rules and Seif-Stimulation
10.2.3 Nonlinearity, Predictability, and Chaos
10.2.3.1 Fundamentals of Chaos Theory
10.2.3.2 Saperstein (1984) 10.2.3.3 Grossma.nn and Mayer-Kress (1989)
10.2.3.4 Saperstein and Mayer-Kress (1988)
11 The Elements of the SCX Model
11.1 Basic Requirements
11.2 Model Assu.mptions and Elements
11.3 Survey on the SCX Model Elements
11.4 The Elements of the Security Dynamics
11.4.1 The Security-Cost Coeffi.cients
11.4.2 Security-Cost Exchange Ratios
11.4.3 The Self-induced Security Effect
11.5 The Elements of the Cost Dynamics
11.5.1 The Secw:ity Aspect Function K 5
11.5.2 The Cost Aspect Function Kc
11.6 Variable and Fixed Costs
11.6.1 The Microlevel
11.6.2 The Macrolevel
11.6.3 hnpact on Security
11.7 Decision Rules for the Strategie Capabilities
11.7.1 Definition of the Decision Rules
11.7.2 The Security Decision Function sf
11 7 3 The Growth Ftmction K f
11 7.4 The Environment Term U {
11.7.5 Limit Cases
11.7.5.1 Dedsion Rules With Security Effects 11.7.5.2 Decision Rules With Security Goals
12 Dynamics and Stability of the SCX Model
12.1 The Security-Cost Dynamics
12.1.l Equilibria and Linear Sta.bility Analysis
12.1.2 The Decoupled Cost Dynamics
12.1.2.1 Basic Equations
12.1.2.2 Connection to Other Arms Race Models
12.1.2.3 Stability of the Cost Model 12.1.3 The Decoupled Security Dynamics
12.1.4 Control Aspects
12.1.4.l Maintain Constant Costs 12.1.4.2 Maintain a Constant Security Aspect Ratio 12.1.4.3 Conditions for Chaotic Behavior 12.1.5 Simulation of the Security-Cost Model - Selected Examples
12.2 Measures of Cost-Effectiveness and Cast-Exchange
Trang 1012.2.2 Cost-Effectiveness of Wa.rheads a.nd lnterceptors
12.2.2.l The Lea.rning Curve 12.2.2.2 Cast-Exchange Ra.tio for Interceptors 12.2.2.3 Exponentia.l Dependence for D(I)
12.2.3 Security-Cost Effectiveness of the Strategie Capabilities
12.2.3.2 Denia.l of a Security Gain 12.2.3.2.1 Interna.! Cost-Effectiveness of Countermea.sures 12.2.3.2.2 Externa.1 Cost-Effectiveness of Defensive Actions
12.2.3.3.1 Interna.! Cost-Effediveness of Countermeasuxes
1 2.4 The Arms-Ra.ce Instability Index (ARlS)
13 Parameter Choice and Simulation
13.1.3 Parameters of First Strike a.nd Second Strike
13.1.5 Cost Estimates
13.2 Progra.m Description a.nd Simulation
13.3.l Interpretation of the Simulation Results
13.3.1.1 The Synunetric Baseline Case 13.3.1.2 The Synunetric Stabilized Case
13.3.3 Fina.l Rema.rks and 011tlook
A Technical and Stability Aspects of Strategie Warfare
A.1.1 Counterforce Uncertainties and Fra.tricide
A.2.2 Orbital Distance between Satellites
A.3.2 Sensitivity of the Reference Laser Configura.tion
A.3.4 Duels between Space-Ba.sed Laser Weapons
Trang 11A.3.-1.2 A Simple Landtester Model of Laser Warfare 270
A.3.5 The Sec.urity-Cost Effects and Strategie Stability 273
• \ t X-R.ay Laser Weapons 275
.\ .t.l Characteristics and Basic Equations 275
A.4 ~ Defense Capability for the Reference Con.figuration 277 A.4.3 Stability A!!pects 277
A 5 Space-Ba.sed Interceptors (SBI) 280
A.5.1 Basic Equations 280
A.5.2 Defense Capability and Cost-Effectiveness for the Reference Configuration 281
A.5.3 Other Stuclies • 285
A.6 Terminal Defense Intercep tors 287 A.6.1 The Interception Probability 287 A.6.2 Defense Capability of a Two-Layer Terminal Defense 288
A.6.3 Some Models on Stability Aspects , 290
B Models of Arms U se
B 1 Terminology
B 2 The Landtester Theory of Warfare
B.2.1 The General Equa tions
B.2.2 Distributed Fire and the Linear Law
B.2.3 Concentrated Fire and the Square Law
B 3 Models lncluding La.wich Reductions
B 3.1 Distributed Fire ·
B.3.2 Concentrated Fire •
B.3.3 A Missile Exdtange Model with Casualties
