The thai yellow shirts movement as a struggle for class recognition

This thesis contends that conceptualization of class in Thailand must take into consideration important issues of class interests and status, particularly the interaction between members

Chapter 1: The Yellow Shirts Movement of Thailand

1.1 Introduction

On 25 November 2008, supporters and members of the Peopleʼs Alliance for Democracy (PAD) marched to Bangkokʼs Suvarnabhumi International Airport and occupied it As a result, thousands of tourists were left stranded in the capital of Thailand (Bangkok Post, 26 November 2008) Two days later, Don Mueang International airport was seized as well, bringing air traffic to a complete standstill (The Age, 28 November 2008) For a country with a rich history of social movements1, the PAD movement raised several immediate questions: Why did the Thai middle class2, recognized as supporters of democracy especially after the 1990s demonstration, choose to support a movement that was apparently extra-democratic in nature? What were their motivations for doing so? Were the accusations of corruption in the government the main reason? If so, why did the movement continue even after the fall of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006?

The PAD movement proved to be different from other social movements in Thailandʼs history in several respects: firstly, despite the 







1 Somchai
 Phatharathananunth
 (2006)
 examined
 the
 struggle
 of
 the
 Small
 Scale
 Farmers’
 Assembly
 of
 Isan
 (SSFAI)
 in
 Northeast
 Thailand
 from
 1993
 to
 2002.
 Consider
 also
 Suthy
 Prasartset
 (1996)
 who
 looked
 at
 Non‐governmental
 Group’s
 (NGOs)
 movements
 in
 Thailand
 since
1969
with
the
establishment
of
the
Thailand
Rural
Reconstruction
Movement
(TRRM),
the
 first
non‐governmental
development
group
in
Thailand.
Jim
Ockey
(2002)
highlights
the
protest


of
22
January
1956,
arguing
that
the
protest
that
took
to
the
streets
has
been
forgotten
despite
its
 influence
 in
 shaping
 much
 of
 the
 political
 sphere
 in
 Thailand
 for
 a
 couple
 of
 decades
 after
 the
 event
itself.
The
point
is
that
Thailand
has
a
rich
history
of
social
movements
that
spans
over
at
 least
half
a
century,
yet
none
of
them
involved
the
taking
over
of
airports.



2 This
 was
 the
 term,
 and
 identity,
 the
 PAD
 movement
 adopted
 for
 itself.
 Here,
 I
 borrow
 its
 connotations
on
their
terms
but
maintain
that
the
term
‘middle
class’
remains
highly
problematic
 and
will
discuss
this
in
further
detail
below.



heterogeneity within the PAD (Pye and Schaffar, 2008), a large portion of its support base consists largely of the urban middle class This differed from the middle class-led movement in May 1992, which has been touted as an epitome of democratization in Thailand (see Hewison, 1996; Ukrist, 2008) Secondly, never has any movement in the countryʼs history resulted in such a drastic political polarization of Thai society The occupation of Suvarnabhumi airport was merely an episode in a long drawn political conflict between the PAD and the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) that peaked again in April 2010 Empirically, the question of why the Bangkok middle class supported such a movement spills over to an important theoretical question of the relationship between class, democracy and social movements Thus, this thesis aims to understand the motivation of the ʻmiddle classʼ as well as the significance of this motivation in the recent PAD movement

1.2 Relevance to Contemporary work(s)

Following the 2006 coup dʼétat, work on Thailandʼs political conflicts has been copious (see Kasian, 2006; Giles 2007; Case, 2007; Ockey, 2008a, 2008b; Connors, 2008a; Connors and Hewison, 2008; Pasuk and Baker, 2008b; Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Thongchai, 2008; Ukrist, 2008; Funston, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009; McCargo, 2009; Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz3, 2009) While these were certainly commendable, there are several

3 Kevin
 Hewison
 (2010)
 provides
 a
 relatively
 balanced
 review
 of
 Nostitz’s
 book,
 noting
 that
 while
this
written
account
is
“not
scholarly,
[but]
nor
is
it
meant
to
be”
(ibid:
523),
it
is
influential
 enough
to
become
“a
book
that
anyone
who
has
a
serious
interest
in
Thailand’s
politics
should


points that ought to be addressed Firstly, scholars have attempted, directly or indirectly, to answer the important questions of why and how the movement emerged: these explanations revolve around two broader themes of intra-elite struggle and Thaksinʼs corruption Albritton and Thawildawee (2007: 23), for instance, suggest that Thaksin was seen as competing with the king, by

“insinuating himself into ceremonies honouring the 60th year of the kingʼs accession to the throne” Similarly, Connors (2007: 252) emphasized that the movement was a consequence of Thaksin attempting to replace the “old power group – a network based around the palace, Prem, elements of the Democrat Party, members of prominent establishment families and senior bureaucrats – with his own network of intimates and associates” (see also Giles, 2009b) On the other hand, scholars such as Thitinan (2008: 142) highlighted the “controversies, contradictions, and corruption allegations” of Thaksinʼs administration and how these contributed to the displeasure towards the ex-premier (see also Case, 2007; Connors and Hewison, 2008; Pasuk and Baker, 2008; Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Ukrist, 2008; McCargo,

2009 for more explanations4)

While these are not necessarily inaccurate, several questions remain:

why should members of the Thai middle class be involved in the movement?

What were their motivations? Moreover, if we were to approach these studies








not
 “an
 entirely
 non‐partisan
 account
 as
 he
 shows
 sympathy
 for
 the
 red‐shirted
 campaigners”
 (ibid:
523).
Nevertheless,
the
attempt
to
capture
the
developments
of
events
places
it
as
one
of
 the
foremost
accounts
on
the
movement
to
date.


