Developmental Changes in Speed of Processing: Central Limiting Mechanism or Skill Transfer?. http://www.jstor.org Developmental Changes in Speed of Processing: Central Limiting Mechanism
Trang 1Developmental Changes in Speed of Processing: Central Limiting Mechanism or Skill Transfer?
Article in Child Development · August 1988
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.1988.tb03267.x
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Developmental Changes in Speed of Processing: Central Limiting Mechanism or Skill Transfer? Author(s): James W Stigler, Howard C Nusbaum and Laurence Chalip
Source: Child Development, Vol 59, No 4 (Aug., 1988), pp 1144-1153
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development
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Trang 3Conunentaries
Central Limiting Mechanism or Skill Transfer?
James W Stigler, Howard C Nusbaum,
and Laurence Chalip
University of Chicago
STIGLER, JAMES W.; NUSBAUM, HOWARD C.; and CHALIP, LAURENCE Developmental Changes in Speed of Processing: Central Limiting Mechanism or Skill Transfer? CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1988,
59, 1144-1153 In this article we examine Kail's claim that similarity in developmental speed-of- processing curves for 2 tasks indicates that performance on a wide range of cognitive tasks is constrained by the growth of a central limiting mechanism We argue that the "specific learning" hypothesis, which Kail rejects, does not consider the role of transfer of learning between tasks, and thus assumes that domain specificity of learning implies complete domain independence We dem- onstrate, through simulations, that the operation of a central limiting mechanism is neither sufficient nor necessary to generate the curves observed by Kail 3 alternative models of skill transfer are proposed, and the ability of each model to generate data similar to Kail's is demonstrated It is concluded that the types of data collected by Kail are essentially incapable of identifying task- specific and task-general constraints on performance
In performing any complex cognitive task
in an experiment, a subject can draw on a
wealth of resources consisting of some combi-
nation of knowledge and skills Some of these
capabilities may be limited by the matura-
tional state of the subject; others may be lim-
ited by the amount of practice and experience
the subject has had One challenge for the
developmental cognitive psychologist is to
specify how these different types of cognitive
limitations interact to explain performance on
particular tasks Where performance changes
in similar ways across tasks, can these similar-
ities be tied to general maturational factors or
to specific experiences?
In a recent Child Development article,
Kail (1986) argues that the growth of a central
limiting mechanism underlies age differences
in speed of processing across a wide range of
cognitive tasks Kail bases his argument on
studies of speed of processing in two different
tasks, name retrieval and mental rotation His
basic claim is that performance in both tasks
is governed by a central limiting mechanism
such as the availability of cognitive resources
As the child matures, the availability of men- tal resources increases, thus reducing a sub- stantial constraint on performance Kail pre- sents three pieces of evidence in support of his argument (1) The shape of the function relating speed of processing to age is similar across the two tasks that ostensibly measure different processes; (2) this function is better fit by an exponential function than by a hyper- bolic curve, indicating that the cause of the performance improvements is not learning, since learning curves are almost always bet- ter described by hyperbolic curves; and (3) the correlation of mean response time across conditions between adults and children ap- proaches unity
At first glance, it would seem that the similarity between speed-of-processing curves for different tasks across ages should provide only the weakest kind of support for a single mechanism mediating performance After all, there are many ways in which pro- cessing similarities can arise without postulat- ing a single, common underlying mechanism
As Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) stated, af-
This paper was written while the first author was supported by a Spencer Fellowship from the National Academy of Education The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Robert Sternberg, Robert Kail, and an anonymous reviewer Also, thanks to Robert Siegler for his sharp eye, and to Kevin F Miller for comments on an earlier draft Correspondence may be ad- dressed to the authors at Department of Behavioral Sciences, University of Chicago, 5730 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637
[Child Development, 1988, 59, 1144-1153 ? 1988 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc All rights reserved 0009-3920/88/5904-0031$01.00]
Trang 4ter finding similarities in the shapes of learn-
ing curves across a wide range of tasks, "We
do not wish to assert that such an effect stems
from a single cause or mechanism Indeed, its
apparent ubiquity might seem to indicate
multiple explanations" (p 16) Their conclu-
sion is that the regularity in the shape of
