Chapter 7 - International banking and the basel accords. The objectives of this chapter are: To find out why banks are assigned special importance and why banking is more regulated than other business, to consider the types of risk a bank is exposed to, to consider the pros and cons of banking regulation…
Trang 1Chapter 7
International Banking and the
Basel Accords
Trang 2Objectives
• To find out why banks are assigned special
importance and why banking is more regulated than other business
• To consider the types of risk a bank is exposed to
• To consider the pros and cons of banking regulation
Trang 4Why banks are important
• Banking regulation centres on the objective of
minimising the possibility of bank failure because banks command more importance than other
financial and non-financial firms
• The failure of banks creates more turmoil in the
economy than perhaps any other kind of firm
Trang 5Reasons for the special importance
of banks
• The difference between the degrees of liquidity of
their assets and liabilities, which makes them highly vulnerable to depositor withdrawal and bank runs in extreme cases
• Banks are at the centre of the payment system (they are the creators of money, the medium of exchange)
(cont.)
Trang 6Reasons for the special importance
of banks (cont.)
• They face an asymmetric loss function, which is a
consequence of handling other people’s money
• The sheer size of the interbank market, resulting
from the fact that banks deal with each other on a
massive scale
Trang 7Reasons for the special importance
of banks (cont.)
• The failure of banks leads to a reduction in credit
flows to the rest of the economy, and hence adverse economic consequences
• The levels of turnover and product innovation are
high, making it unlikely that employees would
experience full business and product cycles
Trang 8The kinds of risk facing banks
• Financial risk
Credit risk
Market risk
• Interest rate risk
• Foreign exchange risk
• Equity price risk
• Commodity price risk
• Energy price risk
Trang 9The kinds of risk facing banks
Trang 10Examples of operational risk
Trang 11Examples of operational risk (cont.)
Trang 12Examples of other non-financial risk
Trang 14Types of operational loss events
Event Definition Example
Internal fraud Losses due to acts of fraud
involving at least one internal party.
Bribes, credit fraud and theft
Discrimination
of a product.
Product defects and misuse of confidential information
Terrorism, vandalism and natural disasters
Business
disruption and Losses arising from disruptions to or failures in Hardware, software and telecommunications
Trang 15Operational risk in the FX market
• One reason for the increasing level of operational
risk encountered in executing foreign exchange
transactions is increasing diversity of the foreign
exchange market, which is no longer dominated by commercial banks
(cont.)
Trang 16Operational risk in the FX market (cont.)
• The level of operational risk in the foreign exchange market has risen also because the increasing
complexity and size of the market have made it
necessary to introduce regular changes in trading procedures, trade capture systems, operational
procedures and risk management tools
Trang 17Justification for banking regulation
• Banking regulation can be justified on the basis of market failure such as externalities, market power, and asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers
• The second justification for banking regulation is the inability of depositors to monitor banks
Trang 18Arguments against banking
regulation
• Some economists dispute the arguments typically presented in favour of bank regulation
• There is significant scepticism about the role of
regulation as a means of achieving financial stability
• Regulators do not take into account the fact that risk creates value and that profits come from taking risk
Trang 19Regulation in the post-crisis era
• While the proponents of banking regulation argue that their views have been vindicated by the global financial crisis, those who hold opposite views still argue otherwise
• Some proponents of free banking assert that the
impact of the crisis would have been worse if it were not for deregulation
Trang 20Regulatory functions
• Macroprudential supervision is intended to limit
financial system distress that might damage the
economy
• Microprudential supervision focuses on the solvency
of individual institutions rather than the whole system
• Conduct-of-business regulation is also justified in
terms of consumer protection
Trang 21Segregation of regulatory functions
• The segregation of regulatory functions (for example, between APRA and the RBA in Australia) is a
controversial issue on which there is no consensus
• Some would argue that one lesson learned from the global financial crisis pertains to the segregation of supervisory roles, particularly between central banks and other supervisors
Trang 22Forms of banking regulation
• Deposit insurance: Arguments against are moral
hazard and adverse selection
• Operations regulation, including loans (highly
leveraged activities), investment in securities and balance sheet transactions
Trang 23off-Forms of banking regulation (cont.)