B.4 Applicability and Limitations
C Selected Tables and Figures
C.1 Strategie Offensive Fore.es
C.2 Strategie Defensive Forces
Trang 12compre-re ductio n of ~trat~gic nuclear weapons and defense system s is examined, including a variety of sc:ientific,
technical, economic, and political factors The interdisciplinar y attempt combines several contexts and
model approa.ches on different l~vds of complexity
The framew•>rk model, which to some degree is extracted from an extensive study of the literature
on missile defänse, stability, and modelling in security policy but predominantly is derived from own
con.siderations by means of physical and mathematical methods, has the following elements:
l The dynamics of the basic variables, security S, costs C, and armament (military capabilities) X
( offmse deft.nse, anti-defense) the so-called SCX mo del, is represented by time-discrete difference
equations and is studied by analytic means of stability theory, in particular
2 Th e security criteria, which ac:t as driving forces ofthe dynarnics , a.re derived from elementary game
theoretic ronsidera.tions on the expected outcomes an d probabilities of a strategic nuclear war, where
the number of nuclear warheads and their potential damage are used as security measures
3 For different quantitative criteria of crisis instability, arms race instability survivability and
cost-effectiveness, lirnit condition.s 1)f stability are derived
4 With regard to the problem of stability during the introduction of strategic defense and the realization
of eomprehensive nuclear disarmament, calculat i ons are carried out on transition stability between
unstable first-strike regions; a dynarnic model for the exchange between space weapons is applied ;
cost-effectiveness of measures and cou nterm eas ures is estimated; and the a.rmament dynarnics is
simulated by a computer prog ram
5 Within ll gener11l treatment of the limits of modelling, a strong emphasis is placed on the role
of uncertainties and the impact of threat perception Establishing a baseline parameter choice,
the effect of parameter variations is tested In the Ap pendix some model param et ers for different
technol ogies are derived from physical considerations
The following general conclusions can be d r awn from the study Under current or near future technical,
economic s tra tegii: and political conditio ns , the massive attempt to build strategic defense systems wo ul d
be, wi th high probability destabilizing with respect to c risis stability, arms race stability, and the risk
o f technical accidents Faced with the insufficient t e chnical basis and the high costs to be expected for
Strategie missile defense such an attempt might stimul a te o ff en sive countermeasures and prevent or delay
comprehensiv(' nuclear disannament Even for cost-effective and considerably survivable strategic defense
systems thP model behavior can become chaotic and unpredictable by the interplay between actions and
reactions, being reinforced by a variety of technical and political factors of uncertainty , leaving room for
different perceptions
A stabilization of this process would require decisive measures of mutual arms control, veriftcation,
conftdence building, and coopeI1ltion A way with less risks 1md costs for threat elimination would be
based on drastic reductions in t he nuclear arsenals without defense systems, whose stability would be
preserved by different mearures, in particular, by a strict inspection and verification regime , the normal
depreciation of armament due to ageing and non-rnodemization, and the conversion of cost savings for
c ivilian purposes