NEPA and Environmental Planning : Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners - Chapter 10 pdf

TABLE 10.1How Potential Terrorist Acts or Natural Disasters Might Trigger NEPA’s NEPA’s 10 Significance Factors Effects of Potentially Catastrophic Events 1.. The court concluded that N

Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks

The legendary Chinese general Sun Tzu was a strategic military genius In his classical book,

The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote

The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of

the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of

all is to besiege walled cities… 1

This book is still widely read by people from a diverse range of backgrounds including generals,

politicians, businessmen, and even terrorists A growing number of terrorist groups, some of whom

are drawing at least in part from Sun Tzu’s strategies, have a common goal not only to undermine

the political and economic structure of the West, but also to throw Western society into chaos

This being the case, what can Westerners do to prevent this nightmarish scenario from becoming

a reality? The answer is obvious: to thwart their plans at every turn This implies being at least one

step ahead of them and perhaps a little more clever As Sun Tzu might have counseled, this can be

achieved by developing superior plans while disrupting their objectives Plans can be developed for

scattering and splitting the enemies of peace to “prevent the junction of their forces”; and perhaps

most importantly, plans and security measures can be forged for constructing walled cities that

cannot be besieged

10.1 CAN PLANNING FOR A DISASTER PREVENT A DISASTER?

Nearly all environmental statutes regulate or place substantive constraints on what may be done

and how it is to be done The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is unique in that it neither

regulates nor mandates substantive contraints.1 NEPA provides the only comprehensive federal

planning process that is applicable to virtually all federal actions Its purpose is not to place strict

limitations on what can be done, but instead provides a rigorous planning process for ensuring that

actions and alternatives are appropriately considered before a final decision is made, and before

other highly prescriptive environmental laws and regulations are triggered that dictate precisely

under what conditions actions may be carried out

NEPA is a planning process that might provide a 21st century framework for implementing

Sun Tzu’s strategy Performed correctly, NEPA and other similar planning processes can provide a

cutting-edge tool for helping secure the Western homeland

10.1.1 C ATASTROPHIC E VENTS AND THE H UMAN E NVIRONMENT

Detractors may question the relevance of including potential terrorist acts or natural disaster

sce-narios into what has been more traditionally and strictly an environmental analysis Some might

even question whether it is legal, let alone wise, to analyze such scenarios within a NEPA or similar

planning process; for that matter, do potentially catastrophic events even fall within the scope of

NEPA?

As prescribed in Section 102 of NEPA, an environmental impact statement (EIS) must be

pre-pared for all

“… major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment …”2 (emphasis

added).

Consequently, federal actions that have the potential to significantly affect the human

environ-ment are potentially subject to the EIS requireenviron-ment According to the Council on Environenviron-mental

Quality’s (CEQ), NEPA regulations (Regulations), the human environment shall be interpreted

(§ 1508.14)

… comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with

that environment … When an environmental impact statement is prepared and economic or social and

natural or physical environmental effects are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement

will discuss all of these effects on the human environment (Emphasis added.)

Based on this, the phrase “human environment” is interpreted comprehensively to include not

only the physical environment but also its relationship with people; thus, significant socioeconomic

impacts that are interrelated to environmental impacts must be evaluated within an EIS Moreover,

under the Regulations, the section of the EIS describing environmental consequences is to address

(§ 1502.16[g])

… Urban quality, historic and cultural resources, and the design of the built environment, including the

reuse and conservation potential of various alternatives and mitigation measures.

This provision implies that if urban quality, historic and cultural resources, or the design of the

built environment (i.e., human-made structure) could be significantly impacted, such effects should

be investigated in the EIS Thus, it appears that potential terrorist acts, homeland security issues,

and natural disasters might indeed fall within the scope of NEPA

10.1.2 S IGNIFICANCE

As described in Chapter 6, the Regulations define 10 factors that are to be assessed in determining

the significance of a potential impact (§ 1508.27[b]) Depending on the particular circumstance,

vir-tually each one of the 10 significance factors could be triggered by various types of potential attacks

or human-induced disasters An EIS might be required if such events could trigger any one of them

Table 10.1 compares the relationship between potential terrorist acts and natural disasters, and

NEPA’s 10 significance factors

10.2 NRC RULES TERRORISM REVIEWS ARE NOT REQUIRED

What is an agency’s responsibility under NEPA to consider intentionally malevolent acts, such

as those directed at the United States on 9/11? The U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

addressed this question in four orders issued in 2002, each holding that NEPA did not require the

NRC to consider impacts of terrorism in rendering licensing decisions

10.2.1 N UCLEAR F UEL S TORAGE C ASE

The NRC provided a detailed rationale for its conclusion in an order involving a proposal by Private

Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS) to build an independent spent fuel storage installation on the Skull Valley

Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah The proposed facility was to store spent nuclear fuel from

commercial nuclear power plants pending disposal in a repository

TABLE 10.1

How Potential Terrorist Acts or Natural Disasters Might Trigger NEPA’s

NEPA’s 10 Significance Factors Effects of Potentially Catastrophic Events

1 Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse

A significant effect may exist even if the federal agency

believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial.

