Vietnam: Pacification and the Big War

ID & SIG:• air mobility, attrition, Ia Drang, Kennedy, limited war, NVA, Operation Rolling Thunder, pacification, Special Forces Green Berets, strategic hamlet program, Westmoreland...

Vietnam: Pacification and the

Big War

Lsn 33

ID & SIG:

• air mobility, attrition, Ia Drang, Kennedy, limited war, NVA, Operation Rolling Thunder,

pacification, Special Forces (Green Berets),

strategic hamlet program, Westmoreland

program in Vietnam, part

of which would become

the “pacification” program

– Cut into the heart of

the Viet Cong

politico-military organization

• Designed to “win the

hearts and minds” of the

South Vietnamese

In 1967, Robert Komer, shown here with President Johnson, was selected to head CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural

Development Support)and coordinate all pacification programs

• Strategic Hamlet Program…

South Vietnamese peasants

from scattered villages were

brought together in defended

and organized hamlets in order

to protect them, isolate the Viet

Cong, and show the superiority

of what the SVN government

could offer

– Patterned after British experience

in Malaya

– Did not work in Vietnam because

of traditional Vietnamese ties to

the land

• Combined Action Program… Placed

selected Marine squads within the

village militia to eliminate local guerrillas– Very successful at the local level but required

• Instead, American troops concentrated

on the “big war”and left pacification to the South Vietnamese who did not show

an abundance of commitment to the task

• Revolutionary

Development

Program… Put armed

social workers into

– When VC saw the program

might bear fruit they

unleashed a terrorist

campaign that reduced

defections from 5,000 to 500

a month

– CORDS responded with

Operation Phoenix, a direct

action plan to kill, capture, or

co-opt the “provincial

reconnaissance units”

These former VC who took

advantage of the chieu hoi

amnesty receive training in automotive repair to help them

in their new lives

Pacification: Overall Assessment

• Commonly considered a

missed strategic

opportunity

• Suffered from being “too

little, too late”

– CORDS not activated

until 1967

• Perceived as competition

with the “big war” and

many military officers

favored a “military

solution”

Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay reportedly said, “Grab

‘em by the balls and their hearts

and minds will follow.”

Limited War

• When the Soviet Union and the

US nuclear programs reached

the point of Mutually Assured

Destruction, the US faced the

dilemma of responding to

communist challenges in

peripheral areas by either risking

starting a nuclear war or doing

nothing

• The alternative strategy of limited

war was developed to harness

the nation’s military power and

employ only that force necessary

to achieve the political aim

The US considered, but did not use, atomic bombs in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954

Limited War

• The objective of limited war

was not to destroy an

opponent but to persuade him

to break off the conflict short of

achieving his goals and without

resorting to nuclear war

• The limited war theory was

more an academic than a

military concept and its

application resulted in

tensions, frustrations, and

misunderstanding between the

military and civilian leadership McNamara is sharply criticized Secretary of Defense Robert

for his technocratic and statistical approach to the

Vietnam War

Johnson’s Approach

• The Johnson

Administration was

deeply influenced by

limited war theory

– Desirous not to let the

conflict expand into a

third world war

Westmoreland, Feb 1966)

Strategy of Attrition

• Traditionally, the “American way of

war” had been a strategy of

annihilation

– Seeks the immediate

destruction of the combat power

of the enemy’s armed forces

• In Vietnam, the US would instead

follow a strategy of attrition

– The reduction of the

effectiveness of a force caused

by loss of personnel and

materiel

• This proved to be a poor strategy

against the North Vietnamese who

used a strategy of exhaustion

– The gradual erosion of a

nation’s will or means to resist

Anti-war protests such as this one at the 1968

Democratic National Convention showed domestic support for the war was waning

Problems with the Strategy of

Attrition

• Led the US to fight according to the

theory of gradual escalation

– A steady increase in the level of

military pressure (rather than

employing overwhelming force

all at once) would coerce the

enemy into compliance

– US never had enough forces to

control the countryside

– US soldiers served one year

tours in Vietnam

– North Vietnamese soldiers were

there till the end and recognized

“Victory will come to us, not

suddenly, but in a complicated

and tortuous way.”

US soldiers regularly conducted clearing operations but the Viet Cong would reoccuppy the area after the US units moved on

US Troop Levels in Vietnam

Problems with the Strategy of

Attrition

• Led to a “body count” mentality

– Many reports were exaggerated or

falsified

– North Vietnamese were always able

to replace their losses while

Americans became disillusioned with

the mounting death toll

• Nightly news broadcasts reported US

deaths versus North Vietnamese deaths

– If ours were less, we were winning!