4 In
 addition
 to
 these
 articles,
 others
 have
 attempted
 to
 offer
 a
 perspective
 that
 focused
 on
 Thaksin’s
mistakes
in
isolating
the
Bangkokians
and
his
policy
mistakes
(see
for
instance
Kasian,
 2006;
 Connors,
 2007;
 Hewison,
 2008;
 Thitinan,
 2008;
 Montesano,
 2009b).
 Nevertheless,
 I
 maintain
 that
 these
 explanations
 are
 seldom
 divorced
 from
 the
 idea
 of
 a
 conflict
 of
 interests
 between
the
Thai
elites,
such
as
military
leaders
and
the
ex‐prime
minister.



from a social movements perspective, as this thesis aims to do, the explanations offered thus far may be construed as strategies of mobilization – more specifically, as “frame alignment” This still leaves us with the crucial

question of why In addition, the mechanisms of mobilization have also been

largely overlooked More intriguingly, substantive studies on the motivation of the participants and supporters of the Yellow shirts movement have been conspicuously neglected Studies that come closest to this concern themselves with explaining perceptions of democracy among the Thai middle class (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2007) or the notion of democracy and good governance (Albritton and Thawilwadee, 2009) Even then, these studies were not specific to the supporters of the Yellow shirts but the ʻmiddle classʼ,

or urban Bangkokians, in general Furthermore, the focus on democracy from the onset, I contend, restricts the viewpoint by which one perceives the phenomenon In other words, the explicit focus on democracy (see Thitinan, 2009; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) assumes that the movement had little to do with class interests

1.3 Statement of Problem & Thesis Statement

This brings us to one of this thesisʼs main conceptual contention – that

“class” as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and generalized manner Many authors, as well as popular media and pundits,

over-have tended to assume and refer to a middle class – usually understood as

occupying the ʻmiddleʼ of the socio-economic spectrum (see Diagram 1.1) This understanding, unfortunately, confuses more than it clarifies, especially

in explaining the PAD movement Firstly, the PAD supporters are presented

as members of the Thai middle class by mainstream media This has left those who are less attuned to the developments of the movement with the notion that the Thai middle class, as a whole, supports the PAD movement Secondly, some scholars have been quick to dismiss the Yellow (and Red) shirts movement as a class conflict, arguing that the presence of inter-class alliance among members of both the Yellow and Red shirts negates it from being a simple class conflict (Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz, 2009; Kitti, 2010) These two representations of the PAD supporters have, in turn, placed serious limitations on the conceptualization of the PAD movement as a movement for democracy, or even royalism I contend that these arguments tend to consider class as an immutable category, in tandem with a Marxian perspective – that is to say, class is seen as a set of fixed categories rather than a dynamic outcome of social and economic processes and conflicts Moreover, the presence of cross-class alliances does not negate the fact that there are groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar interests – an important feature in Frank Parkinʼs notion of “social exclusion” Perhaps most importantly, in considering class from this Marxian perspective,

we are unable to move beyond understanding class as “mere incumbents of positions, or embodiments of systemic forces” (Parkin, 1979: 4)

Diagram 1.1: Classes in the Marxian perspective

In light of this, I argue that a perspective based purely on Marxian assumption and understanding hinders us from appreciating class as a dynamic concept More importantly, it limits the appreciation of the Yellow shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict, overlooking the significance

of the participation of the masses Following Parkinʼs (ibid: 13) argument that

“the relations between classes are to be understood as ʻaspects of the

distribution of powerʼ”, this thesis adopts a stance that incorporates both a Marxian and neo-Weberian perspective, suggesting that the movement is an

attempt by particular groups of people to secure their interests in response to the social exclusion experienced It would be more useful then, to think of

several groups – or classes – occupying the ʻmiddleʼ stratum of society (see

Diagram 1.2) This thesis contends that conceptualization of class in Thailand must take into consideration important issues of (class) interests and status, particularly the interaction between members of different social position

Diagram 1.2: Society/social stratum as consisting of several status groups

Thus, this thesis is concerned with understanding the motivation behind the involvement of the middle class for a movement, purportedly a result of intra-elite conflict, and how this motivation is appropriated into mobilization “frames” (Benford and Snow, 2000) Accordingly, the principle

contention of this thesis is that the PAD movement is not a movement of all ʻmiddle classesʼ in toto, but one aimed at usurping the opportunities and resources had been excluded from groups found in the middle stratum of Thai

society Specifically, the thesis argues that it was Thaksinʼs increasing monopolization of the Thai economic and political sphere, coupled by crucial structural changes brought about by the 2007 economic crisis which led to the exclusion, and marginalization, of the Thai economic middle class In this respect, the movement ought to be understood in the larger context as an attempt by various groups in Thai society to counter and contest their gradual exclusion by those in power

1.4 Contribution to Knowledge

In conceptualizing the PAD movement as a manifestation of class conflict – in part but not exclusively – instead of an intra-elite struggle, this thesis positions itself to make the following contributions to existing works on Thai politics and social movements Firstly, this thesis provides an account of the emergence of the PAD movement from a social movements perspective, a perspective that has been conspicuously missing up till now Secondly, the neo-Weberian perspective adopted by this thesis allows for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics between the military, monarchy, and the capitalist groups – key actors in the Thai political sphere – as well as the masses, allowing for the involvement of actors from various social positions in society to be included in this struggle for social, economic and political inclusion In doing so, I suggest that the occurrences of social movements reflect the process of class formation in Thailand as members from various strata of society attempt to consolidate and solidify their social positions By taking a perspective that sees emotions as a function of class, and by extension an expression of social relationships, we are able to avoid reifying class and dealing with it in broad, generic terms Instead, it allows for a more dynamic and robust approach that takes into account the interests and orientations of members of Thai society, and how these are aligned through socio-economic processes, bringing a more nuanced understanding to the notion of class in Thailand In other words, while the movement may not be exclusively class-based, I maintain that a class perspective allows us to

appreciate the intricacies of the movement Finally, by viewing the PAD movement from this perspective, this thesis aims to provide an alternative approach to understanding the precedents leading up to the rise of the Red Shirts in early 2009

It must be made clear here that this thesis does not claim to have uncovered innovative findings per se The fundamental contribution this thesis aims to make is the provision of an alternate theoretical paradigm to existing explanations

1.5 Scope of Study

This thesis scrutinizes the periods between the coup in September

2006 that ousted Thaksin from power and the election of current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in early 2009 This period is also particularly important as it provides us with a sociological and historical context to appreciating the demonstrations of the Red shirts, which reached its peak in May 2010

Given that this thesis aims to understand the motivations behind the supporters and members of the PAD, this study adopts a primarily qualitative approach In this section, I discuss and justify some of the research methods undertaken in the process of this research This includes methodological issues of locating and obtaining access to informants who were interviewed,

as well as a brief discussion on the challenges encountered The limitations of this study, arising from the methods adopted, will also be outlined briefly

