U.S.-Russian Relations Implications for the Caspian Region

KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENTCaspian Studies Program A Report from the Caspian Studies Program’s Conference Held on October 22-23,2000 U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian

HARVARD UNIVERSITYJOHN F KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Caspian Studies Program

A Report from the Caspian Studies Program’s Conference

Held on October 22-23,2000

U.S.-Russian Relations:

Implications for the Caspian Region

With an Executive Memorandum by Brenda Shaffer Summarizing Key Findings and Policy Recommendations

Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 2001

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Dear Colleague,

On the eve of the U.S Presidential elections, Harvard University’s Caspian Studies Program held a conference in Cambridge titled “U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian Region” (October 22-23, 2000) Security studies specialists, experts on the Caspian region, and past and present U.S and Russian policymakers attended the

conference There was lively and candid debate about the respective policies of the U.S and Russia toward the region; there were also discussions about the impact of great and regional power rivalry on the state of conflict, stability, and development

Recent changes in the area make the current period an especially opportune one for exploring how U.S and Russian relations affect the Caspian region Under President Putin, Russia has articulated and initiated a more coherent policy toward the Caspian region, significantly increasing its activities there Moscow’s recent change in policy suggests that Russian policymakers now believe that Russia can achieve more influence

in the region by demonstrating flexibility on key issues One the one hand, an assertive, coordinated Russian policy toward the Caspian will likely increase the challenges to U.S.-led initiatives in the area On the other, Russia’s more centralized and coherent policy should facilitate the negotiating of cooperative arrangements with Moscow

A number of policy recommendations emerged from the conference that should help the new U.S Administration promote U.S interests without contributing to the

destabilization of the region or to worsening relations with Russia (outcomes which are clearly in conflict with overall U.S interests) The Executive Memorandum of this report summarizes these policy recommendations as well as the main findings of the

conference The report also includes summaries of the five conference panels and an appendix containing a transcript of a press conference held on the sidelines of the

conference with Ambassadors Carey Cavanaugh and Anatoly Adamishin.

This report has been compiled and edited by Emily Van Buskirk, Patrick McCrann, and Robert Krikorian, with proofreading assistance from Seth Jaffe Please feel free to direct any comments or questions about the report or its recommendations to Brenda Shaffer, Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA

02138, or Brenda_Shaffer@harvard.edu

The Caspian Studies Program is made possible by a generous grant from the

U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce and a consortium of companies led by ExxonMobil, Chevron, Aker-Maritime, CCC, and ETPM This conference was also made possible by a donation from the Amerada Hess Corporation.

In the months to come, all of us at the Caspian Studies Program will continue to explore the issues of vital interest to the Caspian basin region, including the many ways in which the U.S.-Russian relationship impacts the peoples and situations on the ground We will continue to engage governments, the press, NGOs, companies, and academic experts in the in the hopes that the answers to these questions can positively inform U.S policy

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toward the region We hope that you will find this report useful as you contemplate Russian relations, the strategic Caspian region, and United States policy overall We look forward to hearing your suggestions and comments on this report and to collaborating with you in future exploration of these critical issues.

U.S.-Sincerely,

Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D.

Research Director, Caspian Studies Program

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Memorandum by Brenda Shaffer……… 2

Panel One: Introduction and History……… 8Introducers: Graham Allison, Melissa Carr, Brenda Shaffer; Panelists: Carol Saivetz,

Mark Kramer, Gerard Libaridian

Panel Two: U.S Policy and Activity in the Caspian Region……… 12Chair: John Reppert; Panelists: Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, Anthony Richter, John Elkind

Panel Three: Russian Policy and Activity in the Caspian Region,

Additional Rivalries in the Caspian Region……… 16Chair: Timothy Colton; Panelists: Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin, Fiona Hill, Brenda Shaffer

Panel Four: Lessons about the Nature of Power in the Caspian Region…… 20Chair: Paul Goble; Panelists: Steven Walt, Arman Grigorian

Panel Five: Models for U.S.-Russian Interaction in the Caspian Region:

Impact on Stability and Conflict……… 24Chair: Monica Toft; Panelists: Stuart Kaufman, Peter Rutland

Appendix: Transcript of the Press Conference with Ambassadors Anatoly

Adamishin and Carey Cavanaugh ……… 29

Conference Participants list……… 40

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EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

U.S.–RUSSIAN RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CASPIAN REGION 1

Executive Memorandum

By Brenda Shaffer 2 , Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University

On October 22-23, 2000, security studies specialists, researchers specializing in the Caspian region, and policymakers from both Washington, D.C and Moscow convened at Harvard

University’s John F Kennedy School of Government to discuss U.S.-Russian relations in the Caspian region, and to devise policy recommendations for the United States government

The conference, held on the eve of the U.S presidential elections, anticipated that a newadministration would likely reevaluate its policies toward the Caspian region Under theleadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s policy toward the region has changed significantly; whilethe overall relationship between the U.S and Russia is in a period of flux and redefinition Thisenvironment provides an ideal opportunity for a reshaping of U.S.-Russian relations in theCaspian region

The following points represent the author’s interpretation of the main elements of consensus emerging from the conference (Individual participants may not agree with each and every point contained herein.)

MAIN FINDING AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION:

Articulated U.S policy and its present implementation in the Caspian region reflect a nominallycooperative attitude toward Russia Though the U.S does not want to exclude Russia from theregion, nor intensify a U.S.-Russian rivalry there, the United States is committed to strengtheningthe independence of the states that emerged from the Soviet Union and weakening their

vulnerability to outside influences Accordingly, Moscow perceives some U.S actions as

attempts to exclude Russia from the Caspian region, or marginalize its influence there In parallel,Russia has sought to expand its presence and influence in the region At times, these competingattempts for regional influence have had destabilizing effects on the region itself This instability

is clearly at odds with U.S policy objectives To correct this situation, the U.S needs to clearlyarticulate to Russia its objectives in the region, explaining the rationale behind specific policies—such as those targeting Iran, for example—while clarifying that the exclusion of Russia is not theultimate goal of American policy In areas where U.S and Russian interests converge, thearticulation and coordination of joint, complimentary policies will better serve the interests ofboth countries than uncoordinated action aimed at common problems: dealing with the threat ofAfghanistan, for example

A IMPACT OF RIVALRIES

1 Rivalries between various actors often have destabilizing effects on the Caspian region.

1 The term ‘Caspian region’ refers to the countries bordering the Caspian Sea—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia—plus the neighboring countries of Armenia, Georgia, Turkey andUzbekistan

2 The author acknowledges her appreciation to the conference participants for their contributions to thefindings of this memorandum The author would like to especially thank Emily Van Buskirk and MelissaCarr for their extensive contributions to this memorandum

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

The competition and rivalry between the U.S and Russia, the U.S and Iran, and between Russiaand Turkey significantly impact the stability of the Caspian region Moreover, the actions of thesepowers often complicate conflict resolution between the countries comprising the Caspian region.Over the last decade, the U.S and Russia have at times exhibited “neo-Cold War” behavior intheir rivalry over the region At the same time, local states have attempted to “suck in” the greatand regional powers, involving them in local struggles and playing them against each other

