The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia - A Net Assessment pptx

Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, Leanne PiggottPrepared for The Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARC

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated

in a notice appearing later in this work This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law Permission is required from RAND to reproduce,

or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

Research Institute

For More Information

the RAND Corporation

6Jump down to document

CIVIL JUSTICE

EDUCATION

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE

WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

Purchase this documentBrowse Books & PublicationsMake a charitable contributionSupport RAND

RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors All RAND mono-graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, Leanne Piggott

Prepared for The Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The Evolving

Terrorist Threat to

Southeast Asia

A Net Assessment

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

R® is a registered trademark.

© Copyright 2009 RAND Corporation

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND.

Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation

1776 Main Street, P.O Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

Secretary of Defense (OSD) The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN 978-0-8330-4658-1

This monograph, prepared by the RAND Corporation and the Centre for International Security Studies in Australia, develops a net assess-ment against which to gauge the scope and parameters of the terrorist threat to Southeast Asia and, by extension, U.S security interests in the region Its main purpose is to enhance understanding of the dangers posed by politically motivated violence in Southeast Asia and to rec-ommend improvements to U.S counterterrorism (CT) policy, which,

if implemented, would reduce the terrorist threat to the stability of this important region

Building on prior RAND research undertaken to analyze the underlying motives, drivers, and capabilities of the principal extrem-ist groups that have resorted to terrorist violence in the Philippines, southern Thailand, and across the Indonesian archipelago, this study examined the historical roots of militancy in these regions to provide context for assessing the degree to which local agendas are being either subsumed within a broader ideological framework or shaped by other extremist movements To illuminate some of these connections, this monograph analyzes the organizational structure, cohesion, and ideol-ogy of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the most dangerous of the various dis-parate jihadist groups operating in this part of the world, and assesses its capacity to exploit and aggravate established Islamist conflicts in Southeast Asia It also includes a dedicated appendix that breaks new ground in exploring the potential for Cambodia to emerge as an attack

or logistical hub for terrorists over the next five years

By definition, a comprehensive terrorism assessment must include more than just a threat evaluation Any meaningful analysis needs

to take into account the thoroughness and relevance of government countermeasures and capabilities Accordingly, this monograph exam-ines the effectiveness of the key national security strategies that have been enacted by the three regional states that are presently most affected

by terrorism—Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia—as well as the impact of U.S CT and law enforcement assistance that has been pro-vided to each of these countries

The subsequent gap analysis should help to provide a sive picture of the overall terrorist environment in Southeast Asia and the specific nature of the militant support networks currently operating

comprehen-in this part of the world It is hoped that these fcomprehen-indcomprehen-ings will assist the United States and regional partner-nation governments to better shape and refine the parameters of their respective assistance programs and mitigation efforts

This research was sponsored by the Australian Federal Police and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Inter-national Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop-ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community Comments are welcome and may be directed

to the principal investigator, Peter Chalk, at Peter_Chalk@rand.org.For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins He can

be reached by email at James_Dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200

703-S Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202 More information about RAND