This study adopts both a qualitative methodology and a historical one for three main reasons Firstly, although a quantitative approach may allow us

to have a better perspective on who the participants were – facilitating a broader overview of their identity and social ʻclassʼ – statistics would be unable to provide us with an accurate depiction of the mechanisms behind the workings of the movement As such, its validity should be critically interrogated Secondly, qualitative methods are particularly relevant for uncovering and understanding the meanings, especially those attached to the discourses and rhetoric used by the PAD supporters In other words, a qualitative approach allows the voices of individuals to emerge through their account of their experiences Finally, because the phenomenon to be studied

is a historical one, it is crucial that oral accounts be collected and analyzed to serve as a form of balance to official accounts This is because such accounts afford us the ability to interrogate official accounts of events available in mainstream media, which are more often than not, influenced by those in power Methodologically then, this study utilizes two forms of qualitative inquiries – (1) informal, in-depth interviews and (2) rigorous discourse analysis

of PADʼs official and supportersʼ websites

Interviews

Informants for interviews were purposively sampled for two reasons First, it allows for the selection of case(s) based on “the basis of their

relevance to [the] research questions, [the] theoretical position and analytical framework…constructing a sample…which is meaningful theoretically and empirically” (Mason, 2002: 124) This approach entails being critical in the selection of the sample from the general populace For this study, participants who had been involved actively in the series of protests and demonstration during the peak of the PADʼs movement between 2006 and 2008 were selected Secondly, due to my position as a foreigner, access to supporters of the Yellow shirts was limited Hence, I contacted people I knew in Bangkok and requested to conduct an informal, one-to-one interview with them I also explained my research objectives to them and acknowledged the sensitive nature of my topic, explaining that I would require their help in using the

“snowball” sampling technique (Lee, 1993)

In total, fifteen informants, aged 24 to 61 (as of 2010), were interviewed over a period of two months In terms of socio-demographics, the informants fall into the segment between the lower-classes which execute tasks and the dominant classes who hold the decisional power in organizations although

some also ran their own (small) business (refer to Table A on vii for a full list

of informants and their background) Interviews were conducted in a mixture

of Thai and English, with some translation, through the informant(s) who introduced us, on the spot when required Generally, each interview lasted about an hour, although there was a case where it went up to two hours Before the commencement of each interview, issues such as informed consent, confidentiality as well as the rights of an informant were made clear

to each interviewee Each interview began with a short self-introduction and

an explanation of my research objectives The intention to have the interview recorded for transcribing purposes was stated from the onset as well

One of the biggest methodological limitations arising from qualitative interviews is that these oral accounts, especially when the topic is centered on

a past event or occurrence, “tells us not just what people did, but what they

wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think

they did” (Hong and Huang, 2008: 71, emphasis mine) Thus, while interviews allow for a more balanced perspective, it ought to be cross-examined with official accounts Consequently, much caution was exercised in taking into account the background of the informant and the influence it may have on their responses Furthermore, given the nature of the topic – where support for the PAD is almost synonymous with being nationalist or royalist – the possibility for the informant to be defensive for his or her actions and thoughts has to be recognized too

Additionally, Mills (1940: 904) reminds us that

“over against inferential conception of motives as subjective ʻspringsʼ

of action, motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having

ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations Human actors

do vocalize and impute motives to themselves and to others…Rather

than fixed elements ʻinʼ an individual, motives are the terms with

which interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds This

imputation and avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena to

be explained The differing reasons men give for their actions are not

themselves without reasons.” (emphasis in original)

Thus, motives are part of the linguistic tools of an individualʼs self-justification and are best understood as the basics of social rhetoric of verbal action rather than the source of social action in general In other words, we may not be able

to draw a perfect correspondence between motives and actions but it is highly plausible for us to assume that the way in which the respondents articulate

their views is closely related to their motives and motivation – even if these articulations and motives appear questionable

Despite these caveats, one has to suspend a certain degree of skepticism and recall that this thesis aims to uncover the motivations of those involved Accordingly, these personal, oral accounts should be supplemented with other empirical sources (Fairburn, 1999) in order to obtain a more holistic picture

Discourse Analysis

In this study, newspaper reports and online resources were scrutinized

to complement my interview data Specifically, I analyze the discourses and rhetoric found on websites that propagate and openly support the PAD, as well as newspapers such as The Nation and Bangkok Post These sources of data are particularly important for it shows how collective sentiments are mobilized and understood by the PAD supporters on an official front Also, newspapers are a useful source of data in studies of collective action as it allows “more leverage over processual and mechanistic elements in causal explanations” (Earl, et al, 2004: 66) However, newspapers, given their interests, tend to reflect a position that supports the state and, or, its owner(s) (Mullainathan and Shlefier, 2002) Thus, on one hand, while newspapers provide some basic facts, the manner in which it is structured – reflected in the discourse and rhetoric used – influences how the movement, or an event, comes to be perceived and understood Sources from public websites and

newspapers then serve as important evidence of the construction and manipulation of images, rhetoric and discourses to mobilize the ʻmiddle classʼ

All in all, the combination of qualitative interviews and discourse analysis not only allows for a close comparison between rhetoric and motivation, the relationship between the two, and also allows for a more holistic construction of the phenomenon By doing this, we can also uncover and understand the mechanisms and processes beneath the mobilization of the movement

1.7 Prospectus

This thesis is thus organized in the following manner Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical framework and concepts used in

this thesis Specifically, it aims to apply the Weberian concept of social

closure as a tool to understand the class conflict underlying the PAD

movement In Chapter 3, a historical overview of the Thai political sphere will highlight the strong historical links between the recent coup and the roles key actors play In demonstrating the contestation between these actors, I contend that there are important historical antecedents in the emergence of the PAD movement The chapter that follows (Chapter 4) will examine the motivations of some PAD supporters, illustrating the importance of emotions – specifically fear and hope – in motivating and mobilizing support and participation for the PAD Next, Chapter 5 explicates how these existing emotions are mobilized through discourse of royalism and the demonization of Thaksin These, I argue, are facilitated by the strategic use of ideological

resources and communications network Finally, in Chapter 6, I reiterate this thesisʼ main argument, contributions and limitations before presenting suggestions for future research

Chapter 2: Social Closure and Social Movements (in Thailand)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to accomplish the following goals First, it will consider works done on social movements in Thailand, particularly political movements I contend that there has been a limitation in the way movements

in the last two decades of Thai history has been studied and conceptualized

as a ʻmiddle classʼ movement Specifically, I argue that these studies tend to adopt a position where class is understood as set of relatively broad and fixed social relationships revolving only around capital However, this position limits our understanding of the issue as a class conflict, presenting it as a clash among different classes – in the case of the PAD movement, the ʻurban middle classʼ and the ʻrural poorʼ (see Giles, 2009b) In addition, by postulating that these movements are ʻmiddle classʼ movements, important mechanisms and processes of class formation such as “exclusion” and