A catastrophic event is obviously an adverse impact, potentially subject to NEPA’s requirements.

2 The degree to which the proposed action affects public

health or safety.

A catastrophic event can affect public health and safety, resulting in untold fatalities and casualties For example, an attack on a dam, nuclear reactor, or petroleum storage facility might result in disastrous impacts.

3 Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as

proximity to historic or cultural resources, parklands,

prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or

ecologically critical areas.

A catastrophic event can affect historic and cultural sites, particularly landmarks and national emblems as well as ecologically sensitive resources For example, a new agricultural policy or decision might leave a major food source vulnerable to acts of agricultural terrorism, resulting

in catastrophic impacts.

4 The degree to which the action effects on the quality of

the human environment are likely to be highly

controversial.

The impacts of potentially catastrophic events are uncertain, which can raise significant scientific controversy concerning the severity of the actual effects.

5 The degree to which the possible effects on the human

environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or

unknown risks.

The impact of many potentially catastrophic scenarios is uncertain or involves unique or unknown risks.

6 The degree to which the action may establish a

precedent for future actions with significant effects or

represents a decision in principle about a future

consideration.

Many federal policies, plans, or decisions may establish precedents that could have far-reaching implications in terms

of the risks of potential terrorism For example, a decision to employ a new nuclear technology might result in setting a precedent that could have grave homeland implications in terms of future terrorist acts or natural disasters.

7 Whether the action is related to other actions with

individually insignificant but cumulatively significant

impacts Significance exists if it is reasonable to

anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the

environment Significance cannot be avoided by terming

an action temporary or by breaking it down into smaller

component parts.

Obviously the impacts of a catastrophic event can result in significant cumulative impacts Moreover, segmented federal actions might result in significant cumulative impacts if a terrorist attack was targeted at one or more of these segmented actions For example, making a decision regarding an isolated border crossing without considering the larger context of border security might trigger this factor.

8 The degree to which the action may adversely affect

districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed

in or eligible for listing in the National Register of

Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of

significant scientific, cultural, or historical resources.

Evidence indicates that terrorists have actively considered attacking significant national scientific, cultural, and historic icons and institutions (e.g., Pentagon, World Trade Tower, Statue of Liberty, and Congress) Natural disasters can also significantly affect such resources.

9 The degree to which the action may adversely affect an

endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has

been determined to be critical under the Endangered

Species Act of 1973.

A terrorist attack or natural disaster can obviously result in grave impacts to endangered species Some federal proposals and plans should be considered in terms of potential impacts

on species because of a terrorist attack For example, a biological terrorist attack might eradicate an entire species.

10 Whether the action threatens a violation of federal,

state, or local law or requirements imposed for the

protection of the environment.

A significant terrorist attack or natural disaster could breach any number of safety and environmental laws.

10 Significance Factors

In abbreviated orders issued for the three other companion cases, the NRC referred to its

ration-ale expressed in the PFS order One of the companion cases involved a proposed mixed oxide

(MOX) fuel fabrication facility The NRC order in the MOX case reversed a decision of the

Licens-ing Board to admit for licensLicens-ing, after hearLicens-ing an intervenor’s contention that NEPA required

the NRC to evaluate terrorism impacts at the proposed MOX facility The Licensing Board had

stated

Regardless of how foreseeable terrorist acts that could cause a beyond-design-basis accident were prior

to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it can no longer be argued that terrorist attacks … are not

reasonably foreseeable …

10.2.1.1 Basis for NRC’s Conclusion

As explained in the PFS case, the NRC concluded that

… the possibility of a terrorist threat … is speculative and simply too far removed from the natural

or expected consequences of agency action to require a study under NEPA … As a practical matter,

attempts to evaluate that threat even in qualitative terms are likely to be meaningless and consequently

no use in the agency’s decision-making.

