the university of north carolina press fall-out shelters for the human spirit american art and the cold war jun 2005

This is surprisingsince during the two and a half decades following the end of World War II, the Department of State, the usia, and even the Smithsonian tion saw to it that hundreds of e

FALL-OUT SHELTERS FOR THE HUMAN SPIRIT

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FALL-OUT SHELTERS FOR THE HUMAN SPIRIT

American Art and the Cold War

m i c h a e l l k r e n n

t h e u n i v e r s i t y o f n o r t h c a r o l i n a p r e s s

c h a p e l h i l l a n d l o n d o n

∫ 2005 The University of North Carolina Press All rights reserved Designed by Rebecca Giménez Set in Minion by Keystone Typesetting, Inc Manufactured in the United States of America The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee

on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity

of the Council on Library Resources Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Krenn, Michael L., 1957– Fall-out shelters for the human spirit : American art and the

Cold War / by Michael L Krenn.

p cm Includes bibliographical references and index.

isbn 0-8078-2945-5 (cloth : alk paper)

1 Art and state—United States 2 Art, American— 20th century 3 United States—Cultural policy.

4 Cold War 5 Propaganda in art I Title.

n 8835.k74 2005 701%.03%097309045—dc22

2004027173

09 08 07 06 05 5 4 3 2 1

5 A Little Too Strange for the Average Russian : 147

6 New Frontiers for the Government and the Arts : 179

7 See Venice and Propagandize : 207

Conclusion : 233

Notes : 245

Bibliography : 281

Index : 289

Major General Lemuel Mathewson at

the 1951 Berlin Cultural Festival : 72

Works of Yasuo Kuniyoshi at the

1952 Venice Biennale : 81

Highlights of American Painting

exhibit in Santiago, Chile, 1955 : 123

Arshile Gorky, Betrothal II (1947) : 150

Jackson Pollock, Cathedral (1947) : 171

Nikita Khrushchev at the American

National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959 : 172

Italian students protesting the opening

of the 1968 Venice Biennale : 225

Henry Hopkins, Margaret Cogswell, and

others plan the U.S exhibition at the

1970 Venice Biennale : 228William Weege demonstrating printmaking

techniques at the 1970 Venice Biennale : 231

Communication Through Art exhibit

in Lahore, Pakistan, February 1964 : 241

Seminar from the Communication

Through Art exhibit in Lahore,

Pakistan, February 1964 : 242

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In the past, whenever I found myself in Washington, D.C., I evitably ended up at the National Gallery of Art Like the thou-sands of people who visit the museum every day, I wanderedfrom gallery to gallery, stopping here to admire the fabulousskies of Turner, there to take in the beauty of Monet I alwaysfinished up in the same place, however, the American section.From the early portraits, to the landscapes of Cole and Moran, tothe often stark realism of Eakins and Homer, I made my way tothe early-twentieth-century room and found a good viewingspot on one of the benches I was sometimes there for more than

in-an hour, drinking in my favorite artists There was The City From Greenwich Village, by John Sloan, capturing the vibrancy of the city he loved Edward Hopper’s Cape Cod Evening has that

instantly recognized sense of loneliness, and perhaps unseendanger, so characteristic of many of his works And then there

were the works of George Bellows The Lone Tenement and Blue Morning capture both the beauty and the sense of alienation to

be found in America’s largest city Finally, there was Both bers of This Club, which portrays the brutality, ugliness, and

Mem-beauty of the sport of boxing better than any painting (or graph) ever will Reveling in the loveliness of these works, I oftenfound it di≈cult to imagine how the artists, and many others oftheir time, inflamed the passions of art lovers, critics, and thegeneral public, many of whom condemned the art as ‘‘too mod-ern,’’ too unconventional, or as not ‘‘American’’ enough.During the writing of this book, however, I often went to the

photo-‘‘newer’’ part of the National Gallery To be perfectly honest, Ihad never really understood or cared much for the works of themodernists and abstract expressionists As I studied, researched,and wrote on the role of art in U.S cultural diplomacy duringthe Cold War, I was struck by the continuities in the debates

over ‘‘new’’ forms of art As with their predecessors in the field of can art, Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, Robert Motherwell, and manyothers found themselves at the center of controversy Their art, too,seemed too wild, too indulgent, too subversive, too ‘‘un-American.’’ Then

Ameri-one day, as I stood in front of Pollock’s Number 1, 1950 (Lavender Mist),

the beauty and power of his work began to make their first real sions on me And suddenly the politics, the ‘‘isms’’ of the Cold War, thedebates over what was or what was not ‘‘good’’ art became, at least for amoment, of little interest to me

impres-Just as the finishing touches were being put on this manuscript, Ivisited the National Gallery one more time To my dismay, Bellows,Sloan, Hopper, and many other early-twentieth-century American artistswere no longer in their familiar homes A query at the information deskelicited the answer that the Hopper was not currently on display and thatthe other works had been moved to the East Building with the other

‘‘contemporary’’ and ‘‘modern’’ works of art I hurried over and therethey were, looking as beautiful as ever and quite comfortable in their newsurroundings I was struck by the long, strange journey of these works ofart: from ‘‘radical’’ visions, celebrated and condemned with equal vigor

in the early 1900s; to ‘‘traditional’’ paintings, far removed from the world

of ‘‘modern’’ art and housed in the marble halls of the West Building ofthe National Gallery of Art; and now, in the first years of the twenty-firstcentury, housed with the works of Pollock and Rothko—the ‘‘radicals’’ ofthe 1940s and 1950s who felt the very same slings and arrows from theAmerican public and critics

Downstairs from Bellows and Sloan, one could catch a glimpse of thelarge new exhibit of Rothko’s murals and, a little farther on, Pollock’s

Lavender Mist It seemed entirely appropriate that they had been brought

together under one roof As I reluctantly left the National Gallery until

my next trip to Washington, I remembered the words of one of myfavorite authors, Henry James, when he said, ‘‘It is art that makes life,makes interest, makes importance and I know of no substitute what-ever for the force and beauty of its process.’’ Of course, the angry denun-ciation of new art forms continues in our contemporary society, as self-appointed art critics try to decide what is ‘‘tasteless,’’ what is ‘‘porno-graphic,’’ what, in fact, is art Now decades removed from the similar uglyand squalid debates surrounding American art in the post–World War IIperiod, it is perhaps just as well that we also remember the words ofHippocrates: ‘‘Life is short Art is long.’’

There are many people I wish to thank for their absolutely sential assistance during the course of researching and writingthis book First, of course, are the archivists and librarians whohelped this neophyte find his way through the worlds of bothcultural diplomacy and American art: Elizabeth Andrews, In-stitute Archives and Special Collections, mit Libraries; MichelleHarvey, Museum Archives of the Museum of Modern Art; AnneRitchie, Gallery Archives, National Gallery of Art; Karen Schnei-der, Phillips Collection; and Kenneth Heger, National Archives

es-In particular, I would like to thank the sta√ of the SmithsonianInstitution Archives, Kathleen Williams, Bill Cox, and BruceKirby, who provided monumental amounts of support and con-stant encouragement It was a pleasant surprise for me to findthat Bruce Kirby had moved to the Library of Congress Manu-script Division, where he again provided much needed assis-tance The same must be said of Judy Throm and her sta√ at theArchives of American Art, including Annie Bayly, who helped

me secure permissions for use of some of the restricted oralinterviews And finally, my very great thanks to Martin Man-ning, who at the time of the research for this book was the head

of the United States Information Historical Collection Martin isone of those truly unsung heroes for historians, one who hasalways gone the extra mile to assist any and all researchers

I also owe thanks to two universities The work on the bookbegan during my last years at the University of Miami I wouldlike to thank the O≈ce of Research and Sponsored Programs atthe university for providing much needed research and travelmoney that helped sustain this e√ort A special thanks must go

to Darby Bannard, who very kindly let me be a ‘‘student’’ in hisgraduate seminar on abstract expressionism at the University ofMiami In the middle of the project, I took up a new position as

chair of the Department of History at Appalachian State University Boththe department and university have been generous in their support of myattendance at conferences, during which early drafts of many of thechapters of this book were presented Most of all, I would like to thank

my colleagues in the Department of History While chairing a ment of thirty people has certainly proved challenging, it has also beenthe most rewarding experience of my professional life In particular, Iwould like to o√er my very great appreciation to Tim Silver, who read themanuscript from top to bottom and made numerous suggestions forimprovement

depart-Sian Hunter of the University of North Carolina Press has been one ofthose editors that authors dream about She was encouraging, helpful,quick to respond, and receptive to new ideas and suggestions, and sheprovided a sympathetic ear when my doubts about completing the proj-ect were at their highest The two outside readers provided perhaps thebest evaluations I have yet had as an author, not because they were overlye√usive with praise, but because they o√ered clear, substantive, and sig-nificant suggestions for improvement Any problems or errors that re-main, therefore, must remain the sole responsibility of the author.Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Margaret Cogswell.The interview I did with her in the early stages of researching this bookchanged its direction and focus, and very much for the better Throughthat interview, I finally grasped the immense amount of passion, emo-tion, and pure love of art that sustained so many of the people whoworked to make a U.S international art program a reality Yet she wentbeyond this by reading the manuscript not once, but twice, with some ofthe sharpest editorial eyes it has been my pleasure to know She lookedover documents and photos and gave me feedback and information.Most important, perhaps, she gave me constant encouragement, espe-cially when the project seemed to be slowing down to a crawl Now if

I could only get her to write her autobiography!

