Research Aim
To contribute to research on intelligence in the Global South, by analysing the roles of intelligence agencies in the DRC between 2003 and 2011
Research Objectives
1. To review academic studies on intelligence services;
2. To analyse the political context of intelligence operations in the DRC during and after the Cold-War;
3. To explain and analyse the strategic and operational tasking of intelligence agencies in the DRC;
4. To suggest ways in which the Congolese state might improve its governance of intelligence;
5. To shed further light on these agencies by comparing and contrasting with agencies in South Africa;
6. To respond to research gaps on intelligence in the Global South in general;
Research Questions
This research is structured around five research questions:
1. In contemporary academic literature, what are established theories about the roles and definitions of intelligence in democratic states?
2. What has been the DRC experience of intelligence reform between 2003 and 2011?
3. Are there any similarities or differences between intelligence reform in DRC and South Africa?
4. What are the formal and informal mechanisms of democratic governance for intelligence? Do they work? Are there any
lessons that can be learnt by the DRC from long established democracies or from recently reformed countries where mechanisms of democratic governance have worked well?
5. What sort of strategic tasks and operational practices of intelligence might be reformed in the DRC?
Some intelligence reform advocates have argued that Western models of intelligence oversight and accountability can be successful in every state depending on the political will of the government. I have found little evidence to support this argument and I therefore adopted the following hypothesis in order to focus my research:
Western models of intelligence oversight and accountability cannot be successfully applied in a country such as the DRC which has no developed traditions of democratic governance - mechanisms that take into account the country’s political context and that are developed by or in agreement with the Congolese political class are more suitable.
In order to focus my research I described the context in which intelligence reform took place in DRC and I identified and analysed mechanisms of democratic control of intelligence that are used there. I also assessed the extent to which such mechanisms contribute in making intelligence agencies of the DRC more democratic.
The arguments proposed in this thesis are based on the following assumptions:
a. The intelligence sector of the DRC has been reformed with some success;
b. Established control and oversight mechanisms are making Congolese intelligence agencies more efficient and effective – progress has been made on the compliance by intelligence services with the law;
c. Change in political culture is leading slowly but surely to change in intelligence culture.
By addressing the research questions, the thesis tests the assumptions and illustrates challenges of designing and implementing instruments for democratic control of intelligence service in a post-dictatorial country. It will also verify the limitations of Western model of democratic control of intelligence services which seek to end or prevent the undemocratic governance of the intelligence sector in new democracies without taking into account the political environment in which intelligence organisations operate and the existing intelligence culture which are largely overlooked by the studies on security sector reform. Hence, this research envisages its contribution to knowledge through three broad areas as set out below.
Firstly, this research will offer empirical analysis and data on intelligence reform and governance in the DRC. In so doing, it will fill the gap in the existing literature by providing insights into intelligence services in developing democracies and will demonstrate the complexities of intelligence reform and the effect of the political context on the outcomes of such reform.
Secondly, the findings of this research will help crystallise the view about the limitations of Western-based conceptualisation of intelligence as an earlier paper (Aldrich & Kasuku 2012) on the analysis of the role of intelligence services in the global South has uncovered the need for a more global concept of intelligence which is critically lacking in most studies available to date despite the fact that most states in the global South have a substantial tradition of intelligence and internal security organisations, or else clandestine activity.
By examining cases of amendments of laws pertaining to the security sector relevant to good governance of intelligence in the DRC, I will seek to elucidate a critical theoretical contradiction associated with the application of the Constitution to overcome the core dilemma of
balancing effectiveness and democratic governance of intelligence services. I will also address one of the key problems in situations marked by long history of undemocratic rule – how to make parliament, the judiciary and civil society fully involved in the oversight of intelligence services, which is a necessary step within participatory governance processes.
In short, I will provide insights into policies on intelligence reform agenda that are highly relevant for policymakers, intelligence agencies, academics, and the public, especially at a time when demand for transparent and accountable intelligence services is ever increasing.
The thesis will therefore highlight the need to consider the context of transition from authoritarianism to democracy as one of the key factors in the assessment of intelligence reform processes in developing democracies which needs not to be evaluated based only on conformity to democratic norms as understood by the West. My third contribution to knowledge will therefore be to start the formulation of a theoretical framework for analysing intelligence reforms in the context of transitions from authoritarian regimes, and in so doing open a debate on the creation of such a framework.