2 Moscow has perceived Washington’s policies as competitive

While the U.S aims to implement a Caspian policy that is relatively cooperative with Russia, Moscow nevertheless perceives Washington’s policies as competitive, and has viewed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, for instance, as an attempt to exclude Russia from Caspian resources, instead of as an attempt to enhance the options in the region by developing east-west corridors and multiple pipeline routes (as envisioned by the designers of this policy)

3 Russia interprets some U.S policies that target Iran as anti-Russian.

U.S policies aimed at averting the expansion of Iranian influence in the Caspian region are often interpreted by Moscow as anti-Russian activities This misunderstanding has had a detrimental affect on Russia’s perception of U.S polices in the region

4 The Caspian is high priority for Russia.

Some of the conference participants postulated that the U.S and Russia would sooner reach an accommodation over the Middle East or the Balkans than they would over the Caspian, because

of the region’s strategic importance to Russia

5 Interactions between Russia and U.S are not necessarily “zero-sum.”

Despite the rivalry on a variety of subjects, on a number of Caspian issues Russian and U.S interests clearly overlap: attaining stability in Afghanistan, preventing the flow of refugees, and halting both human and narcotic trafficking Moreover, both sides clearly benefit from stability inthe South Caucasus

6 Alignments are based on interests, not culture or religion.

In the Caspian region cooperative alignments emerge that are not based on nominal religious orideological identity or orientation, but instead on complimentary interests This has made forunexpected political and strategic bedfellows such as Iran and Armenia, and Russia and Iran.Historical factors play a much smaller role in determining alliances and cooperation than docurrent, concrete interests Rivalries in the region are intertwined and cooperative frameworks arenot rigidly based on divisions of ideology or identity This allows disparate groups to evolve,work together, and then disband on an almost constant basis When one discusses loyalties andinterests, there are no ‘absolutes’ in the Caspian region

7 Domestic lobbies have significant influence over state policies in the region.

Domestic inputs play a large role in many of the policies of the states in the region: Russia(expatriates from the Caucasus, economic concerns), Iran (where ethnic Azerbaijanis make up athird of the population), Turkey (Chechen, and Abkhaz minorities), U.S (Armenian domesticcommunity) U.S domestic elements play a dominant role in determining U.S policies towardthe Caspian region, often leading to policies contrary to the declared objectives of the U.S (e.g.section 907 of the Freedom Support Act3) The heavy involvement of domestic lobbies and

3 Section 907 prohibits U.S assistance (with the exception of assistance for nonproliferation anddisarmament programs) to the government of Azerbaijan under the Freedom for Russia and EmergingEurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (also known as the Freedom Support Act)

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

diaspora communities at times creates incoherent state polices The Caspian region isoverburdened by rivalries and struggles that are not directly related to the area, but instead arisefrom the agendas of outside actors

8 Regions are trading and interacting despite states’ lack of ties.

Despite unresolved problems and conflicts on the state-to-state level, many provinces of rival states still conduct trade and cooperate on the local level: for example, the cooperation

agreements between the Kars Province in Turkey and the Gyumri Province in Armenia and the general indirect trade between the two sides; trade between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Republic of Georgia; and direct trade and cultural and educational cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani-populated provinces in Iran, despite Tehran’s

attempts to prevent these direct ties Many of these border zones have become hubs of exchange and cooperation, and they have the potential to become epicenters of vibrant intellectual and technical innovation

B U.S POLICY TOWARD THE CASPIAN REGION:

1 The U.S communicates mixed signals to the states that comprise the Caspian region.

On the one hand, the U.S consistently declares that one of its main policy goals is strengthening the independence of the states in the region; on the other, the U.S labels these countries “Newly-Independent States (NIS)” and refers to them as part of the “Former Soviet Union,” as if their independence even after 10 years is still conditional In addition, these states are handled by

2. Bureaucratic politics often create substantial inconsistencies in U.S policies.

Bureaucratic politics often create inconsistencies in both the perception and execution of U.S policy This results, in part, from the conflicting public statements made by different governmentarms (e.g., the U.S military versus the State Department), which have different policy agendas Additionally, the U.S must take into account the fact that policy statements made by

representatives of certain government agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD), for example, have different impacts and connotations than statements made by other government agencies, such as the State Department The U.S needs to coordinate its statements and allocate them in such a manner that the appropriate spokesperson enumerates a clearly articulated policy

Misperceptions of U.S intentions and policies toward the Caspian region are influenced by the fact that many in Moscow and in the states of the region view pronouncements by different

journalists and editorial staffs (e.g The New York Times) as representing official policy.

3 U.S policy at times addresses the Russia of yesterday and not the Russia of today

U.S policy toward the Caspian region seems to address the behavior of the Russia of 1991-1994, instead of the Russia of today Since the Soviet breakup, Russian policy toward the Caspian region has gone through a number of changes Until 1994, Russia was adamant about retaining hegemony in economic and security matters in the Caspian region, as well as having Russian troops returned to the former borders of the U.S.S.R Since 1994, Russia has modified its goals inthe region While still aiming for maximum influence and accrual of benefits, Russia now realizesthat it must accommodate other powers and interests in the region Recognizing the independence

of the new states, Russia still strives for maximum influence over them, sometimes subversively exploiting minority groups to achieve its own aims Russia, however, is now far more reluctant

to employ this tactic than it has been in the past, because of Russian vulnerability to separatist activity in the northern Caucasus

Russian policy in the Caspian region and the extent of its cooperation with the U.S affects the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations Conversely, the U.S.-Russian interaction in the Caspian itself affects the overall bilateral relations between the two countries

4 The U.S needs to recognize the difference between relative power and relevant power.

While Russia is no longer a superpower on strategic parity with the U.S., Moscow retainsmany levers for influencing the Caspian region that the U.S cannot, or is not willing to, apply:i.e., “relevant” versus “relative” power Moreover, some actions are available to Russia at a muchlower cost than they are to the U.S.: such as the use of military troops Certain policies, like

“until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is takingdemonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.” Later modifications in the legislation have enabled the granting of humanitarian/NGOassistance

4 The Bush Administration has taken steps to rectify this situation and some of the government’sdepartments, such as the National Security Council and the State Department, are making an effort to bothrename and reorganize some of these departments

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

obstructing U.S pipeline plans, cost Russia less to implement than they cost the U.S to undo orreverse In other words, it is easier to obstruct than to build The applicable resources that Russiahas at its disposal in the Caspian region—for instance, destabilization through local forces oreven the introduction of military troops—must be part of U.S calculations in assessing Russia’spotential actions in the Caspian That being said, the use of such means is not without cost toRussia, and would certainly not be indiscriminate