In 1962, Lloyd Goodrich, director of the Whitney Museum ofAmerican Art and chairman of the National Committee onGovernment and Art, reflected on the ominous times in which

he lived The Soviets were ‘‘making every e√ort to diminish ourwill to resist by a rain of threats of mass destruction.’’ Russianleader Nikita Khrushchev declared that ‘‘he holds a ‘sword ofDamocles’ over our heads.’’ In response, the U.S governmentwas ‘‘considering the appropriation of substantial funds to help

in the construction of fall-out shelters.’’ In Goodrich’s opinion,

‘‘The individual has a feeling of helplessness, with or withoutthese shelters, to protect himself from destruction or to foreseethe conditions under which he and his family will have to strug-gle to survive.’’ In these chaotic and frightening times, he con-tinued, ‘‘the arts provide fall-out shelters for the human spiritvastly more essential, more urgently needed and at infinitely lesscost than those for the human body.’’ As such, he called uponCongress and the American people to ‘‘consider government aid

to the arts in an entirely new light, as an integral part of thedefense of our civilization.’’∞

During the post–World War II period, the American ment—and American art world—followed Goodrich’s prescrip-tion and considered the relationship between government andart in ‘‘an entirely new light.’’ Recognizing both the power of art

govern-in terms of delivergovern-ing political messages and the need to wgovern-in the

‘‘hearts and minds’’ of the world’s people, U.S o≈cials began tomore carefully and thoroughly consider the idea of culturaldiplomacy as part of the nation’s Cold War arsenal Startingfrom extraordinarily humble beginnings, the United States em-barked on this new form of diplomacy by sending American artand culture around the globe Jazz became a staple on the Voice

of America radio broadcasts; later, rock and roll would also

be featured Jazz artists such as Dizzy Gillespie and Louis Armstrongwere among the musicians highlighted in American propaganda, and theUnited States Information Agency (usia) promoted and funded tours bythem and other artists Productions of American plays were also mounted

overseas, such as the popular Porgy and Bess (which simultaneously

served to showcase American culture and to counteract criticisms ofAmerica’s treatment of its African American population) ‘‘High’’ culturewas also well represented, as American symphonies and opera companiescircled the globe Naima Prevots, in her 1998 study, explains that Ameri-can dance companies—both classical and modern—were also the recipi-ents of government support so that they might tour overseas Hollywoodgot in on the act as well, and American films were soon prominentlyshown in numerous foreign markets.≤

Much less is known about the e√orts to send American painting fordisplay to foreign audiences Aside from studies of the disastrous Depart-

ment of State–sponsored Advancing American Art show in 1946, a

collec-tion that came in for harsh criticism from U.S congressmen and othersfor its ‘‘un-American’’ and potentially ‘‘communistic’’ modern art, littlehas been written about this important and extremely controversial com-ponent of America’s Cold War cultural diplomacy This is surprisingsince during the two and a half decades following the end of World War

II, the Department of State, the usia, and even the Smithsonian tion saw to it that hundreds of exhibitions of American paintings foundtheir way to Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and eventually intothe heart of the communist bloc Requests for showings of American art,particularly modern art, flowed in from around the world Americanpaintings were on display at world’s fairs and at the large and prestigiousinternational art shows in São Paulo and Venice, as well as in small urbanareas in Guatemala, Iran, Senegal, and Cambodia By the late 1960s andearly 1970s, however, the program was in disarray, floundering withoutdirection or focus, functioning on an ever-shrinking budget Even duringits periods of greatest success, the art program was a constant lightningrod for controversy; U.S government support waxed and waned in re-sponse to criticisms from art groups, congressmen, and, in the end, thevery foreign audience to which the program was directed

Institu-In a very direct fashion, Goodrich’s metaphor serves as an explanation

as to what went wrong with the U.S government’s attempt to construct aworkable and e√ective international art program during the Cold War.His call for ‘‘fall-out shelters for the human spirit’’ illustrated the di-lemma that both government o≈cials and supporters of the program in

the private sector faced For many art lovers across America—artists,museum directors and curators, gallery owners, private collectors, orga-nizations and agencies dedicated to the arts—it was the ‘‘human spirit’’that mattered most Art, for them, was not a means to an end, but an end

in and of itself It was an international language of peace, understanding,and spirituality in a world that seemed in short supply of all of thesequalities Works of art would speak across borders, across political ide-ologies, and across racial, ethnic, and national di√erences and serve as abridge to further understanding between the earth’s peoples O≈cials inthe Department of State and the usia, however, generally focused on theneed for ‘‘fallout shelters.’’ For those interested in winning the propa-ganda war with the communists, art was an attractive tool It could beused to reflect American diversity, dedication to culture, and artisticfreedom American art—particularly the more modern and abstract ex-pressionist styles—would say to the world that in the United States theartist was free to paint what he or she wished, without censorship or fear

of retaliation Thus, it would stand in stark contrast to the strict ‘‘socialistrealism’’ dictated by the government of the Soviet Union And Americanattention to the arts would serve as an antidote to the criticisms—fromfriends and foes alike—that the nation and its people were uncultured,unsophisticated, materialistic, and militaristic

At least initially, U.S o≈cials and interested members of the Americanart community felt that they might work together in the e√ort to bringthe nation’s art to a world audience In fact, it was so obviously necessarythat they cooperate that the idea seemed a natural The governmentcould provide the funds for what was a relatively costly operation, and itsoverseas personnel would facilitate local arrangements The American artworld would provide much-needed expertise in the area of aesthetics,and their contacts with peers in foreign nations could prove valuable.Almost from the beginning, however, the conflict between these twogroups became apparent For, in truth, they saw the international pro-gram in very di√erent ways Both sides believed that American art had animportant role to play in the Cold War world The one side sought to useart as a salve for a scarred and uncertain world; the other saw in art

a valuable weapon in the ongoing propaganda battle with the SovietUnion Thus, when government o≈cials tried to provide ‘‘policy guide-lines’’ or requested that this or that piece of art or artist be excluded from

a particular exhibition, members of the art community cried censorship.Similarly, when the nation’s art lovers demanded complete freedom ofartistic expression, the Department of State and usia calmly observed

that if the government was footing the bill, it naturally expected results—

in this case, propaganda victories Unfortunately for both sides, theywere never able to discover a happy medium between art as art and art aspropaganda

A number of interesting studies have appeared in recent years ing American art and politics in the wake of World War II To a largeextent, however, these works have either focused on the internal dy-namics of the struggle (debates between the more conservative and ‘‘rep-resentational’’ artists and the more ‘‘radical’’ abstract expressionists), orhave tried to understand that debate as largely a reflection of Cold Warfrictions within the American art world and society at large.≥ Otherscholars, more interested in the political/diplomatic context, have turnedtheir attention to the ‘‘covert’’ side of America’s cultural diplomacy Anumber of important recent studies examine the links between ‘‘state’’and ‘‘private’’ institutions and individuals in creating networks for carry-ing out the business of promoting American culture (and politics) over-seas As Giles Scott-Smith has demonstrated in his examination of theCentral Intelligence Agency (cia)–funded Congress for Cultural Free-dom (ccf), which numbered many prominent American intellectualsand artists among its members, the agency was certainly well aware of thepotential power of culture and ideas in the war against communism anddid not hesitate to put resources into initiatives such as the ccf Turningtheir attention particularly to America’s overseas art program during theCold War, some writers, such as Frances Stonor Saunders, have suggestedthat the relationship between an influential handful of individuals in theAmerican art world and the U.S government was primarily an under-

regard-ground e√ort, funded and supported by the cia Arguing that the vancing American Art fiasco left the Department of State gun-shy about

