That the distributive injustices it’s creating have contributed to the erosion of public trust in the liberal capitalist system; that it denies its employees sufficient bases for self-re
Trang 1Finally, the stories of both Linux and Wikipedia tell us something
about leadership, for want of a better word, in environments such as
today’s in which self-organization fosters more creativity and produces
generally better results than the CEO system
Stewards, seeders, guardians
There are protagonists in these stories of new enterprise: Richard
Stallman and Linus Torvalds at GNU/Linux; Larry Wall at Perl; John
Ousterhout at Tcl; Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger at Wikipedia But
they are not “leaders” in the normal sense of the word
Perhaps there was a time when Wales could have established “rights
of sovereignty” over the Wikipedia project, equivalent to those he
already had at Nupedia But had he done so it is very unlikely, in my
view, that the phenomenon of Wikipedia we know today would have
“snapped into existence.” The lack of a CEO, an agenda, a strategy and
a “business model” was an important part of the attraction for the new
encyclopedists They could do their own thing, knowing that no
commercial interest mediated their relationships with those who sought
enlightenment from their articles
But the beginnings of things cast shadows over what happens
Those who were there at the beginnings, either because they were in
the right places, at the right time, or because things they did or did
not do became initial conditions that generated the positive feedback
loops that drive complex adaptive systems, have authority and
influ-ence People are interested in beginnings Although Torvalds and
Wales could not have known how the processes they seeded would
turn out, they’re respected by Linux and Wikipedia devotees as the
creators and patriarchs
How this patriarchal authority is used is crucial It will be lost if it
is mistaken for and used as CEO-type control Nor should it be used
to guide, because no one can know where things are going The
patri-archs of complex adaptive systems are more like guardians and
stew-ards, than guides The system is owned by all participants collectively
The patriarchs cannot tell them where to go, or what to do, but the
regard participants hold them in, and their vantage points above the
system, as benign overseers, give them the power to proscribe; to
suggest to participants that they’re barking up the wrong trees,
re-inventing wheels, or heading down roads others have proved to be
dead ends
Trang 2As Piers Ibbotson explains in The Illusion of Leadership,16 a good
theatre, or film director encourages the emergence of a great
perform-ance from the ensemble, by imposing “creative constraints” that liberate
creative energy “Creative leadership is a balancing act between the
emergent and the directed … the changes that will happen in spite of,
or without, your interventions and the desired changes that can be
encouraged by your actions and directions.”
This is the role of patriarchs of MaBEs The rules that led to the
emergence of Linux and the Wikipedia are creative constraints that
liberate energy, which the patriarchs protect thereafter by saying “no”
from to time
Their model is Holden Caulfield, protagonist and narrator of J D
Salinger’s novel, Catcher in the Rye, and his imagined role as the
guardian of young children playing in a rye field on the edge of a cliff.17
The argument so far
Part I was about how big business has got to where it is today and why
it is not a good place, either for people or big business It argued that
large, joint stock companies face two main challenges If they don’t
offer work more in tune with what people want, they will find it hard to
attract and keep good staff and if they don’t rein in executive pay, they
will destroy the political consensus on which their current freedoms
depend Part II is about where big business goes from here and how it
can reform itself It begins in this chapter with a warning: if MuBEs
cannot kick their addiction to omnipotent, charismatic leaders they may
find it hard to defend their markets against attacks by more adaptable
MaBEs In the last three chapters we look at how MuBEs can take up
arms against their sea of troubles
References
1 The Sunday Times 100 best companies to work for, March 8, 2009.
2 Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs, Princeton
5 At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity,
Oxford University Press, 1995.
Trang 36 Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, Free Press,
1980.
7 The Fifth Discipline, Doubleday, 1990.
8 Thriving on Chaos, Macmillan, 1987.
9 Competing for the Future, Harvard Business School Press, 1994.
10 Chaos, Management and Economics: The Implications of Non-Linear Thinking, Institute of
Economic Affairs, Hobart Paper 125, 1994 See also: Complexity and Creativity in
Organizations, Ralph Stacey, Berrett-Koehler, 1996.
