Ethical Prudence in Rebuilding Iraq

Ethical Prudence in Rebuilding Iraq: An Analysis of Coalition Provisional Authority LeadershipRichard K.. This inquiry assesses the ethical character of leadership in the Coalition Prov

Ethical Prudence in Rebuilding Iraq: An Analysis of Coalition Provisional Authority Leadership

Richard K Ghere

Abstract This inquiry assesses the ethical character of leadership in the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA) amid unfolding events in 2003 that affect its mission to rebuild Iraqisociety Such analysis can inform the study of public sector ethics to the extent it balances moral concerns of leadership with the political complexities of rebuilding a society This study

incorporates J Patrick Dobel’s treatment of political prudence as a framework for evaluating CPA leadership—especially that of its Administrator, Paul Bremer Dobel’s seven dimensions of political prudence (openness, foresight, power deployment, timing, means/ends alignment, legitimacy, and community empowerment) in pursuit of political excellence are used as criteria for assessing CPA leadership in reference to particular issues and events Although tentative, the findings suggest that some specific CPA leadership accomplishments in rebuilding Iraqi

institutions are overshadowed by the Administrator’s ideological commitment to a vast scale of privatization—a scale that is disproportionate in reference to the breadth of vital needs and insensitive to core values in Iraqi culture

In 1947, Harvard University President James Conant hailed George C Marshall as “An American to whom freedom owes an enduring debt of gratitude, a soldier and statesman whose ability and character brook only one comparison in the history of the nation.” The comparison in Conant’s tribute, delivered in awarding Marshall an honorary doctorate, was to George

Washington (Hart and Hart, 1992 85-86) Six years later, Marshall was presented the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to rebuild Europe—one year after Dr Albert Schweitzer had won that award In their treatment of George Marshall as a moral exemplar, Hart and Hart elaborate upon his steadfast commitment to the public interest not only in his military career but also in his subsequent civilian roles of as Secretary of State as architect of the European Recovery

Program and of Defense (1992 91-93) The ethical example of Marshall as leader—especially

in rebuilding the institutions and economy of a war adversary—offers an especially salient benchmark in observing current Coalition efforts (between the United States and Great Britain)

to rebuild Iraq after the fall of the Ba’athist regime in Spring of 2003 In this vein, an ethical assessment of leadership within the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the entity currently governing Iraq and directing reconstruction efforts, can inform the study of ethical leadership in

the public sphere Such an assessment can be helpful to the extent it reasonably balances the moral qualities of leadership (such as truthfulness, openness, and fairness) with the inherent political complexities of rebuilding a society from outside of its culture.

The tension between ethical performance in leadership and problematic political contexts

is by no means unique to the CPA experience in Iraq Rather, it assumes prominence as a central

theme in the study of ethical leadership In his influential book Leadership of Public

Bureaucracies, Larry Terry portrays the administrator as a two-faced Janus figure whose first

face looks to virtuosity but whose opposing face peers away toward abusive authority, ostensibly

in the “furtherance” of good motives (1993 172-173) And, perhaps with less dramatic flair, particular case studies of ethical administrators characterize the leadership challenge in terms of demonstrable effectiveness in the midst of particularly difficult political circumstances

Sherwood for example recounts how George Hartzog, Jr., Director of the National Park Service from 1964 to 1972, contended with a Congress that had turned its vision toward urban America (1992 146-150) Stivers elaborates on Beverlee Myer’s tenure as California’s Cal-Med

(Medicaid) Program that brought her in head-to-head combat with the state’s medical

establishment As Comptroller General, Elmer Staats stood at the fault-line between Congress and a president who impounded appropriated funds and who later engaged in the Watergate cover-up (Frederickson, 1992 22-239) Gloria Flora served as Supervisor at the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada during the “Sagebrush Rebellion,” when local hostilities against the Federal presence in the West had peaked (Frederckson and Newman, 2001 342-362) Pfiffner characterizes the exemplary moral courage of Elliot Richardson, the Attorney General