Ad-supporting an overseas art program, these historians suggest that the cia,working mostly through the Museum of Modern Art (moma), arrangedfor ‘‘private’’ showings of the controversial modern and abstract Ameri-can art abroad (mostly in Western Europe) Few of these studies ofAmerican art overseas extend beyond the 1950s or early 1960s.∂

While these earlier works have raised some interesting and sial questions concerning America’s Cold War cultural diplomacy, thefocus on the ‘‘covert’’ side of this e√ort—particularly when applied to theoverseas art program—is problematic A much more dramatic illustra-tion of the complex interrelationship between art and government dur-ing the Cold War was the ‘‘overt’’ international art programs run through

controver-the State Department, controver-the usia, and controver-the Smithsonian Institution, whichhave been to a large extent ignored The American Federation of Arts(afa) actually played a larger, and more important, role in the inter-national art program than moma, and its e√orts were openly funded andsupported by the Department of State and, later, usia By 1951, beforemoma even got seriously involved in overseas exhibits, the afa and theState Department were already working together to organize a show thatincluded modern and abstract art for exhibit in Berlin By 1953, an afashow—supported now by the usia—went to India; and a 1954 exhibit ofmodern watercolors was sent to France Dozens of other exhibitions soonfollowed.∑

What is perhaps most overlooked in analyses that suggest a covertworking relationship between the American art world and agencies such

as the cia is that what held true for the American government did notnecessarily hold true for the art community As Eloise Spaeth, a notedcollector and vice president of the board of trustees for the afa, explained

to an audience (which included usia o≈cials) in 1951, ‘‘You and I havedi√erent reasons for wanting our visual arts known abroad We are notprimarily interested in using art as an instrument of propaganda We lovethis particular art form (or we wouldn’t be gathered here today) Loving,

we want to share it.’’∏ Understanding these di√ering viewpoints, and howthey came together to first create and then eventually derail the inter-national art program, is a key element of this study My research suggests

a complex picture, one in which the American art world was not merely awilling (or unwilling) dupe in a cia plot; nor was the U.S government,with Machiavellian ruthlessness, simply ‘‘calling the tune’’ to which theart world danced Both sides had their goals; both sides saw the need forcompromise; and both sides, operating within the confines of the ColdWar, were unable to bridge the gap between their di√ering aims

The central purpose of this book is to explain how and why theprogram to send American art abroad, a program vigorously supported

by so many members of the American art world and a handful of o≈cials

in the U.S government, had virtually collapsed by the early 1970s Why,even when the U.S art world and government agreed on the importance

of sending the nation’s art overseas, when American art was finally ing a maturity that established it as a leading force in world culture, wheno≈cial reports and the responses from foreign audiences suggested thatthe art was making a dramatic impact, wasn’t the program able to sustainitself at the same level after the 1960s? In short, despite their shared

reach-interest in exhibiting America’s art to foreign audiences, why were theU.S government and art world unable to maintain an apparently success-ful e√ort in cultural diplomacy?

Answering those questions leads to a broader understanding of thecultural dimensions of the Cold War The controversies that the inter-national art program engendered in the United States involved muchmore than simply matters of ‘‘taste’’ (though, to be sure, this rather vagueterm was always used) Art, and the artists who produced the works,found themselves enmeshed in sometimes confusing, sometimes ugly,sometimes contradictory political and ideological battles The Cold Warmind-set in the United States certainly created a distinct ‘‘us versus them’’mentality; it also helped, at times, to create a climate of fear and anxiety.Why would art find itself pulled into these matters? For most of theartists, their work was primarily an expression of self or deep emotions;

an exploration of the new and the unknown For many viewers, however,the art spoke directly to what it meant to be ‘‘American.’’ For theseindividuals and groups, there was a distinctly American art, expressive ofwhat were defined as innate American values Modern art, and abstractexpressionism in particular, challenged that perspective by moving awayfrom works that were representational or that contained easily under-stood and recognizable forms and shapes This, detractors declared, was

positively not American art—if it was art at all Had the argument stopped

there, it would have remained of little interest to most Americans, forwhom debates about the aesthetics of painting were of scant concern.Wrapped up in the suspicions and animosities created by the Cold War,however, the attackers soon moved on to label modern art and artists aspositively subversive and quite possibly procommunist And thus wascreated one of the rich ironies of the international art program The veryreason why so much modern and abstract art was sent overseas wasbecause it was believed that it provided a potent weapon in the propa-ganda war with the communists In this light, the art was actually the

most American art, symbolizing democracy, freedom of expression, and

creativity The Soviets, for their part, agreed, and quickly denouncedAmerican modern art as the decadent, perverse, and subversive man-ifestation of bourgeois capitalism It was a rather remarkable feat: ColdWar politics somehow defined modern art as both the insidious rep-resentation of communist infiltration and a tribute to the democraticspirit Remarkable, but also interesting in terms of how the Cold War led

to a discussion and redefinition of what was—and was not—American.Following the trajectory of the international art program also al-

lows us to understand more fully the means and goals of America’scultural diplomacy during the Cold War The program was designed tosay something about America to what the nation’s professional pro-pagandists defined as ‘‘target audiences.’’ The controversies associatedwith the program illustrate how di≈cult it was for U.S o≈cials to projectthe ‘‘proper’’ image of America overseas After all, one of the main goals

of sending American art to foreign nations was to demonstrate the sity of the nation’s culture and artistic freedom Diversity and freedom,particularly when associated with art, were di≈cult concepts to ‘‘chan-nel’’ precisely into the desired message That di≈culty reflects one ofthe inherent dilemmas related to America’s cultural diplomacy in thepost–World War II period American o≈cials sought to portray ‘‘Amer-ica’’ to others without, it often seemed, completely agreeing on what theterm meant And meaning was important, especially when those o≈cialssought to define the proper audience for American art and to measure itsimpact When historians have discussed the ‘‘battle for hearts and minds’’that took place during the Cold War, it is often assumed that the battlewas for a single and well-defined ‘‘heart’’ or some sort of universal

diver-‘‘mind.’’ As the history of the international art program demonstrates,U.S o≈cials carefully monitored their propaganda program Art deemed

as essential and meaningful for a Western European audience would beclassified as inappropriate or useless for an Asian or African audience.They classified target audiences in terms of geographic location, age,socioeconomic status, perceived degree of friendliness toward America,and even, on occasion, artistic tastes And they always made clear theirgoals for the art It might be to deliver a simple message about America’sdedication to cultural a√airs For Eastern Europe, the exhibitions might

be designed to send a more powerful message about personal and cal freedom An exhibit in Africa, on the other hand, might be set up tostress issues of racial equality and civil rights for the African Americanpopulation

politi-Yet, to focus entirely on the government’s goals, the government’sintentions, and the government’s involvement in the international pro-gram is to ignore the fact that for many private individuals and organiza-tions in the United States art was viewed as the best and brightest hopefor bringing understanding to a world in chaos, peace to a world on theverge of war, and a sense of kinship to peoples divided by walls andpolitical ideologies They viewed their mission of sending U.S art abroad,

to a large degree, as above the political and military jousting between Eastand West Their battle was a larger one and, to them at least, much more

crucial Leaders, ideologies, even nations might rise and fall, come and

go, but the human spirit must endure and progress Their pleas likelystrike the scholar of Cold War diplomacy, whether realist or revisionist,

as hopelessly nạve, as impossibly idealistic However, they represent astrain of thinking during the Cold War that is often ignored in the race tofind the ways in which that conflict shaped, or mangled, or destroyedaspects of American culture The Cold War was indeed a powerful force,but it was not omnipotent—there were survivors, people and ideas whotried to find (and occasionally found) shelter from the political andideological storms Today, in a world where chaos has actually evolvedinto a theory, in which a ‘‘new war’’ has been declared, and where newwalls seem to be daily replacing those torn down over a decade ago, theneed for those fallout shelters for the human spirit seems more pressingthan ever