In reaching this conclusion, the NRC noted two federal court of appeals decisions that addressed

the issue of terrorism and NEPA in the area of nuclear regulation Both the decisions upheld an

agency’s refusal to consider terrorism under NEPA as reasonable.3 It should be pointed out that both

of these court cases were rendered years before the attack of 9/11

Further, the NRC observed that the risk of a terrorist attack (generally thought of as the product

of the probability of an occurrence and the consequences) cannot be adequately determined because

“the likelihood of attack cannot be ascertained using any state-of-the-art methodology.”

An intervenor in the PFS proceedings asked the Commission to assume an attack with a large

jumbo jet and to analyze the consequences without the consideration of probability The NRC,

how-ever, concluded that such an analysis

… amounts to a form of ‘worst case’ analysis, which the Supreme Court, in Robertson v Methow

Val-ley Citizens Council [490 U.S 332 (1989)], determined is not required under NEPA.

The NRC went on to write

… presumably all other kinds of terrorism, if conceivable, would require NEPA review as well … Such

an open-ended approach to NEPA is unworkable … As the Supreme Court noted in Robertson, it is

always possible to ‘conjure up’ progressively more disastrous scenarios.

In further arguments that NEPA is not an appropriate forum for considering terrorism, the NRC

noted

The public aspect of NEPA processes conflicts with the need to protect certain sensitive information …

In our view, the public interest would not be served by inquiries … into where and how nuclear

facili-ties are vulnerable …

The NRC did not entirely close the door to analyzing terrorism in NEPA documents, as

men-tioned in a footnote:

This is not to suggest that an environmental review should never consider [the] threat of terrorism … In

fact, the NRC has briefly considered, as a matter of discretion, the issue of terrorism in generic

environ-mental reviews [for nuclear power plant license renewal].

Yet, some local critics maintain that planning for events such as terrorist acts are precisely the

types of scenarios and issues that Congress intended agencies to consider when it passed NEPA

Although potential terrorist events may not have been reasonably foreseeable prior to the attack of

9/11, such an argument is more difficult to defend in a post-9/11 world

10.2.1.2 Court Rejects Reasoning

More recently, plaintiffs petitioned the court to review NRC’s approval of the proposed dry cask

storage facility of spent nuclear fuel The plaintiffs’ NEPA claims challenged the 2003 decision

by NRC not to evaluate terrorism-related impacts in an environmental assessment (EA) completed

for the proposed storage facility On June 2, 2006, U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

concluded that NRC erred in its determination that NEPA does not require an analysis of impacts

resulting from a potential terrorist attack.2

The court did not provide direction on how NRC was to evaluate terrorism-related impacts

and instead left this matter to the agency’s discretion The court concluded that NRC’s justification

for not considering impacts of potential terrorist attacks “… either individually or collectively,

do not support the NRC’s categorical refusal to consider the environmental effects of a terrorist

attack.”

On January 16, 2007, the Supreme Court declined to review the decision by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals As is common for this type of action, the Supreme Court provided no explanation

for its denial of the appeal request It is recommended that the reader consult legal counsel in

deter-mining to what degree the impacts of potential terrorist attacks be considered in NEPA analyses

10.2.2 DOE P RACTICE

The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) sometimes finds it appropriate to consider potential

envi-ronmental impacts of intentional destructive acts (e.g., sabotage or terrorism) in its NEPA

docu-ments, although the Department has not expressed a conclusion regarding whether or not such

analyses are required under NEPA

In its guidance document, Recommendations for Analyzing Accidents under NEPA (July 2002),

the DOE stated

In identifying the reasonably foreseeable impacts of a proposed action and alternatives, past DOE

NEPA documents have addressed potential environmental impacts that could result from intentional

destructive acts Analysis of such acts poses a challenge because the potential number of scenarios is

limitless and the likelihood of attack is unknowable.

The guidance further states that

Intentional destructive acts are not accidents Nevertheless … the consequences of an act of sabotage

or terrorism could be discussed by a comparison to the consequences of a severe accident … When

intentional destructive acts are reasonably foreseeable, a qualitative or semi-quantitative discussion of

the potential consequences of intentional destructive acts could be included in the accident analysis.