5 The beginnings of anti-Americanism.

U.S engagement in the Caspian region is still quite modest, despite American declarations to the contrary Moreover, the first signs of anti-American sentiments are emerging This trend seems tocome from a variety of factors, including the disappointment resulting from the perceived failure

of the U.S to meet its own declared security, economic, and political commitments in the region Some states, foremost among them Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, demonstrated an almost

unwavering pro-U.S orientation, and took many steps to encourage American involvement These gestures were often met with apathy and escalating demands from the United States U.S democratization efforts in the region also contribute to the increasing anti-American trend: these efforts are viewed by some as condescending, or as attempts by the U.S to export values to the region The lack of U.S recognition that many of the societies in the region share democratic and liberal values, yet interact in culturally different ways than Americans, has hurt some

liberalization efforts Moreover, U.S democratization programs often emphasize formal and measurable indications of change (election monitoring for instance), instead of long-term, gradualand sustainable change Foreign-sponsored programs often empower elites and individuals to challenge the existing power structures, creating animosity among certain groups In addition, at times, the perception that some value-laden programs are of foreign origin produces a reflexive animosity toward them Those who design U.S assistance programs need to be extremely

conscious of how their programs become perceived on the ground

6 Washington often overestimates the religious factor.

While the Muslim peoples of the Caspian region possess multiple national and ethnic identities, Washington often assumes that their nominal religious identity as Muslims is their most

important sense of identity If it is generally assumed that most states act to pursue their

geostrategic interests, Washington policymakers too often think that Muslim states act in

irrational ways, somehow driven by religious zeal An overemphasis of the Islamic factor leads the U.S to lose sight of many foreign policy opportunities In addition, official U.S

governmental reports have a tendency to exaggerate the extent of the connections between the Muslim countries in the area, (such as Azerbaijan) to radical Islamic groups: the State

Department’s 1999 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report demonstrates this tendency

C POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1 Analyze the Caspian as a multi-polar region.

The Caspian region should be analyzed with a paradigm that moves beyond the traditional bipolarregional perspective, one that accommodates the multiple interactions in both U.S and Russiancalculations toward the region Examples might include a U.S.-Russia-Iran model or a U.S.-Russia-Iran-Turkey model

2 U.S policy must address current Russian activity.

The U.S should design and implement policies toward the Caspian region that are aimed at addressing Russia’s policies under Putin and not the policies of the preceding regimes

Consequently, the U.S should recognize that Russia is now implementing a more centralized and

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

focused policy in the area, and that Moscow is less inclined than in the past to actively destabilizethe region At the same time, Moscow has learned to tolerate many stances that it once viewed as intolerable The U.S should continue to project its commitment to the independent policies of thestates of the Caspian region, and not allow Russia to strong-arm them

3 The U.S should more clearly communicate the goals of its policies.

The U.S should regularly communicate with Russia about the goals of its policies, especially those that target Iran, to ensure that Moscow understands that it is not the intended recipient of these moves

4 Consolidate envoys, but communicate changes.

The U.S should consider organizing its envoys to the region in a more focused and centralized fashion Today, in the State Department alone, there are two special ambassadors as well as a special advisor handling the Caspian region.5 While Washington’s intention, demonstrating the importance it attaches to this area, is commendable, the result often creates mixed signals and cumbersome policies The U.S should work to coordinate policies among various agencies that have at times promoted conflicting goals Before publicly announcing institutional changes, however, the U.S should inform the governments of the region of its intentions and explain the implications

5 Drop conditional labels when referring to the Caspian region.

In the process of appointing new officials and revamping governmental agencies and

departments, Washington should think carefully about the signals it sends through both the structure and the names of these offices: Labels like, “Newly-Independent States” and “Former Soviet Union” inappropriately imply that the independence of these states is conditional and tenuous Policy divisions should be organized like they are in other regions, on a geographic basis, and not on the status of the former colonizing power

6 Encourage cross-border trade and ties.

The U.S should encourage and provide resources for the continued development of the local and provincial zones of trade as well as the cross-border cooperation that is on the rise despite the many obstacles on the state-to-state level: such as Armenia-Turkey, Azerbaijan-Armenia, and Azerbaijan with Azerbaijani-populated provinces in Iran

7 Preempt emerging anti-Americanism with credible commitments.

To address potentially emerging anti-American sentiments, U.S officials should be explicit abouttheir policies and commitments when speaking with the leaders of the Caspian states: i.e., make only credible commitments and consider how these policies and activities will be perceived in theregion The new Administration should be careful not to make dramatic and quick shifts in its policies without sufficient explanation and preparatory work inside the region; nor should the new Administration make light of moving the cornerstones of the previous administration’s policies Such moves have the potential to create confusion and disillusionment among the peoples of the region, and they risk fostering resentment toward the U.S

5 On March 12th, the U.S State Department announced that Secretary Powell had abolished 23 “special envoy” posts, including that of the Caspian special envoy, held at the time by Elizabeth Jones Jones was renamed “Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy.” The Embassy in Kazakhstan put out a

statement that Jones’s new title “is a slight change from her previous one, reflecting the new

administration's prerogative The change in title does not change her status as an

ambassador nor diminish her authority.” (Reuters, 3/13/01)

PANEL 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

Panel 1: Introduction and History

Chair and Introducers:

Graham Allison Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

Kennedy School of Government and Chair, Caspian Studies Program (Panel Chair)

Brenda Shaffer Research Director, Caspian Studies Program

Melissa Carr Program Director, Caspian Studies Program

Panelists:

Carol Saivetz Research Associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, and

Executive Director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies

Mark Kramer Director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, and Senior

Associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies

Gerard Libaridian Senior Adviser to the former President of Armenia, Levon

Ter-Petrossian, from 1991-1997, currently Visiting Professor, History Department, University of Michigan

After introductory remarks by G RAHAM

A LLISON , B RENDA S HAFFER and M ELISSA

C ARR, outlining the goals of the conference

and placing the Caspian region within the

context of American and Russian security

interests, the speakers on the first panel

discussed a wide range of issues using

historical comparisons C AROL S AIVETZ of

the Davis Center for Russian Studies and the

American Association for the Advancement

of Slavic Studies spoke on “U.S.-Soviet

Rivalry and Its Impact on the Third World:

Lessons for the Caspian Region,” placing the

current U.S.-Russian competition in the

context of past relations and rivalries Recent

statements from both American and Russian

policymakers, she noted, make it clear that the

two states are currently competing for

influence in the Caspian region

The dynamics of relations both with and

within the Caspian region have changed

What was once the sole province of the

U.S.S.R (and Iran) has now been penetrated

by outside forces, including Western oil

companies, Turkey and the United States

government The U.S is pushing for an export

pipeline from the Azerbaijani capital, Baku,

through Georgia, to the Turkish

Mediterranean port of Ceyhan Russia is

concerned about a foreign presence in an area

so close to its borders According to Saivetz,the maneuvering and wrangling over oil,natural gas reserves, and oil pipelines coulddevelop into a far more rigid confrontation.Given this possibility, Saivetz explored somelessons gained from observing superpowercompetition in the Third World throughoutthe Cold War period as a means of discussingthe Caspian region today