1ADVANCING AMERICAN ART

In March 1941, the United States was less than a year away frombeing engulfed by World War II On the seventeenth of thatmonth, President Franklin D Roosevelt briefly turned his atten-tion away from foreign policy and the economic depression thatstill lingered in his nation to speak at the opening of the NationalGallery of Art The first director of the gallery, David Finley,remembered that it was a ‘‘cold, blustery day,’’ and a strong windthat evening ‘‘added to everyone’s discomfort.’’ Yet, nearly 10,000people came to hear the president open the first truly nationalart museum in the history of the United States Roosevelt de-clared that ‘‘there was a time when the people of this countrywould not have thought that the inheritance of art belonged tothem or that they had responsibilities to guard it.’’ The NationalGallery was the physical embodiment of the change in attitude.But that was not the only thing that had changed There had alsobeen a time, the president continued, when Americans thought

of paintings as ‘‘only works of art.’’ That did not hold true in

1941 ‘‘Today they are the symbols of the human spirit and of theworld the freedom of the human spirit made—a world againstwhich armies now are raised and countries overrun and menimprisoned and their work destroyed.’’ By establishing a greatnew museum in a time of such turmoil and danger, the people ofthe United States signaled that ‘‘the freedom of the human spiritand human mind which has produced the world’s great art andall its science—shall not be utterly destroyed.’’∞

During and immediately after World War II, a sizable tion of the American art community and the Department ofState came to share President Roosevelt’s belief that art had notonly come to play a larger role in the lives of the people of theUnited States but was also taking on a larger and more signifi-cant role in the world While in most regards the two groups

por-dramatically disagreed on the precise shape and meaning of that role, formany critics, artists, curators, and museum directors, it was enough thatthe federal government was showing an interest in cultural matters Forits part, the Department of State was happy to use the expertise andconnections a√orded by members of the American art scene in under-standing the world of art Immediately following the war, the depart-ment, ably assisted and much encouraged by vocal segments of the artprofession, embarked on a bold new initiative designed to bring Ameri-can art—particularly modern art—to the world That initiative endeddisastrously Instead of dampening the enthusiasm of the nation’s artconnoisseurs, however, the episode provided them with valuable lessonsthat they would apply during the late 1940s and 1950s to help shape andsustain America’s international art program.

THE COUNTRY OF THE SOUL

In the April 1943 issue of Fortune, amidst the despair and destruction of

World War II, Dr William Macneile Dixon of the University of Glasgowtook time to ponder the issue of ‘‘civilization and the arts.’’ With thenations of the world apparently bent on mutual destruction, he imploredhis readers to remember that ‘‘art and literature were not merely to beregarded as pursuits pleasant in themselves, but beyond doubt themost valuable of allies in the long battle for a nobler and a better future,

as making for the common good of human society.’’ What, he asked, hadhumanity’s faith in science and technology gained for the human race?

‘‘We have put our trust in political, economic, and scientific remedies—yet, judging from the present state of the world, without any very daz-zling or resounding success.’’ In an ‘‘age of crowding doubts,’’ the artscould ‘‘point to a world above our heads, a transcendental world, inwhich, if anywhere, we may hope to find the fulfillment of our heart’sdesire.’’ Only the arts, he concluded, could show the way to ‘‘a province ofhuman life to whose interests and problems the most extensiveknowledge or control of nature’s machinery a√ords no entrance, a coun-try upon which the bright sun of science sheds not a ray of light It is thecountry of the soul.’’≤

As war descended upon the world in the late 1930s and 1940s, manyartists, critics, and art lovers in the United States and elsewhere came toshare Dr Dixon’s concerns They saw art not as a separate or distantaspect of life but as a powerful, vital force for peace, humanity, civiliza-tion, and democracy Even before the conflict reached America’s shores,

Duncan Phillips, director of the Phillips Memorial Gallery in ington, D.C., declared that ‘‘art is the antithesis of war Art is the greatestnatural language between the di√erent tribes and races It is the symbol ofthe creative and social forces which unite men Art o√ers the only uni-versal currency of thought-exchange and fellowship of the likeminded.’’

Wash-In a world being torn asunder by war, ‘‘art must go on We must keepthat beacon burning.’’ With the economic, political, and social regimen-tation required by societies at war, ‘‘art must be the last stand, as it will bethe eternal stronghold of the individual.’’≥

The ideas that art was in some way the keeper of civilization’s flameand a force for international understanding and peace were powerfulones during and immediately after World War II As Peyton Boswell,

editor of Arts Digest, suggested just a week after the bombing of Pearl

Harbor, humanity was now in a ‘‘struggle for the survival of culture.’’ Art,which always left the most ‘‘enduring imprint’’ on society, was ‘‘livingproof that there is a continuing line to man’s constructive progress; livingproof that man has su√ered other cataclysms—and has always survived.’’

Alfred M Frankfurter, editor of Art News, in 1943 decried the notion

prevailing among some politicians and citizens that art was ‘‘just about asessential today as fan-dancers.’’ He noted the wartime work of artists with

‘‘posters and cartoons and camouflage and therapy’’ but then declared

that ‘‘there is still room and, above all, the absolute need for art as art.

Without that there would be fatally interrupted the very Western tion of civilization that the whole fight is about.’’∂

tradi-As important as art was during the war, its supporters also made clearthat it was equally significant for achieving a lasting peace To a largedegree, art’s principal role was seen as that of an international ‘‘language’’that could help bring a shattered world together The English novel-ist Aldous Huxley argued that artists could ‘‘do the most for enduringpeace by genuinely believing in transcendental values and by givinge√ective expression to their beliefs in plastic or literary form.’’ In anarticle entitled, ‘‘Art, A Factor for International Peace,’’ the director of artfor Milwaukee public schools wondered whether ‘‘the same amount ofenergy, skill, money, materials, and planning which periodically is ex-pended for destructive purposes could be used for creative e√ort.’’ He wasconfident it could, for certainly ‘‘the creative and brilliant minds whichcan work together collectively to split the atom and to devise the atomicbomb could under favorable circumstances and with adequate financialsupport create a world of untold beauty.’’ Such views, which bordered onthe utopian, found common expression among those in the American art

community E M Benson of the Philadelphia Museum of Art declaredthat art ‘‘can destroy the hate in our hearts, and help to create a world wecan all be proud to live in—a place for the spirit to grow strong.’’ Theartists themselves were primarily responsible for this healing value of art,for they were ‘‘for the most part, good citizens who make an earnest e√ort

to leave this world a little better than when they entered it.’’∑

The director of the Department of Painting and Sculpture at the seum of Modern Art, James Soby, went to the crux of the matter when hestated in 1944 that ‘‘art is international.’’ The museum, he suggested, was

Mu-‘‘aware of the desperate need for recognizing the arts as vehicles of thatinternational communication and understanding on which the future ofeveryone depends.’’ Writing just a few months after the end of the war,Peyton Boswell surveyed the new world, one in which ‘‘air power and theatomic bomb have given new meaning to the shortest distance betweentwo points.’’ The change was clear: ‘‘our thinking is international inscope, and our artists, fulfilling their traditional function, are begin-ning to express this world-wide scope of interlocking interests.’’ That somany artists and art lovers in the United States couched their discussions

in international terms was hardly surprising The period of the 1930sthrough World War II witnessed an important migration of Europeanartists to the United States and, in turn, what one might call the inter-nationalization of American art Marion Deshmukh, in her study of thistransatlantic movement, estimates that between 1933 and 1944 over sevenhundred artists came to the United States from Germany, France, Italy,Russia, and elsewhere The list was a virtual who’s who of modern art.Marc Chagall, Marcel Duchamp, Hans Hofmann, Fernand Léger, PietMondrian, Wassily Kandinsky, Salvador Dalí, and others came to Amer-ica seeking refuge from war and persecution in Europe Their impact onAmerican art, particularly modern and abstract expressionist art, cannot

be overestimated As Deshmukh concludes, ‘‘New York had replacedParis and Berlin as the home of Europe’s artistic avant-garde.’’∏

The tremendous significance of these developments was immediately

apparent to the American art world The December 1941 issue of Fortune

contained a lengthy piece entitled ‘‘The Great Flight of Culture.’’ menting on the recent influx of European artists and intellectuals, thearticle declared that ‘‘this is a transplantation of a whole culture from onecontinent to another.’’ This development, which the article termed the

Com-‘‘greatest migration of intellectuals since the Byzantine,’’ had far-reachingimportance for American art: ‘‘for better or for worse it cannot escapeEuropean influences more powerful than those exerted by the mere

transatlantic interaction of past generations.’’ Writing nearly a year later,Archibald MacLeish called on Americans to recognize their ‘‘duty toFrench culture.’’ The gist of that duty was to provide the French artist thefreedom to ‘‘do his work as a man, as Frenchman, and as artist.’’ He wasconfident that America did indeed ‘‘o√er such an opportunity.’’ Both the