“caught in the middle” between Federal Judge John Sirica who subpoenaed White House tapes and Richardson’s boss, Richard Nixon (2003 261-263) And in particular, Patrick Dobel’s treatment of William Ruckelshaus’s administrative leadership as Director of the U.S

Environmental Protection Agency during both the Nixon and Reagan administrations graphicallyillustrates ethical finesse in navigating “divided government” wherein conflict between the legislative and executive branches was intense Dobel’s work on Ruckelshaus is especially insightful in demonstrating the bureaucratic resources available for strategic managerial

responses to challenging political environments For example, Ruckelshaus relied upon savvy staff appointments, his bureaucratic obligation to enforce environmental laws, and the agency’s information function as supports for maintaining his independence in turbulent political settings (1995 488-503) In essence, the institutional routines within bureaucracy offer some degree of ethical autonomy that can foster effective leadership amid complex political environments

Yet from an organizational standpoint, the CPA is not a permanent bureaucracy but is

instead a temporary coalition team that ultimately reports to the U.S Secretary of Defense As Administrator of the Coalition, Paul Bremer exercises his authority as a one-person executive and legislator and imposes strong oversight on a reconstituted Iraqi court system (discussed later) Detailed information about the structure and processes of the CPA is not widely available The CPA website shows the “top wrung” of an organization chart that places eleven directors under the direct charge of the Administrator.1 Five of these eleven (Directors of—Operations andInfrastructure, Economic Development, International Development, Civil Affairs, and Security Affairs) sit on the CPA Review Board that approves project funding requests from three resource streams: U.S congressional appropriations, seized Iraqi (property and cash) assets, and Iraqi oil proceeds It is difficult to document how this top-level apparatus couples with middle-

management staffing (if it indeed exists) or with “street level” CPA personnel widely cited in

journalistic reports as instrumental in various rebuilding efforts A London Times article, for

example, tells of Steve Wirges, a U.S Army enlisted man (a stock broker in civilian life), who has assumed key policy responsibility in reforming banking practices and in reopening the

Baghdad Stock Exchange and who speaks for the CPA at International Monetary Fund meetings

“One sergeant joked that when Wirges went for a meeting with senior bankers, his commanding officers stood outside guarding his vehicle Another pointed out that the rank of specialist in the

US Army was ‘lower than whale s .’ He is paid about 15,000 pounds a year” (Beeston 2003)

This inquiry addresses ethical leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority at a time when “the ground is in motion” (that is, events affecting the mission of the CPA are frequently unfolding) and when much information about how the CPA functions is unavailable In regard to ethical autonomy, it appears that Administrator Bremer lacks some of the administrative

resources for establishing the degree of independence that William Ruckelshaus harnessed in the EPA bureaucracy (Dobel 1995) to cope with a complex political environment Nonetheless, there

is some contextual similarity between Ruckelshaus’s conundrum of “divided government” (between the Congress and Executive Branch) and Bremer’s plight in the center of a widely-reported bureaucratic struggle for policy control between the U.S Departments of Defense and State Paul Bremer was appointed CPA Administrator in early-May of 2003, in some regards a

“compromise candidate” replacing Retired General Jay Garner—Administrator of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (predecessor of the CPA) Garner had been closely allied with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to the extent that “the NGO’s [nongovernmental organizations undertaking relief efforts in Iraq] complained that putting Garner in command made it look like they were working for the Pentagon” (Donnelly 2003) Reports covering Bremer’s appointment contrast his diplomatic image to Garner’s military presence as more palatable to the Department of State, even though Bremer “is known as a hawk and a neocon-servative with close ties to Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz” (Harper 2003) It appears that a series of security problems during the summer of 2003, most notably the bombing of U.N headquarters in mid-August, weakened Rumsfeld’s influence over Iraqi reconstruction in relation

to the State Department (Watson and Hider 2003) And almost two months after the U.N

incident, President Bush authorized his National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, to assume

an operational role as head of a Stabilization Group (with representatives from Defense, State, Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency) that would likely “cut through” some Pentagon red tape as well as buffer CPA leadership from direct Defense Department control Thus,

although Administrator Bremer may not exercise the degree of leadership authority available to

an executive in bureaucracy—for example Ruckelshaus, one can trace gradual movement of the CPA in a direction that offers its Administrator a bit more executive latitude since May of 2003