During the Cold War, most internationalactors knew the rules of the game, many ofwhich stemmed from the bipolar nature of theinternational system Today the situation is agreat deal more mutable According toSaivetz, it can be argued that the currentperiod is best characterized by unipolarity anddecisive U.S preponderance However, theU.S seems uncertain as to how to exercise itspower, and this uncertainty is reflected inAmerica’s assessments of the situation in theCaspian and the scope of its possibleinvolvement there Saivetz also pointed outthat during the Cold War the U.S.S.R wasvery conscious of its image and status,projecting power to demonstrate its globalreach The Basic Principles Agreement signed

by the two superpowers in 1972 ostensiblycodified the Soviet Union’s coequal status

PANEL 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

with the U.S One of the legacies of that era is

Russia’s pretension to superpower status The

second legacy, which for Saivetz is linked to

the first, is that this pretension may well lead

Russia to act from a position of weakness

Both sides are reluctant to completely leave

behind the tit-for-tat, zero-sum mentality This

can be seen in the U.S focus on the

Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, clearly designed to exclude

both Russia and Iran During the Cold War,

the Third World presented constraints and

opportunities for both superpowers Civil

wars and insurgencies created opportunities

for the superpowers to exploit or counter the

movements of the other side Many of these

situations turned into traps Similar traps

exist in the Caspian region, Saivetz argued,

providing Russia’s relations with Georgia and

Azerbaijan as key examples

Both sides are reluctant to

completely leave behind the

tit-for-tat, zero-sum mentality.

In the Caspian region today, in addition to the

interaction of the great powers, bureaucratic

competitors and oil companies also vie for

influence These conditions are a variation on

the themes prevalent during the Cold War, as

evidenced by the numerous studies of interest

group politics published during that period In

concluding, Saivetz posed the question

whether the current incipient rivalry between

a weak Russia and an all-powerful U.S might

turn into a new type of Cold War Though she

answers with a qualified “yes,” Saivetz thinks

the phrase “collaborative competition” (used

by George Breslauer in his discussion of the

Cold War in the Middle East) is a more

appropriate descriptor for future U.S.-Russian

relations in the Caspian region She also noted

that for the U.S the Caspian region seems to

be a lower priority than the Middle East or the

Balkans According to Saivetz, the U.S

needs to clarify its objectives in the region

and articulate them clearly, while

simultaneously keeping Russia’s interests in

mind

The next presentation, by M ARK K RAMER of

the Cold War Studies Project and the Davis

Center for Russian Studies, was titled “AComparative Approach to U.S.-RussianRelations in the Post-Soviet Period: Impact onthe Regions of Interaction.” Kramer firstmade a clear distinction between today’sRussia and yesterday’s Soviet Union, furthernoting that this difference is often not seenclearly by many circles, even in Russia; thishas had a tendency to send mixed signals toRussia’s international partners He alsoexamined questions of U.S and Russianinterests and interactions in the Baltic States,Ukraine and parts of Eastern Europe as ameans of providing comparisons to U.S.-Russian interests and relations in the Caspianregion He described interests as based oneither the military or economic salience of acountry or region Kramer set his discussionwithin the framework of identifying whodefines the agenda in the U.S.-Russiarelationship and determining to what extentthe United States accepts the Russian agenda

in any given case

Kramer noted Russia’s concern with thesituation facing Russian-speaking minorities

in the Baltic States as well as the Russiansupport for separatist movements in Ukraine

In Georgia and Moldova, Russian support forseparatists was overt and contributed to theoutbreak of armed conflict Regarding themilitary relevance of Eastern Europe,especially Ukraine, the nuclear issue took avery high priority in U.S.-Russian relationsand was one policy area in which the U.S.largely accepted the Russian agenda As theU.S.S.R was breaking in late 1991, Russiawas given sole control of the U.S.S.R.’snuclear weapons, partially as a result of U.S.pressure Another area in which the U.S.accepted the Russian agenda was the decision

to allocate the former U.S.S.R.’s UN securityseat to Russia, instead of creating a revolvingseat By bringing up these decisions, Kramershowed that several competing options wereavailable to the U.S

The U.S did not, but could have consideredthe option of joint control of nuclear weapons

as an alternative to sole Russian control.Kramer noted that regarding Ukraine, the

8

PANEL 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

fundamental American concern was how to

assure nuclear disarmament; the bulk of U.S

attention was concentrated on this issue As a

result, the U.S paid little attention to Russia’s

subversive activities in Ukraine Some U.S

officials felt that this was an acceptable price

to pay to gain Russian compliance on the

nuclear weapons issue

Kramer also identified the important

differences between the U.S and Russia

regarding NATO enlargement The United

States does not accept the Russian agenda for

Eastern Europe Russia has been an opponent

of NATO enlargement into the territory of its

former client states Though the U.S appeared

willing at first to acquiesce to Russian

requests, later U.S policy has reflected a

different agenda Russia has not been able to

set the security agenda in Eastern Europe in

the same way that it has in the Baltic States

Today, there is a de facto consensus that the

Baltic States will not enter NATO Kramer

saw no valid reason to keep the Baltic States

out of NATO, though he acknowledged that

there were such reasons in the past and that

there is, realistically, little chance of this

occurring in the near future Additionally,

according to Kramer, The United States has

accepted the Russian security agenda with

regard to Ukraine

It is primarily the economic salience of the

Caspian region that has determined U.S

interests and actions there Thus, NATO

involvement in the region is highly unlikely;

the wishes of Georgia and Azerbaijan to the

contrary notwithstanding Kramer sees the

U.S.-Russian interaction in the Caspian region

as relatively well regulated Moreover, Russia

has been accepted by the U.S as the single

most important successor state to the Soviet

Union Kramer concluded by remarking that

in his view U.S.-Russian relations in the

Caspian region are relatively predictable

In the final presentation G ERARD

L IBARIDIAN, Senior Adviser (1991-1997) to

the former President of the Republic of

Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, discussed

“The Caspian Region and the Problem of

Definition.” He began by arguing that U.S.relations with the Russian Federationfollowing the collapse of the Soviet Union can

be understood on three levels:

1 Relations related to international security,

especially nuclear non-proliferation andmutual treaty obligations can becharacterized as cooperative and for themost part constructive

2 With regard to the resolution of regional and local conflicts, the two countries

consult with each other and, wherepossible, they cooperate and even combineforces

3 In matters relating to what they consider

exclusive national and vital interests, the

two countries compete and take unilateralaction, regardless of the position of theother Due to the advantages of the U.S ineconomic and military capabilities, thismode of action is more common to theU.S., at least in the international arena As

a result, Russia and others have chargedthe U.S with hegemonic ambitions andactively sought ways to preserve a multi-polar world

It is not so much the geography of the Sea that earns it the label of

“region” but its hydrocarbon resources as they relate to world markets

According to Libaridian, the first problem thatone encounters in determining theimplications of U.S.-Russian relations for theCaspian region is one of definition As usedhere and elsewhere in policy and securitydiscussions, the Caspian region refers tocountries littoral to the Caspian Sea (and itshydrocarbon resources) as well as to countriesthat might be involved in any of the plansaimed at the transport of these resources toregional or world markets Thus, Libaridianargued, this “region” brings together countriesand regions and/or sub-regions that havehistoric, geographic, political, economic,cultural, linguistic, and religious differencessignificant enough to complicate groupingthem together as a “region.” It is not so muchthe geography of the Sea that earns it the label

