FAILURE ANALYSIS CASE STUDIES I1 A sourcebook of case studies selected from the pages of Engineering Failure Analysis 1997- 1999 An imprint of Elsevier Science... PREFACE It is now thre
Trang 1FAIZURE ANAZYSIS
CASE SZZLDIESII
Pergamon
Trang 4Failure Analysis
Trang 6FAILURE ANALYSIS CASE STUDIES I1
A sourcebook of case studies selected from the pages of
Engineering Failure Analysis 1997- 1999
An imprint of Elsevier Science
Trang 7ELSEVIER SCIENCE Ltd
The Boulevard, Langford Lane
Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1 GB, UK
0 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved
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First edition 2001
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Trang 8PREFACE
It is now three years since Elsevier Science published the first book of Failure Analysis Case
Studies selected fiom volumes 1 , 2 and 3 of the journal Engineering Failure Analysis The book has proved to be a sought-after and widely used source of reference material to help people avoid
or analyse engineering failures, design and manufacture for greater safety and economy, and assess operating, maintenance and fitness-for-purpose procedures In the last three years,
Engineering Failure Analysis has continued to build on its early success as an essential medium for the publication of failure analysis cases studies and papers on the structure, properties and behaviour of engineering materials as applied to real problems in structures, components and design
Failure Analysis Case Studies I1 comprises 40 case studies describing the analysis of real
engineering failures which have been selected from volumes 4, 5 and 6 of Engineering Failure
Analysis The case studies have been arranged in sections according to the specific type of
failure mechanism involved The failure mechanisms covered are overload, creep, brittle fracture, fatigue, environmental attack, environmentally assisted cracking and bearing failures The book constitutes a reference set of real failure investigations which should be useful to professionals and students in most branches of engineering My sincere thanks go to the authors
of the case studies for finding the time to communicate their experiences to the wider world for the benefit of us all
Trang 10Shear failure of a road-vehicle steering shaft
J.H Cleland and D.R.H Jones 1 1
Breakup of the firewall between the B and C modules of the Piper Alpha
platform - I Analysis by hand calculation
A.C Palmer 19
Failure of a flexible pipe with a concrete liner
M Talesnick and R Baker 3 1
Torsional failure of a wire rope mooring line during installation in deep water
C.R Chaplin 45
Creep failures
Type I11 creep cracking at main steam line welds
K.G Sedman, J.C Thornley and R.M Griffin 63
Creep failure of a spray drier
P Carter 73
Catastrophic failure of a polypropylene tank Part I: primary investigation
P.R Lewis and G.W Weidmann 79
Catastrophic failure of a polypropylene tank Part 11: comparison of the DVS 2205
code of practice and the design of the failed tank
G.W Weidmann and P.R Lewis 97
Brittle fracture
Investigation of the M V Kurdistan casualty
S.J Garwood 117
Investigation of failed actuator piston rods
T.F Riitti and E.J Wentzel 139
Premature failure of prestressed steel bars
A Valiente and M Elices 147
Premature fracture of a composite nylon radiator
P.R Lewis 157
Trang 11P.A Withey 185 Low-cycle fatigue of titanium 6A1-4V surgical tools
H Velasquez, M Smith, J Foyos, F Fisher O.S Es-Said and G Sines 193 Failure analysis and experimental stress analysis of a threaded rotating shaft
R.B Tait 199
An investigation of the failure of low pressure steam turbine blades
N.K Mukhopadhyay, S Ghosh Chowdhury, G Das, I Chattoraj, S.K Das and
D.K Bhattacharya 211 Vibration-induced fatigue failure of an impulse line
K.R Al-Asmi and A.C Seibi 225 Malfunctions of a steam turbine mechanical control system
J.H Bulloch and A.G Callagy 235 Fatigue failure of hold-down bolts for a hydraulic cylinder gland
C Tao, N Xi, H Yan and Y Zhang 241 Analysis of a vehicle wheel shaft failure
J Vogwell 247
Fatigue failure analysis of a leg press exercise machine
P.J.Vernon and T.J Mackin 255 Failure analysis of rubber fuel pipes in aero-engines
G Fu 267
Environmental attack
Failure of austenitic stainless steel components used in nitrogen oxide plant
V.M.J Sharma, A.K Jha, P Ramesh Narayanan, S Arumugham and T.S Lakshmanan 277 Corrosion of central heating systems
D.R.H Jones 285 Crevice corrosion of 3 16L caused by chloride partition in water-butanone mixtures
J.H Cleland 301 Type I pitting of copper tubes from a water distribution system
P.J.L Fernandes 307 Corrosion of flexible waveguides
D Papatheodorou, M Smith and O.S Es-Said 3 13 Failure of automobile seat belts caused by polymer degradation
J.M Henshaw, V Wood and A.C Hall 317 Oxidation failure of radiant heater tubes
K.B Yoon and D.G Jeong 33 1
Environmentally assisted cracking
Sustained load crack growth leading to failure in aluminium gas cylinders in traffic
J.W.H Price, R.N Ibrahim and D Ischenko 345 Hydrogen-assisted stress-corrosion of prestressing wires in a motonvay viaduct
L Vehovar, V Kuhar and A Vehovar 357
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Failure analysis of camer chain pins
G.A Slabbert, J.J McEwan and R Paton 365
Unusual cases of weld-associated cracking experienced in a high temperature
catalyst reduction reactor
M.L Holland 373 Hydrogen cracking of ferritic stainless steel thermal storage tanks
S Konosu and T Nakaniwa 383
Hydrogen embrittlement failure of hot dip galvanised high tensile wires
N.K Mukhopadhyay, G Sridhar, N Parida, S Tarafder and V.R Ranganath 393
Bearing failures
Contact fatigue in rolling-element bearings
P.J.L Fernandes 409
An air crash due to fatigue failure of a ball bearing
I Salam, A Tauqir, A U1 Haq and A.Q Khan 415
Failure analysis of a condensate pump shaft
A.M Lancha, M Serrano and D Gdmez Briceiio 425
Author Index 443
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Fig 1 Damaged silos: view of the site
k l i - I , , / , i , ( , , , ,
Fig 2 Bolted joints of the sheets used for the silo In the lower part, a reinforcement nng was attached
occurred by rupture of the boltholes of the vessel in circumferential and longitudinal directions (Fig 4)
After the search had been carried out, specimens were taken, as detailed in Table 1
After the accident, the silo was still full up to the seventh ring (counted from the bottom), as can
be seen from Fig 5
Trang 16(IV) level after bursting
!