As mentioned previously, ethical assessment of Coalition Provisional Authority

leadership depends upon criteria that temper moral obligation with the political complexity of thereconstruction effort in Iraq In this regard, Patrick Dobel recommends a moral framework based upon the ethics of political prudence, a virtue that obliges leaders toward “moral self-mastery” inpursuit of lasting political achievement (1998 74-75) For some, the pragmatic character of political prudence may constitute an unreasonably low ethical standard that could offer self-serving justification for most any act of leadership Dobel addresses such a concern, observing that “virtues alone [and political prudence in particular] cannot sustain a full political ethics” andthat they “co-exist in dialogue with norms, principles, and conceptions of the good society” (1998 75; [insertion added]) Yet Dobel’s prudence framework is especially helpful in assessing CPA leadership as it recognizes the legitimate uses of power as essential for accomplishing lasting political achievement—something that moral intentions and behaviors alone cannot insure Given its timing amid unfolding events, this study can offer only tentative assessments of the ethical character of CPA leadership that align Dobel’s criteria for political prudence with current journalistic accounts of CPA activities in Iraq Specifically, this case study of Paul

Bremer’s leadership of the Coalition Provisional Authority draws upon available media reports2

that speak both to prudent administrative actions and corresponding deficits in regard to each of Dobel’s seven dimensions This inquiry therefore assesses CPA leadership in rebuilding Iraq by comparing ethical strengths and weaknesses in achieving lasting political accomplishment in the rebuilding process.

Prudence and Coalition Provisional Authority Leadership

Dobel presents political prudence as a leadership virtue that interjects moral actions into

“…a world of limited resources and constraints set by circumstances, all morally imperfect” (1998 79) Rather than rescuing it from politics, prudence projects morality as excellent political achievement Dobel therefore treats prudence as political achievement in reference to seven particular dimensions, each of which stimulates ethically pertinent discussion of Coalition Provisional Authority leadership in Iraq

Reason and Openness

Dobel maintains that prudence requires disciplined reason and an openness to the

complexity of reality The complexity of the reconstruction task is especially daunting given the multitude of Iraqi expectations on the CPA to restore semblances of normalcy to basic living

Indeed, the Baghdad Bulletin presents numerous articles that address claims citizens make that

seek remedies to the fundamental failings of public institutions—students demand the physical restoration of Baghdad University, which was damaged by military actions (Walker and McCaul 2003); power officials call for enforcement of existing contracts with foreign companies to provide power to Iraq; citizens demand an end to the dramatic surge of violent crime, especially assaults on women (Walker 2003b); and ethnic groups—such as Jewish minorities—seek normalpassage in and out of Iraq’s borders Although Coalition officials cannot effectively respond to all claims, those expectations that are directed toward the most visible deficits of existing Iraqi institutions and markets warrant special attention Openness to expectations that the CPA can

“deliver” in fixing existing public institutions appears crucial in maintaining Coalition legitimacyamong Iraqis.

Particular attention, for example, needed to be directed toward the inability of public institutions in Iraq to adopt appropriate personnel standards and to offer reasonable

compensation for workers (and in some cases, provide back pay for labor rendered) While reports of such demands are widespread (among for example hospital physicians, police officers, and power grid workers), the problem of compensation for city-wide trash pickup in Baghdad is indicative of how the lack of adequate pay incentives leads not only to service ineffectiveness butalso to more complex patterns of corruption One journalistic account relates how a lack of personnel standards and operations procedures has resulted in trash that has accumulated on Baghdad streets for over a decade (McCaul 2003b) The Head of the Department of Cleaning reports that drivers, not having received pay for two months, draw straws on a daily basis for preferred routes in the city’s affluent residential neighborhoods where tipping is generous A U.S.military officer (a city planner in civilian life) in charge of municipal centers for the CPA