“usurpation” (Parkin, 1979) are glossed over while the dynamics of interaction between the various groups, as well as their interests5, involved in the movement are neglected Accordingly, this chapter proposes a Weberian slant, on top of the existing Marxian understanding, so as to better conceptualize the notion of ʻclassʼ in Thai society To accomplish this, I outline

Marxʼs conception of class and its usefulness in explaining social movements

but maintain that a perspective incorporating both Marxian and Weberian

perspectives on class is more beneficial for making sense of the movement at hand In other words, while the Marxian perspective allows us to account for the economic dimension, a Weberian perspective privileges the dynamic cultural processes of class formation Together, I argue that these perspectives allow for a more dynamic understanding of the phenomenon

This chapter, then, draws on Frank Parkinʼs (1979) notion of “social

closure as exclusion and usurpation” and attempts to offer an explanation

rooted in a Weberian understanding of class In short, it emphasizes an analytical framework centered around an understanding of social closure as the dynamic struggle between forces of exclusion and monopolization on the one hand and the forces of usurpation and opportunity hoarding on the other This would allow us to appreciate the movement as more than a push for

democracy but as a movement that emerged as a consequence of social

exclusion In other words, a contest for opportunities lays the foundation for

the displeasure and fear felt by the ʻmiddle classʼ This in turn, sets the stage for their mobilization In addition, I argue that it is these common emotions that unite the various groups in the ʻmiddle classʼ, resulting in what we have come to recognize – that the PAD movement is a ʻmiddle classʼ one This chapter maintains that the notion of class must remain a dynamic one, especially in the study of social movements in Thailand (and elsewhere) Therefore, the principal theoretical contention this chapter aims to make remains as this: the recent Yellow shirts movement is a consequence of an

attempt by contesting groups in Thai society to secure their own interests in response to the social closure experienced

Finally, this chapter will go on to survey existing literature on social movements in general and introduce us to the dominant perspectives and discussion in social movement literature Effectively, leading theories on social movements not only explain the conditions under which movements emerge (political opportunity structure), how they are organized and mobilized (resource mobilization theory), but also attempts to account for participantsʼ involvement (grievances and relative deprivation) In outlining these theories, I lay out the theoretical tools I utilized in accounting for the mechanisms behind the emergence of the PAD movement

2.2 Surveying the Literature: Social Movements in Thailand

Studies on the social movements in Thailand can be classified into two broad categories The first, in line with social movement literature, is concerned with what has come to be associated with the middle class: “new social movements” The term ʻnew social movementsʼ was used to describe a diverse range of campaigns that championed a variety of causes – such as student movements (see for instance Rootes, 1980; Burg, 1998; Boren, 2001), gay (see Smith, 1999) and environmentalist (see also Albrecht, 1972, Gale, 1986) movements – or movements with interests that were not directly political or economical These ʻnewʼ movements saw its social base coming together from a basis other than class – such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity or age Another common feature among these movements was that

they sought to establish some form of identity, lifestyle or were aiming to assert rights of the individual instead of the “proletarian revolution associated with classical Marxism” (Buechler, 1995: 442) of the ʻold social movementsʼ More importantly, there appears to be an “elective affinity” (ibid: 456) between new social movements and the middle class In the context of Thailand, anti-dams movements (Kanokrat, 2003), environmental movements (Forsyth,

2001, 2007), movements involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Suthy, 1996; Hirsch, 1997; Naruemon, 2002; Somchai 2002, 2006; Giles, 2009a) and religious movements (Mackenzie, 2007) constitute the main foci

of these studies

The second category of work on Thai social movements revolves around political ones6 - more specifically, how the middle class advanced democracy This branch of studies has emphasized two themes: (1) the importance of the Thai middle class in bringing about democratization (Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996; Anek, 1997; Surin, 1997; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) while paying attention to the socio-economic context in which the movement emerged (Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996); and (2) the role of the middle class in relation to other actors in society (Surin, 1997; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) While these illustrate the importance of historical antecedents, structural conditions contributing to the emergence of the recent PAD movement and the significance of networks in these movements, there

6
Here,
I
borrow
generously
from
Tilly
and
Tarrow’s

(2006)
definition
that
a
movement
becomes
political
when
it
involves
agents
of
governments.
In
the
case
of
social
movements,
the
state
often
 takes
the
role
of
either
the
opposition
against
which
the
movement
is
challenging
or
an
actor
the
 movement
is
trying
to
win
over.


appears to be an important conceptual limitation: “class” as a concept has been applied in an unproblematized and over-generalized manner For instance, the middle class has tended to be defined in terms of income and occupational status (Girling, 1981; Robison, 1995; Robison and Goodman, 1996) I argue that this perspective not only reifies class but presupposes that the movement is a quest for democracy instead of a consequence of a struggle for social position In attempting to understand the middle class based on purely economic factors, the relational aspect of social stratification

is overlooked Simply put, a Marxian conception of class (over)emphasizes the material and neglects the notion that oneʼs position is defined, or understood, in relation to others in that society

Scholars have been quick to contest the notion of the PAD movement

as a class conflict, noting the presence of inter-class alliance among members

of the Yellow shirts (Montesano, 2009a; Nostitz, 2009; Kitti, 2010) However, I contend that such arguments are premised on the notion that class is an immutable category That is to say, it is contingent on socio-economic measurements, or the Marxist idea of “haves” and “haves-not” Nonetheless, such a disclaimer hardly allows us to move beyond understanding class as

“mere incumbents of positions, or embodiments of systemic forces” (Parkin, 1979: 4) Furthermore, the presence of cross-class alliances does not negate the fact that there are groups of people from similar status contesting for dissimilar interests Instead, I argue that such a perspective hinders us from appreciating class as a dynamic concept Above all, it limits the appreciation

of the Yellow shirts movement to a matter of intra-elite conflict Hence, I

propose and alternative to the conceptualization of class in Thailand that may

be more useful and pertinent

2.3 The Thai ʻMiddle Classʼ

A key concept that this thesis aims to address is that of the ʻmiddle classʼ, specifically in Thailand Often conceptualized in terms of occupational class and income level (see Girling, 1981), I contend that this perspective, while effectual, is limited in allowing for a clearer approach to understanding the PAD movement In conceptualizing ʻclassʼ along lines such as occupation and income level, ʻclassʼ, both as a concept and a social institution, is reified (see Brubaker, 2005) In other words, to call the PAD movement a ʻmiddle classʼ movement is to replicate the rhetoric and notion of class, defined along material lines