is available at www.rand.org

Preface iii

Figures ix

Tables xi

Summary xiii

Acknowledgments xix

Abbreviations xxi

ChAPTer One Introduction 1

ChAPTer TwO Malay Muslim extremism in Southern Thailand 5

Militant Context 5

Background to the Southern Thai Conflict 5

The Malay Muslim Militant Struggle 7

1960–1998 7

1998–2004 10

2004–Present 12

Militant Groupings 17

Structure and Size 17

Goals and Motivational Drivers 19

Patterns of Recruitment and Radicalization 23

Traction Among the Local Population 25

External Dimensions 26

Assessment 29

ChAPTer Three

Muslim and Communist extremism in the Philippines 33

Militant Context 33

Militant Groupings 37

Moro Islamic Liberation Front 37

Misuari Breakaway Group 46

Abu Sayyaf Group 49

Communist Party of the Philippines–New People’s Army 57

Assessment 63

ChAPTer FOur Terrorism and national Security in Indonesia 67

Militant Context 67

Militant Groupings—Nationalist Islamists 69

Laskar Jihad 69

Front Pembela Islam 71

Antistatist Islamists 75

Laskar Jundullah, KOMPAK Movement, AMIN, and Ring Banten 75

Attitude of Local Population 78

Nascent Jihadist Networks 80

Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia 80

Assessment 83

ChAPTer FIve The regional Dimension: Jemaah Islamiyah 87

Background 87

Objectives 89

Structure and Size 92

Operational Activities 96

Participation in Communal Violence in Maluku and Sulawesi 96

Early Terrorist Activity: 2000–2001 97

Terrorist Activity: 2002–2005 98

JI Traction in Southeast Asia 100

JI’s Future Prospects 102

ChAPTer SIx

Counterterrorism and national Security in Thailand 105

Historical and Political Context 105

Security Resources Deployed to the South 107

Key Counterterrorism Measures in the South 111

The Thaksin Administration 111

The Post–September 2006 Situation 115

Peace-Building and Reconciliation 116

Security 118

Dialogue 120

Assessment 122

ChAPTer Seven Counterterrorism and national Security in the Philippines 131

Historical and Political Context 131

Resources Allocated to Internal Security 134

Key COIN and Counterterrorism Measures 137

Assessment 141

ChAPTer eIghT Counterterrorism and national Security in Indonesia 149

Historical and Political Context 149

Resources Allocated to the National Security Mission 152

Key Counterterrorism Programs and Measures 157

Assessment 160

ChAPTer nIne national Security in Southeast Asia: The u.S Dimension 167

Main Components of U.S Security and Counterterrorism Assistance 167

International Military Education and Training Program 168

Foreign Military Financing Program 168

Antiterrorism Assistance Program 168

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Program 169

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 169

Economic Support Fund 170

U.S Security Assistance to Primary Partner Nations in Southeast Asia 170

Thailand 170 Indonesia 172 The Philippines 175 Challenges Associated with the Implementation of U.S Security

Assistance in Southeast Asia 179

ChAPTer Ten

Conclusion 185 The Current Terrorist Environment in Southeast Asia 185 Policy Recommendations 188

APPenDIx

exploring the Potential for emergent Operational and Logistical Terrorist hubs in Cambodia 199

Bibliography 215

2.1 Violent Incidents in Southern Thailand,

January 2004–April 2008 13 2.2 Deaths and Injuries, by Religion,

January 2004–April 2008 14 2.3 Leaflet Portraying the Thai State as a Rapacious,

Anti-Islamic Entity 17

3.1 MILF Base Commands 41

5.1 High-Profile JI Neutralizations, 2001–2008 94

5.2 High-Profile Attacks Attributed to JI, 2002–2005 99

9.1 ATA Allocations to Indonesia, FYs 2002–2007 173

9.2 ATA Allocations to the Philippines, FYs 2002–2007 178

10.1 Southeast Asian Ratification of International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism 192

10.2 Popular Access to Media and Broadcasting Outlets in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand 197

The Current Terrorist Threat

Overall, the terrorist threat to the countries covered in this graph remains a serious but largely manageable security problem In Thailand, while the scale and scope of Islamist-inspired violence in the three southern Malay provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat have become more acute since 2004, the conflict has (thus far) not spread

mono-to the country’s majority non-Muslim population nor has it taken on

an anti-Western dimension.1 Indeed, at the time of this writing, side demagogues and radicals had singularly failed to gain any con-certed logistical or ideological foothold in the region, which suggests that Thailand’s so-called “deep south” is unlikely to become a new hub for furthering the transregional designs of fundamentalist jihadi elements

out-In the Philippines, Moro Muslim extremism has declined edly since its high point in the 1990s and early 2000s The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) both remain factionalized with the bulk of their existing cadres mostly confined

mark-to isolated pockets across the Sulu archipelago The leadership and

1 In this monograph, Islamist is used when describing Islam as a religiopolitical enon The term is an immediate derivation of Islamism, which has its moorings in significant

phenom-events of the 20th century, such as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of

Afghani-stan, and the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation It is distinguished from Islamic,

which is more correctly understood as signifying religion and culture as it has developed over the past millennium of Islam’s history For more on these terminological nuances, see Denoeux, 2002; Roy, 1994; and 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p 562, fn 3.

mainstream membership of the largest and best-equipped Moro rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), appears sincere in its stated desire to reach a comprehensive peace settlement, despite the breakdown of a cease-fire reached in July 2003 Although a perceptible communist threat continues to exist, the New People’s Army (NPA) has witnessed a steady decline in numbers and weapons Moreover, the NPA’s ability to fully control those areas that it has infiltrated, which presently amount to only 5 percent of the country’s total, is declining The situation in Indonesia is somewhat more fluid On the one hand, the latent threat posed by Islamist radicalism has patently declined since 2000, reflecting both more effective CT actions on the part of the police and widespread popular opposition to militant groups whose attacks have disproportionately affected Muslim interests On the other hand, a significant minority of the Indonesian population harbors a desire for some form of fundamentalist Islamic political order, which under certain circumstances could spark a resurgence of support for extremist jihadism if not carefully managed and countered.