I
Fig 4 Longitudinal bolted joint, presumably at location of start of rupture
Table 1 Specimens and samples taken
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Fig 5 Top view of failed silo, showing remaining filling level
2.2 Tests for traces of an explosion
Specimens F were subjected to laboratory tests to detect possible traces of heat influence by fire
or explosion No such traces could be found Thus, one can conclude that failure was not caused
by the explosion of methane or any other gas produced in the silo by fermentation
2.3 Tensile tests
The sheet metal was tested using specimens BR, CR, BP and CP, as shown in Fig 6 and
Table 2
Fig 6 Specimens for mechanical tests
Table 2 Results of tensile tests on sheet material from silo Yield Tensile Reduction Elongation Uniform strength strength of area (5 diameters) elongation Specimen Orientation ( N ~ I I - ~ ) ( N ~ I I - ~ ) (”/) (”/I (”/)
BR I to joint 288 341 18 4 4 5 25
CR I to joint 261 316 I1 47.5 24
BP 11 to joint 300 345 IS 43 24
1) 278 313 70 46.3 29
Trang 18Fig 7 Behaviour of bolted joints in tension tests
Specimens B 1, B.2, C 1 and C.2 were tested for the strength of the bolted joints From Fig 7, it can be seen that they started to yield between loads of 15 and 25 kN, and that the deformation before fracture was in most cases more than 25 mm
2.4 Determination of the density of the slurry
density of 1.05 kgl-I
3.1 Determination of$lling level from records of the user
After the accident, the user of the silo supplied notes of deliveries, from which the theoretical
This height corresponds to filling up to the upper edge of ring 7 (counted from the top)
filling level at the time of the accident could be calculated (Table 3)
3.2 Stress analysis of boltedjoint
material, with Rpo.2 = 283 MPa and R, = 330 MPa This gives for shear:
The average values for yield and ultimate strength are provided by the tensile tests on the sheet
Density according to tests, maximum 1.05 kgl-'
Base area of silo (inside) 27.98m2 Theoretical level 13.9m
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3.3 Assessment of the theoretical bursting pressure
This also corresponds to the mean value of the forces calculated from Eqns (3) and (4)
In the test, the lower bound for the strength of the bolted joint was measured as FFractuIe = 22 kN
22 x 103
T= - 204Nmm-’
108 The burst pressure can be calculated from this, using the diameter of the silo (6m), as
2 x 204
The corresponding level over the ruptured ring is
This is equivalent to the height of 4.7 rings of the silo, and would mean that the level of the slurry was approximately in the middle of the third ring (counted from the top)
3.4 Spurting distance
From the visual inspection at the site of the accident, the approximate spurting distance of the slurry of 30m is known Since this was not a simple parabolical throw, but the jet was dispersed further after hitting the ground, the process can only be calculated approximately The intention of such an assessment is, of course, to determine the filling height of the silo
The horizontal velocity of the jet is given by u = q S H , and from the distance the jet travelled one obtains
9
= Dd2(HL - Ah) ’
Thus, the height of the liquid above the leak is
d* = S/D is the portion of the distance that the jet travels after hitting the ground, cp is the factor
of constriction of the jet (normally cp I I), and the other symbols are explained by Fig 8 If different
Trang 209
levels HL for the first leak and different ratios of sloshing (d* = 6 / D ) are assumed, it can be seen
from Fig 9 that the silo must have been filled to the top, and the liquid must have sloshed relatively
far after hitting the ground to have produced the observed pattern on the site
4 CONCLUSIONS
Thc visual inspection at the site of the accident showed the typical picture of failure by
the overpressure, were not found A pressure above atmospheric pressure can also be excluded because the necessary safety devices were installed and operative
According to the manufacturer of the silo, it was permissible to fill the silo with liquid up to the seventh ring (counted from the bottom), i.e ca 10 m high
The assessment of the filling height from the observed spurting distance also points to a filling level practically at the top of the silo
The design, manufacture and assembly of the silo can be judged as proper, suitable and according to normal engineering practice
Tests on the material also indicate a higher level than the seventh ring (counted from the bottom) This is supported by the observed deformations in the failed bolted joint of the silo
An additional argument against the statement of the user related to the filling level is the fact that the silo was still filled to the middle of the tenth ring (counted from the top), although the whole neighbourhood was covered with slurry from the silo
Based on these findings it can be said that failure of this silo was caused by filling it to too high a level with liquid instead of forage
It cannot be completely excluded that a mix-up in the way of counting the rings has contributed
to the failure Whereas one would normally count the rings starting from bottom, as for buildings, the manufacturer of the silo counts the rings starting from top, because the silo is
erected that way, assembling first the top, then putting rings under the top ring until the intended height of the silo is reached
Acknowledgemenf-The calculations were performed by R Primas, Section Materials and Structural MechdnicsiJoining Technology of EMPA