11 Financial Times, December 7, 1998.
12 Is Microsoft the Great Satan?, FSF, 2007.
13 IDC press release, August 27, 2008.
14 Microsoft Missing Netbook Growth as Linux Wins Sales, November 6, 2008.
15 “El Aleph,” first published in the Argentine journal, Sur, in 1945.
16 The Illusion of Leadership: Directing Creativity in Business and the Arts, Palgrave Macmillan,
2008.
17 Catcher in the Rye, Little, Brown, 1951.
Trang 4That the distributive injustices it’s creating have contributed to the
erosion of public trust in the liberal capitalist system; that it denies its
employees sufficient bases for self-respect and that its structure is
unsuited to the modern business environment, does not mean the large
joint stock company is doomed But it does mean it has some adapting
to do if it is not to undermine the liberal capitalist consensus utterly,
and lose the able people it needs to maintain its current position to
other kinds of enterprise, better suited to the modern world
It has adapted of course, and continues to adapt Globalization is
an adaptation to improved communications and the removal of trade
barriers The unilateral repudiation of the “loyalty for security”
psychological contract between companies and their employees was
an adaptation to a more volatile and competitive environment The
adoption of shareholder value maximization as the listed company’s
primary objective, and the emergence of debt as the main source of
company finance, were both adaptations to the growth and increased
efficiency of capital markets
But adaptations to environmental pressure in one area often create
new environmental pressures in other areas This chapter examines two
adaptive approaches that large companies have pursued over the past
two decades with little success, and a third approach that is both more
promising and more challenging
The question of purpose
A decade ago, before the management discourse came to be dominated
by shareholder value analysis and financial engineering, there was quite
a lively debate about the “purposes” of companies It seemed a
poten-tially powerful adaptive approach, because it addressed the problems
created by the large company’s perceived detachment from the moral
constraints of civil society If a company could somehow persuade its
existing and prospective employees and customers that it was moved by
Trang 5a higher purpose than making profits, it could, or so it seemed, become
better adapted to the modern environment
Some commentators argued that it was the responsibility of CEOs
or “leaders,” as they were coming to be seen, to choose purposes for
their companies, and that they could choose whatever purposes they
liked, subject to the constraints imposed by capital markets
If it’s true that companies are free to choose whatever purpose or set
of purposes they like, they’re free, it was argued, to be what they like; to
be, for example, “soft,” rather than “hard”; “nice,” rather than “nasty”;
“responsible,” rather than “selfish”; and “cooperative” rather than
“competitive.”
I was associated with this idea, because of a book I had written a few
years before, in which I had argued that companies were coming under
pressure to behave in ways that were seen, by their existing and
poten-tial employees, customers, suppliers, and neighbors (by which I meant
local communities and society at large), to be fair, ethical, responsible,
and responsive, because otherwise they would be unable to attract and
retain able employees and loyal suppliers and customers.1
I emphasized, however, that what I had called “niceness” was not a
purpose, but an aspect of a new shareholder-value-maximizing (SVM)
strategy more in tune than the traditional “nice guys finish last”
philos-ophy, with the heightened environmental, moral, and community
consciousness of existing and potential employees and customers
Although I have some sympathy with the thinking behind it, the
idea that a company can choose its purpose is wrong A company can
have no purpose other than to maximize shareholder value, and that is
not so much a purpose as a raison d’être, or fate bequeathed to it by the
logic of the capitalist system
Capital moves to its highest value use If a company declared that (or
behaved as if) it regarded SVM as subordinate to some higher purpose,
such as supplying quality goods and services to customers or quality of
life to employees or other “stakeholders,” it would become less
attrac-tive to investors, which would cause its cost of capital to rise, and its
ability to achieve any purpose to fall
The debate about the “purposes” of companies and the popularity
of what I’ve always thought was the rather facile idea that investors are
just one among a number of so-called “stakeholder groups” who have
legitimate claims on the company, both stem from the mistaken belief
that SVM is irreconcilable with allegedly nobler aims, such as serving
customers, caring for employees and the environment, or being a
responsible corporate citizen
Trang 6Companies are not free to choose their purposes, but they are both
free and duty bound to choose ways to maximize shareholder value
Because SVM is hardly a goal that can stir human blood and inspire