The threat environment in Indonesia also has direct relevance for transnational terrorism in Southeast Asia, not least because the coun-try plays host to JI Although the network has been substantially weak-ened by the arrests of several leading midlevel commanders, as well as internal disputes over the utility of large-scale, indiscriminate bomb-ings, it has demonstrated a proven capacity to adapt and will probably never be fully expunged as a movement of radical ideas

Counterterrorism Responses

A true assessment of the current terrorist environment in Southeast Asia must take into account the nature and appropriateness of state responses Again, there is reason for guarded optimism here In Thai-land, the government has gradually come to appreciate the virtues of more nuanced, dialogue-based approaches to conflict mitigation in the southern border provinces The new emphasis on development and

“soft” hearts-and-minds initiatives is likely to continue regardless of the political complexion of future Thai governments

In the Philippines, the armed forces have made significant ress in defense reform and civil-military relations and are now reaping significant rewards in the ongoing battle against Islamist and Moro extremists in Mindanao The admittedly halting negotiations with MILF have made progress, and, with the notable exception of ances-tral domain, most outstanding issues have now been settled Manila has also made headway against the NPA insurgency through a com-bination of “hard” and “soft” security policies aimed at normalizing (former) hostile communist areas.

prog-Finally, in Indonesia, the central government has fully committed

to professionalizing the police force and ensuring that it is ally recognized as adept and accountable In addition, Jakarta is slowly augmenting what hitherto have been very weak coastal surveillance capabilities, and it now recognizes the need for a concerted deradical-ization program Most significantly, the government has established

internation-a credible internation-and effective CT unit—Speciinternation-al Detinternation-achment [Detinternation-asmen Khusus] 88—which reports directly to the military and has been cred-ited with the neutralization of at least 450 militants since 2005

Policy Recommendations

While U.S security assistance to Southeast Asia has been important to the development of a more efficacious regional CT strategy and struc-ture, much more could be done to inoculate this part of the world against the possibility of a renewed terrorist threat, from either domes-tic extremists or an emboldened transborder jihadist network Accord-ingly, this monograph offers the following recommendations

Better integrate CT, law and order, and development policies to address the issue of corruption in the region This enduring and pervasive

problem not only fuels resentment against incumbent governments,

it also sustains popular support for extremist groups It is crucially important that elected officials, bureaucrats, and other representatives

of the state are able to win the trust and confidence of their own munities and thereby deny terrorists the political influence they need

com-to grow their support and mount effective operations

Promote further police reform in the Philippines and Thailand This

could certainly be done through the current bilateral suite of assistance that is provided through the U.S Department of State (DoS) Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program, and International Crimi-nal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) However, the United States should additionally consider sponsoring a much broader program of professional training through nascent but proven multi- lateral arrangements Entities such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok all offer the major advan-tage of bringing practitioners together in a single organizational setting where professional networks can be built and ideas and perspectives on terrorism and CT can be exchanged and debated

Foster a less benign environment for terrorism in Southeast Asia by increasing support for regional institutions, such as the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit Channel-ing security and CT assistance through these collaborative frameworks will help reduce the perception that terrorism is an exclusively Ameri-can problem It will also provide an opportunity to buttress indigenous capabilities in areas where Washington is unable to operate bilaterally for political or logistical reasons

Asia-Press all 10 ASEAN countries to sign and ratify each of the 16 United Nations (UN) conventions dealing with CT Although political agree-

ment was reached at the Jakarta Sub-Regional Ministerial Meeting in March 2007 on the need to strengthen legal CT tools, the fact remains that many Southeast Asian countries have yet to enact a broad range of conventions and protocols relating to terrorism

Emphasize the use of soft power to enhance local governance in regions susceptible to fundamentalist propaganda (through INCLE); foster greater military and police awareness of human rights and appropriate rules of engagement (through U.S Department of Defense–sponsored Interna- tional Military Education Training program, or IMET, courses); and promote general socioeconomic development (through the U.S Agency

for International Development [USAID] and DoS Economic Support Fund, or ESF) To ensure that these types of endeavors have a long-term, sustainable impact, it is critical that they be carried out in close cooperation with national and local authorities and are executed with due regard for community consultation in civic action planning.

