Th e key question today is whether there is still a legitimate culture and, if so, what are its defi ning characteristics. One way to approach that question is to consider the longevity and the fate of the high culture system. For it is plausible to assume that there was, in Bourdieu’s France and in post-war Britain, a legitimate culture. A dominant, consecrated high culture, with roots in the eighteenth century, was reinforced by state institutions, which sponsored, supported, celebrated, diff used and subsi- dised particular cultural goods and activities. Th ere was some overlap of
10 Lamont ( 1992 ) is a fi ne example of how this can be done methodologically.
content between the school curriculum, state broadcasting, museums, art galleries, classical music concerts and the curricula of universities, which attributed particular aesthetic value to some products, genres and spec- tacles, and which left other popular cultural activities to look after them- selves. Parents with aspirations for the worldly success of their children made knowledge of these consecrated cultural genres, and if possible experience of performing or attending performances, an element of their socialisation strategy with a view to both educational success and social respectability. An ideology justifi ed consecration and superiority in terms of their being the best exemplars of world cultural heritage, serious, dif- fi cult or challenging, worthy of appreciation.
Th e evidence about what people claim to do, know or prefer—much of which has arisen from the cultural omnivore debate—suggests that command of high culture is of less value in the early twenty-fi rst cen- tury than it was fi fty years previously. 11 Nevertheless, the omnivore thesis maintains that high culture items remain part of the portfolio of many persons of high socio-economic status (and mostly only those with high socio-economic status), but now mixed with other types and genres of popular culture.
Th ere are eff ectively two versions of the omnivore thesis. Th e Petersonian omnivore is a person of high socio-economic status who has incorporated the dubious and previously demeaned products of mass cul- ture into her or his portfolio. Th e Bourdieusian omnivore is one who stubbornly insists on maintaining products previously identifi ed as high culture within a more mixed portfolio. Th e empirical evidence required to identify the omnivore may be identical in both cases, but the theoreti- cal signifi cance, imputed experience and normative implication are quite diff erent. For the Petersonian, the contemporary upper middle class are exhibiting an openness to the popular culture of the mass of the popu- lation; American scholars tend to see it this way and to commend it. 12
11 Support for this observation hangs heavily on the changing role of classical music in elite portfo- lios, not immediately unreasonable given Peterson and Kern’s ( 1996 ) initial operationalisation of the omnivore syndrome.
12 Peterson is not especially interested in social justice, and certainly not in the transmissibility of taste. He is examining the current distribution of tastes and acknowledges the association of taste with social prestige. But he is not politically critical of the consequences.
For the Bourdieusian, the upper middle class is exerting social closure around a set of marked practices which are diffi cult to acquire for other sections of the population. For the Bourdieusian, omnivores are ethically dubious characters; European sociologists detect subtle forms of the inju- ries caused by class. Two points might be made. Th e fi rst concerns Will Atkinson’s ( 2011 ) claim that Bourdieu is vindicated against an omni- vore interpretation, because it can be demonstrated that middle-class Bristolians have tastes for ‘high culture’ which their working-class coun- terparts do not. However, omnivorousness and distinction are not mutu- ally exclusive (Holbrook et al. 2002 ; Roose et al. 2012 ). It seems to me that a person may be omnivorous, in the sense of loving jazz and curry and horse racing, and by being disposed to openness (Ollivier 2008a , b ), while still disproportionately commanding valuable legitimate cultural competences which may be deployed profi tably in the stakes for distinc- tion. Th e case for the original Bourdieusian orthodox position required that classes with high volumes of cultural capital reject other, less ele- vated cultural forms. However, Warde ( 2011a ) fi nds scant evidence of such a marker of cultural hostility in the UK across several broad cultural domains, although comedy may be an exception (Friedman 2015 ).
Th e second point is that the cultural fi eld requires mechanisms which establish agreement and widespread recognition of items of superior value (whether legitimate or otherwise) which accord symbolic credit. Th at process typically still works through the apparatus of the nation-states. 13 Schooling does not only generate institutional cultural capital by award- ing certifi cates; the content of the cultural material worked upon when developing abilities and testing achievement is presented as valuable.
Th e more that education curriculum is common to all citizens (which I understand to be the case in France but not in the UK, for example), the greater the likelihood that there will be consensus on the value of cultural artefacts. States also sponsor culture in very diff erent degrees (Katz-Gerro 2011 ). Th e more the state intervenes in provision, the more likely it is that an environment will be created in which particular cultural forms are
13 Only at Baccalaureate, further, and higher education levels is the formal educational curriculum international.
ascribed exceptional value. 14 Lizardo and Skiles ( 2009 ) make a good case that variation in the national institutional structure of the TV industry is the key determinant of whether TV programmes are incorporated as part of the high-culture portion of portfolios in Europe. Th e market does not have the same authority, because it relies more on the plebiscitarian technique—do people buy it, is it popular? For the market is essentially populist with the rate of adoption of the goods made available providing the estimate of value.
One useful way to take the debate forward would be to analyse explic- itly the processes behind changes in the value of high cultural capital, inquiring into the conditions of existence of the previous cultural regime (the high culture system), which conferred legitimacy on a particular and narrow range of cultural items. Another step would be to examine con- temporary taste among elites.