reported that $400,000 has been allocated to pay rubbish subcontractors on a performance

basis $1.25 per cubic meter of garbage delivered Yet this official concedes that this “remedy” simply reconfigures the corruption He comments on particular on a subcontractor who submitted a bill for $18,000 worth of trash reportedly collected in a single week: “There aren’t enough trucks in the whole country to collect that much garbage in a week.” On October 1 of 2003, Administrator Bremer authorized implementation of Order Thirty—entitled “Reform of Salaries and

Employment Conditions of State Employees”—that establishes a civil service-like system—one that would “foster transparency in payments and regularize payments to ensure that individuals are compensated at comparable levels for comparable work across all areas of public service.” (This action also disqualifies those stripped of employment through DeBa’athification from any

retirement benefits.) Although the Order does not refer specifically to the issue of back pay, it does suspend any previous salary enactment (outside the limited discretion of the CPA Director

of Management and Budget) Thus, Iraqis presumably accrue the institutional benefits of an American-style personnel system, but without consideration of past compensation inequities

Central to Iraqi reconstruction is the development of a market economy that can sustain trade and attract investment Understandably, the CPA (through its association with the U.S Agency for International Development—AID) states these market-oriented goals in macro-economic terms: For example, the U.S AID web page announces its request for proposals to

“facilitate the economic integration of Iraq with its regional and international partners, adopt international standards of production, harmonize economic policy, reinforce traditional trade linkages, develop new trade partnerships, and foster sustainable job creation.” Nonetheless, citizen expectations of a viable market are more likely directed toward micro-level concerns that impact directly upon their lives As a case in point, the real estate market in Baghdad (as of early July, 2003—see Walker, 2003e) is booming as agents purchase properties of fleeing Ba’athist officials at deep-discount prices and then profit from the high demand created by the resettlement

of people (such as Kurds) who had been forced out of Iraq under Saddam Hussein In some ways, the property market is currently correcting itself from Sadddam’s practice of confiscating the property of those groups out of favor and then reselling it to partisans of the regime Yet, the question of legal ownership looms over this booming market One real estate agent comments,

“At the moment, everybody is working on a matter of trust My role now is simple: direct

negotiation between landlord and buyer Deals are struck quickly, but there may be some

consequent difficulties in the future” (Walker 2003e) In response, a Committee for the

Restoration of Properties works in conjunction with the CPA in an effort to establish rightful ownership in the absence of appropriate institutional controls over real estate transactions

Moreover, the CPA has published some resolutions that govern property sales—one for example temporarily suspends the sale of property owned by Ba’ath party members Whether these resolutions will prove effective in regulating the real estate market remains to be seen

If prudence can be attributed to (the CPA as) a network of dispersed agents, there is evidence of openness in response to the complexity of rebuilding public institutions and markets

In essence, CAP’s “street level bureaucrats” (from both civilian and military ranks) appear to have secured modest allocations to pay trash haulers and to establish a transitional means to address property ownership issues Ostensibly, resources to alleviate the most immediate of institutional problems are available through funding request approval by the CPA’s Program Review Board or U.S AID’s Quick Response Programs that “link short-term emergency

programs to longer-term reconstruction.” Perhaps it is the longer-term that calls the prudential questions of reason and openness into question

Foresight and the Long Term

Foresight, according to Dobel, obligates the prudent leader “to think through the

consequences of action and avoid actions where probable negative consequences will overwhelmthe public good sought” (1998 76) Leaders nonetheless must contend with the pressures and ambiguities of the political missions they follow.3 The political climate in which the Coalition Provisional Authority functions is also aptly characterized as a strong force-field, but one that is particularly ambiguous in at least two important respects First, there appears to be considerable uncertainty regarding the degree and complexity of effort needed to rebuild Iraq Thomas

