Sinking of MV sewol

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 2 On 15 May 2014, the captain and three crew members were charged with murder, while the other 11 members of the crew were indicted for be accused of abandoning

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 1

Sinking of MV Sewol

- Excerpted from Wikipedia,

The sinking of MV Sewol (Hangul: 세월호 침몰 사고; Hanja: 世越

號沈沒事故), also referred to as the Sewol Ferry Disaster, occurred on the morning of 16 April 2014, when the passenger/ro-ro ferry was en

route (on the way) from Incheon towards Jeju in South Korea The

Japanese-built South Korean ferry sank while carrying 476 people, mostly secondary school students from Danwon High School (Ansan City) The 6,825-ton vessel sent a distress signal from about 2.7 kilometres (1.7 mi) north of Byeongpungdo at 08:58 Korea Standard Time (23:58 UTC, 15 April 2014) In total, 304 passengers and crew members died in the disaster Of the approximately 172 survivors, more than half were rescued by fishing boats and other commercial vessels that arrived at the scene approximately 40 minutes after the South Korean coast guard

The sinking of Sewol resulted in widespread social and political reaction within South Korea Many criticized the actions of the captain and most of the crew Also criticized were the ferry operator and the regulators who oversaw its operations, along with the South Korean government for its disaster response (including the poor showing of the then Korean coastguard) and attempts to downplay government

culpability (to weaken the governmental responsibility)

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 2

On 15 May 2014, the captain and three crew members were charged with murder, while the other 11 members of the crew were indicted for

(be accused of) abandoning the ship An arrest warrant was also issued

for Yoo Byung-eun, the owner of Chonghaejin Marine, which operated

Sewol, but he could not be found despite a nationwide manhunt (a

nationwide seeking for a guilty man) On 22 July 2014, police revealed

that they had established that a dead man found in a field 415 kilometres south of Seoul was Yoo Foul play was ruled out

Background

Sewol at a port in Incheon on March 2014, after modifications had been made At the time of her purchase by Chonghaejin Marine in 2012, the ship that would come to be known as the Motor Vessel (MV) Sewol

was 18 years old and dilapidated (/dɪˈlæp.ɪ.deɪ.tɪd/: old and in poor

condition) She was originally named Ferry Naminoue and was

operated from 1994 to 2012 as a transport ship for cargo and passengers

by the Japanese company A-Line Ferry According to A-Line Ferry, she did not experience any problems while being operated by the company in Japan After she was purchased on 8 October 2012, she

was registered by Chonghaejin on 22 October 2012 and underwent

modifications from 12 October 2012 to 12 February 2013 The modifications were later found to have been based on an illegal

redesign of the ship

After the modifications, which included the addition of two floors of passenger space and the expansion of the cargo space, Sewol had her

gross tonnage (Total tonnage measurement) increase by 239 tons to

6,825 tons and her persons capacity increase by 116 people for a total

of 956 people including the crew The modifications also resulted in her center of gravity being moved upward by 0.51 m (1 ft 8 in) as well

as a left-right imbalance After the modifications were completed, she underwent investigations by the Korean Register of Shipping including

an inclining test, and received the ship inspection certification and the certification for the prevention of sea pollution on 12 February 2013 During the process of approving the modifications, the Register reduced the maximum amount of cargo that could be carried by 1,450 tons to 987 tons, and increased the amount of ballast needed by 1,333

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 3

tons, to 1,703 tons The cargo limits were not known by the Korea Shipping Association, who has the responsibility to manage ferries, or the Korea Coast Guard, who were responsible for overseeing the Shipping Association The South Korea government's Audit and Inspection Board later revealed that the Register's licensing was based

on falsified documents (fake records) After the inspections, 37 tons of

marble were further added to the gallery room at the bridge deck located on the back of the ship

Sewol began operations on 15 March 2013 She made three rounds trips per week from Incheon to Jeju, each one-way voyage of 425 kilometres (264 mi) taking 13.5 hours to complete On 19 February 2014, she received an interim inspection and a periodic inspection from the Register She had made the round trip a total of 241 times until the day

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 4

leading the Shipping Association to hold Sewol's departure The VTS retracted the warning around 8:35 p.m., and the Shipping Association removed the restriction on Sewol's departure after checking the weather conditions with the operator of the Palmido lighthouse and consulting with the Korean Coast Guard She departed around 9 p.m., and was the only ship to leave port that evening

