Folie 1 “Macroeconomics of Housing Markets” Discussion of the papers presented in Session 4 Timo Wollmershäuser (Ifo Institute Munich, University of Munich, CESifo) “Macroeconomics of Housing Markets”.
Trang 1“Macroeconomics of Housing Markets”
Discussion of the papers presented in
Session 4 Timo Wollmershäuser
(Ifo Institute Munich, University of Munich, CESifo)
Trang 2Session overview
Session 4: Housing, Credit and Monetary Policy
1 Tobias Duemmler and Stephan Kienle, “User costs of
housing when households face a credit constraint - Evidence for Germany”
2 Sébastian Frappa, Jean-Stéphane Mésonnier, “The housing
price boom of the late 90s: Did inflation targeting matter?”
3 Vladimir Borgy, Laurent Clerc and Jean-Paul Renne, “Asset
boom-bust cycles and credit: what is the scope of macro prudential supervision?”
The Duemmler/Kienle paper is about a particular
aspect of macroeconomic modeling
It investigates the implications and the empirical evidence of
credit constraints for households’ housing demand decisions.
Trang 3Session overview
The other two papers have a clear policy focus
They try to shed some light on the causes of asset price
booms.
They aim at drawing conclusions for monetary and regulatory policies.
These two papers are complementary:
• One focuses on institutions (inflation targeting versus no inflation targeting).
• The other follows a pure time series approach.
Trang 4Tobias Duemmler and Stephan Kienle
“User costs of housing when households face a
credit constraint - Evidence for Germany”
Trang 5Summary of the Duemmler/Kienle paper
The paper theoretically derives a housing demand
equation from the first-order conditions of a
representative household that draws utility from the
consumption of non-durable goods and the use of
housing services
It shows that if in the maximization procedure the
household is subject to a credit constraint (implying
that the real value of credit is limited to a positive
fraction of the real stock of housing), the user costs of housing are not only determined
by the real market value of a new house, the real costs of
mortgage debt and the depreciation rate
but also by an additional term that is determined by the to-value ratio and the gap between consumer and house
loan-price inflation.
Trang 6Summary of the Duemmler/Kienle paper
The authors estimate the resulting housing demand
equation for the German economy and try to find out
whether the assumption that credit constraints have an impact on the households’ decision problem really
matters
Their results indicate
that credit constraints play a significant role
that in periods where consumer prices are rising faster than house prices (as is the case in Germany from the mid 1990s on) the user costs of housing (the shadow price of housing
services) for constrained households is higher than for
unconstrained households
Trang 7Discussion of the Duemmler/Kienle paper
You are denoting the value ratio as marginal
loan-to-value ratio It is not clear to me why you are emphasizing this marginal nature of your estimate several times in your paper Since in your empirical set-up you are using macroeconomic time series, I would rather call the resulting estimate as
average loan-to-value ratio.
Trang 8User costs derived from a theoretical model
The Steady-state of a consolidated first-order condition
of the maximization problem of a representative
household that faces a credit constraint is given by:
The credit constraint is defined as:
If we assume a fully constrained household and set the loan-to-value ratio to zero, the user cost definition
collapses to
which, however, equals the user costs definition
resulting from the maximization problem of a
household without credit constraint
Trang 9Empirical paper without data appendix
What are the sources of the time series used for the
regressions?
House price data and flow of funds data is only
available on an annual basis in Germany: How did you construct quarterly data?
What kind of interest rate was used to calculate the
user costs of housing?
Trang 10Estimate of the steady-state inflation gap
If the mean (the steady state) of the inflation gap was zero, the existence of credit constraints would be
irrelevant for calculating the user costs of housing
It seems that the sample chosen by the authors (1982-2007)
is driven by this precondition.
If the sample started before 1980 or after 1985 (which would probably render the sample too short for a reasonable
cointegration analysis), the simple mean of the inflation gap wouldn’t be statistically different from zero.
Trang 11Estimate of the steady-state inflation gap
Estimated means for samples starting in the quarter
depicted on the horizontal axis and ending in 2007:4
-.005 000 005 010 015 020 025
mean inflation gap 95% confidence interval
Trang 12Non-financial assets are missing
According to OECD estimates 60% of households
assets in Germany are non-financial
Even though in German flow of funds non-financial
assets are not published, there are some proxies
around
Trang 13The empirical estimates
The long-run equilibrium relationship is given by
You are testing the hypothesis whether the estimated coefficient of the inflation gap is equal to zero
which either implies a loan-to-value ratio equal to zero
(hence a fully constrained household) rejected
or which tests the significance of the additional inflation gap term (hence the user cost definition of an unconstrained
household)
Trang 14Sébastian Frappa, Jean-Stéphane Mésonnier
“The housing price boom of the late 90s: Did
inflation targeting matter?”