Freidman comments, “We are not rebuilding Iraq We are ‘building’ a new Iraq from scratch… Iraq is not a vase that we broke to remove the rancid water inside, and now we just need to glue

it back together We have to build a whole new vase We have to dig the clay, mix it, shape it, harden it and paint it” (2003b) And second, there is little certainty about how long the CPA will

remain in authority in Iraq The possibilities range from merely a few months (until a new Iraqi constitution can be drafted and established) to many years (consistent with Freidman’s appraisal

of the task’s enormity)

In reference to an ethical prudence that attends to the long-term, the question arises if CPA leaders can direct their powers in ways that anticipate the unfolding of future events yet alsosatisfy their political masters in addressing the expediencies of the present With regard to powers, the Administrator of the CPA is authorized to issue regulations and orders that, in

essence, pre-empt parts of existing Iraqi law (otherwise in effect) as necessary As

legislator/executive, the Administrator can issue an order as encompassing as that establishing a new Iraqi army (Order 22) or as specific as outlawing vehicles with tinted windows (public notice issued June 29, 2003) From the standpoint of prudence, the administrator’s dilemma becomes clear: Strategically, regulations and orders needed to be crafted and issued in a

compressed time frame immediately after Paul Bremer assumed CPA leadership—indeed, twenty-two orders were issued in the first six weeks of his tenure Although this expeditiousness establishes the Coalition’s authority in the short-run, it may preclude opportunities to anticipate adversities in rebuilding Iraqi institutions

It is not surprising, for example, that four of the first five orders issued by the CPA administrator (issued within a ten-day period in May, 2003) address various DeBa’athification issues related to Ba’ath Party Member dismissal from positions of authority, property holdings, and subsequent criminal proceedings Order Number One—entitled “DeBa’athification of Iraqi Society”—stipulates that

Full members of the Ba’ath Party holding the ranks of [Regional Command Member, Branch

Member, Section Member, and Group Member] are hereby removed from future employment in

the public sector These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct or threat to

the security on the Coalition Those suspected of criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if

deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest (Section 1, 2)

By design, this order affects public institutions by purging leaders loyal to the deposed regime Yet it is difficult to anticipate is how important public institutions might respond to a loss

of an existing leadership structure Previously, during Jay Garner’s brief tenure as head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (the CPA’s predecessor organization), some ministry leaders were directly appointed by the ORHA while others were democratically elected by those remaining in agency staff positions One journalistic account of leadership replacement in the Ministry of Health relates that elections did not necessarily eliminate

Ba’athist party members A director of maternity care in the ministry comments on the

complexity of Ba’athist corruption, “I don’t know what the Americans are going to do We know

of some people who sold medicine (on the black market) and we know some Ba’ath party

members who were honest and good in their fields of work I think the bad people must be out ofthe system It’s not like a snake, that if you cut off its head it will die The corruption is through along chain of people The elections were taken too early” (Hassell 2003) Presumably, reference

to “a long chain of people” here underscores the persistence of patron-client reciprocity (a prevalent form of corruption in the Middle East—see Caiden 2001, 29) that perpetuated Ba’athistinfluence even after Saddam’s ouster Whether the specifics in Order Number One—in

conjunction with the other three DeBa’athification orders—facilitate leadership succession in a manner that strengthens public institutions is open to question

Political timing (another element of political prudence discussed below) demanded precipitous action in ridding Iraq society of Ba’athist authority Perhaps this context of

immediacy appropriately overshadows the virtue of foresight in this case Nonetheless, the authority to alter institutional structures and processes (such as leadership succession) offers unusual opportunities to change public values in ways that empower institutions Conceivably,

such empowerment could offer some measure of autonomy that buffers from traditional forms ofcorruption

Deploying Power

Political prudence saves us from ignoring the primacy of power in accomplishing

executive missions As Dobel puts it, “Political achievement depends upon attention to one’s own power as well as the ability…to marshal power and resources to the achievement of goals” (1998 77) In general, the function of the CPA Administrator in rebuilding Iraq can be aptly characterized as leveraging the authority to issue orders and regulations in ways that breathe life into essential Iraqi institutions Yet merely exercising these administrative powers by no means guarantees accomplishment in various reconstruction endeavors Rather, the task of “creating power where none exists” (Dobel, 1998 77) in rebuilding Iraqi institutions depends upon a repertory of finesse, arbitrary edict, and compromise needed to surmount the controversial character of the CPA’s presence in Iraqi society

