Most markets fall between the two extremes of monopoly and perfect competition – would like to sell more at the going price – faces a downward-sloping demand curve – recognises its out
Trang 1Chapter 10
Market structure and imperfect competition
David Begg, Stanley Fischer and Rudiger Dornbusch, Economics,
6th Edition, McGraw-Hill, 2000 Power Point presentation by Peter Smith
Trang 2Most markets fall between the two extremes
of monopoly and perfect competition
– would like to sell more at the going
price
– faces a downward-sloping demand
curve
– recognises its output price depends on the quantity of goods produced and
sold
Trang 3Imperfect competition
An oligopoly
– an industry with a few producers
– each recognizing that its own price depends
both on its own actions and those of its rivals.
In an industry with monopolistic
competition
– there are many sellers producing products that are close substitutes for one another
– each firm has only limited ability to influence its output price.
Trang 4Market structure
Number
of firms
Ability to affect price
Entry barriers
Example
Perfect competition
Imperfect competition:
Monopolistic competition
Oligopoly
Monopoly
Many
Many
Few
One
Nil
Small
Medium
Large
None
None
Some
Huge
Fruit stall
Corner shop
Cars
Post Office
Trang 5The minimum efficient scale and
market demand
The minimum efficient scale (mes) is the output at which a firm’s long-run average cost curve stops falling.
The size of the mes relative to market demand
has a strong influence on market structure
D LAC 1
LAC 2
LAC 3
Output
£
Trang 6Monopolistic competition
– many firms
– no barriers to entry
– product differentiation
so the firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve
– The absence of entry barriers means
that profits are competed away
Trang 7Monopolistic competition (2)
Firms end up in TANGENCY EQUILIBRIUM, making normal profits
Firms do not operate at minimum LAC
Price exceeds marginal cost
Unlike perfect competition, the firm here is eager to sell more at the going market price.
P 1 =AC 1
£
Output
Q 1
D MR
AC MC
F
Trang 8industry is the need for each firm to consider how its own actions affect
the decisions of its relatively few
competitors.
Trang 9Collusion and cartels
– an explicit or implicit agreement
between existing firms to avoid or limit competition with one another
– is a situation in which formal
agreements between firms are legally
permitted
e.g OPEC
Trang 10Collusion is difficult if:
changing rapidly
There are no barriers to entry
Trang 11The kinked demand curve (1)
Q 0
P 0
Quantity
£
Consider how a firm may perceive its demand curve under oligopoly.
It can observe the current price and output,
but must try to anticipate rival reactions to any
price change.
Trang 12P 0
£
The kinked demand curve (2)
The firm may expect rivals
to respond if it reduces its price, as this will be seen
as an aggressive move
… so demand in response
to a price reduction is likely
to be relatively inelastic
The demand curve will
be steep below P D
Trang 13The kinked demand curve (3)
Q 0
P 0
Quantity
£
D
…but for a price increase rivals are less likely to react,
so demand may be relatively elastic
above P 0
so the firm perceives that it faces a kinked demand curve.
Trang 14The kinked demand curve (4)
P 0
£
D
Given this perception, the firm sees that revenue will fall whether price is increased
or decreased,
so the best strategy is to keep price at P 0
Price will tend to be stable, even in the face of an increase
in marginal cost.
Trang 15Game theory: some key terms
Game
– a situation in which intelligent decisions are necessarily interdependent
– a game plan describing how the player will act or move in every conceivable
situation
– where a player’s best strategy is
independent of those chosen by others
Trang 16The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game
Consider two firms in a duopoly each with a choice
of producing “high” or “low” output:
Firm B output
Firm A
output
Trang 17The Prisoners’ Dilemma
produce high
but they would both be better off
producing low
– as long as they can be sure that the
other firm also produces low.
benefits
but there is incentive for each firm to cheat
Trang 18More on collusion
affected by agreement or threats
– an arrangement, entered voluntarily,
restricting future options
Credible threat
– a threat which, after the fact, is optimal
to carry out
Trang 19Contestable markets
characterized by free entry and free
exit
– no sunk costs
– allows hit-and-run entry
incumbent firms from exploiting their market power.
Trang 20Strategic entry deterrence
Some entry barriers are deliberately erected by incumbent firms:
– threat of predatory pricing
– spare capacity
– advertising and R&D
– product proliferation
potential entrants