Supplement the use of soft power with “smart” power This can

be achieved by (1) spearheading public diplomacy, exchange, and educational efforts to discredit perverted interpretations of Islam; (2) empowering moderate Muslim leaders as voices for greater reli-gious negotiation; (3) investigating possible alternatives for reducing the pull of pan-regional sentiment from the inside out, by ascertain-ing the extent to which emergent fissures between JI’s mainstream and the pro-bombing faction can be exploited; and (4) promoting prison reform to reduce the potential for jails to be exploited as recruiting

or radicalization hubs These dialogue and communication initiatives should focus not only on Southeast Asian states with established mili-tant Islamic entities but also on countries that could foster or other-wise encourage hardline Islamist sentiment Notable in this regard is Malaysia, where a more radical, “enabling” environment could emerge

if divisions within the Malay community widen as a result of domestic political instability

Give greater attention to identifying and supporting conventional and nonconventional broadcasting and message-delivery systems that can

be effectively utilized in a multilayered communication strategy aimed

at countering the proselytizing activities of extremist groups Properly

employed, these conduits could be highly effective in prosecuting the

“struggle of ideas”—not least by targeting and influencing those tors that are most able to bolster the middle ground of political com-promise and, through this, foster an environment that is hostile (or at least nonreceptive) to the appeal of violent Islam

The authors would like to express their gratitude to those interviewed for this project, the names of whom have been deliberately withheld due to the sensitive nature of the topic at hand In addition, a special expression of thanks is owed to Paul Smith of the Naval War College

in Newport, Rhode Island, and to RAND colleague Kim Cragin for their insightful reviews of the document Additional acknowledgments are owed to Lauren Skrabala for editing the manuscript and to James Dobbins and Alan Dupont for their feedback on earlier versions of this monograph Needless to say, all errors and oversights are the sole responsibility of the authors

dan Berkeyakinan

CMO civil-military operation

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training

Assistance Program

Enforcement program

program

Mujahidin

NDF National Democratic Front

Al-IslamiyyahRKK runda kumpulan kecil [dedicated military wing]

Centre

Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Counter-Terrorism

TECD Terrorism Eradication Coordinating Desk

Terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia Indeed, for much of the Cold War, the activities of a variety of domestic ethnonationalist and religious militant groups posed what was arguably one of the most significant challenges to the internal stability of several countries across the region These violent organizations arose in reaction to the unwillingness of many Southeast Asian governments to acknowledge or recognize the right of minority self-determination Such reticence essentially owed itself to an implicit fear that acceding to even limited ethnonationalist demands would result in an unstoppable secessionist tide, challeng-ing the very basis of statehood that underscored Southeast Asian post- colonial identity (Acharya, 1993, p 19; see also Christie, 1996; Jeshurun, 1985; Joo-Jock and Vani, 1984; D Brown, 1994; Findlay, 1996; and Nathan, 1997)

Since the 1990s, however, the residual challenge posed by substate militant extremism has risen, in reaction to both the force of modern-ization pursued so vigorously by many Southeast Asian governments and the political influence of Islam—which has, itself, been further amplified by the contemporary force of South Asian (and, more spe-cifically, Afghan) radicalism (Christie, 1996, pp 207–208; D Brown, 1994; von der Mehden, 1996; Reilly, 2002; Tan, 2004; and Kurlantz-ick, 2001)

In the southern Philippines, an ongoing Moro insurgency tinues to disrupt stability, investment, and local development, and, in stark contrast to the character of its original inception, now has an explicitly religious bent Three groups remain at the forefront of mili-

con-tant action in this part of the country: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) Complicating matters in the country is an entrenched communist-terrorist insurgency that is seeking the establishment of a Maoist state through protracted people’s war and that continues to ben-efit from popular disillusionment borne out of government corruption and extreme socioeconomic inequities The New People’s Army (NPA) stands at the forefront of this challenge and, though weakened, con-tinues to demonstrate an ability to disrupt and operate on a national basis.

In southern Thailand, violence associated with Malay Muslim aratism has been a recurrent problem since the late 1960s The overall scale of unrest, however, has risen dramatically since 2004 to the extent that the so-called “deep south” is now in the throes of what amounts

sep-to a full-scale ethnoreligious insurgency Although it lacks clear nizational coherence and strategic direction, the present generation of militants operating in southern Thailand have taken their struggle to

orga-a level of violence orga-and brutorga-ality not previously witnessed orga-and, over the past four years, have been instrumental in carrying out repeated attacks against local administrators, politicians, police, Buddhist temples, and schools Moreover, the current manifestation of Malay Muslim mili-tant extremism has been marked by an explicit jihadist undertone that

is seriously threatening to unravel the fabric of communal relations in this part of the country