DOE’s guidance provides two examples of qualitative discussions of intentional destructive acts

that might be appropriate in an EIS

Regarding security concerns, DOE conducts reviews of its environmental documents to ensure

that security-sensitive information is protected For example, some DOE EISs have contained a

nonsensitive summary of the results of an analysis of intentional destructive acts; in such cases,

details of the analysis, which may contain nonclassified security-sensitive information, have been

segregated into a separate EIS appendix whose distribution was appropriately limited

10.2.2.1 DOE Litigation

In a recent case involving a challenge to the DOE, EA for construction and operation of a biosafety

level-3 facility in which the impacts of a potential terrorist attack were not addressed, the court

concluded:3

Concerning the DOE’s conclusion that consideration of the effects of a terrorist attack is not required in

its Environmental Assessment, we recently held to the contrary in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace

v Nuclear Regulatory Commission In Mothers for Peace, we held that an Environmental Assessment

that does not consider the possibility of a terrorist attack is inadequate Similarly here, we remand for

the DOE to consider whether the threat of terrorist activity necessitates the preparation of an

Environ-mental Impact Statement As in Mothers for Peace, we caution that there “remain open to the agency

a wide variety of actions it may take on remand [and] … [w]e do not prejudge those alternatives”

(cita-tions omitted).

As a result of such court decisions, the DOE issued an interim guidance on December 1, 2006,

indicating that all DOE EISs and EAs, whether for nuclear or nonnuclear proposals, should include

explicit consideration of the potential environmental impacts of sabotage and terrorism The DOE

is currently developing additional guidance on considering sabotage and terrorism in NEPA

documents

10.3 WHY NEPA CAN PROVIDE AN IDEAL FRAMEWORK FOR

EVALUATING TERRORIST AND NATURAL DISASTER SCENARIOS?

NEPA is the only federally mandated planning process that is applicable to virtually all major

fed-eral proposals There are many advantages of using NEPA as a comprehensive planning process for

screening actions in terms of potential terrorist attacks or other high-consequence events

Planning processes such as NEPA, State Environmental Policy Acts (SEPAs), and other similar

impact assessment processes provide an ideal framework for ensuring that a rigorous analysis of

potential threats is performed As depicted in Table 10.2, the NEPA planning process incorporates

every essential element necessary for ensuring that a comprehensive, scientific, rigorous, and

ana-lytical process is used in evaluating threats such as terrorist acts or natural disasters

10.4 USING NEPA TO PLAN FOR POTENTIAL TERRORIST

ACTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS

NEPA is sometimes perceived as just another obstacle that federal officials must surmount before

implementing a proposal Yet, executed in a streamlined manner, NEPA presents an ideal

frame-work for providing a decision-maker with information regarding the consequences of potential

ter-rorist attacks Table 10.3 describes how NEPA and NEPA-like impact assessment processes can be

applied to safeguard communities, and government projects and installations.4,5

10.4.1 S TRATEGIC AND P ROGRAMMATIC R EVIEWS

A NEPA analysis can be prepared to actively identify the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of an

entire program or mission Here, a strategic, programmatic, or site-wide EIS can be prepared to

assess the risks of an entire program

Experts can be consulted and the public can be actively engaged in seeking comments that

would help the agency identify potential risks and weaknesses, as well as terrorist and natural

disaster scenarios In some cases, these comments and the information obtained might need to be

restricted from public distribution This input would then be evaluated to determine threats and

impacts

TABLE 10.2

Why NEPA Provides All Essential Elements Necessary for Comprehensively Evaluating

and Countering Potential Terrorist Threats

Essential Elements Description of How NEPA’s Elements Support a Successful Analysis

Rigorous planning process NEPA requires that a rigorous process be used in assessing impacts of potential

actions.

Scoping NEPA requires a thorough scoping process to identify the range of actions, impacts,

and alternatives that need to be considered NEPA’s procedures can help ensure that

a reasonable range of potential terrorist threats, and all significant issues are identified and flushed out for investigation.

Scope of decision-making NEPA is applicable to the adoption of official policy, formal plans, programs, and

approval of specific projects.

Consultation A successful analysis of potential terrorist acts typically necessitates consultation

with other agencies and experts (e.g., cognizant agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Defense) possessing special expertise with respect to these issues.

Interdisciplinary An interdisciplinary approach is typically required to successfully identify and assess

potential terrorist scenarios.

Systematic A logically ordered and systematic process is typically required to successfully

identify and assess potential terrorist scenarios.

Scientifically-based process NEPA provides a scientifically based process for rigorously ensuring that all impacts

and threats are appropriately analyzed.

Impact analysis Requires analysis of direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts that could result from

a potential terrorist attack.

Alternatives All reasonable alternatives and mitigation measures must be considered for avoiding

or reducing significant impacts of potential terrorist acts.