PANEL 1: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

of “region” but its hydrocarbon resources as

they relate to world markets

As a consequence, the problems discussed

shift with the user’s preferred route of

transport and the politics attached to it

U.S.-Russian relations (as impacted by U.S policy

toward the NIS) and the U.S policy toward

the Caspian overlap for the most part, though

not completely The crucial difference is Iran,

said Libaridian To look at the South

Caucasus and Central Asia through the prism

of Moscow may be convenient, but in terms

of policy, it basically means accepting

Russia’s primacy in these regions and

strengthening Russia’s position in the Caspian

vis-à-vis Iran As for the initial U.S response

to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it

was benign and rather positive: to strengthen

the sovereignty of the new states, to promote

state-building based on democracy and

economic transformation, to emphasize

peaceful resolution of disputes and increased

cooperation, and to push for the integration of

the new states into the international

community But between 1994 and 1996, the

U.S began to act in an increasingly unilateral

fashion, characterized in part by its pipeline

politics

With these more aggressive policies, the

countries of the region were faced with the

dilemma of trying to accommodate American

strategic interests while not yet having

established a modicum of coexistence with

their three largest neighbors (Turkey, Iran,

and Russia)

According to Libaridian, it is feasible that

Russia will accept a reduced role in the South

Caucasus and Central Asia, but it is less likely

to do so if such a reduced role effectively

means U.S dominance of these regions The

U.S has the advantage of being recognized as

the only superpower, but the term is a

description only of capabilities and not of

wisdom The U.S must take into account that

the usual perception of a weak Russia may not

apply when vital Russian interests in regions

close to home are at stake Libaridian

concluded by arguing that the policy of

superimposing an external framework on aregion as diverse as the Caspian has failed,and if pursued may even deepen, rather thanresolve, antagonisms

DISCUSSION

John Elkind of the National Security Councilasserted that U.S policy in the Caspian hasnot been directed against Russia, but insteadagainst Iran He argued that the U.S haspursued a multiple pipeline policy, asevidenced by the pipelines that currently run

to Novorossiisk from Baku and from Tengiz(CPC) The focus of the debate, he stated,should be whether it is legitimate for the U.S

to pursue a policy of choices for export routes.Gerard Libaridian remarked that EnergySecretary Bill Richardson himself has stateddirectly that the U.S seeks to minimizeRussian interests in the region, maximizeTurkish interests, and cut out Iran entirely Paul Goble of Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty pointed out that in the region, Baku-Ceyhan is perceived as a way to excludeRussia However, at the same time, people inthe region see a contradictory trend: whenthey hear Washington-speak about the

“Newly Independent States,” and the “FormerSoviet Union,” they think these terms implycontinuing American recognition of somekind of Russian empire

The panel ended with a set of questions posed

by Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin aboutAmerican perceptions of Russia’s role in theregion He wondered: Are U.S politiciansgoing to take Russian interests in the Caspianinto account? If the U.S is trying to pushRussia away, are Americans confident thatthey can fill the void left by Russia? If theU.S acts with Turkey as a proxy, will this notcreate new rivalries in the region? Do Baku-Ceyhan and CPC exclude one another or isthere room for both? John Elkind addressedmany of the Ambassador’s questions duringthe second panel

10

PANEL 2: U.S POLICY AND ACTIVITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION

Panel 2: U.S Policy and Activity in the Caspian Region

Chair:

John Reppert Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government

Panelists:

Ambassador Carey U.S Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and NIS Regional

Anthony Richter Director, Central Eurasia Project, Open Society Institute

John Elkind Director of Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs, National

Security Council

J OHN R EPPERT began the panel by referring

to Steve Miller’s talk at the opening dinner of

the conference regarding nine realist facts

concerning the Caspian region—all of which

relate to international relations theory—as an

incomplete list of “objective factors.” Reppert

argued that while these factors (for example,

that there is a power vacuum in the region and

great powers abhor a vacuum and significant

natural resources serve as an additional pull

for great powers) are generally accepted

conceptions regarding the Caspian region,

they don’t truly encompass the existing

situation Reppert identifies this missing part

of the equation as intentions—the inconsistent

and mutable elements that severely

complicate a basic understanding of the

Caspian Region The intentions of the

countries active in the Caspian region

determine how the region is perceived

Reppert noted that some identify

hydrocarbons or geopolitics as the primary

source of interest in the region, while others

identify security interests As the U.S has

specifically stated that internal and

international warfare is not in U.S national

interests, it is not surprising that the violence

and potential for violence in the Caspian

Region has attracted U.S attention

Reppert also proposed that current policies

toward the region are affected by U.S

domestic politics and political events This is

an election year, after all, and Republican

vice-presidential candidate Dick Cheney has

more than a passing interest in the Caspianregion In fact, Reppert noted, Cheney hasexpressed interest in changing U.S policytowards the region—another potential shapingfactor

A MBASSADOR C AREY C AVANAUGH opened

his talk with the prediction that by the end ofthe conference there would be a great numbermore questions than answers as the groupsought to understand the Caspian region usingthe fundamentals of political science Itshould come as no surprise, AmbassadorCavanaugh noted, that the U.S still hastrouble describing the Caspian region in itsown terms, having for so long used the termsformer Soviet, new independent, and newlyindependent, for example

Ambassador Cavanaugh began his discussion

on U.S interests in the Caspian region bynoting that the process of explaining interestsautomatically juxtaposes them to somethingelse Are U.S interests really againstRussia’s? Some, but not all, he answered Toclarify matters, Ambassador Cavanaugh brokeU.S interests in the Caspian Region into thefollowing categories:

Political: Advance democracy, independence

and a market economy;

Economic: Promote economic development,

development of resources;

Security: Promote stability and peace;

Domestic: Be responsive to the U.S

Armenian population (approx one million),

PANEL 2: U.S POLICY AND ACTIVITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION

which plays a major role in U.S policy and

activity in the region

Ambassador Cavanaugh pointed out that U.S

policy is shaped by a variety of forces While

it seems easy to identify the big oil companies

as the real players, in reality they have been

unsuccessful in getting Section 907 repealed

(Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act

restricts U.S government assistance to

Azerbaijan) If the U.S oil companies are so

influential, Cavanaugh asked, why did the

U.S House of Representative come close to

passing a resolution on recognizing the

Armenian genocide by Turkey? This would

potentially ruin U.S relations with Turkey

and possibly even jeopardize the

Baku-Ceyhan pipeline The bill, which had 141

sponsors and bipartisan support, was

withdrawn at the last minute before a planned

vote on October 20th—a withdrawal made at

the urging of President Clinton

Reiterating that one of America’s primary

interests in the Caspian Region is Russia,

Ambassador Cavanaugh stated that it is

essential for the U.S to engage Russia there

as well as in the other areas of the former

Soviet Union in a way that doesn’t impede

other U.S policy goals He seconded Carol

Saivetz’s point that Russia could conceivably

make missteps, actions that would adversely

affect the U.S.-Russia relationship While it

is necessary to build individual relationships

within the Caspian region, these relationships

should not come at the expense of the

U.S.-Russian dialogue, Cavanaugh argued In fact,

there are many areas in which both countries

can cooperate: starting with the problems of

the ‘arc of instability’ in the region

Ambassador Cavanaugh stressed that the U.S

is very active in the region, and to prove his

point he mentioned that the U.S has three

ambassadors covering the area Ambassador

Bill Taylor, in charge of assistance, reviews

the billions of support dollars that are sent for

food, fuel, medicine, strengthening

democratic institutions, etc Ambassador

John Wolf, the Advisor to the President and

Secretary of State for Caspian Energy Basin

Policy, deals mainly with the oil pipelines,

and as such, has a highly visible positionabroad Ambassador Cavanaugh describedhis work as focusing solely on conflicts andpeace efforts This work encompassesOssetia, Abkhazia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabagh

