This chapter reviewed the literature on six areas that are relevant to the research subject, namely definition of intelligence, theory of intelligence, role and mission of intelligence services, security sector reform and democratic control of intelligence services. This review has demonstrated that much of the existing literature on intelligence is Anglo-American - there is very little on the intelligence services in the global South and only few comparisons are made in the literature between different African states. The choice of the objectives of this research (set in the introduction) has been made to fill this gap through the provision of in-depth analysis in the following chapters of this thesis.
The end of the Cold-War marked the beginning of a new period in during which new security challenges occurred and threatened the security of many states. Intelligence services in many states appeared not to be adapted to the new security environment which is characterised by terrorism and international organised crime. Several research were conducted to find out if intelligence were still able to contribute to understanding foreign entities, making good policy decisions, achieving military victory, or accomplishing other desirable outcomes.
Amongst various approaches to the adaptation of intelligence services to the new security environment, a common understanding of the roles of intelligence agencies in a state has been highly influential in the development of intelligence theories that can make intelligence more
precise if related immediately to the needs of intelligence producers and customers. The lack of one common definition of intelligence has been attributed to the fact that intelligence means different things to different people. But emphasis has been put on the difference between intelligence that is supplied to politicians or national policymakers and intelligence that is supplied to all other manners of decision-makers.
The outcome of research on the adaptation of defence and security organisations in the globalised world acknowledges the multidimensional role of intelligence services in the protection of democracy against attempts by foreign states and non-states entities to destroy or subvert them. While the politicisation of intelligence is considered to be the key driver of intelligence failure or surprised attacks, the need to clarify the type of relationship that should exist between intelligence analysts and policy-makers has to be taken seriously and important reforms have to be undertaken to increase the effectiveness of intelligence services.
The democratic control of intelligence services, which aims to prevent political abuse by upholding the rule of law and ensuring the proportionate use of exceptional powers in order to protect civilians, consists of formal and informal mechanisms of oversight. These mechanisms have not been successful in every state apart from those that have long history of democratic governance. Nonetheless, the crucial shortcoming of democratic governance framework for intelligence services appears to be the need for secrecy in the conduct of intelligence affairs which is the opposite of transparency, an important democratic norm that has be to be upheld by all state institutions. Given the importance of secrecy but whose increase makes it harder to ascertain and assess the features and performance of the services, there is empirical evidence that the subjection of intelligence services to the same democratic principles as all other government institutions can fill
the gap between the need for democracy and the need for security which comes from effective and efficient intelligence services.
This literature review has demonstrated that the security intelligence literature draws on the analysis of socio-legal studies which examined whether the subjection of intelligence services to the rule of law can positively affect their performance and at the same time make them socially acceptable. As the literature accumulated analytical evidence to demonstrate the advantages of putting all government institutions under the Constitution, it has expanded to look into the correlation between the democratic control of intelligence services, their efficiency and effectiveness.
This emergent field of knowledge is based on the evaluation of two broad variables – secrecy and transparency. The secrecy hypothesis asserts that all intelligence business has to be conducted in secrecy for it to be fit for purpose, especially with regard to counterterrorism and other operations that are very important for the protection of national security and require some degree of secrecy. However, the secret nature of intelligence has always caused concern to the public as many undemocratic or illegal acts may be committed by intelligence services under the cover of the needed secrecy if they are not subjected to public accountability and respect for the rule of law. Transparency is therefore widely accepted by political, legal and ethical studies as being an antidote to dangerous uncontrolled behaviours of state most secretive institutions.
While many of the existing studies consider the democratic oversight of intelligence services as important measure for preventing the abuse of power by intelligence agencies and for increasing the success rate of intelligence operations, the transparency hypothesis is criticised by some intelligence practitioners for being too political and unrealistic for it does not fully appreciate the existing difficulties and challenges in the world of intelligence.
Political, legal, and ethical studies do, however, recognise the need for intelligence services to operate in secrecy. They also recognise that there are moments when the requirements for intelligence services to uphold transparency may become incompatible with the tasks given to them by the government. These studies emphasise the need for governments, which must act on behalf of the people, and intelligence services, whose activities must be implemented only for the best interest of the state, to find a proper balance between the need for secrecy and the need for transparency.
The policy responses to abuse and failure associated with the work of intelligence services have, therefore, become increasingly global, and are often manifested in a framework for democratic governance of intelligence, control and oversight mechanisms which aim to overcome the shortcomings of unaccountable intelligence sector and the problem of compliance and efficiency in intelligence gathering and analysis in every state. This framework also reflects the concerns of the three arms of government - executive, legislative and judiciary-, civil society and regional and international partners.
Africa and Kwadjo (2009) claim that before 1990 the way intelligence services were governed in most African states raises urgent concerns for the safety and security of the public, and poses a real threat to democratisation efforts that are underway on the continent. It is crucial to address the issues of the reform of intelligence sector, especially because democracy calls for the proper use of government power to prevent the violation of civil liberty and the re-emergence of tyranny in Africa. There is, therefore, a great expectation for intelligence reforms to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence organisations through increased transparency and accountability, thereby preventing the abuse of power and intelligence failure. This research is crucial in examining the usefulness of democratic control of intelligence agencies in the case of the DRC where intelligence services are usually
used not for knowledge but as a source of action against the political opposition.
3
METHODOLOGY
“The employment of methods […] requires that the world be of one kind rather than another. Method is not a thing for all worlds. It presupposes a certain answer to a type of question.
What must the world be like for the Methodist’s knowledge to be possible?
Wolin (1993:28-9)