Fortune article and the piece by MacLeish would not go so far as to

suggest that the center of the art world had been transplanted from Paris

to New York Peyton Boswell, just a week after the United States enteredWorld War II, had no such qualms, informing his readers that ‘‘the firsttwo years of the Hitlerian war shifted the art capital of the world fromParis to New York, making America, in e√ect, the custodian of Westernculture We Americans accepted the responsibility eagerly.’’ While warhad raged far from America’s shores, ‘‘let it be said that we have mean-while shielded the torch of Western culture from the aggressive blows out

of the Far East and out of Hitler’s degraded Europe.’’π

Yet many involved with the American art world went beyond thesuggestion that the United States was serving as a mere repository forEuropean artists and schools of art Artist Stuart Davis proudly declaredthe ‘‘beginning of a great American renaissance in art’’ in 1943 Although

he felt that this process had been ‘‘retarded by the war,’’ he was confidentthat it would be ‘‘accelerated by the coming of peace.’’ Peyton Boswellgave support to that belief in December 1945, arguing that ‘‘America isvoicing her artistic reactions with a more imaginative, expressionisticart.’’ He concluded that ‘‘American art, having experienced youthful vi-tality and revolt, is now geared for productive maturity.’’ Two years later,artist Frederic Taubes answered the question, ‘‘Do we have a nationalart?’’ with an emphatic yes The nation’s art had ‘‘at last become indepen-dent, self-reliant, a true expression of the national will and character.’’ Hewas convinced that ‘‘we have moved far away from the codified Europeanestheticism, and evolved our own esthetic expression.’’∫

Nowhere was this new ‘‘independence’’ and ‘‘self-reliance’’ more parent than at the series of exhibitions put on at New York’s Art of ThisCentury Gallery, the creation of art doyenne Peggy Guggenheim Fromthe time of its opening in 1943 until its close in 1947, the gallery featurednearly every American artist who would come to dominate the field inthe years to come: Jackson Pollock, William Baziotes, Robert Motherwell,Mark Rothko, and Morris Graves were just a few of the notables Inparticular, Pollock and his fellow abstract expressionists led the way to

ap-a dynap-amic new ap-art form thap-at wap-as, perhap-aps most importap-ant, distinctlyAmerican As art historian Matthew Baigell sums up, ‘‘Abstract Expres-

sionism was accepted in the 1950s as the movement that propelled can art to the leading position in the international avant-garde.’’ By thetime critic Clement Greenberg o√ered his review of one of the firstpostwar exhibitions of the newest French art, the leadership of Americanart seemed apparent: ‘‘when one sees how much the level of Americanart has risen in the last five years then the conclusion forces itself,much to our own surprise, that the main premises of Western art have atlast migrated to the United States.’’Ω

Ameri-It was a heady time for American art and artists Despite the gloomand pessimism created by World War II, the American art world saw apromising ray of light Art, often seen as a mere byproduct of society or afrivolous decoration, took on new meaning and importance, as a weaponagainst the forces of destruction, an agent for lasting peace and inter-national communication, and a safe haven for the human spirit Armiesand governments might fight to protect the countries of politics andeconomics; art would serve as the guardian of the ‘‘country of the soul.’’What made it all the more significant for the American art community

was the fact that American art—not pale imitations of the European

schools—would be in the vanguard of this cultural crusade Little didAmerican artists realize, however, that they were not the only ones con-sidering such matters Inside the Department of State, the role of art inwar and peace was attracting more and more attention

PROPAGANDA IN THE BEST SENSE

The use of art as propaganda was already an accepted practice long beforeAmerican artists and o≈cials began to consider the issue during and afterWorld War II As James Leith notes in his study of art and propaganda inFrance during the late eighteenth century, there have always been thosewho ‘‘have insisted that the main value of art lies in its usefulness as aneducational force in the service of religion or some secular ideology.’’ Heconcludes, in fact, that the use of art by the revolutionaries and phi-losophes during and after the French Revolution as a way to bring about a

‘‘moral transformation’’ of French society marked the beginning of ‘‘theidea of the total mobilization of mass media in order to indoctrinate themasses.’’ Todd Porterfield carries the analysis into the mid-nineteenthcentury, arguing that ‘‘French artists and governments provided a ra-tionale for the imperial project’’ in Algiers and Egypt through paintingsand sculptures that celebrated French imperialism and portrayed the

areas invaded by the French as both alluring and rich in resources Yet,while Paris became the acknowledged center of the art world in thenineteenth century, by the mid-twentieth century France found itselfunwilling or unable to use its immense cultural prestige e√ectively onthe world stage The Paris International Exhibition of 1937 was a financialand cultural disappointment, and France soon found itself outstripped

by other nations in the field of cultural diplomacy As one historianconcludes, for France, ‘‘Cultural prestige had become a substitute forpower.’’∞≠

One of those nations that began to move past France in the arena ofcultural diplomacy was Great Britain Like the French, British govern-ment o≈cials had early come to the conclusion that art could be a meansfor delivering powerful and needed messages to the British masses AsFrances Borzello explains, it began to occur to British o≈cials in thenineteenth century that art—generally thought of as something that ap-pealed only to the highest classes—might serve to uplift and enlighten theincreasingly rowdy and unruly crowds of lower-class English poor andworkers They came to believe, in other words, in the ‘‘civilising powers ofart.’’ Throughout the mid- to late nineteenth century, the British govern-ment established a number of commissions to study the question of artand the English public and also worked with private philanthropists toprovide support for the arts, culminating in the establishment of the TateGallery in 1897–98.∞∞

By 1934, the British government began to more fully consider the use

of art as a foreign policy tool In their study of cultural policy, Toby Millerand George Yúdice suggest that the government’s creation of the BritishCouncil in that year was ‘‘part of its defense against German nationalistpropaganda throughout Europe.’’ The council’s job was to spread knowl-edge and respect for the English language and British accomplishments

in the fields of art In just a few years, the council’s budget had increased

to £100,000 and German propagandists were scrambling to counter itsactivities.∞≤

The Soviet Union, too, quickly grasped the power of art The Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was set up

All-in 1925 and served as both an All-instrument for trumpetAll-ing Soviet cultureoverseas and bringing foreign artists and intellectuals on specially de-signed ‘‘tours’’ of the Soviet Union In 1934, Josef Stalin proclaimed thathenceforth the ‘‘o≈cial’’ art of the Soviet state would be ‘‘socialist real-ism,’’ a form of art that glorified the worker, the farmer, and the commu-

nist regime The Soviet state provided support to hundreds of theaters,orchestras and musical groups, filmmakers, and artists in order to infuseRussian culture with the socialist realist message.∞≥

The United States, however, was much slower in developing directconnections between the state and the arts As one study of this uneasyrelationship suggests, ‘‘American attitudes toward the arts have been am-biguous and contradictory.’’ The nation, justifiably proud of its eco-nomic and material accomplishments, seemed torn between the beliefthat America’s culture was as vibrant as that of any nation on earth andthe nagging doubt that American art was really little more than a pale—and inferior—copy of its European peers This was not to say, however,that the U.S government did not make sporadic forays into the world ofpublic art and architecture Very often, however, these attempts ended inembarrassment, or worse Art historian Vivien Green Fryd, for example,describes the angry debates that accompanied e√orts to decorate thenation’s Capitol building Each painting or sculpture added and eachrevision of the building itself resulted in often loud and vociferous inputfrom congressmen, private citizens, and artists about what art would be

‘‘proper’’ and ‘‘meaningful.’’ As Fryd argues, each of the participants inthese debates had in mind a particular ‘‘message’’ that should emanatefrom the art bedecking the Capitol Yet, even something as mundane as asculpture of the nation’s first president, George Washington, could eruptinto artistic warfare Horatio Greenough was the artist commissioned to

do the sculpture, but the resulting work—a Washington who appearedmore like a Roman god or Greek senator—soon became the center ofcontroversy For one thing, critics complained, Washington was ‘‘nude’’(meaning that he was shirtless) Others felt that the piece deified Wash-ington, putting the man above the democratic principles of the nation Inshort order, the statue was moved out of the Capitol Rotunda, thenplaced outside facing the Capitol, then carried o√ to the Smithsonian in

1908 where it languished for many years until it was rescued and put inthe Museum of American History in 1962.∞∂