Ambassador Cavanaugh also addressed thecommon belief that peace is of greaterimportance in the Caspian Region than insome other areas For argument’s sake, heproposed that if another conflict were to breakout between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russiacould mobilize to protect Armenia, whileTurkey would respond on Azerbaijan’sbehalf A conflict between Russia andNATO-member Turkey would be a hugeproblem for the U.S This problem wouldonly be compounded if the other countries ofthe region were to become involved in aconflict

According to Cavanaugh, the Karabagh peace process has improvedmarkedly over the last year The presidents ofboth countries have a direct dialogue witheach other, which could potentially lead to asolution, as there are no third parties toconfuse or complicate the issue Hecommended the joint heads of the OSCEMinsk group (France, the U.S., and Russia)for working closely together with each other(as well as with the presidents of Armenia andAzerbaijan) to try to find a Karabaghsettlement Ambassador Cavanaugh alsomentioned the events of October 1999, when

Nagorno-it seemed that a peace settlement was wNagorno-ithinreach That is, until armed rebels burst intothe Armenian parliament and assassinatedVazgen Sargsian, effectively short-circuitingthe peace process

Using the Nagorno-Karabagh example,Ambassador Cavanaugh pointed out that bothArmenia and Azerbaijan have difficulteconomic situations, albeit Armenia’s iscertainly more severe Armenia has beenunable to attract foreign investment, in spite

of its wealthy diaspora, without the guarantee

of a peace settlement As a result, theArmenian people are voting with their feetand emigrating, an action that could

13

PANEL 2: U.S POLICY AND ACTIVITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION

destabilize the situation Ambassador

Cavanaugh concluded by stressing the

importance of finding a peaceful resolution to

the myriad conflicts existing in the Caspian

Region Without peace, the region could

present a problem on a global scale

U.S policy toward the region was

formed in a period of exuberance

and idealism about the way

markets would solve problems

better than governments.

A NTHONY R ICHTER, director of the Central

Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute,

spoke from the perspective of the ‘non-state’

actors that play an important role in the

region Richter began by stating that

‘non-state’ doesn’t necessarily mean ‘anti-state.’ In

his opinion, U.S policy towards the Caspian

region over the past 10 years has achieved

modest results The results are modest

especially in comparison to the high

expectations placed upon the programs, staffs

and, most importantly, the Caspian region

countries themselves following the fall of

Communism U.S policy toward the region

was formed in a period of exuberance and

idealism about the way markets would solve

problems better than governments

Meanwhile, policymakers forgot about their

own lack of ground experience in the region

This mistake led to a variety of complications,

especially when one considers that the

majority of issues facing the Caspian region

are local: terrorism, drug-trafficking, and

“Islamic fundamentalism.” Richter specified

four ‘trouble’ areas for U.S policy:

1 Democratization: The Freedom Support

Act was created in 1992 when an

optimistic outlook predominated

diplomatic circles Its goals were to

establish sovereignty and encourage

reform by funding a variety of

international organizations and regional

Caspian initiatives It was expected that

what worked in Poland would work for

Tajikistan However, opportunities for

real change have been few and far

between It would now be a mockery,

Richter stated, to talk about the continued

success of democratization in the region.Consequently, the concept of ‘civilsociety’ has lost its momentum inWashington, D.C

2 Stalled energy policy: The past

methodology for invigorating andrevitalizing the Caspian region was ‘If agovernment proposes a policy, the marketwill resolve it.’ Unfortunately, this has notbeen the case with Caspian region energypolicy In fact, the oil companies activewithin the region have been reluctant toput up the necessary money fordevelopment Richter creditedAmbassador Wolf with achieving morethan a rhetorical commitment from thecompanies to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.However, financing still remains aproblem

3 Peace and security (especially in Central

Asia): To date, a great deal of hope hasbeen placed on organizations andcoalitions (for example NATO, PfP, andGUUAM) that might be able to bringpeace and stability to the region Citingthe recent incursions of militants intoUzbekistan, Richter states that this goalhas not been achieved

Next, Richter identified two emergingpriorities in the region:

1 Afghanistan The Taliban represents a

major regional security threat both withinCentral Asia and in Russia (the Russianssuspect the Taliban of supporting theChechen fighters)

2 Drug trafficking The increasing opium

trade in Central Asia can also be linked tothe Taliban

Richter noted that there has been a trend inU.S assistance to the region, fromencouraging sovereignty and reform, totargeting oil extraction and reform, andfinally, to extraction and containment (ofterrorism and drug trafficking)

Richter reminded the participants that the U.S

is not the only player in the region Russia,Turkey and China have each become activelyinvolved in the Caspian region As such, theCaspian states have the opportunity to shop

PANEL 2: U.S POLICY AND ACTIVITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION

for the discourse that meets their needs The

Russians have shown that they can make

progress in pursuing their interests in Central

Asia without the human rights talk The

Caspian states have learned that if the U.S

condemns your human rights abuses, another

suitor is waiting in the wings It is even

possible to conceive of the Caspian region

states playing the larger powers off of one

another in order to achieve their own goals

Richter concluded by mentioning the current

‘anti-U.S.’ feeling that has begun to spread

throughout the region He warned that unless

the U.S develops a clear, coherent and

effective strategy for the Caspian region, it

might have difficulty operating there in the

future

J OHN E LKIND of the National Security

Council formulated his comments in response

to questions posed by Ambassador Adamishin

during the first panel Adamishin had

articulated his perception of American policy

towards the region as being aimed at pushing

Russia out He asked whether the U.S., if it

succeeds, is confident it can fill the void left

by Russia and address the poverty that could

spread throughout the region He also asked

whether the U.S had considered fully the

implications of using Turkey as its proxy in

the region, whereby Turkey could become a

regional hegemon

Mr Elkind assured the ambassador in clear

terms that “it would be idiocy for the U.S to

push Russia out of the Caspian.” He

explained that Russia’s geographic location,

its cultural and educational ties to the region,

and the commonality of issues it faces with

the countries in the region were all reasons for

Russian involvement in the Caspian He was

careful to leave no doubt “Is the U.S pushing

Russia out of the Caspian?” he asked “No,”

he answered “Should we be?” he continued

“No,” he answered In addition, he stated that

the U.S does not wish for Turkish

“domination” of the region or for any other

state’s domination However, he explained

that Turkey is not on a quest for domination

It is in the interest of the U.S., Elkind

concluded, to pursue independent relations

with the countries in the Caspian region This

is an area where the U.S is, by necessity,learning quickly, as we possessed littleexpertise previously Elkind also noted thatRussia would lose substantially in the Caspian

if it does not bring peace to its southernborders

DISCUSSION

In response to the question, “Is the U.S againdeveloping overly ambitious plans for theCaspian region?” Richter answered that thedanger now lies in the U.S approach towardsregional events, as certain behavior may forcethe U.S into the role of the bad guy Ifnarcotics trafficking is our number oneconcern, we could put ourselves on the side ofthuggish regimes If we spend money only on