In Indonesia, Islamic extremism has emerged as an increasingly salient threat since the demise of the Soeharto regime in 1998 In par-ticular, a dramatic reawakening of atavistic Muslim identity has com-bined with a more fluid domestic environment to dangerously exacer-bate and radicalize popular sentiment across the archipelago This has,

in turn, helped foster the formation of a newer generation of jihadist movements variously dedicated to the establishment of a fundamental-ist order in Indonesia and/or a wider caliphate in Southeast Asia.Intelligence and government sources in Washington have viewed these developments with considerable consternation, expressing fears that Southeast Asia is now a major springboard for local and wider acts of international terrorism that has direct relevance for Western

security, political, and economic interests Indeed, various tions of politically motivated extremism sourced out of the region are presently counted as—if not the number-one security challenge and research priority in the United States—a principal focus of concern.Problematically, to date, however, most of the attention paid to terrorism in Southeast Asia has tended to emphasize response contin-gencies and crisis management at the expense of systematic risk vul-nerability assessments As a result, policy has often been shaped by preconceived and, in many cases, unsubstantiated threat scenarios Absent has been the type of comprehensive, empirically grounded analysis that is critical to prioritizing and marshaling resources across intelligence, informational, law enforcement, first responder, and com-munity jurisdictions.

manifesta-Accordingly, this monograph aims to provide a holistic tion of the overall terrorist environment in Southeast Asia by consider-ing the issue from the “red” (adversary), “blue” (partner-nation), and

depic-“green” (partner-nation populace) perspectives The study had three main objectives:

first, to provide an informed appreciation of the motivations,

•

aims, modus operandi, and effectiveness of regional terrorist groups, the methods by which they entrench themselves in local civilian populations, and the extent to which they interact across national boundaries

second, to weigh the effectiveness of partner-nation efforts in

•

Southeast Asia to (1) address underlying political, military, social, economic, and infrastructure conditions that foster extremist vio-lence; (2) mitigate the traction or pull of militant ideology and propaganda; and (3) disrupt terrorist network effects

third, to audit the relevance and appropriateness of existing U.S

pines, southern Thailand, and Indonesia and the regional challenge posed by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Chapters Six through Eight discuss the principal elements of Philippine, Thai, and Indonesian national security and counterterrorism (CT) strategies analyzing their effective-ness in ameliorating the contemporary terrorist challenge to regional states Chapters Nine and Ten describe the main parameters of exist-ing U.S security assistance to Southeast Asia and assess how future programs can be structured to ensure the best possible CT outcomes Finally, the monograph includes a dedicated appendix that examines emergent or potential operational and logistical hubs in Cambodia

Militant Context

Background to the Southern Thai Conflict

Islamic fundamentalist violence in Thailand centers on the ist activities of the Malay Muslim population in the country’s south-ern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.1 Historically part of the former Kingdom of Patani,2 three main pillars have traditionally underscored Malay separatist identity in this region: (1) a belief in the virtues and “greatness” of the Kingdom of Patani (Patani Darulsalam); (2) an identification with the Malay race; and (3) a religious orientation based on Islam These base ingredients are woven together in the tri-

separat-partite doctrine of hirja (flight), imam (faith), and jihad (holy war),

which collectively asserts that all Muslim communities have both a right and duty to withdraw from and resist any form of persecution

1 The population of these three provinces is roughly 1.8 million, of which approximately

79 percent are Muslim Satun, which is also a majority Muslim province in the south, has largely been spared the violence that has afflicted the aforementioned three regions This probably reflects the nature of ethnoreligious identity in the province, which has histori- cally been more accepting of assimilation with Thailand, given that it was never part of the historic Patani Darul Kingdom (author interviews, Pattani, September 2006, and Bangkok, September 2007).

2 This is the Malay spelling of the province The name refers to the Sultanate of Patani and

is used by ethnic Malay Muslim groups to express their aspiration for full independence from

the Thai state Pattani, which is used throughout this chapter, is the official transliteration

employed by the central government in Bangkok.

that is serving to place their survival in jeopardy (see Bailey and Miksic,

1989, p 151, and Christie, 1996, p 133)

The roots of indigenous Malay Muslim dissatisfaction and ceived discrimination trace back to the establishment of the modern Thai/Siamese state by the Chakkri Dynasty in the 18th century, when

per-a vigorous per-attempt wper-as mper-ade to extend centrper-al control over Pper-atper-ani Although the local population was initially able to resist external pen-etration, the entire kingdom had been brought under effective Siamese rule by the late 1700s During the 19th century, increasingly uniform, centralized bureaucratic structures were introduced throughout the region to forestall the steady expansion of British colonial influence throughout the Malay peninsula.3 As part of this process, chieftains in the Patani rajadoms were absorbed into the salaried administration—effectively becoming Siamese civil servants In addition, a conscious effort was made to reduce the range of issues that Islamic law could independently deal with by extending the jurisdiction and ambit of the Siamese legal system (Liefer, 1996, p 35).4