learning curves is based on more general fea-
tures of the learning system or situation rather
than on the postulation of some specific com-
mon, cognitive mechanism Following the
same line of argument, the similarity of pro-
cessing speed curves reported by Kail may be
better accounted for by a more general view
of the performance of these tasks rather than
by hypothesizing a single, central limiting
mechanism
However, Kail's argument is based on all
three lines of evidence taken together to rule
out an alternative interpretation of develop-
mental changes in cognitive processing Ac-
cording to this alternative account, called the
specific learning hypothesis, developmental
changes in speed of processing are due to the
cumulative effects of learning and experience
rather than to maturational changes in some
general mechanism An examination of Kail's
proposal for evaluating the contrasted hypoth-
eses of specific learning and a central limiting
mechanism reveals the assumptions underly-
ing both hypotheses:
[One] way to evaluate these hypotheses is to com-
pare patterns of developmental change across tasks
Assume that change in processing speed reflects
the acquisition of task-specific procedural or de-
clarative knowledge Presumably the events (e.g.,
specific experiences, maturational changes) that
produce increased speed for some process X are
independent of those events that yield increases in
speed of a second process Y Because the events
that facilitate the two processes are independent,
there is no necessary relation between develop-
mental change in the speeds of these processes Of
course, task-relevant knowledge could develop in
parallel for particular tasks, resulting in identical
growth functions, but this must be the exception
rather than the rule if the hypothesis of task-
specific change is to have much heuristic value In
contrast, if performance on any speeded task is lim-
ited by a general mechanism, then the same pattern
of growth in processing speed is expected across
tasks [Kail, 1986, p 970]
Kail argues that according to any version
of the specific learning hypothesis that has
"heuristic value," similarities in develop-
mental speed-of-processing curves across
tasks will only occur by coincidence, which is
"the exception rather than the rule." In other
words, Kail's assumption is that domain
Stigler, Nusbaum, and Chalip 1145 specificity of learning implies complete do- main independence of the effects of learning
It is our view that the version of the specific learning hypothesis that Kail pits against his central limiting mechanism hy- pothesis is highly restricted because it is lim- ited to the case in which learning on one task
is completely independent of learning on any other task This limitation may be unwar- ranted, in that there are few cognitive tasks that are so independent as to use completely different sets of skills and resources To as- sume that learning on any two tasks is com- pletely independent precludes the possibility that transfer might occur between tasks Although it is possible that the specific learning hypothesis, as described by Kail, may be ruled out by Kail's data, we do not believe his data militate against less restricted versions of a specific learning hypothesis A broader interpretation of specific learning, which we call the skill transfer hypothesis, may redress some of the limitations in Kail's formulation of specific learning Furthermore, models of skill transfer may provide us with
an alternative explanation of evidence cited
by Kail as support for a central limiting mech- anism The question of interest is not whether domain-specific or general changes occur- for they both certainly do occur-but rather which kind of change is primary Are these changes driven by specific learning, or by the independent growth of some general mecha- nism that applies to all tasks? We contend that the data reported by Kail are equivocal with respect to differentiating a central limiting mechanism from a skill transfer account of age-related changes in processing speed The Central Limiting Mechanism Hypothesis
Before we argue that the skill transfer hy- pothesis can plausibly account for develop- mental changes in speed of processing, it is worth considering the central limiting mecha- nism hypothesis a little more closely Kail suggests that only a central limiting mecha- nism could reasonably generate his data His fundamental claim is that if two processes are limited by the same general mechanism, the performance curves will necessarily have the same shape But this is not necessarily cor- rect
It is not sufficient to merely suggest that performance in both tasks is limited by the same mechanism; it also is necessary to specify how the mechanism limits perfor- mance It is quite possible that a single lim-
Trang 51146 Child Development
iting mechanism could play different limiting
roles in two tasks (e.g., affecting the asymp-
tote for one and the slope for the other), in
which case performance curves for the two
tasks would not necessarily be similar A cen-
tral limiting mechanism may constrain the
rate at which information is processed by a
system or it may constrain the total amount of
information being processed These alterna-
tive roles for a limiting mechanism may affect