When she departed, she was carrying 443 passengers, 33 crew members, and a total of 2,142.7 tons of cargo including 185 cars 325

of the passengers were students on a field trip from Danwon High School and five passengers were of non-Korean nationality The ship

was commanded by 69-year-old Captain Lee Joon-seok, who had been

brought in as a replacement for the regular captain He had over 40 years of experience at sea, and had traveled the route before He was hired on a one-year contract, with a monthly salary of ₩2.7 million (roughly 2,500 USD) Lee worked with 33 crew members for the journey, of which 19 were irregular, part-time workers.[48]

Later investigations discovered problems concerning the state of Sewol

at the time of departure The Safety Investigation Report made by the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal noted that Sewol at the time of departure was carrying 2,142.7 tons of cargo when its maximum allowance was 987 tons TIME magazine further noted that the cargo had been improperly secured.[49] The Report also noted that only 761.2 tons of ballast were taken on board, that some ballast tanks had not been properly maintained, and that the last voyage was made without making further adjustments to the ballast during the journey Kukmin Ilbo reported that Captain Shin, the regular captain of Sewol, had warned the company about the decrease in stability and passenger satisfaction and attributed it to the removal of the side ramp Captain Shin claimed that the company responded with threats to fire him if he continued his objections Captain Shin's warnings were also relayed through an official working for the Incheon Port Authority on 9 April

2014, which an official from the company responded to by stating that

he would deal with anyone making the claims The Korea Herald also reported that the captain had requested a repair for the malfunctioning steering gear on 1 April 2014, which was not done The Daily Telegraph reported that the Korean Register of Shipping had noted in

a stability test report dated 24 January 2014 that Sewol had become 'too

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 5

heavy and less stable after modifications were made.' The New York Times reported that the company budget for the safety training of the crew was $2 USD, which was used to buy a paper certificate

16 April 2014

Entering the Maenggol Channel (07:30–08:46)

On 16 April at 7:30 a.m (KST), third mate Park Han-kyul and helmsman Cho Joon-ki took over the watch from the previous team At this point in time, Sewol was heading at a course of about 165 degrees

at a speed of about 20 knots, and was operating two radar devices Around 8:20 a.m when the ship was about 2-3 miles from entering the Maenggol Channel, Park ordered Cho to change the steering system from autopilot to manual steering When Sewol arrived at the channel

at 8:27 a.m at a course of around 137 degrees, the wind speed was between 4 and 7 meters per second, the wave height about 0.5 meters, and the visibility good

The Maenggol Channel has strong underwater currents, which

necessitate extreme caution (necessarily requires the most the state of being catious) when steering a ship through the channel At the time of

the incident, conditions were calm and Sewol was following a route that was frequently used While the wider areas of the channel contain rock hazards and shallow waters, they were not in the immediate vicinity of the ship's usual path While prosecutors and some news organizations including CNN and The Chosun Ilbo labeled Park as being 'inexperienced' based on her unfamiliarity with the channel, the Safety Investigation Report noted that Park had on multiple occasions passed through the channel on another ship.[29]:40

As Sewol approached the fatal turn, breakfast was being served in the cafeteria Kim Seong-mok, a passenger, later recalled having eaten breakfast right before the incident CCTV data taken at 8:40 a.m also showed students present and socializing on the deck Another passenger, Choi Eun-seun, recalled having gone up to the deck to smoke right before the incident

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 6

Multiple turns to the right (08:48)

Right before the incident, the Chief Engineer, Helmsman Cho, and Third Mate Park were standing side by side near the ship's wheel at the bridge Captain Lee was being absent from the bridge at the time At 8:46 a.m., Sewol was travelling at a speed of 18 knots at a course of around 136 degrees At this time, Park ordered Cho to change the course from 135 degrees to 140 degrees, which Cho consequently undertook

There are conflicting accounts (debates) of what happened next According to Park's testimony (evident proofs), after she had used the

radar to check that Sewol's course was changed and the current course was set to 140 degrees, Park ordered Cho to change the course of the ship further to 145 degrees The order was given at 8:48 a.m After realizing that the ship was heavily listing to port which led the bow to turn to the right, she gave an order to turn the wheel to port Immediately after giving the order, she heard Cho exclaim "the wheel isn't working" in a flustered voice, after which the ship started listing The testimony of the Chief Engineer did not notably differ