With this in mind, this thesis proposes a perspective that views emotions as a function of class That is to say, instead of defining the participants and supporters of the PAD movements as members of the ʻmiddle classʼ on account of their socio-economic background, this thesis proposes that these people belong to a similar social position, identified as the ʻmiddle classʼ, because of the common emotions they experience and display Emotions allow us to understand where oneʼs position is in any social relationship This means that the social position an individual finds himself, or herself, in may affect the extent to which s/he feels a particular emotion For example, the less well off may feel a sense of anger towards those who are richer than them Underlying this contention is the notion of power relations

and dynamics This argument has its theoretical roots in Barbaletʼs (2002: 4) contention that emotions arise from the “structure of relations of power and status in which [people] are implicated”, or it is in social relationships that emotions lie For instance, if one has insufficient power in a relationship, one would more likely experience fear Similarly, in a case of racism, the emotions

of anger and hatred stems from power dynamics rather than simply income or wealth This is to say that oneʼs structural position is not restricted to social class alone This would allow us to approach the emotions evoked as more than a matter of socio-economic inequality as well More importantly, by looking at emotions, we are better able to appreciate the actual social position

of an actor This is because one may possess economic wealth but lacks political power In this case, s/he is still susceptible to the emotion of fear, in relation to those who hold the power in society

Kemperʼs (1978) work on emotion also sheds light on the notion that people sharing homologous structural positions may experience common emotions Essentially, individuals, in their relationships with others who

occupy similar social situation, contribute to “the feelings of the group qua

group” (Barbalet, 2002: 5) In short, emotions tell us the social position one is

in relation to others in the same society Instead of confining them to an immutable category resting on socio-economic factors, emotions allow us to adopt a relational perspective to social class Thus, I have attempted to categorize and conceptualize the participants and supporters of the PAD through a perspective grounded in emotions

With these in mind, I propose then, that a ʻclassʼ can also be understood as a group of people who experiences similar emotions, or group emotions7, as a consequence of structural relations of power and status

Unfortunately, ʻmiddle classʼ as a concept, and term, is an insufficient, yet

necessary, expression to capture the nuanced and complex nature of a group

of people occupying a specific social class and position For the purpose of differentiation, in accordance with occupational and income categorization, people with professional occupation and small businesses shall be referred to

in this thesis as the “economic middle class8” Accordingly, this thesis borrows and retains the concept of the ʻmiddle classʼ but employs it with the following understanding: in this thesis, the “affective middle class” refers to the group of people, occupying similar social locations, who has been excluded and,

hence, display group emotions of fear and hatred arising from the exclusion

It is necessary to address and discuss a crucial critique of using emotions to understand and define class Emotions can, and often do, originate from material reasons; it would seem fallacious then, to be emphasizing a perspective that de-emphasizes the material aspect However,

I maintain that emotions remain an important indicator of class and social position because it allows us to better determine the actual status of an individual in a particular society As we shall see, in Chapter 4, material and economic wealth does not always translate into power in society Emotions 







7
Here
I
borrow
Kemper’s
(2002:
62)
idea
that
by
“group
emotion”
refers
to
a
situation
whereby


“some
aggregate
of
individuals
is
feeling
something
that
is
sufficiently
alike
to
be
identified
as
the
 common
emotion
of
that
aggregate”.


8
This
term
is
used
here
to
refer
to
the
very
group
that
other
authors
have
been
looking
at.
By
adding
the
“economic”
prefix,
I
hope
to
draw
a
distinction
between
the
middle
class
defined
and
 recognized
 by
 economic
 indicators,
 and
 those
 that
 are
 identified
 based
 on
 the
 emotions
 they
 display.


thus allow us to appreciate the overlap between socio-economic status and the corresponding, or lack of, power In other words, by focusing on the emotions displayed, we may be able to better locate the social position of an individual who may possess wealth but lacks political voice in society, giving

us a more nuanced understanding of social class and position Again, this thesis is not arguing for a stance that negates a material understanding and definition of class Rather, it aims to broaden this conception and advocates a perspective that takes into consideration the underlying social interactions and relations

2.4 Class and Social Movements – Insights from Marx, Weber and Parkin

Here, it is useful to revisit existing arguments on Yellow shirts movement as well as important theoretical perspectives on class As mentioned, works on the Yellow shirts movement tended to begin with the premise that it is a movement with a ʻmiddle classʼ social base (see Pye and Schaffer, 2008; Kengkij and Hewison, 2009) Attempts to define the Thai ʻmiddle classʼ has been made (see Girling, 1981; Ockey, 1992; Surin, 1997; LoGerfo, 2000; Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) but these have often embraced a conception of the ʻmiddle classʼ based on the notion that the structure and foundation of social stratification is defined by the ownership of property or means of production In other words, to see the ʻmiddle classʼ as

“executives and professionals…clerks and shopkeepers chiefly outside the government bureaucracy and many with specialized skills” (Prudhisan and

Chantana, 2001: 263-264) is to adopt the Marxian understanding of class in terms of property and means of production

2.4.1 Marx – Class, Revolution and Social Movements

For Marx, society is structured around the central notion of ownership

of property and the means of production Those who own the means of

production he called the capitalists, or the bourgeoisie, and those who did not, the proletariats Due to their contradictory interests, these two groups were

conceived as having an antagonistic relationship This became the basis of Marxʼs famous thesis on the proletarian revolution – and also the model for classical social movements However, it is important to recognize that this conception of class is a relational one That is to say, the capitalist class only exists in relation to the proletariat class This leads us to an important question of groups found in the ʻmiddleʼ, between the capitalists and

proletariats Marx identifies this third major group as the petty bourgeoisie, or

the middle class – people who own some property but lack control over labour In Marxʼs view, with the development of capitalism, this class was expected to disappear as its successful members moved into the bourgeoisie class while those who were not would become part of the working class Importantly, Marx conceived the middle class as a group that sought to preserve their private property but often had conflicting interests to the bourgeoisie (see Giddens, 1971; Giddens and Held, 1982; Bottomore, 1983)

It is evident from this that most works on social movements, especially political movements, in the Thai context tend to privilege the Marxian

perspective – as highlighted, these explanations have a propensity to see the middle class in terms of ownership of capital However, I argue while this perspective has its strengths, it has the consequence of reifying class, limiting the advancement of us understanding the movement from a more sociological perspective