the shape of a processing speed curve in very
different ways Alternatively, the central lim-
iting mechanism may have the same limiting
role for two tasks (e.g., setting the slope for
both), yet the two tasks may be mediated by
different processes that are described by dif-
ferent characteristic functions (e.g., one hy-
perbolic and the other linear) Kail has neither
specified how the central limiting mechanism
would affect performance on his two tasks,
nor has he given any rationale for his implicit
assumption that the mechanism affects both
tasks in the same way
We can demonstrate the differential ef-
fects of a single limiting mechanism that con-
strains the rate modifier of one process and
the asymptote of another by using a simple
mathematical model The model is based on
the following assumptions First, we assume
that we can describe the change in processing
speed of a system with a single difference
equation, such that the overall response time
is monotonically decreasing with develop-
ment This means that gains in processing
speed are not lost with normal development
Second, we assume that there is some limit on
processing speed that represents optimal per-
formance in the fully developed adult Third,
we assume that developmental improvements
in response speed are proportionate to the
distance from this asymptote
According to Kail's account, the capacity
of a central limiting mechanism grows with
age In our model, this capacity serves to gov-
ern changes in performance on specific tasks,
which are described by difference equations
We constructed two models, one for each task
For one task, available capacity limits the pro-
cessing speed rate, and the asymptote is fixed,
while for the other task, capacity sets the
asymptote and the processing speed rate is
fixed As long as the difference equation fol-
lows the assumptions we have outlined, it can
take almost any specific form
The top two panels of Figure 1 show
simulated developmental speed-of-process-
ing curves for two different tasks, A (shown in
the top panel) and B (shown in the bottom
panel) Task performance was simulated us-
Task A
400
N(t+1)= N(t) - 8LM(t) (N(t) - 115)
300
( 200
0
100
Age (years)
Task B
9
4
8 R(t+1) = R(t)- 09 (R(t)- 1/LM(t))
7 -
6-
5 -
4
2
Age (years)
Growth of Limiting Mechanism 1.0
0.8 0.6- 0.4-
0.2
Age (years)
FIG 1.-Simulation of the effect of a central limiting mechanism on two tasks, A (top panel) and
B (middle panel) Performance on these tasks is de- scribed by the same general function However, the growth of the limiting mechanism (shown in the bottom panel) sets the performance asymptote for Task B, and it modifies the increment of perfor- mance improvement for Task A
Trang 6ing the same difference equation for both
tasks, but with different parameters for each
so that the range of performance would reflect
absolute differences between the two tasks
Remember that it is the shape of the curves
that is important and not the absolute levels of
performance
Equation (1), which was used to simulate
these tasks, is based on the activation equa-
tion used by McClelland and Rumelhart
(1981) The choice of this model for perfor-
mance improvements is based on a view of
changes in performance as an accumulation
process In this equation, pi(t) represents per-
formance on task i at time t, and a and b are
constants that modify the input I and the
minimum performance asymptote A
pi(t + 1) = pi(t) - aI[p1(t) - bA] (1)
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the
hypothesized growth of a central limiting
mechanism with age The growth of this
mechanism over time is described by equa-
tion (2), which is simply another variation of
the activation equation in which capacity is
increased by a constant proportion (gJ is a
constant in this simulation) of the difference
between the asymptote M and the current ca-
pacity available
c(t + 1) = c(t) + gJ[M - lc(t)] (2)
Although both tasks are limited by the
growth of a central limiting mechanism, this
mechanism limits performance in two very
different ways In Task A (shown in the top
panel), the asymptote for processing is a con-
stant and capacity LM(t) limits the proportion
by which performance speed can increase
at each age (by setting I in eq [1]) This role
for a central limiting mechanism might be
viewed as developmental increases in the
efficiency of cognitive processing
By comparison, in Task B (shown in the
middle panel), the central limiting mecha-
nism, LM(t), sets the asymptote of perfor-
mance, A As capacity grows, the asymptote
limiting performance decreases, so processing
time is reduced This could be viewed as a
physiological change with development that
permits the response system to generate faster
responses, or as a change in the speed with
which certain mental processes are carried
out Thus, as we outlined above, there are two
different ways in which cognitive processing
can be constrained by a limiting mechanism
The developmental speed-of-processing
curves shown in Figure 1 have very different