(significantly similar to) from that of Park

Cho testified that the listing of the ship began with the order to turn to

140 degrees According to Cho, he only received the order to change the course to 140 degrees, and not the order to change the course to 145 degrees Because the ship kept turning towards the right even as he was holding onto the wheel, he made two turns to the left amounting to a 5-degree turn Because the ship did not stop its rightward turning, it was eventually facing a 145-degree course Cho testified that Park gave an order to turn "in the opposite direction" at this point, which he followed

by turning the ship further to the left by 10 degrees, so the total amount

of the turn became 15 degrees to the left

The court came to the conclusion that Cho's steering led the ship to attempt a 15 degree turn for 40 seconds The court concluded that Cho, who was flustered by the ship turning faster than expected when he was following Park's order to turn to 145 degrees, was attempting to turn to the left when he took Park's order to mean a turn in the opposite

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 7

direction This led him to make a turn to the right, causing the head of the ship to rapidly turn right

Effects of the turn

Later analysis of Sewol's track chart by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries revealed that the ship's Automatic Identification System had stopped collecting data from 8:48:37 to 8:49:13; consequently, the Ministry and the Jindo Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) lost 36 and 29

seconds of data, respectively While earlier reports and investigations

believed that there was a power outage, Huh Yong-bum, the head of the expert advisory panel on the police-prosecution joint investigation team, testified that the AIS failure was due to system limitations and that the failure did not affect the steering

According to the joint investigation team, the sharp turn was a combined result produced by the steering error and the lessened restoring force caused by overloading; investigations did not show any malfunctions with the generator or the battery From 8:49:26, AIS data showed Sewol's angular velocity accelerated from 0.29 radians per second to 0.83, 1.00, and 2.00 until 8:49:39; these readings were consistent with previous testing data gained from earlier tests conducted on an empty Sewol Consequently, the ship herself listed 20 degrees into the water; on 8:49:40, causing cargo to fall to one side of the ship The impact caused the ship's gyroscope to erroneously record angular velocities of 15 radians per second on 8:49:40, 14 on the next second, and −11 on the consequent second, and tilt the ship 10 degrees further into the water Passengers also reported hearing a loud "bang"

As Helmsman Cho sharply turned the wheel from 135 to 150 degrees,

Sewol began to list to port and tilt towards the water The overall effect

was that the ship turned about 45 degrees to the right, then rotated 22 degrees on the spot for a span of 20 seconds The cargo falling to one

side of the ship caused Sewol to lose all her restoring force and allowed

water to flow into the ship through the side door of the cargo loading bay and the car entrance located at the stern This scenario was confirmed by simulations separately run by the expert advisory panel

on the joint investigation team, the Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering, and the Advanced Marine Engineering Center

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 8

of Seoul National University The chief engineer testified that the tilting lasted for about two to three minutes after the initial tilt During this time, Oh Yong-seok, an off-duty helmsman who was sleeping in his cabin, was awakened when he was thrown against its port side As

of 8:50 a.m., Sewol was leaning 30 degrees to port

Captain Lee, who was in his private cabin at the time of the incident, immediately rushed to the bridge After a short period, all the ship's mates and helmsmen arrived there as well Around this time, the chief engineer stopped the engines, although it is unknown whether it was on his own volition or following an order from Captain Lee At 8:50, the

chief engineer ordered an evacuation (the act of to move people from a

dangerous place to somewhere safe) of the engine room through a call

to the assistant engineer During this time, Park was crying, as she was

taken aback (If you are taken aback by something, you are surprised or

shocked by it and you cannot respond at once) by the sudden incident;

this lasted until at least 9:06 a.m

With the engines off, Sewol became unable to change directions and began drifting sideways A passenger later testified that lights went out

after the ferry started listing (began to sink off)

Calls for rescue (8:52–9:30)

Announcement repeated during capsizing:

“Do not move Just stay where you are It's dangerous if you move, so just stay where you are.” - As reported by CNN on 16 April