In the midst of the Great Depression of the 1930s came the boldestattempt to bring art and the government together With thousands ofartists, actors, musicians, and writers out of work and the Americanpeople trying to cope with the disbelief and despair that accompanied theeconomic crash, the administration of Franklin D Roosevelt hit upon theunique idea of providing government subsidies to creative individualsand groups in order to bring entertainment and culture to the nation’speople Years later, artists and government o≈cials alike could remember

both the optimism and the excitement that greeted the establishment ofthe Federal Arts Project (fap) under the auspices of the Works ProgressAdministration in 1935 and the vicious attacks by congressmen, anticom-munist zealots, and some outraged artists that led to the destruction ofthe program less than five years later For some of the critics, the issue wassimple economics—the American people should not be providing whatamounted to subsidies for a bunch of artists Some were simply express-ing the traditional American antipathy toward anything that smacked ofthe creation of an ‘‘o≈cial’’ art The loudest of the detractors, however,claimed to find too strong a ‘‘leftist’’ tendency in the art (and artists)associated with the fap Often citing the program as just another example

of the New Deal’s ‘‘socialism,’’ these critics were not above suggesting thatmuch of the fap artwork was, quite simply, communist propaganda.∞∑

As for art as part of the nation’s diplomacy, it had certainly come intouse during World War I and World War II, largely in the form of propa-ganda posters that degraded the nation’s enemies, glorified the act of war,

or urged American males to come to the aid of ‘‘Uncle Sam.’’∞∏ One couldargue, however, that this was ‘‘art’’ in the loosest sense It was propa-ganda, pure and simple, and there was little or no pretense concerningthe government’s o≈cial support of these e√orts Perhaps because of the

longstanding antipathy toward any government involvement in the arts,

or perhaps because of the always present sense of inferiority concerningAmerican culture, the idea that America’s art—or literature, or music, ortheater, or dance—could (or should) be put in the service of the nation’sforeign a√airs was much slower to develop

In fact, the United States lagged behind the French, British, and viets in putting art to work in the international field The State Depart-ment’s first tentative step into the arena of cultural diplomacy took place

So-in 1938 with the establishment of the Division of Cultural Relations Themain focus of this understa√ed and underfunded o≈ce was cultural andscientific exchanges with the Latin American republics As historianFrank Ninkovich explains, even this relatively small gesture was under-taken halfheartedly and was primarily a ‘‘response to what was perceived

as a cultural o√ensive in Latin America by the Axis powers.’’ The limitedactivities of the division were primarily due to the nearly unanimousopinion in the department that government should not be directly in-volved in the ‘‘culture business.’’ As one report noted, ‘‘It is the view of theDepartment that in this country the primary responsibility for culturalexchange properly resides with private agencies and institutions and the

major functions of the Division is [sic] to make the good o≈ces of the

Government available to private enterprise and to serve as a clearinghouse for the activities of private organizations.’’ The department’s earlyactivities related to art were indicative of this deep-seated reluctance In

1941, an exhibit of American paintings was sent to various Latin can nations The State Department, however, merely provided some gen-eral policy guidelines It was the O≈ce of the Coordinator of Inter-American A√airs (oiaa)—headed by millionaire and art collector NelsonRockefeller—that provided the funding, with expertise coming from pri-vate groups and individuals Within two years, the oiaa’s cultural opera-tions had been transferred to State, but the department was still hesitantabout jumping into the cultural field In 1944, David Finley was asked bythe State Department whether the National Gallery of Art would assumecontrol of the art exchange program formally housed in oiaa ‘‘With theapproval of the trustees, an Inter-American O≈ce [iao] was established

Ameri-in the Gallery, usAmeri-ing funds supplied by the Department of State for thispurpose.’’ Again, a division of labor had been established, with Stateproviding the funding and policy, and the iao supplying the expertiseand organization.∞π

With its tiny budget and a rather narrow charge of ‘‘administering,maintaining, and expanding a program of artistic exchange with theother American Republics,’’ the iao still managed to put on a variety ofart exhibits from 1944 through mid-1946 Ten art shows were sent to LatinAmerica, including exhibitions of American murals and Native Americanart, as well as a showing of nineteenth-century French prints The iaoalso arranged for exhibits of Latin American art in the United States,such as the paintings of José María Velasco and separate showings ofoils, watercolors, and photographs from Cuba Despite these accomplish-ments, the Department of State began to seriously reconsider both therole of American art in international relations as well as its own role inexhibiting that art abroad As Assistant Secretary of State for Public andCultural Relations Archibald MacLeish declared in mid-1945, the nation’scultural policy and cultural program ‘‘need a little formal recognition—alittle institutional prestige—if they are going to be moved out of theirpresent second-class quarters (second service and no deck games) on theport side aft.’’ With America sending ‘‘commercial attachés, financialattachés, and agricultural attachés’’ around the globe, ‘‘we can hardlyexclude cultural attachés, unless we are ready to tell the world that every-thing the French and Latin Americans have ever said about us is true, andthat Calvin Coolidge was right when he said that the business of theUnited States is business.’’∞∫

In February 1945, as the war in Europe drew to a close, over two dozenmuseum directors, artists, and State Department o≈cials gathered inWashington to discuss the future of the department’s art program Thismeeting of the Advisory Committee on Art to the Department of Stateserved as a sounding board for those present to express their views as tohow, and why, American art should play a significant role in the nation’spostwar foreign policy In attendance were Grace Morley, director of theSan Francisco Museum of Art, David Finley, director of the NationalGallery of Art, Daniel Catton Rich, director of Fine Arts at the ArtInstitute of Chicago, and the artist Henry Varnum Poor III They werejoined by Assistant Secretary MacLeish, Bryn J Hovde, who was chief ofthe Division of Cultural Cooperation, Margaret Garrett, acting chief ofthe iao, and the director of the American Council of Learned Societies,Waldo G Leland, among other government o≈cials and invited guests.Hovde began the proceedings by announcing that ‘‘the concept of foreignrelations has undergone a profound change.’’ It was obvious, he said, that

‘‘relations between peoples are as important, if not more important,than relations between governments.’’ In a world brought closer togetherthrough breakthroughs in communication technology, it would be ‘‘nec-essary that peoples know more and more about one another One of thebest means for increasing such understanding is the arts.’’ Echoing thesentiments of many of those in the art world who saw art as a new

‘‘language,’’ Hovde concluded that ‘‘appreciation of the arts of other ples is comparatively easy as they melt the barriers of language.’’

peo-Indeed, a good deal of the rhetoric flying around during the ensuingdiscussion at the meeting would not have been out of place in one of thewartime editorials by Peyton Boswell or Alfred Frankfurter MacLeish,who as both a poet and Pulitzer Prize–winning author and a State De-partment o≈cial provided an interesting perspective on the matter, ar-gued that sending American culture abroad would ‘‘give to peoples ofother nations a picture of what we are like as a people’’; the arts wereparticularly e√ective mediums for ‘‘they and they alone can speak with-out interpreters.’’ Dr George C Vaillant, director of the University Mu-seum in Philadelphia, waxed eloquently, if not entirely clearly, on howAmerican works of art ‘‘intermesh with similar elements in other cultures

to form an overall world synthesis in which we may share by virtue of thepresence of these elements in our own society.’’ Yet the minutes of themeeting make clear that there was a growing consensus that American arthad roles to play beyond its somewhat hazily defined work as a symbol ofpeace and world brotherhood

Thomas Munro, curator of education at the Cleveland Museum ofArt, went to the heart of the matter when he suggested that ‘‘there wasneed for clarification on whether our emphasis should be on the develop-ment of good will (on propaganda in the best sense) or on a completelyfree interchange of products and ideas The two are by no means identi-cal.’’ His fellow discussants wholeheartedly agreed with this last point andthen proceeded to sketch out how art as propaganda could work most ef-fectively for the United States They began by noting that other nations—Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—were already active in culturaldiplomacy Each nation was ‘‘spending great sums of money in culturalpropaganda out of a realization that it is one of the most e√ective means

of winning friends and influencing people.’’ In order to compete withthese e√orts by European nations, the committee resolved that America’scultural program should be ‘‘broadly conceived.’’ Particularly in the field

of art, the goal would be to present ‘‘the proper analysis and presentation

of important art trends.’’ The discussion made clear, however, that U.S.art exhibits overseas could no longer remain the relatively unfocusede√orts undertaken in previous years The selection of what kinds of art todisplay was key, for ‘‘the picture of American life which is given to othercountries should be adapted to a level of understanding of given culturesand should subordinate to some extent the worst elements of our cul-ture.’’ Munro completely agreed, and he suggested that the State De-partment should determine the ‘‘acceptability’’ of the art In planningart exhibits, the United States needed to study the ‘‘obstacles to coop-eration in each country,’’ such as ‘‘racial antagonism, economic rivalry,religious and linguistic di√erences,’’ to ensure the proper ‘‘understand-ing’’ of American art ‘‘Specific projects,’’ he concluded, ‘‘should be fittedinto a context of such understanding, as means to ends In other words

we should have scientific reasons for anticipating the results of what we

do, so as to avoid mistakes and wasted e√orts It would then be possible toselect and devise exhibits and other projects of the right sort.’’ RobertWoods Bliss, a longtime diplomat and collector of pre-Columbian art,summed up the meaning of Munro’s comments: ‘‘It is entirely properthat the Department of State should control what is selected in works ofart in which the United States is o≈cially represented.’’∞Ω