extraordinary effort, other purposes, visions or missions may need to be
invoked But it is wrong to see a mission as having priority over or being
in some sense “higher” than the goal of SVM Visions and missions are
marketing; means to the end of creating value for shareholders, not
ends in themselves
I have never wavered from this position My view was always that the
“nice” strategy was value maximizing, because it acknowledged the
value of a class of intangible assets that I call “reputational,” the
accumu-lation and preservation of which were in the interests of shareholders
Although some, including Elaine Sternberg,2 concurred, others took
serious issue with this view, and some even seemed to find it downright
obnoxious The quality of giving, in their view, is more to do with the
motives that inspire the giving, than with the gift itself, although what
earthly difference motivation makes to those who receive I have never
been able to fathom
Those who insist there is something disingenuous and cynical about
companies that give generously to charities, adopt codes of ethics and
promulgate environmentally responsible operational guidelines, not
out of the goodness of their corporate hearts but to maximize value for
shareholders, are effectively arguing that the owners of companies
should subordinate their interests to nobler more caring purposes
chosen by executives This is absurd Shareholders choose their own
causes to support It is not the job of managers to act as the consciences
of their shareholders and nor are they equipped for that role
But that doesn’t mean appeals to the company’s non-existent better
nature are pointless Such appeals are messages from outside about the
changing relative value of the various classes of reputational asset, and
thus convey important information to value maximizers Moreover,
volunteering, company philanthropy, and Corporate Social
Responsi-bility (CSR) projects engage the humanity of employees who do have
“better natures,” and thus add authenticity to the “nice” strategy
Although sincerity and a genuine wish to do good are not necessary
when hunting for “reputational assets,” they can help to maintain
consistency and reduce the risk of the company’s exposure as a
corpo-rate hypocrite
There are many genuinely good, even saintly, people working in the
community relations departments of many companies, creating value
for shareholders as well as for the clients of their volunteering,
Trang 7philan-thropic, and community activities But there’s no denying the conflict
between the company as a value creator and the company as a
respon-sible and generous corporate citizen To minimize the cost of financial
capital, firms must appear to be “value hunters”; but to minimize the
cost of human capital (and maximize their ability to attract and keep
employees and customers), firms must appear to be “value givers.”
In the past the conflict was resolved by the “security for loyalty
contract” (keep your nose clean and close to the grindstone, and you’ve
got a job for life) before it became a dilemma When it was “my
company, right or wrong” there was no need for the company to be
responsive to public opinion Now that companies have forfeited
employee loyalty, by unilaterally repudiating the old security for loyalty
contract, the inherent conflict emerges
Philanthropy, CSR, volunteering, and commitments to sustainability
or carbon neutrality are all sensible adaptations Companies can’t disavow
a value-hunting destiny bequeathed by nature, but they can try (and
many are trying), to resolve the value-hunting vs value-giving dilemma
by wearing new clothes, and going about their value-hunting business
with an appearance of niceness and the attributes associated with it
The problem with this kind of adaptation is cognitive dissonance
Because it relies on masquerade, on giving the impression that the
company is a value giver, while it remains, by its nature, a value hunter,
there is a constant risk of being unmasked Reputational assets are hard
to win, but easy to lose A reputation for being a socially responsible
neighbor, earned, for example, by helping the unemployed in the area
around a company factory, will be destroyed overnight by a
value-hunting decision to close the factory and set up manufacturing overseas
where wage costs are lower
Moreover, CEO-led companies could find it hard to earn
reputa-tions for being philanthropic, and concerned about the disadvantaged,
if they continue to pay their CEOs huge salaries, contribute enormous
sums to their pension funds, grant them king’s ransoms in bonuses,
stock options, and restricted stock each year, and ferry them about in
executive jets
Soul and community
Another kind of adaptation some companies tried was to replace the
long-repudiated security for loyalty psychological contract with a new
kind of magnetic glue to attract and keep able employees
Trang 8It was proposed, for instance, that since the human hunger for the
sacred and profound was no longer satisfied, in this secular age, by
non-work institutions, employee loyalty will be strengthened if the leader
can discover (or “conjure up,” if you’re a skeptic) the company’s “soul,”