This Marxian perspective has also led to the prevalent explanation that the movement is about a selected group of elites9 – for instance, military leaders such as General Prem (Ukrist, 2008; Tongchai, 2008) – mobilizing the masses to overthrow a corrupt politician At best, explanations from this standpoint offer us insights to the strategies employed by the Yellow shirts leadership in rallying support for its cause At worse, it leaves us wondering why these educated ʻmiddle classʼ should willingly “buy” into the rhetoric and discourse espoused by the leaders of the movement without any substantial justification Thus, to appreciate the movement as more than a group of people led by elites exercising their ideological power, I propose that it may be useful to incorporate a Weberian perspective so as to further appreciate this issue

2.4.2 Weber – Class, Interest, Status Groups and Social Closure

While Marx saw society as consisting of two primary, conflicting groups determined by property ownership and means of production, Weber (1978; 







9
Some examples of elites are military, religious and political leaders They may possess power and may exercise some form of rule, but for Marx, control of the economy or capital determines who dominates or are dominated Thus, the dominant class would be the class own or control the means of production or property An elite may have power, but may only be able to exercise it if they controlled

of the means of production in the hands of owners (Giddens,
1971;
Giddens
and
Held,
1982;


Bottomore,
1983)

Gerth and Mills, 1958), however, saw classes and social groups being connected within the sphere of power and attached to the important notion of the distribution of power For Weber, multiple overlapping dimensions of wealth, power and prestige determine social stratification In fact, “the term ʻclassʼ refers to any group of people that is found in the same class situation” (Gerth and Mills, 1958:181), or simply put, people who display similar lifestyle patterns, occupational class and who enjoy similar prestige and privilege constitute members of the same class

In addition, Weber argues that there are three features of class: economic interest, life chances and markets (Weber, 1978; Gerth and Mills,

1958) In this thesis, the concept of interest is especially useful for not only

does it “create[s] ʻclassʼ” (Weber, 1978: 928), but it is among the “most fundamental and universal components” of human behaviour (ibid: 601) Furthermore,

“…the concept of divergent sectional ʻinterestsʼ cannot be limited to economic interests, but must be extended to other spheres of social life Thus political parties, for example, have interests which derive from their situation as aspirants to, or as wielders of, power, and such interests do not necessarily rest upon shared class situations” (Giddens, 1971: 195)

In other words, class, from a Weberian perspective, is one way by which society is stratified Class does not necessarily correspond with status, however Thus, this thesis emphasizes status honour as the more consequential concept on which society is stratified The concept of status groups – defined by the specific lifestyle shared by members of the group – is especially relevant for it not only make up the social order, but are determined

by the distribution of social honour Rather than rely on economic indicators,

such as income, occupation and assets, in stratifying society, status groups considers non-economic qualities as well This includes political power In short, status groups allow us to integrate social, economic and political power into determining oneʼs social position Weber states that membership in these status groups take several forms, including kinship, education and religion I add to this by proposing that the display of group emotions constitutes another form of identifier for class, as argued above A more significant and crucial point for this thesis is that entry into these status groups is often

restricted, or as Weber calls it, there is social closure

2.4.3 Parkin - “Social Closure as Exclusion and Usurpation”

Weberʼs notion of social closure has been elaborated on by Frank

Parkin who conceptualizes this process as an exclusionary relationship in

which

“social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles…securing for itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process of subordination.” (Parkin, 1979: 44-45; see also Parkin, 1974)

Parkin also notes that, any group attribute may be emphasized for

“the monopolization of specific, usually economic opportunities This monopolization is directed against competitors who share some positive

or negative characteristics; its purpose is always the closure of social and

economic opportunities to outsiders” (ibid; emphasis in original)

However, this exclusionary process is only one side of the coin Just as dominant groups seek to exclude others in order to preserve their advantage, groups who have been dispossessed will also attempt to amass opportunities for themselves (see Tilly, 1998) In doing so, Parkin suggests that groups in

such an outsider position will mount “usurpationary actions” with “the aim of biting into the resources and benefits accruing to dominant groups in society” (ibid: 74) For Parkin, usurpationary closure tends to rely on the public mobilization of members and supporters, as in the use of strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, marches…and the like” (ibid)

2.5 Social Closure and the People Alliance for Democracy

This notion of social closure as usurpation is particularly relevant and appropriate in the re-conceptualization of the PAD movement For one, it presents the movement as more than just a political movement concerned with democracy but also accounts for the involvement of members from all social statuses in Thai society A fundamental idea behind Parkinʼs social closure as usurpation revolves around the interests of social groups and their active attempts in re-appropriating opportunities that had been excluded from them Thus, a perspective consisting of Weber and Parkinʼs concepts allow us

to re-conceptualize the PAD movement as more than an elite struggle, a middle class movement, or even a campaign for democracy Instead, we can now approach the phenomenon not only as a social movement, but more importantly, a manifestation of class conflict The difference lies in the idea that this conflict is not one characterized by class as a structural position but

an interaction and contestation among social groups in Thai society In addition, this conceptual framework fits into the overarching social movement perspective, serving as an incentive for mobilization This will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to come For now, I maintain that both

conceptions of social closure – exclusion and usurpation – are particularly apposite in the case of Thailandʼs political history and context

2.6 Social Movements Theories: Tools of Analysis

Having looked at the overarching theoretical framework around which this thesis bases its argument, let us now consider other relevant ʻtoolsʼ that allow for a holistic understanding of the emergence of social movements

2.6.1 Resource Mobilization Theory

The resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977)

essentially argues that the success of a movement depended on the

resources available and the ability to mobilize these resources (see also Kent, 1982; Kerbo, 1982; Jenkins, 1983) In other words, the strategies involved in

making a movement succeed and demanding a change in government policies or legislation was the main object of study instead of why the movements took place Resource mobilization theorists argued that because grievances existed everywhere, understanding grievances in the emergence

of social movements was unable to explain participation, or are at least of secondary importance (Opp, 1988) As a result, resource mobilization emerged as a form of complementary theory based on the assumption that social movements were a consequence of grievances or relative deprivation (ibid) However, the biggest limitation of this theory lies in its inadequacy in explaining the factors behind the emergence and development of all kinds of

social movements as well as the form these movements come to take (Perrow, 1979; Kerbo, 1982)