The February 1945 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Art naled an important shift in o≈cial thinking about how and why U.S artexhibits should play a role in America’s postwar diplomacy First andforemost, the call for a ‘‘broadly conceived’’ program indicated that theparameters of such an undertaking were to expand beyond exchanges

sig-with the Latin American republics In particular, the discussions at themeeting zeroed in on U.S art programs for Europe; a subcommittee wasestablished to investigate the possibilities Second, the postwar art pro-gram would be no hit-or-miss a√air What art was sent, and where itwas sent, would be determined by analyses of the target nations, U.S.goals, and anticipated results of the exhibits Third, it was now clearthat the Department of State was poised to take a greater role in theart program Rather than simply providing some funds or vague policyguidelines, the department would henceforth become more directly in-volved in every phase of the program, including the selection of the art.Finally, and perhaps most important to an understanding of the rifts thatwould develop in the years to come between many in the U.S art com-munity and the Department of State, American artworks sent overseaswould not be representatives of the ‘‘country of the soul.’’ They would bepropaganda—‘‘in the best sense’’—serving the national interests; theywould be ‘‘means to an end.’’

Implicit in the discussions of the Advisory Committee on Art was theassumption that the role played by the iao in the National Gallery of Artwas not su≈cient to the new plans for the art program Obviously, thenew ‘‘broadly conceived’’ program meant that the iao’s strict focus onU.S.–Latin American art exchanges would have to be dramatically modi-fied As for the iao’s current work, criticisms were mounting both insideand outside of the Department of State Just a few months after theFebruary meeting, Daniel Catton Rich prepared a report on the represen-tation of U.S art in overseas exhibits He sharply criticized what he calledthe ‘‘haphazard and partial record’’ of U.S support of such exhibits With

a direct stab at the iao’s habit of simply recycling existing art exhibits,Rich decried this practice and charged that the ‘‘sponsors’’ of these ex-hibits (private businesses and the iao) had simply ‘‘chosen the easier way

of picking up exhibits already shown in this country with little regardfor suitability outside the United States.’’ In early 1946, J LeRoy David-son, who was the visual arts specialist in the Division of Libraries andInstitutes—part of the newly formed O≈ce of International Informationand Cultural A√airs in the Department of State—was more direct in hisattack on the iao’s unfocused e√orts The entire situation had ‘‘beenextremely unsatisfactory.’’ The iao had actually organized few exhibits orexchanges with Latin America, and ‘‘much has been sent down that is notwhat the Department would have desired.’’ This was hardly surprising,since ‘‘the Department has practically no control over the activities of theInter-American O≈ce.’’ Davidson then made a cryptic remark concern-

ing iao personnel to the e√ect that the ‘‘personalities involved are chologically unsuited to an operation of this type.’’≤≠ Other evidencesuggests what Davidson meant: that David Finley and John Walker, direc-tor and chief curator, respectively, of the National Gallery of Art, were notsupportive of an overseas art program run by the Department of State;and that the two men were far too restrictive and conservative in terms ofthe art they selected for exhibition abroad.

psy-That both Finley and Walker were uneasy with the National Gallery’srelationship with the State Department is clear Both men saw the gallery

as the repository of the nation’s greatest art treasures and themselves asarbiters of taste and culture While they were not opposed to the inter-national exhibition of American art per se, they were suspicious of anysuggestion that the Department of State should have a greater role (whichwould equate to a lesser role for the gallery and themselves) in organizing

and showing those exhibits In 1944, an editorial in Art News suggested

that the National Gallery was about to establish a permanent collection ofLatin American art as ‘‘a continuation of the artistic e√orts of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American A√airs.’’ This would be a ‘‘deliberate use ofart for a propagandistic end,’’ and ‘‘our southern neighbors are sure to seethrough the device.’’ Finley immediately responded, alerting the readers

of Art News that such an exhibit would be both ‘‘contrary to law’’ and ‘‘a

complete reversal of the Gallery’s established policy regarding tions.’’ He asserted that the gallery did not ‘‘serve the ends of propaganda

acquisi-or political expediency’’ but instead set a ‘‘high standard of quality’’ as itscriteria for selecting art for the museum Finley admitted that an Inter-American O≈ce had been established ‘‘at the request of the Department

of State,’’ but its function would be to ‘‘act primarily as a clearing house ofinformation on art activities in the American Republics.’’≤∞

Walker was even more adamant about keeping government and artseparated He was also extremely skeptical about the value of internationalart exhibits in terms of diplomacy Responding to an idea for an artexhibition service run by the United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (unesco), he bluntly replied, ‘‘It is very doubtful to

me whether exhibitions of art contribute at all to international standing.’’ He saw no reason for ‘‘unesco muddling’’ up the already

under-‘‘complicated business’’ of organizing international art shows A shorttime later, Walker wrote to Finley concerning a request from unesco andthe Department of State for a U.S art exhibit in Paris He sarcasticallydismissed such attempts to ‘‘make International Cultural Relations a real-ity.’’ He was particularly harsh on unesco’s role, arguing that ‘‘art exhibi-

tions arranged internationally are bound to be chaotic and worthless.’’

‘‘Unless Congress objects,’’ he continued, ‘‘and I think it might be a goodidea if it did, the State Department has committed itself to further inter-national culture at the expense of the American taxpayer, come whatmay!’’ Walker also lambasted the e√orts of several private art organiza-tions to become involved in the selection of art for the Paris show, includ-ing the Artists League of America and the American Federation of Arts(afa) He branded the Artists League a collection of ‘‘Communists andFellow Travelers.’’ Having dismissed unesco, the Department of State,and national art groups as possible directors of international art exhibi-tions, Walker made it clear that ‘‘I think it is important to have the N.G.A.[National Gallery of Art] hold the reins until we decide whether or not wewant to try and run the art end.’’ Finley, in response, agreed that he was

‘‘not very enthusiastic about such an exhibition.’’≤≤

As it turned out, fewer and fewer people were very enthusiastic aboutthe international exhibitions arranged by the iao in the National Gallery

At the February 1945 Advisory Committee on Art meeting, it was notedthat the iao-sponsored exhibit of nineteenth-century French prints hadresulted in ‘‘criticisms voiced by certain United States citizens againstthe selection of French rather than American material.’’ Thomas Munroagreed, wondering whether it was ‘‘wise to send into Latin America works

of art which we ourselves imported from foreign countries Would thisnot confirm the frequent belief that we were a people without muchculture of our own, who were merely able to buy works of art?’’ Inhis confidential report on international art exhibitions, Daniel CattonRich raised an additional criticism The exhibits sent abroad ‘‘represent asegment—rather than the whole of American art endeavor Showings ofso-called contemporary art abroad have, with some exceptions, leanedtowards the conservative and academic.’’ When the Division of CulturalCooperation learned in late 1945 that another exhibit organized by theiao would feature foreign artists, it made known its concerns ‘‘It is feltthat this sequence of non-American art unalleviated by any first classcontemporary American art will tend to weaken whatever artistic pres-tige the United States might have.’’ The division also reiterated Rich’spoint about the ‘‘conservative’’ nature of iao exhibits: ‘‘no exhibition bycontemporary American artists of equal quality has been sent ontour.’’ And, as State Department o≈cials were well aware, requests forshowings of American modern art were coming in from overseas TheUnited States Information Service (usis) representative in China notedthat while Chinese artists were ‘‘familiar and interested in modern French

painting, they are comparatively unfamiliar with modern American art.’’