Stigler, Nusbaum, and Chalip 1147 shapes despite being governed by the same limiting mechanism These simulation results illustrate an important point: the fact that two tasks are limited by the same central mecha- nism is not sufficient to guarantee the similar- ity of their performance curves The assump- tion that all tasks limited by the same mechanism will have the same shape is un- warranted The simple invocation of a central limiting mechanism is not sufficient to gener- ate similar performance curves without sub- stantial elaboration of how the mechanism op- erates in limiting task performance
The Skill Transfer Hypothesis While it may be true that a general lim- iting mechanism could, under certain circum- stances, result in curves with similar shapes,
it is our contention that substantial transfer of skills between tasks could do the same The fact that transfer models can account for per- formance similarities across tasks was demon- strated long ago in a series of papers by Fer- guson (1954, 1956, 1959) If an increase in speed of processing in Task A leads to a cor- responding increase in speed of processing in Task B, for whatever reason, the develop- mental functions for the two tasks will tend to resemble each other
In Kail's study, the two tasks were chosen because "for both cognitive theorists and psychometric theorists, mental rotation and name retrieval represent distinct processes" (p 971) Kail's claim is that mental rotation loads psychometrically on spatial ability, while name retrieval loads on verbal ability This reported difference in psychometric loading suggests that there may be minimal overlap among the processes that mediate these tasks This processing distinction be- tween tasks is important for Kail's argument
If the tasks were not distinct, then develop- mental similarities between tasks could be at- tributed to the common structure of the tasks, making it unnecessary to invoke a more gen- eral mechanism
We question whether Kail's two tasks are distinct enough to claim that there is no pro- cessing overlap between them Although it may be true that "name retrieval" tasks, in general, load on verbal ability, there is some evidence suggesting that the matching task used by Kail may load more highly on spatial ability than on verbal ability List, Keating, and Meiman (1985) used a task that was structurally similar to that used by Kail, ex- cept that the stimuli were letters of the al- phabet instead of pictures of common objects Although matching letters should be more of
Trang 71148 Child Development
a verbal task than matching pictures of
objects, List et al found that the only
psychometric loadings for their task were spa-
tial-not verbal
Questions of psychometric loading aside,
the real issue is the extent to which these
tasks share any component skills that could
lead to transfer Even if mental rotation is re-
lated to spatial aptitude and name retrieval is
related to verbal aptitude, if these tasks de-
pend on a single central limiting mechanism,
then by definition (Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981),
these tasks must be at least partially depen-
dent on the operation of control processes in
memory (see Shiffrin, 1976) The subject must
access, maintain, and manipulate information
from memory in both tasks, and it is unlikely
that these very general control processes all
are unique to either mental rotation or name
retrieval If any of these basic skills are used
to carry out both tasks, we would expect trans-
fer between them
Although we have argued that transfer
could occur between two different tasks such
as mental rotation and name retrieval, how
likely is such transfer? Data relevant to this
question have been reported in a recent, in-
teresting paper by Kail (1987) In this study,
Kail trained one group of subjects on mental
rotation and a second group on memory scan-
ning Following training, each group was
given the other group's training task as a
transfer task So the group trained on mental
rotation received the memory search task as a
transfer task, and the group trained on mem-
ory search received the mental rotation task to
measure transfer The results for both groups
showed significant transfer of training be-
tween these very different tasks Based on
these results and on the preceding arguments,
we believe that it is plausible to assume trans-
fer between mental rotation and name re-
trieval as measured by Kail
Three models of skill transfer.-Given
that transfer could occur between different
tasks, it is important to demonstrate that the
effects of this transfer could result in data
similar to those reported by Kail The basic
attribute of a model of transfer is that as per-
formance increases on one task, there are pro-
portionate increases in performance on the
transfer tasks This does not, by itself, indicate
how transfer is accomplished We propose
that one mechanism of transfer between tasks
is by the improvement of shared component
skills Practice on a particular task improves
the skills that mediate it Performance of a
second task that is mediated by any of the
improved skills should show improvement as
well
Figure 2 shows three general models of skill transfer that could account for similarity among speed-of-processing curves in differ- ent tasks In Transfer Model 1 (shown in the top panel), performance on either of two tasks leads to direct improvement on the other task This is the most general view of transfer since
it does not specify the mechanism by which transfer occurs In this model, if transfer