articulate it and embed it in the culture.3
I call this argument “the company as church” and I personally find
it repugnant But the idea that satisfying a spiritual hunger not being
met by any external institution should make the company more
attrac-tive to employees on whose loyalty it depends, is perfectly sensible
Corporate soul would probably make a great magnetic glue if it existed
or could be invented, and if employees were moved by it But although
people certainly do hunger for spiritual meaning, there is no evidence
that they seek it in, or would accept it from corporate churches It’s
presumptuous and, therefore, foolish for companies to suppose they
can induce people to make such deep personal commitments They can
have our diligence, professionalism and, sometimes, our friendship, but
they cannot have our souls and most self-respecting employees would
be offended if they asked for them
A more palatable variation on the theme is the idea that companies
should turn themselves into working “communities” rather than mere
workplaces; that people are starved of a sense of community in the
urban environments in which most companies operate, and are likely to
work hard for, and become committed to, a company that feels as if it’s
a community CEOs shuttle from site so site, holding “town meetings,”
instead of making monologue presentations, to introduce the latest
strategic initiative.4
I call this idea “the company as village.” As well as being rather more
appealing than the “the company as church,” it’s more in tune with
human nature and with how people socially construct their own
work-places But a large company is too big, and its employees are too
dispersed to be one community Moreover, it is difficult for employees
attending a town meeting to see their superstar CEO, who has many
other meetings scheduled at other sites, as their locally elected mayor
The town meeting model of CEO–employee interaction invites
ques-tions from the floor and it is, therefore, better than simply issuing
orders But when all is said and done it’s merely a rallying of the troops,
masquerading as an exercise in democracy Asking for questions from
the floor is just a courtesy Everyone knows there can be no debate; that
the CEO system has already made up its mind by then
The trouble with these assumed qualities and roles is that they’re
hard to reconcile with the qualities expected in “the company as a value
Trang 9creator.” As CSR managers who have to fight with their CFOs to retain
their budgets at the bottom of business cycles know only too well, this
isn’t just a theoretical problem There’s something about large, modern
companies that makes them look awkward wearing “nice” and “soft”
attributes It is almost as if they’re the wrong sex for such finery
Too few women
Efforts to acquire reputations for being soft, nice, sensitive, and caring
amount in my view to the most coherent and, potentially at any rate,
the most promising, of the adaptive strategies currently being deployed
by large companies
Since soft, nice, sensitive, and caring are adjectives applied more often
to women than to men, the adaptation can be characterized as an attempt
by companies to get in touch with, and project, their feminine sides
How could companies go about this adaptive change? It seems fairly
obvious that the best way would be to appoint more women to senior
executive positions I say “more,” because, at present, there are very
few women in powerful positions in large U.S and U.K companies
According to Catalyst, a U.S non-profit focused on women’s issues,
women accounted for barely 15 percent of board positions in large U.S
companies (Fortune 500 companies) in 2008 And according to The
Female FTSE Report, published each year by Cranfield University’s
School of Management, women accounted for less than 12 percent of
the directors of large U.K companies in 2008 The position is worse
than these figures suggest, because of the 131 women on the boards of
FTSE 100 companies in 2008, only 12 were executive directors
Why so few women at a time when there is supposed to be a “war for
talent,” companies are under pressure to project a more caring and
sensitive image and, as I and my friends and co-authors Peninah
Thomson and Jacey Graham reported in our book, A Woman’s Place is
in the Boardroom: The Business Case,5 many of the male chairmen and
CEOs of our large companies seem genuinely keen to appoint more
women to their boards?
We related, in the book, what we all felt was a revealing exchange
during a “diversity workshop” at a large U.K company A group of 30
or so middle managers, about half women and half men, had gathered
off-site to discuss their company’s new “diversity” program:
“OK!” said the facilitator loudly enough to be heard above the
largely female chatter “Everyone’s here, so let’s get started The first
Trang 10thing I want you to do is spend a minute or two jotting down some
thoughts about the company you all work for Since the subject
today is diversity, it would be good to have diverse perspectives, so I
want women to describe what it’s like being a woman working for
the company, and men to describe what it’s like being a man working
for the company.”