It was ‘‘time they had the opportunity to see a few works of Marin,

O’Keefe [sic], Kuniyoshi,’’ and other leading contemporary American

artists.≤≥

The rupture between the iao in the National Gallery and the ment of State was apparent by late 1945, but the final blow to the rela-tionship came from an unlikely source In March 1945, the NationalGallery announced that the Tate Gallery in London had requested that aselection of American paintings be sent for display in England In the latespring of 1946, a collection of over two hundred paintings assembled

Depart-by John Walker, Francis Taylor, director of the Metropolitan Museum ofArt, Duncan Phillips, Daniel Catton Rich, and Alfred H Barr of moma,among others, made its way to England In June 1946, the exhibitionformally opened at the Tate Gallery Large crowds visited the show, and itgarnered a few nice words from some British art critics One claimed that

‘‘the national spirit can be detected everywhere endearingly honest

and free from cliché.’’ The critic for the London Times informed his

readers that the paintings were ‘‘the work of American artists who strike

out an independent line for themselves.’’ A London Times editorial argued

that ‘‘there can be little doubt that the American climate is now favorable

to an indigenous art.’’ For most others, however, the exhibition wasjudged to be a failure on many levels English art critic Cyril Connollydubbed the exhibit ‘‘an American tragedy in four acts.’’ One of his col-leagues, writing under the pen name Perspex, derided the notion thatanything approaching an ‘‘American art’’ was to be found at the Tate Heleft the show ‘‘with the sad Dickensian conclusion that ‘I don’t believethere’s no sich person,’ or if there be his presence is not to be sought atMillbank.’’ Try as he might, he could not ‘‘discover an authentic national

mark.’’ The London correspondent for the Magazine of Art expressed his

disappointment in a scathing review ‘‘There is a lot this exhibition mighthave done—had the actual show not been poorly chosen and inadequate,poorly publicized and poorly hung.’’ Most British visitors and critics, heclaimed, came away from the exhibition befuddled by the ‘‘bewilderingvariety’’ of the paintings ‘‘It made no sense of American painting.’’ The

critic for the Evening Standard spoke for many in the British audience

when he expressed skepticism as to whether art had ‘‘found itself ’’ in theUnited States For many of the reviewers, this expressed the most trou-bling aspect of the exhibition: the art seemed largely imitations (and paleimitations, at that) of European art One American critic recounted anincident in which a British visitor to the gallery asked a U.S reporter to

‘‘show me which of these things represent the American form of art Theyall look French to me.’’ When the reporter ‘‘pointed out regional Ameri-cana by Thomas Benton and John Stuart Curry, the Englishman said,

‘Hmmm, thank you,’ and walked away.’’≤∂

Although there were a handful of works by America’s modern artists—Arthur Dove, Stuart Davis, Marsden Hartley, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, andGeorgia O’Kee√e were some of those included—very pointed criticismswere aimed at the selection of contemporary American art for the Tateshow The news story announcing the exhibition indicated that ‘‘a par-ticular endeavor will be made to represent the contemporary Americanschool as fully as the scope of the exhibition permits.’’ Even before theshow opened in England, however, eyebrows were being raised over theinconsistent quality and relatively small number of contemporary Amer-ican paintings found in the exhibit Peyton Boswell tried to be tactful butcame to the conclusion that ‘‘the contemporaries miss some of thebest painters and include a few who must have come in through the backdoor, proving either that it is harder to judge the living or that museumdirectors are human.’’ Others were not as sympathetic The U.S culturalattaché in Paris was more to the point He asked that the State Depart-ment send an exhibition of modern U.S art to France The works selectedfor the Tate show, however, were not what he was looking for The con-temporary paintings chosen for display in England were ‘‘to us quitedisappointing.’’ The French, who would be ‘‘particularly interested inmodern American art would find the present selection disappoint-ing.’’ Was there a chance, he asked, of ‘‘revising the list for Paris, throwingless emphasis on the historical angle and more on modern tendencies.’’Critics Ralph Pearson and John Anthony Thwaites were frankly appalled

by the selection of contemporary American paintings for the exhibition.Pearson noted with disdain that only thirty of the nearly two hundredpaintings at the Tate represented twentieth-century American art Ofthose, only eighteen could ‘‘with considerable tolerance be classified

as modern,’’ and only three of the moderns could be classified as ‘‘toprank.’’ To Pearson, the selection indicated ‘‘confusion.’’ Thwaites declaredthat ‘‘with the twentieth century the selection stopped being a selec-tion and became a grab-bag of everyone who could pull a string.’’ Thevery best modern artists were either represented by ‘‘atrociously chosen’’works or were terribly underrepresented Writing a few months after theexhibition closed, the leading French arts weekly had the last word: the

‘‘modern section was truly catastrophic.’’≤∑

The problems with the modern art section of the Tate exhibition were

not completely surprising when one considers that John Walker, who wasprimarily responsible for assembling the collection, was not enthusiasticabout such art Walker was also troubled about the modern art section ofthe American exhibit, but for entirely di√erent reasons ‘‘Our one mis-take was in letting Duncan [Phillips] increase the number of modernpictures There were just too many I therefore decided that ratherthan spoil the e√ect by crowding we would omit about half a dozenmodern pictures and after three weeks put these up in place of six now onexhibition.’’≤∏

For many o≈cials involved with cultural diplomacy in the ment of State, the Tate exhibition was the final proof needed to indicatethat the iao and the National Gallery of Art were not capable of running

Depart-an international art program By mid-1946 plDepart-ans were well underway toembark on a dramatically new approach, one in which the department

would have complete control over policy and the art.

ADVANCING AMERICAN ART

In the spring and summer of 1946, the department, using funds originallyappropriated to the defunct O≈ce of War Information (owi) and oiaa,purchased seventy-nine oil paintings The collection would soon come to

be known by its exhibit name, Advancing American Art.≤π The list ofartists was a virtual who’s who of those who were, or would shortlybecome, the leaders in contemporary American art: Georgia O’Kee√e,Arthur Dove, William Baziotes, Robert Gwathmey, Marsden Hartley,Stuart Davis, Milton Avery, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Jack Levine, Ben Shahn,and Philip Evergood were just a few of the notables The cost of thismagnificent collection was a paltry $49,000 (approximately $620 perpainting) The State Department conservatively estimated that the pur-chase prices were based on ‘‘an over-all average discount of 25 percent onactual selling prices and in terms of then current market conditions.’’Such discounts were due to the ‘‘generous cooperation of the dealers,’’many of whom ‘‘eliminated their own commissions or cut prices dras-tically in order that the Department could carry out what they felt was aworthwhile program.’’ The oil paintings were supplemented by a collec-tion of thirty-five watercolors that had also been purchased by the De-partment of State from the afa in the spring of 1946 for the sum of $5,585.The watercolors, like the oils, were in the modern style and boasted anequally impressive array of artists: Jacob Lawrence, Stuart Davis, MiltonAvery, and Lyonel Feininger, for instance.≤∫

Most of the work of assembling the collection fell to J LeRoy son, the same State Department o≈cial who wrote in March 1946 thatpersonnel at the National Gallery of Art were ‘‘psychologically unsuited’’

David-to run an international art program Despite later criticisms about the

‘‘one-man’’ selection process, Davidson was no neophyte to the world ofart Educated at Harvard University and New York University’s Institute

of Fine Arts, Davidson became the assistant director and curator at theWalker Art Center in Minneapolis in 1939 In 1945, following a stint withthe War Department, he joined the Department of State as a visual artsspecialist After his service in the department, he earned his Ph.D at Yale

in 1951 and enjoyed a respected career as an art historian and author ofbooks on Chinese and Indian art In choosing the works of art to include,Davidson did conduct some ‘‘informal consultation with leading special-ists in the field of contemporary American art concerning artists to berepresented.’’ Among these consultants were Hermon More of the Whit-ney Museum, Hudson Walker of the afa, and the noted artist and artdealer Alfred Stieglitz There had been ‘‘general, almost unanimous agree-ment’’ on the artists to be included in the collection Richard Heindel,Davidson’s superior in the department, also assisted in the process.≤ΩThe rationale for the collection and its exhibition overseas encom-passed a variety of reasons and strongly suggested why the NationalGallery’s approach was not appropriate Not surprisingly, the developingCold War with the Soviet Union played a role As Assistant Secretary ofState for Public A√airs William Benton explained in April 1947, ‘‘Exhibi-tions of this kind also make an impact among Communists overseasbecause they illustrate the freedom with which and in which our Ameri-can artists work.’’ He reiterated an earlier State Department statement on

Advancing American Art that declared, ‘‘ ‘Only in a democracy where the

full development of the individual is not only permitted but fosteredcould such an exhibition be assembled.’ ’’≥≠

In addition, a general desire to improve America’s overseas image also

motivated the creation of Advancing American Art In describing the

overall objectives for the exhibition, the State Department indicated thatAmerican painting was ‘‘a small but important’’ part of a ‘‘broad pro-gram of international and cultural relations, aimed at producing a betterunderstanding in foreign countries of American thought in all its as-pects.’’ And such e√orts, particularly in the field of American art, weredesperately needed According to Assistant Secretary Benton, exhibits

such as Advancing American Art helped to create a ‘‘favorable e√ect in

foreign countries It is the sort of thing which helps to counter the