• Regulation of the accounting process, which became necessary following the accounting scandals at
Enron and WorldCom
• In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented in the United States to make corporate managers,
board members and auditors more accountable for the accuracy of the financial statements of their firms
(cont.)
Trang 24Forms of banking regulation (cont.)
• Capital-based regulation requires banks to be
subject to capital requirements, holding a minimum capital ratio, which is the ratio of capital to total
assets
• This is the basis of the Basel accords
Trang 25Global banking regulation
• The Basel accords
• The US International Banking Act of 1978
• The Single European Act of 1987
Trang 26Capital and related concepts
• Capital is simply the arithmetic difference between
assets and liabilities, which is also known as net
worth or shareholders’ equity
• Thus, a bank is solvent if the difference between
assets and liabilities is positive and vice versa
Trang 27Capital and related concepts (cont.)
• Economic capital is the capital that a firm must hold
to protect itself against insolvency with a chosen
level of certainty over a given period of time
• Regulatory capital is determined by regulators, for
example, as a given percentage of the risk-weighted value of assets
(cont.)
Trang 28Capital and related concepts (cont.)
• Capital adequacy refers to the requirement that banks hold adequate capital to protect themselves against insolvency
Trang 29Capital and related concepts (cont.)
• The capital ratio and the risk-adjusted capital ratio
are calculated as follows:
A
K k
A
K k
n i i
1 1
(cont.)
Trang 30Capital and related concepts (cont.)
• The risk-adjusted rate of return on capital is
calculated as:
K RAROC
Trang 31Capital and related concepts (cont.)
• Regulatory capital arbitrage is a process whereby banks exploit differences between a portfolio’s true economic risk and regulatory risk by, for example, shifting the portfolio’s composition towards high-
yield, low-quality (or high-risk) assets
Trang 32The Basel Committee
• The BCBS was established in 1974 following the
collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt
• The BCBS does not have any supranational
authority with respect to banking supervision, and this is why its recommendations and standards do not have legal force
Trang 33Functions of the Basel Committee
• Defining the role of regulators in cross-jurisdictional situations
• Ensuring that international banks do not escape
comprehensive supervision by the domestic
regulatory authority
• Promoting uniform capital requirements so that
banks from different countries may compete with
each other on a ‘level playing field’
Trang 34The Basel I Accord
• In 1988, the BCBS established the Basel I Accord for measuring capital adequacy for banks
• The objective of Basel I were:
(i) to establish a more ‘level playing field’ for
international competition among banks
(ii) to reduce the probability that such competition
would lead to bidding down of capital ratios to
Trang 35Requirements of Basel I
• Banks are required to hold as capital an amount of
no less than 8% of their risk-weighted assets
• The capital ratio, k, can be calculated as:
08
0
CR K k
Trang 37Criticism of Basel I (cont.)
• Failure to differentiate between high-quality and quality assets within a particular asset classes (such
low-as commercial and industrial credit) contributed to a steady increase in the credit risk of bank loan
portfolios
(cont.)
Trang 38Criticism of Basel I (cont.)
• Adding up the credit risks of individual assets ignores gains from diversification across less-than-perfectly correlated assets
Trang 39Criticism of Basel I (cont.)
• The initial exclusion of market risk from capital
requirements and high regulatory costs induced
banks to shift their risk exposure (via securitisation) from priced credit risk to unpriced market risk
(cont.)
Trang 40Criticism of Basel I (cont.)
• It completely ignores operational risk This sounds
odd when it has become a consensus view that
operational risk can be detrimental to the wellbeing
of a bank or any business firm for that matter
Trang 41Criticism of Basel I (cont.)
• The Accord gives very limited attention to credit
risk mitigation despite the availability of risk
management tools such as credit derivatives
(cont.)
Trang 42Criticism of Basel I (cont.)