As Sewol began sinking, the ferry's intercom system started ordering

the passengers to stay put (not to move), alleging that moving was

dangerous The announcements were made by a communication officer, Kang Hae-seong, who had not consulted the manual before the broadcast The announcements began broadcasting by at least 8:52 a.m and continued even when water began flooding passenger

compartments Other crew members corroborated (to add proof to an

account, statement, idea, etc with new information) this order,

instructing passengers to stay put Captain Lee also instructed

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 9

passengers to stay put and did not change the order even as he was leaving the ship

The first emergency call was made by Choi Duk-ha, a Danwon high school student aboard the ferry At 8:52 a.m., he called the national emergency service number and reported to the Jeollanam-do fire station

that Sewol was capsizing (turning upside down) Choi was connected

to the Mokpo Coast Guard at 8:54 a.m and was asked to give the latitude and longitude of the ship's location Three minutes later, the Mokpo Coast Guard station situation room ordered patrol vessel No

123 to be dispatched to the scene; the vessel was launched at 8:58 a.m

Following the Coast Guard search and rescue manual, the boat was to

be in charge of surveying the area and "swiftly" (as quickly as possible)

rescuing passengers Choi did not survive the capsizing and was later found dead

At 8:55 a.m., Sewol's crew made their first distress call to the Jeju vessel traffic service and asked the Jeju VTS to notify the Coast Guard,

as the ferry was rolling and in danger (in jeopardy) At 8:56 a.m., the

Jeju VTS called the Jeju Coast Guard Three minutes later, the Jeju Coast Guard called the Mokpo Coast Guard and discovered that a patrol boat had already been dispatched At 9:01 a.m., a crew member on Sewol called the Incheon branch of Chonghaejin Marine to report the situation, and the Chonghaejin Marine headquarters located in Jeju then called Captain Lee at 9:03 a.m for a report of the situation The Incheon branch then talked with the first mate in five telephone calls over the next 35 minutes

At 9:06 a.m., the Jindo VTS were informed of the capsizing incident

by the Mokpo Coast Guard Around this time, the crew began communicating with the Jindo VTS, which was closer to their location For the next two minutes, Jindo VTS alerted two other ships that Sewol was sinking, with one confirming that it had visual contact with the ship At 9:07 a.m., Sewol's crew confirmed that the ferry was capsizing and requested the help of the Coast Guard At 9:14 a.m., the crew stated that the ship's angle of heel made evacuation impossible Around this time, the captain of Patrol Vessel 123 was appointed the commander of the scene Four minutes afterwards, the crew of Sewol reported to the VTS that the ferry had heeled more than 50 degrees to port

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 10

At 9:23 a.m., the VTS ordered the crew to inform the passengers to wear personal flotation devices When the crew replied that the

broadcasting equipment was out of order (broken), the VTS told them

to personally order the passengers to wear life jackets and more clothing At 9:25 a.m., the VTS asked the captain to decide quickly whether to evacuate the ship, stating that they did not have enough information to make the decision When the captain inquired about the rescue, the VTS replied that patrol boats were due to arrive in 10 minutes and a helicopter in one minute The captain then replied that there were too many passengers for the helicopter

During this time, the captain told passengers to stay in their rooms The communications officer, using the ship's intercom, repeatedly ordered passengers not to move

Around 9:30 a.m., the captain gave orders to evacuate the ship, though the order may not have been relayed to all the passengers At 9:33 a.m., after confirming that nearby ships had volunteered to help in the rescue operations, the VTS told all ships to drop lifeboats for the passengers

At 9:38 a.m., all communications were cut off between the VTS and the ferry About three minutes after all communications were cut, about

150 to 160 passengers and crew jumped overboard

Sewol took two and a half hours to sink By around 11:18 a.m., the stern was submerged, with a section of the hull about 2 metres (6 ft 7 in) high and 20 to 30 metres (66 to 98 ft) long showing above the water

At 12:00 noon on 16 April, only 50 centimetres (20 in) of the bulbous bow was above water As of 1:03 p.m., the ship was completely submerged

Captain and crew

During the capsizing, some members of the crew drank beer.[108] The crew also communicated by telephone with staff from Chonghaejin Marine at seven different times As passengers stayed in their cabins as instructed, the captain and crew members abandoned the ship The captain, the chief engineer, and the chief and second mates were the first people to be rescued The captain was rescued around 9:46 a.m