There was silence for a few moments, as the 30 participants collected
their thoughts Then they started writing furiously Or, rather the
women started writing furiously It seemed the men needed longer
to gather their thoughts – so long that, eventually, the facilitator
asked one of them whether there was a problem He looked around
at the other men and, reassured to see his own puzzlement reflected
on their faces, said: “Yes I’m sorry, but I’m not sure I understand
the question.”
What struck us most about this exchange was not the hapless male’s
obtuseness, but what his and his fellow males’ confusion revealed about
their company and companies in general What is it about the modern
company that made the men react to what seemed, on the face of it, a
fairly straightforward question, as fish might react when asked to
describe water?
It is not just that, in the upper echelons of corporate hierarchies at
least, men outnumber women, and that this majority is reflected in
company cultures There seems to be something more profound and
deep-seated about this maleness of companies than a male numerical
superiority
We decided that, as the ladybird found in the animated film A Bug’s
Life, with his deep voice and belligerent manner, it is not easy to get in
touch with your feminine side with testosterone coursing through
your veins
Matt Ridley, former chairman of the state-owned U.K mortgage
lender Northern Rock (see Chapter 6), supplied a clue to where the
inherent maleness of modern companies might have come from in his
book, The Red Queen.6 Ridley’s not a banker He’s a science popularizer
and an evolutionary psychologist In The Red Queen, he pointed out
that humans are unique among the apes in having developed a sexual
division of labor In chimpanzee societies females and males seek the
same foods, but in early human societies women and men looked for
different foods Women gathered, and needed to read the shapes of
trees and plants, the patterns of foliage where edible berries, nuts, and
roots might be growing, and the colors of their ripeness Men hunted,
Trang 11and needed a sense of direction and location, of where they were, so
they could find their way home after the chase
These differences in the skills required for gathering and hunting
in the Pleistocene period can be summarized by saying women had to
be good at pattern recognition, which made them better at reading
faces and judging character and mood than men, and that men had to
be good at reading maps These contrasting aptitudes of gatherers and
hunters survive to the present day When a couple in a car get lost she
wants to stop and ask someone the way, but he reaches for the map
Both are playing to their strengths She’s relying on her pattern
recog-nition ability and associated social skills inherited from her
fore-mothers He’s relying on his sense of direction and “bump of locality”
inherited from his forefathers, who had to find the way home after
hunting trips Differences between the minds as well as the bodies of
female and male humans evolved, because they played different roles
in Pleistocene society
The differences transcend cultures Men everywhere want to be seen
as “practical,” “shrewd,” “assertive,” “dominant,” “competitive,”
“crit-ical,” and “self-controlled,” and women everywhere want to be seen as
“loving,” “affectionate,” “impulsive,” “sympathetic,” and “generous.”7
We talk in different ways too, and for different reasons Male
conversa-tion is public, competitive, status-seeking, factual, and designed to
demonstrate knowledge Female conversation is private, cooperative,
reassuring, empathetic and enjoyable for its own sake.8
Ridley says that some of the differences stem from the division of
labor (gathering, hunting); some stem from our ape heritage (adult
females leave their groups and live with strangers, males live among their
kin); and others are attributes of all mammals and many birds (females
raise the young, males compete for females) “It surely cannot be a
coin-cidence” he says “that men are obsessed with status … and that male
chimpanzees compete for status, in strict hierarchies of dominance.”
He suggests that our human and mammalian heritage may also
explain why men and women differ in their ambition In all early
socie-ties male reproductive success, the only success evolution cares about,
was measured in terms of quantity, and depended on status; how far the
male climbed up the group or tribal hierarchy Women were less
inter-ested in hierarchy-climbing, because quality was the measure of their
reproductive success, and that depended on the status of their mates
They had to judge the quality of possible mates, find allies in the tribes
into which they married and improve the well-being of their children by
persuading others to help them The few women who are ambitious do