• Basel I did not have the provisions to adequately
measure credit risk in the mortgage market,
creating disincentives for banks to purchase
mortgage insurance and encouraging the issuance
of uninsured mortgages
Trang 43The Basel II Accord
• In response to the criticism of the Basel I Accord and
to address changes in the banking environment that the 1988 Accord could not deal with effectively, the BCBS decided to create a new capital accord, Basel II
Trang 44• While retaining the key elements of the Basel I
Accord, including the general requirement that
banks ought to hold a regulatory capital ratio of at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets, Basel II
provides a range of options for determining capital requirements, allowing banks to use approaches
that are most appropriate for their operations
Trang 45The capital ratio under Basel II
• Because Basel II accounts for operational risk, the capital ratio formula becomes:
08
0
OR MR
CR
K k
Trang 46The pillars of Basel II
• The Basel II Accord has three pillars:
(i) minimum regulatory capital requirements
(ii) the supervisory review process
(iii) market discipline through disclosure requirements
Trang 47Calculating capital against credit
risk under Basel II
• The standardised approach is structurally similar to what is found in the 1988 Accord Banks are
required to classify their exposures into broad
categories, such as the loans they have extended
to corporate and sovereign borrowers and other
banks
(cont.)
Trang 48Calculating capital against credit
risk under Basel II (cont.)
• Under the internal-ratings based approach, banks may use their own internal estimates of credit risk
to determine the regulatory capital for a given
Trang 49Calculating capital against market risk under Basel II
• Two approaches are used to measure market risk: (i) the standardised approach
(ii)the internal models approach
• To be eligible for the use of internal models, a bank must satisfy certain conditions
Trang 50Calculating capital against
operational risk under Basel II
• Under the basic indicators approach, banks must
hold capital against operational risk that is equal to the average of the previous three years of a fixed
percentage of positive annual gross income:
y K
n i i
1
Trang 51Calculating capital against
operational risk under Basel II
(cont.)
• Under the standardised approach, regulatory capital for the whole bank is calculated as a three-year
average of the simple sum of capital charges of
individual business lines in each year:
Trang 52The Betas of business lines
Trang 53Calculating capital against
operational risk under Basel II
(cont.)
• According to the advanced measurement approach (AMA), regulatory capital is calculated by using the bank’s internal operational risk models
(cont.)
Trang 54Calculating capital against
operational risk under Basel II
(cont.)
• The Basel II Accord allows three alternative
approaches under the AMA:
(i) the loss distribution approach (LDA)
(ii) the scenario-based approach (SBA)
(iii)the scorecard approach (SCA), which is also called the risk drivers and controls approach (RDCA)
Trang 55Calculating capital against
operational risk under Basel II
(cont.)
• A bank’s regulatory capital can be calculated from the capital charges of individual business units by adding them up under the assumption of zero
correlation Otherwise, the loss data can be
combined to calculate regulatory capital for the
whole bank from a single loss distribution, in which case we assume perfect correlation
Trang 56Criticism of Basel II
• Basel II represents inappropriate or inadequate
financial supervision While capital adequacy
requirements are designed to protect banks from
insolvency, the problems faced by banks during the onslaught of the global financial crisis were illiquidity and leverage
Trang 57Criticism of Basel II (cont.)
• Banks should not be regulated in the same way as they are managed The objective of aligning
regulatory capital with economic capital (which
implies running the bank the same way as regulating it) is way off the mark
(cont.)
Trang 58Criticism of Basel II (cont.)
• The resulting risk-sensitive capital requirements
enhance procyclicality of the banking system
• Over-reliance on the ratings of the rating agencies to determine the riskiness of assets sounds ludicrous in the post-crisis era
Trang 59Criticism of Basel II (cont.)
• Business and reputational risks, which are not
recognised by Basel II, may be more significant than the direct operational losses that the banking
industry has been asked to monitor
• By increasing its complexity, pillar 1 does not
necessarily make the regulation more accurate
(cont.)
Trang 60Criticism of Basel II (cont.)
• As far as operational risk is concerned, pillar 1 is
criticised on the grounds that operational risk
modelling is not possible in the absence of
comprehensive databases
• The basic indicators approach is criticised for the
calculation of the capital charge as a percentage of gross income