Review and commenting The NEPA regulations establish specific procedures (i.e., reviewing and commenting

on the draft EIS) for ensuring that a scientifically competent analysis has been performed A procedural process is also established for addressing and responding

to internal and public comments concerning the adequacy of the analysis.

Handling classified information The NEPA regulations establish procedures for ensuring that any sensitive

information is appropriately classified to prevent harm to national security.

Decision-making NEPA established a formal and procedural process for ensuring that the analysis is

considered by the appropriate decision-maker in reaching a final decision.

Such information can be used to identify and evaluate programmatic alternatives and mitigation

measures for addressing potential threats

10.4.2 P ROJECT -S PECIFIC R EVIEWS

As witnessed earlier, virtually all federal proposals are subject to a NEPA review At the minimum,

a cursory review of potential terrorist acts should be an integral element of any proposal

involv-ing potentially high-value targets or high-consequence events As described below, this can be

efficiently implemented for the three principal levels of NEPA review

10.4.2.1 Environmental Impact Statements

If an EIS is prepared, a task force should be selected to screen the proposal for potential terrorist

and natural disaster threats NEPA acts as an umbrella planning process for integrating relevant

threats that need to be considered comprehensively during the early planning process As

appropri-ate, experts should be consulted to consider potential scenarios and their potential impacts If this

screening process concludes that a reasonable threat exists that could pose a significant impact, a

detailed analysis of the threats would be performed

An EIS analysis of potential threats would typically be carried out in much the same way that

accident analyses are performed on high-profile proposals such as nuclear reactors, hydroelectric

dams, and chemical or radioactive processing facilities If the analysis finds that the impacts could

indeed be significant, an effort should be launched to identify and evaluate alternatives and

mitiga-tion measures that could reduce or eliminate potential threats Secmitiga-tion 9.2 provides specific

guid-ance for assessing mitigation measures

10.4.2.2 Environmental Assessments

As appropriate, the proposed action described in an EA should be briefly screened for potentially

significant terrorist acts or threats from natural disasters As appropriate, experts should be

con-sulted to consider potential scenarios and impacts

If there is a reasonable possibility that a terrorist threat related to the proposal could result in a

significant impact, an EIS can be prepared

Conversely, if the screening process concludes that there is no reasonable scenario for a

significant terrorist or natural disaster threat and that there are no other significant environmental

impacts, the proposal qualifies for a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)

10.4.2.3 Categorical Exclusions

Where a categorical exclusion appears to be appropriate, the action should be screened in terms of

any significant impact that could result from a potential terrorist attack or natural disaster In the

vast majority of cases, this would not be the case However, if the screening review concludes that

such a threat could result in significant impacts, this would meet the criteria for extraordinary

cir-cumstances, and an EA or EIS can be prepared

For instance, moving a tank of chlorine gas from a fortified building onto an outdoor pad might

appear to be an innocuous activity until one considers that a terrorist act might easily breach the

tank, resulting in potentially catastrophic results for the nearby workers or inhabitants

TABLE 10.3

How NEPA, SEPA, and Other Similar Planning Processes Can Be Used in Assessing

Potential Terrorist Acts and Natural Disasters

Properly integrated and executed planning processes such as NEPA provide an ideal tool not only for analyzing traditional

impacts of proposed projects, but also for evaluating terrorist and natural-disaster scenarios associated with proposed

projects Alternatives and mitigation measures can be assessed for reducing or eliminating such threats.

Federal agencies can prepare strategic or programmatic EISs for developing master plans for identifying and securing

high-value targets across new or existing broad programs These analyses can be used in evaluating programmatic alternatives

and mitigation measures for countering or reducing such threats.

Nearly one-half of the states in the US have a NEPA-like process (SEPA), a number of which contains a requirement to

prepare an analysis of potentially significant proposals These planning processes can be used by states in preparing

programmatic counter-terrorist plans for fortifying potential terrorist targets or mitigating the impacts of natural disasters.

At the city and community level, a NEPA-like process can be applied in identifying targets and evaluating potential threats

For example, the analysis can be used to identify and prioritize high-risk terrorist scenarios (water reservoirs, chemical

factories, national monuments, airports, etc.) Here again, the results of such studies can be used in developing alternatives

and measures for mitigating potential impacts.

Most Western governments already have an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process in place similar to that of

NEPA From the standpoint of the international community, EIAs can be prepared to identify potential threats, evaluate

their impacts, and consider alternatives and measures for mitigating them.