Trang 15Summary of the Frappa/Méssonier paper
FM present an empirical study about the
consequences of inflation targeting (IT) policies for
financial stability
Hypothesis:
Since IT central banks primarily aim at stabilizing inflation
over a 2-3 years horizon, such a policy could actively
contribute to damaging financial stability at longer horizons.
Trang 16Summary of the Frappa/Méssonier paper
The reason for putting up this hypothesis is that
central banks tend to neglect monetary and financial
developments which are deemed irrelevant for future inflation in the short to medium term:
Either because financial imbalances do not materialize into
consumer price inflation in the short and medium term.
Or because inflation expectations of many investors may still
be above the target (in particular in the transition phase to a credible IT regime), which reduces ex-ante real interest rates and stimulates investment e.g in housing.
Trang 17Summary of the Frappa/Méssonier paper
The empirical approach is a program evaluation
methodology which is composed of two steps
In the first step FM estimate a propensity score using a pooled probit regression for 17 industrial countries
where
the dependent variable is an inflation targeting dummy (equal
to 1 if IT is adopted)
and the RHS variables are the factors deemed to influence
both the choice of an inflation targeting strategy and the
dynamics of house prices (real interest rate, real disposable income, fixed exchange rate regime, private credit-to-GDP
ratio, mortgage market sophistication).
Trang 18Summary of the Frappa/Méssonier paper
In the second step they match the treated and
untreated units according to their propensity scores in order to get estimates of the conditional treatment
effect
They are in particular interested in the effect of IT
adoption on the real (and nominal) growth rate of
house prices and on the price-to-rent ratio
Trang 19Summary of the Frappa/Méssonier paper
The main result of their paper is that they find
evidence of a positive and significant effect of running
an IT strategy on housing price inflation and the house price to rent ratio
When they calculate an average of the findings across all model variants, inflation targeting is associated with
an increase in real housing price growth by 2.2
percentage points, while the price to rent ratio is
increased by 10 percentage points
Trang 20Vladimir Borgy, Laurent Clerc and Jean-Paul
Renne
“Asset boom-bust cycles and credit: what is the
scope of macro prudential supervision?”
Trang 21Summary of the Borgy/Clerc/Renne paper
This paper tries to give some advice on how regulatory policies (in particular macro-prudential policies) should
be designed in order to prevent the build-up of asset
Trang 22Summary of the Borgy/Clerc/Renne paper
The empirical approach focuses on 2 asset prices
(stock prices and house prices) for a panel of 18
OECD countries (1970-2008)
First step
BCR identify asset price booms and busts and distinguish
between costly and non-costly boom periods.
A major goal is to get results that are robust across different empirical identification methods.
Here: 4 univariate backward-looking filters that decompose
the asset price series into trend and cycle.
Trang 23Summary of the Borgy/Clerc/Renne paper
Second step
BCR identify the macro determinants of asset price booms
(identified in step 1) and compare the determinants of costly booms with those of non-costly booms.
The methods used are
• a non-parametric (Kruskall-Wallis) test, which tests for the equality of population medians among groups
• a non-linear probability (logit) model
Here again BCR aim at identifying macro determinants that are robust across the univariate filtering methods.
Trang 24Summary of the Borgy/Clerc/Renne paper
Results
In comparison to stock price booms, house price booms
• are more robustly identified across the different filter techniques
• more frequently end up in costly recessions
• are less correlated across countries
Concerning the determinants,
• credit variables
• and above-trend real activity
play a significant role in triggering asset price booms.
• Interest rates have a significant negative impact on the build-up pf asset price booms, but a positive impact on the economic costs following the boom.
Trang 25Summary of the Borgy/Clerc/Renne paper
Their main policy conclusion is that since not all asset price booms (in particular stock price booms) turn into costly recessions, it would detrimental to implement
rule-based macro-prudential policies
They rather recommend state-dependent policies that address excess-credit developments instead of all
credit expansions per se
However, it is still an open issue on how to distinguish excess-credit developments from “normal” credit
expansions in real time