In specific, the CPA confronted a critical need to create power in a defunct judiciary that had lost much of its authority under the previous regime and had suffered substantial physical destruction as a result of widespread looting The remnant court suffered from a severe shortage

of personnel (after the regime change and subsequent DeBa’athification efforts that dismissed judges with high-ranking party membership) and was confronted a huge backlog of criminal cases One of Saddam’s last acts in power—a general amnesty granted to about 100,000

prisoners—was estimated to account for about twenty-five percent of post-war arrestees (Walker 2003c) In addition, Saddam eroded judicial authority by sidestepping the courts in favor of in-house, private hearings predisposed to favorable regime decisions Amid the critical need for a functioning judiciary, the CPA’s power dilemma arose Although the Administrator could use his delegated powers to resurrect a viable court system, doing so could be interpreted as pre-empting

Iraqis who would subsequently draft a new constitution And those who would castigate the CPA for usurping power could look to the Geneva Convention—that places limitations on the

authority of a temporary occupying power—as ammunition

Attention to the substance of pertinent orders and regulations sheds light upon how the CPA Administrator deployed power in efforts to rebuild the court system Issued on June 18,

2003, Order Thirteen establishes a Central Criminal Court that consists of an Investigative Court (presumably responsible for overseeing evidence gathering toward indictment) as well as a Trial Court In view of the controversy regarding U.S intrusion into Iraqi constitutional matters, it is noteworthy that the Administrator modeled both the investigative and trial chambers upon counterpart courts created earlier under the Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings of 1971 In essence, the Administrator exercised his power in a manner consistent with recent history

Further, Section 6 of this Order addresses the institutional integrity of the Central Court by charging judges with the duty to act impartially without respect to (their own) hierarchical position or the social status (race, nationality and religion) of those who appear before the court

In addition, Section 6 prohibits judges from functioning in other employment capacities that might compromise their interests Issued a week later, Order Fifteen creates a Judicial Review Committee of three Iraqis and three international members tasked to evaluate the suitability of judges and prosecutors to retain their offices Although it delegates some authority to this panel

of six, Order Fifteen clearly stipulates that these individuals are to be “nominated by a senior advisor and appointed by the Administrator, and who should serve at the discretion of the

conduct and proceedings in ways that protect the Coalition Under Section 20 of Order Thirteen, the Administrator delegates himself authority to determine matters to be put before the Court and, in so doing, uses the court to protect the CPA mission Mission-focused criteria for

determining applicable cases are spelled out in Subsection (a)—

a) The accused is suspected of committing a felony that:

i) is intended to destabilize government institutions or processes, in

Iraq;

ii) involves violence of a scale or organization that transcends

provincial boundaries;

iii) involves race, nationality, interethnic or religious based violence;

iv) is related to the investigation of the removal by force of any

government, the CPA or competent Iraqi authorities;

v) involves the illegal trafficking in weapons, drugs or persons across provincial

boundaries or international borders; orvi) involves the use of fraudulent practices across provincial

boundaries or international borders—

as well as in (d)—

d) The accused, either acting alone or as part of a group, is engaged in

criminal or terrorist activities that are directed toward the civilian

population or members of the CPA or Coalition Forces operating legally

within Iraq

It is too soon to judge whether the Central Court will be effective in disposing of its critical case backlog from a position of institutional strength Nonetheless, it is instructive how the CPA Administrator used his power to establish a post-war court—that would establish normaladjudicative procedures in a society besieged by lawlessness—and also to protect the broader