The pace of assimilation gathered momentum during the 1930s, when several key modifications were introduced The country’s name

structure, which had at least allowed some autonomous Malay cal representation, was replaced by a simpler, more Bangkok-oriented system In addition, three provincial units were carved from the origi-nal Patani region—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—all of which were placed under the direct control of the ministry of the interior A mod-ernization program was also initiated to eliminate “backward” Islamic customs and dialects and to enforce uniformity in language and social behavior As part of this latter endeavor, Western cultural and custom-ary habits were stressed and steps were taken to completely phase out

politi-3 Author interview, Pattani, September 2007.

4 For detailed discussions on the roots of Malay Muslim separatism in southern land, see Pitsuwan, 1985; Aphornsuvan, 2004; May, 1992, p 403; Tugby and Tugby, 1989,

Thai-pp 73–77: Alagappa, 1987, p 200; Mudmarn, 1994, p 24; Farouk, 1984, Thai-pp 235–236.

5 The word Thai is a social construct that literally means free but has since been adopted as

the symbolic basis of Thailand’s national identity

sharia law All of these moves were undertaken in accordance with the so-called “Thai way,” which has since defined three main pillars

for state identity: chat, sasana, and kasat (nation, religion—in effect,

It was within this context that Haji Sulong, chairman of the tani Provincial Islamic Council, created the Patani People’s Movement

Pat-to champion demands for regional auPat-tonomy, cultural rights, and the implementation of Islamic legal precepts.7 Arrested by the national-ist military government of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram in 1947, Sulong was allegedly killed by the authorities in 1952 His presumed murder instantly transformed him into a central symbol of ethnic Malay Muslim resistance, which, seven years later, gave rise to the first organized separatist group in the south, the Patani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani, or BNPP) (HRW, 2007,

pp 14–15; Rahimmula, 2005, pp 7–8)

During the intervening 50 years, a variety of militant entities have operated across Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani Initially zones of dis-sidence characterized by, if anything, only sullen submission to Bang-kok’s rule, the situation in the three provinces has since deteriorated

to the extent that the so-called “deep south” is now beset by what amounts to almost daily violence and internecine communal conflict

The Malay Muslim Militant Struggle

The Malay Muslim militant struggle can be divided into three broad phases: 1960–1998, 1998–2004, and 2004 to the present

1960–1998

Between 1960 and 1998, some 60 extremist separatist movements were estimated to have been in operation across the southern Thai provinces,

6 Author interviews, Bangkok and Pattani, September 2007; see also Ball, 2004, p 5;

Christie, 1996, pp 176–177; May, 1992, p 403; Haemindra, 1976, p 205; Thomas, 1982,

p 160; Pitsuwan, 1985, pp 37–44; and Wilson, 1989, pp 59–60.

7 In Bangkok, as long as one buys into and accepts the three pillars of Thai nation-building, one is considered part of that society This is problematic, as Malay Muslims will never sub- scribe to this concept The root of the conflict in the south is, thus, a direct clash of national identity.

many of which benefited from safe havens in the northern Malaysian state of Kelantan (allegedly with the blessing of the ruling Parti Islam se-Malaysia).8 Of these, four were at the forefront of the bulk of militant activity: the National Revolution Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasionale,

or BRN); the Patani United Liberation Organization, or PULO tubuhan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu); New PULO; and the Islamic Mujahidin Movement of Patani (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani, or GMIP) Although each was characterized by different ideological and operational outlooks, these groups were motivated by a common desire

(Ber-to carve out an independent Muslim state with Pattani as the center Violent action in pursuit of this objective typically fell into the classic pattern of low-intensity conflict, generally involving ambushes, kidnap-pings, assassinations, extortion, sabotage, and bomb attacks The main aim was to present the southern provinces as an area that remained beyond the sovereign control of Bangkok, to create a sense of insecurity among ethnic Thais living in the region, and to place additional pres-sure on the central government to accede to the political demands of Malay Muslim separatism.9

In August 1997, the leaders of BRN, PULO, New PULO, and GMIP agreed to form a tactical alliance in an attempt to refocus national and regional attention on the “southern question” (HRW,

2007, p 15) Operating under the banner of the United Front for the Independence of Patani (Barisan Kemerdekaan Patani, commonly known as Bersatu), the four groups carried out a coordinated series

of bombing, shooting, and incendiary attacks—code-named Falling Leaves10—that resulted in nine deaths, several dozen injuries, and con-siderable economic damage At the time, the jointly orchestrated strikes marked the most serious upsurge of Malay Muslim separatist activity

8 It should be noted that a number of these organizations operated in a gray zone of lence motivated by ethnic Malay Muslim consciousness on the one end to straight crime on the other As HRW notes, this nexus allowed separatist insurgents to recruit from criminal syndicates and vice versa (see HRW, 2007, p 15, fn 11).

vio-9 For further details on these groups, see Chalk, 2002; Indorf, 1984; Farouk, 1984; May, 1992; and ICG, 2005b.