2.6.2 Political Opportunity

Following after the resource mobilization tradition, the political

opportunity perspective contented that the success or failure of movements

are dependent on the opportunities available This perspective built upon the

resource mobilization theory by pointing to the significance of external circumstances in providing sufficient openings, or opportunities, to allow mobilization It sought to emphasize that “activists do not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum” (Meyer, 2004: 127) Rather, the political context, or environment, provides an important backdrop against which grievances emerged and are mobilized to the advantage of the movement

For instance, if the regime is strong and repressive, the political opportunity is

smaller and a movement is likely to fail, or may not emerge at all Proponents

of this school accorded less attention to the resources available, but

concentrated on the interaction between the movement and the state, or other forms of established power (ibid) However, as Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) warn, “the concept of political opportunity structure is…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” Other opponents of this perspective (see Goodwin and Jasper, 2003) also argue that it accords too much credit to the environment and structures, overlooking the importance of agency More importantly, the political opportunity argument “actually explains too little, offering only a

mechanistic understanding of social movements that does not apply to many cases” (Meyer, 2004: 126)

2.6.3 Grievances, Relative Deprivation Theory and Emotions

Missing from the previous perspectives, and taken for granted by resource mobilization theorists, is the important idea of motivation behind the

participation The relative deprivation theory sought to explain this by positing that the “perceived discrepancy between expectations and reality” (Gurney and Tierney, 1982: 34) leads to collective action As mentioned, resource

mobilization theorists assume that the motivation behind activism lies in

grievances However, the question of how these grievances originate is often

unresolved (Opp, 1988) Similarly, as Gurney and Tierney (1982: 37) note,

relative deprivation is a “necessary but not sufficient cause” of social

movements and that little attention is devoted to the emergence of this relative deprivation itself and how this is translated into collective action This perspective also overlooks the dynamics of group organization and mobilization and fails to explain how feelings of relative deprivation are translated into collective action (Kent, 1982: 530) Finally, this school of thought is unable to explicate why “the social conditions of relative deprivation have failed to mobilize larger sectors of the population” (Maheu, 1995: 3)

Along the similar line, it was Hochschild (1983) who reoriented the focus of scholars towards the role and importance of emotions in the discipline This re-orientation has had a significant impact on scholars of social movements For one, Barbalet (2002: 3) notes, emotions offer “instant

evaluation of circumstances and influence the disposition of the person for a response to those circumstances” What this meant for social movements studies was that crucial concepts such as political opportunities, mobilizing structures and frames had to take into serious consideration the role of emotion Political opportunity structures, for instance, emphasizes the combination of environmental and grievances, or emotions, in accounting for

the emergence of movements On the other hand, concepts such as frame

alignment (Snow and Benford, 1988) highlights the cultural processes such as

the definition of a social problem and a way to solve it More specifically, it is the “motivational framing” (ibid) – which encourages people to get involved – that has the most to do with emotions for it is what “gets people to actually do something” (Goodwin, et al, 2001)

All in all, it is especially useful to integrate the above-mentioned theories in explaining and accounting for the emergence, growth and sustainability of any social movements

2.7 Conclusion: A Case of Social Closure

This chapter suggests that a neo-Weberian perspective is particularly useful in viewing the movement as consisting of groups contesting for their own interests Instead of identifying the participants of the Yellow shirts as members of a generic ʻmiddle classʼ, this approach allows us to see them as a heterogeneous group, or more accurately, the expressions of group emotions allow us to perceive these groups as occupying similar structural positions, and the emergence of that PAD movement as a contestation for competing

interests In short, the principle contention of this thesis is that the Yellow shirt

movement is a consequence of exclusionary social closure which led to

groups situated within the ʻmiddle classʼ to mobilize, around the expression of

similar emotion, in a usurpationary manner so as to secure their interests

The next chapter outlines the important historical developments in the

Thai political sphere and illustrates the processes of both social closure as

exclusion and usurpation throughout its rich history This will allow us to better

appreciate the suitability of this particular framework which views the movement as a manifestation of class conflict

Chapter 3: Social Closure in Thailandʼs History 3.1 Introduction

Political conflict in Thailand has been marked by “factional infighting among elites” (Patit, 2010: 117) since 1932 but has recently been recognized

as largely ʻmiddle classʼ led However, not only does this emphasis on the ʻmiddle classʼ produce a distorted image of a homogenous ʻclassʼ, it also downplays the significance of other – albeit more elite – actors in these movements The most recent coup in 2006 has brought the attention back to these actors – namely the military, the monarchy and the economic elites10 Yet, analyses of these actorsʼ involvement has centered on the discourse of democracy and corruption Again, I argue that social movements in Thailand,

particularly political movements, have less to do with social class and democracy than it has to do with social groups contesting their gradual

economic, political and social exclusion by the Thai state More specifically, this chapter highlights the historicity of Thailandʼs social movement as a dynamic interaction between groups who have been excluded and their attempt to usurp control, thereby contextualizing and conceptualizing the PAD movement in the broader political milieu

In light of this, this chapter has two aims: first, I outline the development of the Thai political sphere and highlights significant movements that have shaped the political landscape Concurrently, I identify the prominent groups involved and trace their roles in the narrative of Thailandʼs 







10
This
term
is
not
entirely
unproblematic.
For
one,
it
does
not
draw
a
clear
distinction
between
the
new
middle
class
that
emerged
in
the
last
half
a
century
and
the
older,
traditional
elites.



social movements Next, in constructing an account that demonstrates the historical antecedents, this chapter aims to delineate the interplay between the major actors and draws a historical link to the recent movement Secondly, this chapter seeks to acquaint the reader with an adequate understanding of its development by sketching the progress of the Yellow shirts movement, laying the ground work for the analysis of the mechanisms behind its emergence in the later chapters of this thesis