10.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USE OF AN EA AND AN EIS

As described below, there is a distinct difference in the way potentially catastrophic events should

be analyzed in an EA versus an EIS

10.5.1 M AXIMUM R EASONABLY F ORESEEABLE E VENTS

An analysis of a maximum reasonably foreseeable event or a maximum credible event represents

potential acts of nature or accidents (or acts of terrorism) at the high-consequence end of the

spec-trum A maximum reasonably foreseeable accident is therefore an event with the most severe

con-sequences that can reasonably be expected to occur for a given action Typically, this kind of event

has a very low probability of occurrence

Most facilities or operations have operational lifetimes measured in decades Therefore, accident

scenarios having frequencies less than 10–6 per year are so unlikely to occur during the lifespan of

such facilities or operations that they are generally not considered important in making decisions

Nevertheless, analysis of scenarios in the range of 10–6 to 10–7 per year may need to be considered

if the consequences could be catastrophic As a practical matter, events with frequencies less than

10−7 per year rarely need to be examined

In contrast to a standard accident analysis, an investigation of intentional destructive acts

(terrorism or sabotage) poses a challenge because the number of potential scenarios is virtually

limitless, and the likelihood of attack is correspondingly unknowable

Fortunately, the situation is not hopeless The physical effects of an intentionally destructive

act—whether caused by a fire, explosion, missile, or something else—are frequently nearly the same

as, or bounded by, the effects of accidents, particularly maximum reasonably foreseeable events

That is, the impacts (release of radioactivity, hazardous materials, explosions, fires) of an act of

sabo-tage or terrorism on operations and facilities frequently do not exceed those of a severe accident

10.5.1.1 Bounding

Under a bounding approach, the impacts of a potential event are generally bounded by the effects of

a maximum credible event; likewise, since experience indicates that the consequences of an

inten-tionally destructive act are generally “bounded” by those of a severe accident scenario The same

approach may also apply to the analysis of natural disasters

Prudence must be exercised in performing a bounding analysis, as the decision-maker may be

unable to make a reasoned choice among alternatives This is because a bounding analysis tends to

mask their differences

A similar procedure to that described above can also be followed in preparing SEPA,

environ-mental impact assessments (EIA), or other related planning analyses

10.5.2 A N EA VERSUS AN EIS A NALYSIS

Since an EA can be used primarily to determine if an action (e.g., a terrorist attack, an accident, or

a natural disaster scenario) could result in a significant impact, the maximum credible event may

need to be evaluated Once various scenarios have been screened in an effort to identify the event,

it can then be evaluated in detail

Where the maximum credible event can be shown to be nonsignificant, no further review of

such events is warranted However, if the maximum credible event is deemed to be potentially

significant, two options exist:

1 Mitigate the potential impacts to the point of nonsignificance

2 Prepare an EIS to evaluate potential alternatives that might reduce these significant

impacts

In contrast, the purpose of an EIS is to provide the decision-maker with information on which to

base informed decisions It should, therefore, come as no surprise that planning for and evaluating

potentially significant terrorist or natural disaster events in an EIS would be performed in a

differ-ent manner from an EA As shown in Figure 10.1, various scenarios are screened in the EIS process

in an effort to identify a spectrum or reasonable range of potentially significant threats The

reason-able range of potentially significant threats normally includes low-probability high-consequence

scenarios as well as high-probability low-consequence events As appropriate, a reasonable range

of these scenarios should be evaluated

10.6 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY

With little or no modification, methodologies currently used for evaluating potential accidents (e.g.,

nuclear reactors, hazardous facilities, dams) can also be adopted to screen terrorist and natural

disaster scenarios, evaluate their potential consequences, and, if appropriate, develop alternatives

and measures for mitigating potential threats

10.6.1 E VALUATING P OTENTIAL T HREATS

The purpose of scoping is to solicit input so that the analysis can be more clearly focused on issues

of genuine concern Experience has shown that a well-orchestrated scoping process provides a

Initiate EIS process

Identify credible terrorist or natural disaster scenarios

Screen credible terrorist or natural disaster scenarios for significant impacts

Analyze alternatives and mitigation measures for

reducing potential impacts

Complete EIS and reach a final decision regarding the

course of action

Eliminate nonsignificant scenarios from further review

Are the terrorist scenarios potentially significant?

Analyze a spectrum of potentially significant scenarios (low-probability high-consequence to high-probability

low-consequence events)

No Yes

As appropriate, continue the analysis, evaluating other potentially significant environmental impacts

FIGURE 10.1 Using an EIS to evaluate potential terrorist and natural disaster threats.