10 This code name was reputedly chosen because the intent of the attacks was apparently to kill off symbols of the Thai state in the same manner that leaves fall from trees.

since the early 1980s (Chalk, 1998, p 122; “Chronology of Southern Violence,” 1998; ICG, 2005b, p 14).

Falling Leaves was certainly instrumental in heightening the overall visibility of the Muslim cause in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat However, the operation also dramatically increased regional pressure on Malaysia to step up cross-border cooperation, with Bangkok arguing that the attacks could not have been carried out without the benefit of a secure militant safe haven in Kelantan Kuala Lumpur duly responded, marking a major shift in the government’s hands-off approach to what it had traditionally referred to as a purely domestic Thai prob-lem The change in policy—which came with the specific approval of

New PULO, and GMIP of an important source of external sanctuary and resulted in the detention of several separatist leaders and midlevel commanders (“Separatists Arrested in Malaysia,” 1998; “Secrets of the South,” 1998; “Arrests in the South Boost Malaysian Ties, Security,” 1998; “Terrorist Suspects Arrested in South,” 1998) These setbacks triggered a major tactical reassessment on the part of the four groups’ mainstream membership, many of whom subsequently fled abroad

or took advantage of a government-sponsored amnesty program and surrendered directly to authorities (Noiwong, 2001; HRW, 2007,

pp 15–16; “Net Closing in on Rebels in Malaysia,” 1998; “Malaysians Hand Over Separatists,” 1998; “KL Decides It Is Time to Help,” 1998)

11 Mathathir’s willingness to quickly crack down on PULO and New PULO activists in Kelantan almost certainly reflected his awareness of the need to maintain cordial relations with Bangkok to protect the much touted (and publicized) Malaysia-Indonesia-Thailand Growth Triangle Indeed, the arrests came on the heels of earlier visits by the Thai interior minister, foreign minister, deputy foreign minister, and chief of police—all of whom specifi- cally warned that, unless Kuala Lumpur stepped up efforts to control violence in the south, closer cross-border economic cooperation (which was and continues to be critical to the success of the growth triangle) would be curtailed (see “Border Breakthrough,” 1998; “PM: Peace in South Vital to Growth Triangle,” 1998; “Is It So Hard to Be a Good Neighbor?” 1998; “Malaysia’s Policy Shift to Benefit South,” 1998; and “Surin Set to Seek Malaysian Help in Curbing Terrorists,” 1998).

The resultant internal hemorrhaging was decisive and had, by 2000, essentially crippled the separatist movement in southern Thailand.12

1998–2004

The scale of unrest in the southern provinces dropped markedly in the late 1990s Certainly, the effective demise of BRN, PULO, New PULO, and GMIP was highly relevant in this regard Just as impor-tantly, however, were signs (albeit short-lived, as discussed later) that the Thai government was beginning to show somewhat more sensitiv-ity to the lack of economic and administrative development in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Not only did Bangkok pledge to promote the region’s natural resources and invest greater sums in occupational training for local Malays, moves were also made to enhance police, military, and political understanding of the unique Malay Muslim way

of life (see, e.g., Islam, 1998, p 452) Much of this latter endeavor was directed through the Southern Borders Provinces Administra-tive Centre (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force (CPM) 43, both of which had first been established in 1981 to edu-cate bureaucrats and security officials in cultural awareness and the

local Pattani language (known by Thais as Jawi) as well as to formulate

broad-ranging policies for ameliorating the conflict (ICG, 2005b,

pp 34–35).13

The respite in violence proved to be only temporary, however, largely because the Thai government failed to capitalize on the mili-tants’ disarray by quickly winning over the local population through the initiation of a genuine hearts-and-minds campaign Undertakings

to lift the overall economic and unemployment situation of the south were largely not carried through, nor were there any directed efforts to

12 According to Thai authorities, only 70 to 80 separatist militants remained active in the southern border provinces by 2000, with 1,000 having taken advantage of the government- sponsored rehabilitation program and another 200 living abroad in exile (statement by the Thai Senate armed services committee during a parliament radio broadcast on March 14, 2006).