“extraction and containment” initiatives, wewill be ignoring human rights and civilsociety development Anthony Richter saidthat there is a new pessimistic minimalism inU.S foreign policy, whereby human rightsand democracy initiatives do not matter.Ambassadors in the region are indifferent tohuman rights issues, regardless of whatpolicymakers in Washington, or MadeleineAlbright on her visits to the region, say.Steve Walt emphasized the importance ofperceptions Mini-successes for the U.S.could be misconstrued as mini-defeats forRussia We tend to see our own policies fromthe lens of good intentions, he argued, whilethose in the region see them in terms of theireffects He suggested that the U.S try tocontrol the perceived intentions of its Caspianregion policy—in other words, do what yousay and say what you do The ‘cloud ofrhetoric’ that the Russian Federationcomplains about is a direct result of thecontradictions inherent in the U.S foreignpolicy model

Stuart Kaufmann agreed with AnthonyRichter’s statement that the U.S cannotignore the human rights issue The IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan is a threat to bothU.S and Russian interests, one that bothparties need to address as partners, not inopposition to one another

15

PANEL 3: RUSSIAN POLICY AND ACTIVITY, ADDITIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE CASPIAN REGION

Panel 3: Russian Policy and Activity in the Caspian Region, Additional Rivalries in the Caspian Region

Chair:

Timothy Colton Director Of the Davis Center For Russian Studies

Panelists:

Ambassador Former RF Minister for Cooperation with CIS Member-States,

Anatoly Adamishin Former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

Vice President (International Affairs) of Sistema Corporation

Fiona Hill Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution

Brenda Shaffer Research Director, Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University

T IMOTHY C OLTON opened the session by

noting that the previous two panels had

already spent significant time discussing

Russia even though it was not their intended

topic, revealing the importance and

significance of Russia in the Caspian region

Colton then expressed the panel’s intention to

focus on Russia, its foreign policy and the

consequences of its actions, in order to help

elucidate this enormously influential regional

entity

A MBASSADOR A NATOLY A DAMISHIN started

by remarking that the foreign policy of

Russia, especially under Putin, has been

improving by moving further to defend

Russian national interests At the end of the

day, Adamishin argued, “economics don’t

matter as much as politics.” Ambassador

Adamishin identified politicians as having,

once again, the most important role for Russia

in this region

Ambassador Adamishin stated that the

purpose of the conference was to continue the

process of untying the political knot that is the

Caspian region For his part, Ambassador

Adamishin seconded the comments of John

Elkind: there are no irreconcilable or

antagonistic relations between the U.S and

Russia in the Caspian region

Next, Adamishin posed the question, “What

does Russia stand for in the Caspian Region?”

As an answer, he said that Russia is mainly

interested in remaining an influential force inthe Caspian region, and in becoming a leadingpower there Russia has over 120 years ofhistory in the Caspian region, deep roots thathave led Russia to consider itself an importantpart of that region It will not sit idly by and

be pushed out of the geopolitical crossroads ofmany countries that are important to Russia.Ambassador Adamishin stressed that Russiacan achieve its goals through peaceful andcooperative means As an example, hesuggested that the U.S and Russia shouldwork together, using a common assessment,

to definitively determine the resources of theregion

Ambassador Adamishin identified severalways in which Russia has demonstrated anopen attitude through its actions in theCaspian region: It is in favor of doing awaywith the political and ideological surfaceissues and allowing economics to return to theforefront of regional concerns; Russia doesnot object to large oil companies (foreign anddomestic) exploring, extracting andtransporting the resources of the region;Russia is in favor of multiple means oftransporting the resources of the region;Russia, unlike other countries, does notexclude any Caspian Region countries fromits regional efforts; Russia is in favor ofdelineating ownership of the Caspian sea on alegal basis

PANEL 3: RUSSIAN POLICY AND ACTIVITY, ADDITIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE CASPIAN REGION

Ambassador Adamishin disputed the

commonly held view that the U.S.S.R

displayed contempt towards the ecology of

the Caspian region The U.S.S.R made a

conscious decision to ‘freeze’ exploitation of

Caspian resources and to focus instead on

Western Siberia out of environmental

concerns, he said

Adamishin expressed the hope that

U.S.-Russian relations in the Caspian Region will

continue to improve, especially in light of the

positive comments by Ambassador

Cavanaugh and John Elkind (about how

Russia represents a primary American

interest, and how the U.S must engage Russia

in the region) In his opinion, the policy of

“keeping Russia permanently weak” will

actually work against U.S interests—

especially because Russia no longer presents a

threat to the U.S Ambassador Adamishin

noted that the U.S may very well need a

stronger Russian Federation to cope with new

challenges and threats, both within the

Caspian region and abroad

In conclusion, Ambassador Adamishin

reiterated that Russia is prepared to work with

the U.S to ensure the following:

 Multiple means of transporting Caspian

oil and gas;

 Overall stability in the Caspian region,

specifically in the Southern Caucasus;

 Improved living standards for the

poverty-stricken people of the region;

 A common front against the threats of

drugs, arms trafficking and Islamic

extremism;

 Involvement of former ‘pariah’ countries,

such as Iran, in a common positive effort;

 The spread of Caspian region riches to

surrounding areas, particularly the

impoverished Balkans

F IONA H ILL opened by comparing Graham

Allison’s ‘Where you sit is where you stand’

theory from Essence of Decision to her theory

for the Caspian region of ‘Where you sit is

what you see.’ What exists in the Caspian

region is a competition of mutual

misperceptions, not a zero sum game

Making an observation about the discussionthus far, Hill even suggested that the focus ofthe conference should perhaps have been onU.S policy towards Iran, as this policy is one

of the key determinants of the region’sactivities

Hill identifies a similar problem within theCaspian region, in that Russia tends to viewthe area from a bilateral, U.S.-focusedperspective Both the U.S and Russia areguilty of not examining the region and thestates that it consists of in a thorough manner.Russia’s interest in the Caspian is primarily interritory, not resources, but U.S policy fails tounderstand this

Russia’s interest in the Caspian is primarily in territory, not

resources, but U.S policy fails to understand this.