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 11

Passengers

As the ship capsized, some passengers followed the announcements to stay put, even as the water came in Most of the student passengers obeyed the announcements Some passengers who climbed to the top

of the ship or jumped into the water were rescued

Videos made recording passengers during the capsizing have been recovered Some recorded the announcements telling passengers to stay

in place and put on life-jackets, while some showed passengers joking

around, putting on life jackets, and sending farewells (send the

goodbyes)

Passengers made calls and sent text messages and KakaoTalk mobile messages during the capsizing The last message was sent at 10:17 a.m Text messages and social media posts allegedly made by survivors after the capsizing have circulated in the media, but an investigation by the Cyber Terror Response Center found that passengers did not use their phones between 12:00 p.m on 16 April and 10:00 a.m of 17 April and that all the reported survivors' messages were fake

Rescue operations

During the capsizing and the subsequent reporting, the government's announcements, as well as those from the media, were inconsistent and inaccurate An editorial in The Huffington Post stated that the governmental reports were like a rubber band, 'increasing at one moment and decreasing at another.' Newspapers such as The JoongAng

Ilbo, MBN, and JTBC later made corrections and apologies concerning

their earlier reports Conspiracy theories were also present in the

aftermath (consequence) of the sinking

First day

At 8:58 a.m (KST) on 16 April 2014, the Mokpo Coast Guard dispatched patrol vessel No 123 in response to the first report of the incident After receiving the news of the capsizing from the Jeollanam

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 12

Provincial Government, the Republic of Korea Navy 3rd Fleet sent a Gumdoksuri-class patrol vessel (PKG) to the accident site at 9:03 a.m.; the Navy dispatched another PKG at 9:09 a.m At 9:04 a.m., the government created the Central Disaster Countermeasure Headquarters (중앙재난안전대책본부), as an organization which would directly

report to the government The South Korean coast guard set up a rescue

operations’ headquarters at 9:10 a.m

Patrol vessel No.123 arrived at the scene near 9:30 a.m as the first ship

to reach the site after the incident During the time between the dispatch and the operations, members failed to raise Sewol, and chose to call for other ships on the radio Consequently, members on the vessel had not directly communicated with Sewol, and were not aware of the content

of the communication between Sewol and the Jindo VTS on arrival At the time of arrival, Sewol had listed about 50 to 60 degrees to port When the vessel arrived, members made announcements for five minutes, calling people to abandon ship and jump into the water The vessel began rescue operations at 9:38 a.m., with the dispatching of a rubber boat Passengers who had reached the deck or jumped into the water were rescued, including the captain, but rescue members could not get inside the ship due to the list People trapped inside the pilothouse were rescued by breaking through the windows

At 9:35 a.m., the Korean Ministry of National Defense started operating Counter-disaster Headquarters (재난대책본부) At 9:40 a.m., the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries declared the accident to be

the highest state of emergency in terms of naval accidents;

consequently, the Central Accident Response Headquarters (중앙사고수습본부) was established At the same time, the Ministry

of Health and Welfare sent emergency vehicles and the first squad of the Disaster Medical Support Team (재난의료지원팀) to Jindo At 11:28 a.m., the Korea Navy's Ship Salvage Unit (SSU) was reported to

have been deployed for (be effectively used) the operations

At 2:42 p.m., 150 special forces personnel from the ROK Army Special Warfare Command, including 40 scuba divers, were sent for the operation At this point, 196 personnel, including 82 in the SSU and

THE SINKING OF MV SEWOL 13

114 in the ROK Naval Special Warfare Flotilla were involved in the operations At 3:07, the regional government of the Gyeonggi Province was reported to have started operating the Prevention and Countermeasures Headquarters (재난안전대책본부) After 5 p.m., units from the SSU began undersea operations At 5:13, the Gyeonggi-

do Office of Education was reported to have started operating the Ansan Danwon High School Accident Countermeasures Report Compiling Headquarters (안산 단원고 사고대책 종합상황본부) At 8:00, operations investigating the ship's hull were ceased

As of 22:03, the following units were involved in rescue operations: Naval forces include sailors from the 3rd Fleet (제3함대; 第三艦隊),

a Dokdo-class amphibious assault ship, a Chungmugong Yi class destroyer, and an Ulsan-class frigate The ROK Air Force sent support units such as the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, Sikorsky HH-60 Pave Hawk, and HH-47 variant of the Boeing CH-47 Chinook The ROK Army sent units including 150 Special Warfare Command soldiers and 11 ambulances