13 The SBPAC was attached to the interior ministry, while the CPM 43 was placed under the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) of the prime minister’s office (HRW, 2007,

p 16).

increase Malay Muslim participation in regional business and istration.14 Equally, on assuming power in 2001, the newly elected gov-ernment of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra dismantled both the SBPAC and CPM 43—two multiagency mechanisms that had dem-onstrated at least partial success in engendering a sense of ownership among local populations to their problems and solutions.15 In addition,

admin-he transferred responsibility for tadmin-he security of tadmin-he soutadmin-hern border region from the Royal Thai Army (RTA) to the police, which resulted

in the politicization of security policy and the weakening of overall intelligence-gathering capabilities on the ground.16

The first signs of a return to violence surfaced at the end of 2001, when a series of well-coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat left five officers and one village defense vol-unteer dead The level of unrest gathered pace during the next two years—rising from 75 incidents in 2002 to 119 in 2003—dramatically escalating in the first few months of 2004 with a series of highly auda-cious operations (ICG, 2005b, p 16; A Davis, 2004b) January saw one of the most brazen robberies ever to have taken place in the south,

in which a group of roughly 100 unidentified Muslims raided a Thai army camp in Narathiwat and made off with more than 300 weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades Two equally bold operations quickly followed suit The first occurred

on March 30 and involved masked gunmen who descended on a quarry

in the Muang district of Yala and successfully stole 1.6 metric tons of

14 In 2002, for instance, Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani still “enjoyed” a per capita income that was roughly 7,000 baht less than that of neighboring provinces In addition, some 80 percent of the region’s civil-service administration was non-Malay (a ratio that largely exists

to this day) (author interviews, Pattani, September 2006).

15 Thaksin’s decision to dismantle the SBPAC and CPM 43 reportedly reflected his concern that the two bodies were staffed by officials whose loyalties flowed primarily to the opposi- tion Democrats rather than to him and his government In addition, it was predicated on the assumption that the collapse of BRN, PULO, New PULO, and GMIP had dealt a death blow to insurgent activities in the south (HRW, 2007, p 29; A Davis, 2004a, p 24; ICG, 2005b, pp 33–34; “Cabinet to Dissolve Two Security Agencies,” 2002).

16 Author interviews, Pattani, September 2006 See also ICG, 2005b, pp 34–35, and HRW,

2007, p 29.

ammonium nitrate, 56 sticks of dynamite, and 176 detonators The second, known as the Krue Se Mosque siege, took place on April 28, when machete-wielding militants attempted to overrun a string of police positions and military armories in Pattani Ultimately, 108 attackers were killed in the incident, 31 of them shot after seeking refuge in the central Krue Se Mosque (one of Islam’s holiest sites in Southeast Asia).17

The events in early 2004 heralded the onset of the most recent and bloody stage of the Malay Muslim struggle

2004–Present

As highlighted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, over the 52 months from ary 2004 to the end of April 2008, a total of 8,064 violent incidents were recorded in southern Thailand; these incidents left 3,002 dead (including 1,264 Buddhists and 1,624 Muslims) and another 4,871 injured (including 2,908 Buddhists and 1,484 Muslims).18 While civil-ians have been the hardest hit—accounting for more than 70 percent of all fatalities during the period—both the police and military have also suffered significant losses, with casualty counts at the end of August

Janu-2007 of 711 and 689, respectively.19 For a population that numbers only 1.8 million, these figures represent a considerable toll

17 Author interviews, Pattani, September 2006, and Bangkok, September 2007; see also ICG, 2005b, pp 17–23; HRW, 2007, p 36; and A Davis, 2005b, p 27 According to one Western official, the decision to attack the mosque was in direct reaction to the point-blank killing of a Buddhist intermediary who had been dispatched by the army to negotiate with the insurgents

18 It should be noted that, during the first half of 2008, the overall number of attacks had dropped compared to statistics for 2007, possibly reflecting more concerted security sweeps initiated by the Thai military (see Chapter Six) However, at the time of this writing, figures for bombings and shootings had once again spiked; moreover, casualty rates per incident remained consistent between January and July 2008, suggesting that individual strike rates were becoming more lethal (author interviews, Bangkok, July 2008).

19 Statistics provided to the authors in May 2008 by Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, tani Songkla University The database maintained by Professor Srisompob is generally rec- ognized as the most comprehensive and accurate information source on violence in southern Thailand.