CPA mission (including its military components) As indicated, the Administrator exercised his

formal powers amid a dilemma that pit the abject need for a legal infrastructure against the sensitivity of encroaching upon subsequent Iraqi self-determination to design judicial institutions

in a (presumably forthcoming) Iraqi constitution Dobel concludes his discussion of power

deployment in reference to Titian’s painting An Allegory of Prudence that depicts “a dog

look[ing] to the rear” (respecting history), “a lion look[ing] across the plane to the viewer”

(looking to the present with strength), and “a boar look[ing] forward” (anticipating the

consequences of action) (1998 78) Reference to this artistic masterpiece appears particularly apt

in characterizing the parameters of CPA Administrator’s use of power in judicial institution building

Timing and Momentum

Prudence for Dobel requires political patience, “the ability to act with care and wait with patience, then move with quickness and surety when the opportunity arises” (1998 77)

Opportunities taken toward established goals need not attain the ideal so long as they realize material progress (78) In that patience implies a deliberate strategy to wait, it follows that the leader needs a reasonably extended time frame within which to act Yet it appears that

circumstances surrounding U.S efforts at the reconstruction of Iraq binds the CPA Administrator into a substantially compressed time frame that may force actions that position power in the short-run This time compression, that suppresses the advantages of timing and patience,

hampers the leader’s ability to convey a coherent statement of mission and to frame power in ways that foster legitimacy Just after assuming the role of CPA Administrator, Paul Bremer addressed conferees at the 2003 World Economic Forum in terms that cast the economic

component of the reconstruction mission in “hard-line” free-market terms:

[M]ore Iraqis will lose their jobs, government subsidies will be cut and agency budgets will be

slashed to make Iraq ready for competitive markets The lack of paychecks and work could breed

continued unrest in the short term, but changes are necessary to gut the corrupt former Ba’athist

government and rebuild Iraq with a free-market economy (Geitner 2003)

Yet only a few weeks later, E J Dionne commented that the CPA Administrator sounded more

like a “share the wealth” populist than free market economist in a New York Times opinion piece

about the distribution of oil profits:

[A] method should be found to assure that every citizen benefits from Iraq’s oil wealth One

possibility would be to pay social benefits from a trust financed by oil revenues Another could be

to pay an annual cash dividend to each citizen from that trust (as quoted in Dionne 2003)

Conceivably, the pressure to “hit the ground running” to institute far-reaching economic reforms within an undefined—presumably, short—period of U.S leadership in Iraqi reconstruction conveyed messages that could be interpreted as inconsistent and heavy-handed

Timing issues loom as problematic with respect to CPA efforts to reopen and reform the Baghdad Stock Exchange (BSE) in pursuit of the ultimate goal to attract large foreign

investment Journalists seized on the irony that, in the midst of a prolonged bear market in the U.S., Iraqi stock trade has boomed as U.S sanctions were lifted and reconstruction efforts began

(see for example, St Louis Post-Dispatch editorial, 2003) After the BSE closed with the fall of

Baghdad, brokerage firms appealed to the CPA for assistance in reopening it In the absence of a functioning stock market, private banks announced their intentions to fill the vacuum by

engaging in stock trading (Kubba 2003) In response, CPA officials indicated that they would not

be prepared to reopen the BSE until 2004 Although its representatives cited logistical issues to explain the extended closing of stock market (that is, time needed to relocate the facility), the Coalition exercised its authority to audit the accounts of brokerage firms and banks for the first quarter of 2003 Apparently, CPA officials recognized the interruption of the stock exchange (caused by war and subsequent looting) as an opportunity to impose reforms in pursuit of market integrity and transparency And amid brokers’ fears of extensive trading outside of the closed market, CPA representatives declared such transactions illegal (notwithstanding the

enforceability of that action)

On a parallel note, the Coalition’s goal to attract foreign investment collided with

ethnocentricity surrounding Iraqi trade In this regard, existing BSE rules barred non-Iraqis from buying stock in the market In a meeting with Iraqi brokers, a CPA representative (an American broker by trade) announced plans for a two-phase program that would ultimately extend market participation to foreign investors In the first two years after resumption of BSE activity in 2004,