is symmetric, then the speed-of-processing curves will have the same shape; to the de- gree to which transfer is asymmetric, the shapes of the curves will be similar but not identical
The two panels of Figure 3 show simula- tions of the name retrieval and mental rota- tion tasks based on direct transfer between these tasks These simulations are based on equation (1) in which I is set to the perfor- mance level for the other task In other words, increments in response speed are modified by the performance level of the other task The performance level of one task serves as input governing changes in the performance of the other task The asymptote A is set to a differ- ent value for each task reflecting the different scales of performance In this simulation, per- formance starts at some initial level for both tasks, and the more performance on each task improves, the more the other task benefits Since both tasks are engaged in simulta- neously, the performance curves are directly coupled Both curves have the same shape as
a result of transfer
Tranfer Model 2 (shown in the middle panel of Fig 2) is a more elaborated form of Transfer Model 1 By this account, task per- formance may depend on both task-specific and task-shared skills This model assumes that skills are strengthened or improved by practice so that performance of a task im- proves each of the underlying skills (both task-specific and task-shared) which in turn improves performance To the extent that a task depends on a particular skill, improve- ments in that skill will result in better task performance If a skill is shared between tasks and both tasks depend on this skill, improve- ments in the shared skill will largely deter- mine the shape of the performance curves for both tasks Furthermore, if the shapes of the underlying skill-growth curves are generally similar across tasks, the shape of the perfor- mance curves will be generally similar as well, assuming that the characteristic func- tions for task performance are the same and the shared skills play the same role in carry- ing out both tasks
The upper two panels of Figure 4 show the performance curves for simulations of the
Trang 8Stigler, Nusbaum, and Chalip 1149
Transfer Model I
task 1 task 2
Transfer Model 2
task 1 task 2
skll 1 skil2 skill 3
Transfer Model 3
task 1 task 2
skill I
FIG 2.-Three models of skill transfer due to specific learning In Transfer Model 1 (top panel), changes in performance of one task directly affect performance of a second task and vice versa In Transfer Model 2 (middle panel), tasks are performed by a combination of shared and specific skills, and perfor- mance on one task affects performance of a second task by improving common skills In Transfer Model 3 (bottom panel), two tasks are mediated primarily by a common skill; increases in the proficiency of this skill improve performance of both tasks even though the performance of these tasks has little, if any, effect
on the level of the skill
name retrieval and mental rotation tasks
based on Transfer Model 2 Each task was
simulated using equation (1) with I being set
by the sum of the levels of two skills-one
common and one task-specific In this model,
there are three different skills One skill is
specific to each task and one is shared be-
tween them The rate of performance im-
provement on each task is governed by the
sum of the levels of the two skills that
mediate the task The task-common and task-
specific skills are weighted equally
The growth of the three skills (shown in
the bottom panel) is based on equation (2)
For each skill, the asymptote is set to 1 and
the value of J depends on whether the skill
is task-specific or task-common For task-
specific skills, J is set to the performance level
of the appropriate task The input governing
the growth of a task-specific skill is the per-
formance level of the task mediated by that
skill For the task-common skill, J is the sum
of the performance level of both tasks Thus
in this model there is a feedback loop be- tween tasks and skills: Performing a task serves to improve component skills, which in turn further improves task performance Note that the two different tasks have the same shape in their performance curves, despite the fact that each depends partly on an inde- pendent, task-specific skill in addition to the one skill that is common to both Moreover, these curves are the same shape, despite the fact that the independent skill curves are quite different
Finally, Transfer Model 3 (shown in the bottom panel of Fig 2) is perhaps the most telling, as it is computationally indiscrimin- able from Kail's model of a general limiting mechanism According to Tranfer Model 3, the tasks performed by subjects in a particular experiment are transfer tasks These tasks
Trang 91150 Child Development
Name Retrieval
400
N(t+1) = N(t)- 05R(t) (N(t) - 115)
"300
100
6 10 14 18 22
Age (years) Mental Rotation
9
8 R(t+1)=R(t) - OO11N(t) (R(t) - 2.5)
7-
6-
o 4
S5-
4 -
6 10 14 18 22
Age (years) FIG 3.-A simulation of Transfer Model 1
Symmetric and direct coupling between two tasks
improves performance with age so that the curves
have the same shape
have little, if any, direct influence on the
skills that mediate their performance Instead,
tasks such as name retrieval and mental rota-