• North Vietnamese showed a remarkable

capability to cope, rebuild, and repair

– The enemy will was never broken

Nightly news anchors such as Walter Cronkite regularly reported the Vietnam “body count”

Problems with the Strategy of

Attrition

• Low-tech nature of the enemy

prevented the US from bringing to

bear the full effects of its combat

power

– North Vietnamese infiltration

routes were hard to bomb

– North Vietnamese ground

troops used the tactic of

“clinging to the G.I.’s belts” to

minimize American ability to use

artillery and close air support

– The nature of guerrilla war

allowed the North Vietnamese

to avoid contact when it was not

to their advantage to fight

A long line of communist porters carry supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail (AP photo by Trong Thanh)

Other Manifestations of Limited

War Theory

• “Gradual escalation”

– President never fully acceded to the troop or bombing requests of his commanders, but the process resulted

in the failure of one level of force justifying the

increase to the next level

• Restrictive rules of engagement

• Bombing pauses and negotiations

• Failure to significantly mobilize the National

Guard

Total War vs Limited War

• The relationship between the belligerents is asymmetric The

insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of the external power because they lack an invasion capability On the other hand, the metropolitan power poses not simply the threat of

invasion, but the reality of occupation This fact is so obvious that its implications have been ignored It means, crudely speaking, that for the insurgents the war is “total,” while for the external

power it is necessarily “limited.” Full mobilization of the total

military resources of the external power is simply not politically possible Not only is full mobilization impossible politically, it is not thought to be in the least necessary The asymmetry in

conventional military capability is so great and the confidence that military might will prevail is so pervasive that expectation of

victory is one of the hallmarks of the initial endeavor

– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

Total War vs Limited War

• Superior strength of commitment thus compensates for

military inferiority Because the outcome of the war can never

be as important to the outside power as it is to those who

have staked their very existence on victory, the weaker side fights harder, displaying a willingness to incur blood losses that would be unacceptable to the stronger side The signers

of the Declaration of Independence risked their lives,

fortunes, and sacred honor in what became a contest with an imperial giant for which North America was (after 1778) a

secondary theater of operations in a much larger war For the American rebel leadership, defeat meant the hangman's

noose For British commanders in North America, it meant a return to the comforts and pleasures of London society and perhaps eventual reassignment

– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

Total War vs Limited War

• The tables were reversed in Vietnam There, the United States attempted to suppress a revolution against

foreign domination mounted by an enemy waging a total war against a stronger power, a power for which the

outcome of that war could never be remotely as

important as it was to the insurgents The United States could and did wreak enormous destruction in Vietnam, but nothing that happened in Vietnam could or did

threaten core overseas US security interests, much less the survival of the United States Thus, whereas the

Vietnamese communists invested all their energy and available resources in waging war, US annual defense spending during the war averaged only 7.5 percent of the nation’s gross national product.

– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

Total War vs Limited War

• “The ability of the Vietcong continuously to rebuild their units and make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war

We still find no plausible explanation for the continued strength of the Vietcong [They] have the recuperative power of the phoenix [and] an amazing ability to maintain morale.” (Maxwell Taylor)

• “I never thought [the war] would go like this I didn’t think these

people had the capacity to fight this way If I had thought they could take this punishment and fight this well, could enjoy fighting like this,

I would have thought differently at the start.” (Robert McNamara)

• “Hanoi’s persistence was incredible I don’t understand it, even to this day.” (Dean Rusk)

• The US leadership “underestimated the toughness of the

Vietnamese.” (William Westmoreland)

– Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”

Flexible Response

• President Kennedy moved away from the

Eisenhower Administration’s reliance on nuclear weapons and developed a strategy of “Flexible Response” which was designed to permit

different types of military options at different

• Provided equipment and

advisors to South Vietnamese

• Special Forces conducted

civic action programs

• US helicopter pilots

transported South Vietnamese

soldiers

• Advisors accompanied South

Vietnamese units down to the

battalion level Special Forces were active

in training montagnards in the Central Highlands

• Insisted on using technology

and tactics that were

inappropriate for the

environment and the nature of

the war

• North Vietnamese became

very adept at countering US

conventional tactics

B-52 bomber over Vietnam

The Big War

– Vietnamization – Withdrawal

• Legacy

– Vietnam Syndrome

Bombing: Rolling Thunder

• Sustained bombing campaign designed to

– Reduce North Vietnamese/Viet Cong activities by

affecting their will

– Improve South Vietnamese morale

– Provide US and South Vietnam with a bargaining tool – Reduce infiltration of men and material

– Demonstrate US resolve to support allies

• Gradually expanded from 63,000 tons of bombs

in 1965 to 226,000 in 1967

– Bomb tonnage surpassed what had been dropped on Germany, Italy, and Japan in World War II

Bombing: Rolling Thunder

• Heavy reliance on air

power overestimated the

capabilities of strategic

bombing and

underestimated North

Vietnamese will

• North Vietnamese were

able to rebuild damage,

Bombing: Rolling Thunder

• Problems

– Micromanaged targeting

and target restrictions

frustrated military planners

– Difficulty in finding targets

Bombing: Rolling Thunder

• Restrictions

– White House picked targets,

strike force size, weapons,

and timing of attacks

– Most strategic targets were

– North Vietnamese airfields

were off limits

– Could not attack SAM sites

unless fired upon

Bombing Rolling Thunder

and military objectives

– “Rolling Thunder had

not been built to

succeed, and it didn’t.”

• John Correll Johnson supposedly said, “I won’t

let those Air Force generals bomb the smallest outhouse without

checking with me.”

• In Jan 1963 the Army began forming and testing the 11th Air Assault Division which would

ultimately result in the 1st Cavalry Division

(Airmobile) being activated in July 1965

• In Aug the division began arriving in Vietnam

Airmobility: Ia Drang

• The airmobility

concept was tested

in combat when the

• The Big War (continued) and the Vietnam Syndrome