Almost everyone now accepts that simply giving information to people about the consequences of their actions has little eff ect on their behaviour
Lever for change
authoritave direcon personal educaon
homo economicus financial subsidy and informaon
(raonal acon) taxaon
Homo sociologicus prohibion conversion
(normave acon)
Mode of individual acon
Fig. 9.1 Four commonly employed strategies for changing behaviour
(e.g. Barr and Prillwitz 2014 ; Darnton et al. 2011 ). 2 In many areas of consumption—eating, exercise, use of energy and water, etc.—people know about the recommendations of science, government and cultural intermediaries for good behaviour but nevertheless fail to comply. It would suit governments, experts, academics and campaigning move- ments well if this were not the case because information can spread swiftly, pervasively and cheaply. For governments it is especially appeal- ing because it conveniently transfers responsibility to individual citizens.
For other agents, it provides easy access to potential supporters. However, most policy analysis fi nds it ineff ective.
One set of reasons, now widely acknowledged, concerns the ways in which individuals access information. One reason why information does not cut mustard is the existence of many competing and inconsistent messages, and also a lack of trust in the source of the messages and verac- ity of their content; diff erent actors place diff erent information in front of the public. Currently the enhanced techniques of social marketing, which aim to direct and target information more precisely, are fi nding favour. However, although more economical to circulate because more focused, they are unlikely to be signifi cantly more eff ective given the nature of the reception of the impersonal messages of mass communica- tion. Propaganda messages in plural media contexts are little diff erent in principle from advertising, which, it seems to me, (1) works part of the time, although even the professionals cannot predict which part, and (2) serves to exonerate the economic system more than it dictates purchases of particular items (Schudson 1993 ). Wider media communication about goods and services surely fosters some emulation and thereby promotes general demand for categories of product (Schor 1998 ). Certain catego- ries of possessions have become defi ned as a necessary part of a decent and modern way of life. 3 Th e almost universal diff usion in the West of automobiles, televisions, mobile phones and a range of white goods for the kitchen are evidence of collective defi nition of normal domestic standards of living. Importantly, such goods come in many qualities and
2 Th e exceptions are probably those organisations whose existence depends upon dissemination of information!
3 Note that the diff usion varies by country (Nolan 2015 ).
at many prices, such that those with modest incomes want them and acquire them, because practical performance is improved. Th en, because infrastructures change to accommodate their innovation, they become indispensable. In addition, their enforced absence as a result of poverty or ignorance may taint a person’s reputation and even damage the sense of self. Imagine, for example, the poor teenager who had to write letters rather than use messaging apps; not only are letters slow and considered unfashionable but also, as a consequence of reduced usage, the infra- structure of postal services and deliveries has become less eff ective, more expensive and less frequent than previously.
Another reason why information is an ineff ective spur to better behav- iour is that individuals do not engage much in rational deliberation and refl ection. So, even when in possession of perfect information, people may not draw the intended or appropriate conclusions about ensuing action.
Th is is a core observation of behavioural economics, and underpins Th aler and Sunstein’s position. Behavioural economics is having a signifi cant impact on academic and policy discussion about behaviour change. It draws on cognitive science and makes much explanatory use of the propo- sition that the brain has two systems generating behaviour, one ‘automatic’, which is uncontrolled, eff ortless, associative, fast, unconscious and skilled, the other ‘refl ective’—controlled, eff ortful, deductive, slow, self-aware and rule-following. Th e fi rst is employed far more often. If a great deal of our behaviour is governed by mental processes that are automatic, intuitive and emotion-driven, then we are certainly not rational, calculating, self-aware and independently minded in the manner attributed to the sovereign con- sumer. Behavioural economics devotes much attention to describing how this results in systematic deviation from rational economic behaviour. A fairly comprehensive inventory of the eff ects of system 1 processes is com- piled in Kahneman ( 2011 ) and includes the ignoring of absent evidence, neglect of ambiguity, suppression of doubt, inference to and invention of causes and intention, bias towards believing and confi rming, and represen- tation of sets by norms and prototypes. Th aler and Sunstein ( 2009 ), with a view to intervention, emphasise biased judgements, diffi culties in resisting temptation and a strong tendency to social conformity. If most decisions are not rational, planning in the expectation that people will act rationally is a suboptimal and unpromising avenue for altering behaviour.
Th is argument is fundamentally challenging because it degrades the role of personal education; giving people information they will not use is practically pointless if they rarely deliberate in the course of action.
Consequently, it might seem that people must instead be constrained, by legal prohibition, imperative regulation or forceful social pressure, to eliminate undesirable activity. However, Th aler and Sunstein consider this virtually impossible because of the strength of resistance to politi- cal administration and direction of personal conduct. Although maybe the USA is exceptional in the degree of ineff ectiveness of public policy, they have a point; the solution to problematic levels of household waste is hardly likely to be found by passing legislation about the use of the domestic garbage bin. Hence, they coin the term ‘libertarian paternal- ism’, which connotes a ‘third way’ between laissez faire and imperative regulation. Th e underlying principle is that you can always do otherwise, you are not compelled to act in any specifi c manner, but if you aren’t thinking much, you will do what is best for you and everyone else.
Libertarian paternalism presupposes that democratically elected gov- ernments can no longer issue binding directives to citizens or businesses across a wide swathe of issues; for example, measures to restrict waste, cap the use of carbon fuels, set limits to the sugar, fat and salt content of foodstuff s, strictly control alcohol and tobacco use and so forth are deemed politically unenforceable. Th is presumption reeks of political despair, a renunciation of vision of progress and improvement in social life through the channels of deliberative democratic processes. It may apply to an unruly USA more than Europe, for the power of law is not to be disregarded. Illegal activities in Western societies are infrequent, and then mostly the domain of small deviant communities which operate in seclusion or privacy. Nevertheless, the cost of policing usually ren- ders prohibition on personal consumption of individuals or households impracticable. Except when there is a shared public consensus about misdemeanours of consumption, such that ordinary people and people’s friends will report them to the authorities (alcohol in the Middle East, drink-driving in the UK), it is enormously diffi cult to police new regula- tions regarding personal behaviour. Th e fate of policies to prohibit alco- hol sales in the USA in the interwar period was a case in point. One problem is that prohibition encourages illegal trade; the ineff ectiveness
of states currently to restrict the circulation of drugs declared illicit is the obvious instance. Another is that it attracts accusations of paternal- ism. Pekka Sulkunen ( 2009 ) argued that, at the beginning of the twenty- fi rst century, states have lost the indisputable moral authority to interfere with lifestyle choices and, in addition, even were they to try to prescribe behaviour, they have no unchallenged ethical or political rules to follow.
Contemporary policy for public welfare cannot any longer fi nd author- ity because individualisation has tipped the balance against paternalistic discipline imposed in pursuit of a shared vision of the common good. 4 Hence, it follows that even if people did register information in prepa- ration for action, they would resent and resist the directives of political authorities.