In the previous chapter, I have sought to re-conceptualize the phenomenon as an issue of groups contesting for their interests instead of a class or intra-elite conflict – both of which, I argue, are inadequate, in and of themselves, to sufficiently accounting for cross-class alliances among the Yellow shirts as well as accounting for the participation of the people Accordingly, in outlining the developments of the recent Yellow shirts movement, this chapter contends that the Yellow shirts movement is a

contemporary manifestation of historically embedded struggles for power and

recognition In addition, this chapter maintains that the history of political conflict in Thailand is characterized by the struggle for dominance and

recognition by groups of actors occupying dissimilar social positions while

attempting to secure similar interests

3.2 Thailandʼs Political History

3.2.1 1930s – 1950s: Fall of Absolute Monarchy and the Reign of the Military

The fall of absolute monarchy at the start of the 1930s paved the way for a political sphere that been characterized by the frequent involvement of

the military, coup dʼétats and the wrestling of power between the army and the state Led by a group of Western-educated military officers and civilian bureaucrats (Leow, 2002), the absolute monarchy was overthrown in the name of democracy (Prudhisan and Chantana, 2001) and came to bolster the political and economic power of Bangkok (Glassman, 2010) The succeeding regime, ironically, was dominated by the military until 1937 (Leow, 2002) The royalists did not remain silent, however, following the fall of the absolute monarchy In fact, they fought for a monarch11 with as much power as possible within the framework of democracy, albeit with little success (Thongchai, 2008) Yet by 1938, the military was, more or less, in full control and began introducing authoritarian policies, this time under the leadership of Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Hewison, 1996) The eventual defeat of the royalists

in the late 1930s meant that the monarchy as an institution had to remain in a position that was “above” – meaning “beyond, out of, high and away” from – politics (Thongchai, 2008: 15), a position it was made to adopt since June

1932 Overall, the fall of the monarchy ushered in a new economic and political era for Thailand By the end of the 1930s, Thailand had a well-established “commercialization, monetization, and commodification of the economy” despite not having a full-fledge capitalist system (Hewison, 2006: 83) This paved the way for the eventual emergence of the domestic capitalists However, this did not mean that the monarchy was divorced from the state or the Thai political scene totally, as we shall see later

11
In
Tongchai
Winichakul’s
talk
entitled
“Thailand’s
Crisis
and
the
Rise
of
Asia”,
delivered
on
7
June
2011,
he
made
the
distinction
between
monarchy
–
which
he
defined
as
the
“network
 monarchy”
(McCargo,
2005)
–
and
monarch
–
referring
to
King
Bhumibol.
In
this
thesis,
I
borrow
 these
definitions
as
well
to
differentiate
the
various
actors.
Specifically,
in
this
thesis
“monarch”
 refers
to
HM
King
Bhumibol
and
“monarchy”
refers
to
the
institution.



The fear of a growing Chinese-dominated business class, coupled with the potential threat to sovereignty, led Phibun to see this group as a serious threat to the Thai nation-state (Ramsay, 2001) As a result, Phibun adopted a

“nationalist clientalism” (ibid: 61) approach to address this concern Apart from closing down Chinese-language schools and the mandatory taking of Thai names by Chinese in Thailand, anti-Chinese economic policies were imposed

as well (Ramsay, 2001) By the end of World War II, the culminated effects of the world depression which forced many Western businesses to withdraw from the country, left the Sino-Thais with even more economic influence (ibid) while Thailandʼs economy fell behind the rest of Southeast Asia The economic surplus remained in the hands of a small group of economic elites – including the Sino-Thai businessmen as well as the “old nobility, tiny new segment of businessmen, professionals and officials” (Pasuk and Baker, 2008a) Comprising a small proportion of Thai population, this group of elites came to take firm control of Thai economy, controlling the financial and industrial sectors (Hewison, 1993) Due to the prevailing animosity towards the Chinese, this group did not, or could not, as a ʻclassʼ, “effectively or adequately control the state and its apparatuses” as the economic and political condition limited the growth of this group after World War (Turton, 1984: 29) The enmity left this group fairly small, limiting their wealth as well

as political influence (Anderson, 1990) With the military government in charge, little protection was given to domestic capital as business families had

to subject themselves to the patronage of political leaders in order to negotiate individual protection (Pasuk and Baker, 2008a)

The Phibun regime, rising to power after a series of internal strife within the military, eventually faced challenges in the 1956 when thousands took to the streets Marching from Sanam Luang to the parliament and later to Phibunʼs residence, the movement advocated constitutional reform in reaction

to the regimeʼs authoritarian policies This incident was touted as a victory for democracy for it signaled that the people were ready to exercise their views and political power (see Ockey, 2002) The immediate context of the protest was that Phethai Chotinuchit, an opposition MP, accused the government for having never “been for the people” (Ockey, 2002: 110) and called for the dissolution of the government, the elimination of appointed MPs and the transitional provisions of the constitution While Phibun was to remain in power for two more years, General Sarit, with the support of students, the monarchy and the Democrat Party, carried out a coup that finally removed Phibun from power in 195712 (ibid)

On one hand, this event was to be, in Thakʼs (1978) opinion, the most important event in the revitalization of the monarchy as it not only marked the removal of the men behind the 1932 revolution but also meant that Sarit, one

of the first leaders since 1932 to consistently and consciously build up the monarchyʼs prestige, was back in a prominent position This relationship between the monarch and the government, at this time, was on several levels

a mutually beneficial one The king, concerned about the threat of communism and anti-royalist opinions, allied himself to the military and

12
Sarit
was
seen
as
having
cynically
manipulated
public
opinion
through
his
criticism
of
“dirty
elections”
and
then
installed
a
regime
that
did
away
with
most
of
the
political
system
completely
 (Thak,
1978).


demonstrated this visibly – dressing in military uniform and adopting the role

of the natural leader of the military for instance While this brought the king and the royal family positive exposure and reinforced its status in Thai society, the military also gained legitimacy from the royal support The military reciprocated by incessantly promoting the royal family through the celebration

of its deeds and highly publicized events (see also Handley, 2006; Hewison, 2008) On the other hand, the fall of Phibun also ushered in a period of the most repressive regime led by the military (see Ockey, 2004) Sarit installed a regime that claimed legitimacy by capitalizing on the notion of authoritarianism

in Thai political culture (ibid) At the same time, the harsh repression of opposition and management of politics became the primary concern of the Sarit regime instead of economic growth (Hewison, 1996) Throughout this period, the Chinese business class, perhaps still struggling with the prevailing hostility against them, remained small and lacked substantial political influence (Anderson, 1990) Yet, the impact of globalization had a spillover effect of uninterrupted growth for Thailand for approximately four decades after this period (Hewison, 2002a; 2006)

3.2.2 1960s – 1971: The Rise of the Business group and the Democratization

of Thailand

With the influx of foreigners and accompanying investment, Thailand began experiencing economic growth and unprecedented modernization in the 1960s (Surin, 1997) The resultant economic growth drastically changed the socio-demographic conditions of Thai society, posing challenges to the authoritarian regime (Ockey, 2004) Large-scale migration from the rural