tion, which are not practiced extensively in-
side or outside the lab, really only probe the
state of skills already developed indepen-
dently in some other context If performance
of these transfer tasks depends largely on
shared skills that were learned outside of the
lab and on new skills that must be developed
on first encounter with the tasks, it seems
likely that the independently learned (but
shared) skills will dominate performance and
determine the shape of the performance
curves for both tasks
This can be seen in the top two panels of
Figure 5, which show a simulation of Transfer
Model 3 using equation (1) for modeling task
performance and equation (2) for modeling
skill growth For each task, I in equation (1) is
set to the previous level of the common skill
Improvements in performance are governed
by the level of the mediating skill However,
the skill grows independently of the tasks as a
Name Retrieval
400
N(t+1) = N(t) - 3(CS(t) + NS(t)) (R(t) - 115)
300
200
100
6 10 14 18 22
Age (years) Mental Rotation
9
8 R(t+1) = RWt) - 3(CS(t) + RS(t)) (R(t) - 2.5) 8-
4g
6 10 14 18 22
Age (years)
Skill Development
1.0
0.8
SRS(t}
0.2
0.0
6 10 14 18 22
Age (years)
FIc 4.-A simulation of Transfer Model 2 Name retrieval (top panel) and mental rotation (middle panel) are mediated by one common skill and one task-specific skill Developmental changes
in processing speed are a result of the sum of the two skill levels for each task Changes in the com- mon skill CS(t), the name retrieval skill NS(t), and the mental rotation skill RS(t) are shown in the bot- tom panel Despite differences in the shapes of the growth of the individual skills, developmental changes in processing speed for the two tasks are similar
constant proportion of the difference between the asymptote and the current skill level The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the growth curve for the shared skill that limits perfor- mance of the two tasks This model is compu- tationally indistinguishable from Kail's view
of a central limiting mechanism because in this model the limiting mechanism is the level of proficiency of the mediating skill
Trang 10Stigler, Nusbaum, and Chalip 1151 Name Retrieval
400
N(t+1) = N(t) - 5CS(t) (N(t) - 115)
300
!200-
100
Age (years)
Mental Rotation
10
R(t+1) = R(t) - 5CS(t) (R(t) - 2.5)
8 -
4 6-
4
2
Age (years) Common Skill Development
1.0
0.8
S0.6
0.4
0.2
Age (years)
FIG 5.-A simulation of Transfer Model 3
Developmental changes in the speed of performing
two transfer tasks, name retrieval (top panel) and
mental rotation (middle panel), are identical since
they rely on the growth of a common skill (bottom
panel) that is unaffected by performance on the
transfer tasks
Given the type of data presented by Kail and the type of arguments he makes regard- ing the similarity of curve shapes, there is no way to distinguish between a central limiting mechanism based on resource availability and
a skill transfer model in which performance
is constrained by the proficiency of skills learned outside the laboratory The only argu- ment advanced by Kail against a learning model is based on his claim that the perfor- mance curves he observed are best fit by an exponential function Since previous studies examining learning data have concluded that learning data are best described by a hyper- bolic function (e.g., Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), Kail concludes that the exponential shape of his data argues against a learning account such as that provided by Transfer Model 3
Before accepting Kail's argument con- cerning the shapes of the developmental curves, it is important to note two differences between Kail's results and those of Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) Kail's data were ob- tained by sampling different groups of sub- jects at different ages, whereas the learning data analyzed by Newell and Rosenbloom were generally sampled within individuals across time In other words, Kail's data are not generated by practice Although Kail noted this difference, it is not clear how it will affect the shapes of the resulting curves A more important point about Kail's data concerns the magnitude of the difference between the fits
of exponential and hyperbolic functions Whereas in some of the studies examined by Newell and Rosenbloom the difference be- tween curves was large enough to have prac- tical significance within the domain being learned, this is definitely not the case with Kail's data Not only is the difference in fit between hyperbolic and exponential curves not statistically reliable for Kail's data, as Kail himself acknowledges, but we contend that the differences between the curves are too small to be meaningful, and therefore they should not be interpreted
Figure 6 shows the theoretical curves from Kail's Table 2 plotted using Kail's esti- mated parameters for the name retrieval task (top panel) and the two mental rotation tasks (the curve from Experiment 1 is shown in the middle panel and the curve from Experiment
2 is shown in the bottom panel) At the point
of greatest divergence for the two mental rota- tion tasks, these curves differ only by tenths
of milliseconds! There is no extant experi- mental paradigm that has sufficient resolution
to distinguish between two curves differing