The U.S has inherited the role of regional

‘spoiler’ from Britain Hill drew acomparison between Britain’s focus on Indiaand the U.S.’s focus on (and against) Iran.Both policies are definitive (i.e other interestsare derivative) and ignore the other Caspianregion states

We must consider how approaches to theregion have deeply skewed relations, ascountries have become objects of policies, notallies For example, U.S and Iranian relations

as well as U.S.S.R and U.S relations haveaffected not only U.S and U.S.S.R foreignpolicy, but also the interaction between thestates of the Caspian region themselves.Substantial dialogue about each individualstate and their separate interests is essential if

we are to understand the dynamic interplaythat takes place between the Caspian regionentities Hill pointed out that the Caspianregion states are more divided than united.This is in part due to a diplomatic ‘fog’ thathas enveloped the Caspian region as othercountries descend upon the region with theirown interests, goals and issues The U.S isprime example As Ambassador Cavanaugh

17

PANEL 3: RUSSIAN POLICY AND ACTIVITY, ADDITIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE CASPIAN REGION

mentioned, the U.S has three separate

Ambassadors to the region This year Russia

appointed two ambassadors to the Caspian

region Hill suggested that multiple

ambassadors make for more bureaucratic

confusion than coordination This issue only

worsens as one examines the multifaceted

structures within each government that deal

with the Caspian region, because multiple

agencies have multiple interests—the U.S

State Department is pushing the

democracy-building initiatives while the U.S military has

taken the lead in Central Asia This

occurrence alone must present a bewildering

picture to regional diplomats

Hill concluded by stating that the U.S and

Russia, by looking at the Caspian region from

their own skewed perspectives (U.S vs Iran,

Russian Federation looking at the U.S.), have

distorted the entire region This has

subsequently led to the creation of false

alliances, making it difficult for the U.S and

Russia to cooperate with one another Hill

stressed that this behavior has not passed

unnoticed by the regional governments

Quoting a Kazakh senior aide’s comments on

the U.S bombing of Afghanistan she noted

that the Kazakhs said, “We don’t want to

simply replace one demigod with another (i.e

U.S.S.R out, U.S in) The situation is ripe

for local governments to pursue their own

interests, perhaps even by playing Russia and

the U.S off of each other

Brenda Shaffer began her presentation by

noting that, as Fiona Hill stated, there are

other countries in the Caspian region outside

of Russia and the U.S Shaffer referred to the

Caspian region states as mutable ‘small

groups’ whose rivalries are intertwined and

who shift alliances and polarities according to

their interests

Shaffer explained that events in the Caspian

region are heavily influenced by actions taken

outside the area For example, she said, we

must take into account the new ‘arms race’ (as

both Pakistan and India have developed

nuclear weapons) and try to understand how it

will affect Iran

In spite of the Muslim majority, Shaffer statedthat Islam plays only a minor role incooperation in the region For instance, theIslamic Republic of Iran maintains betterrelations with Armenia than with Azerbaijan,despite the fact that the latter’s population ispredominantly Shi’i Muslim She alsodiscounted the theory of a ‘power vacuum’after the fall of the U.S.S.R., stating that withonly 2.5 wars, the Caspian region is fairlystable

Shaffer identified one of the main issuesfacing the region as the fact that it is difficult

to determine who the players are and whatthey are playing for An important factoraffecting the region is the large diasporacommunities and co-ethnics abroad It isoften domestic constraints that influence theforeign policy of Iran, Turkey, the U.S andRussia towards the Caspian region

Iran, for example, has significant domesticinfluences and concerns in the creation of itsforeign policy, with more than 20 millionAzerbaijani Turks living within its borders.For example, Azerbaijani-Iranian Majlis(Parliament) members have petitioned thegovernment in Tehran to change its policytowards the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict,where Iran has supported Armenia

Shaffer also noted that there has been aproliferation of organizations in the Caspianregion (for example GUUAM, the Council ofEurope, Black Sea Economic CooperationCouncil, Partnership for Peace, and the CIS)

to which competing Caspian region statesbelong These non-rigid alliances, whichcreate strange associations, are anotherexample of the overall flexibility of theregional situation Some of theseassociations, such as the Black Sea group,provide the opportunity for cooperation thatmight be difficult on the bilateral level, such

as between Armenia and Turkey

Even Turkey and Russia, traditional rivals, arebeginning to develop closer relations throughtrade and even people (tourists and new

PANEL 3: RUSSIAN POLICY AND ACTIVITY, ADDITIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE CASPIAN REGION

residents in Turkey) Currently, their major

stumbling block is the Bosphorous question –

a geographical issue, not a historical or

cultural one In fact, Shaffer identified the

geographical issue, especially its effect on

trade, as a potential regional flashpoint in the

next ten years

Russia and Iran are strategic

partners Each country sees the

other as an important “pole” in

the creation of a multi-polar

international system.

Russia and Iran are strategic partners Each

country sees the other as an important “pole”

in the creation of a multi-polar international

system In addition, Russia needs close ties

with Iran in order to prevent Muslim

bandwagoning with the Chechen cause It is

not surprising that the U.S has been unable to

break this relationship despite fiscal offerings

to Moscow, as Russia and Iran are mutually

dependent upon each other

Shaffer concluded by noting that in some

cases where state-to-state cooperation has

been lacking, lots of trade occurs on the

province-to-province or people-to-people

level, for example between Azerbaijan and

Armenia (in Georgia) and between Kars

(Turkey) and Gyumri (Armenia) In other

words, in unofficial spheres, the people of the

Caspian region are interacting and

cooperating with each other on a basic level

This dynamic, she predicted, will have a

significant effect upon Caspian region

relations in the future

DISCUSSION

In response to Liz Tarlow’s question aboutwhether, given the complexities of theCaspian region, cooperation between Russiaand the U.S is essential, AmbassadorAdamishin quoted recent surveys thatidentified 22% of the Russian people who feltthe U.S was Russia’s enemy He noted thatthe U.S and the Russia do not quarrel aboutBosnia and Yugoslavia (Russia is evenresigned to the former Yugoslavia eventuallyjoining the EU), and that the two sides haveshown exemplary cooperation regarding theNagorno-Karabagh conflict Yet,Ambassador Adamishin also pointed to areas,such as Abkhazia, where he felt the U.S andRussia still needed to work to create a moreunified approach He admitted that theCaspian region is indeed an area replete withcomplex situations, and stressed that the U.S.and Russia will need to learn together

Roger Kangas asked the panel if multipleorganizations do, as Fiona Hill noted, conflictwith each other, or whether their stability lies

in multiplicity Shaffer described manyregional organizations, with the exception ofthe Black Sea Economic CooperationCouncil, as paper tigers that promote littleadditional cooperation that does not alreadyexist on the bilateral level

Stuart Kaufman commented that it is useful tokeep in mind that geo-politics only go so far,and that there are other forces that determineinteractions between states Kaufman citedthe on-the-ground interdependence of theregions as noted by Shaffer at the end of herpresentation Hill, on the other hand, didaccept the notion that there is action on theground, but reminded the participants that theU.S must be careful in defining this

‘interaction.’ She then noted that some of theregional organizations are exclusive (such asGUUAM for Armenia)

Fiona Hill closed the discussion by pointingout that while the U.S and other governmentsare maneuvering in the international arena,there are other forces at work in the Caspianregion She specifically pointed out that the

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