An Agreement concluded between the Croatian Government and the Serb Authority105 requested the Security Council to establish an international admin- istration to govern the region during a transitional period of 12 months, and to authorise an international force to maintain peace and security during that period and otherwise to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. Th e Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium provided for the peaceful integration of that region into Croatia. Th e Security
101 Annex 11, Dayton Agreement.
102 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), UN Doc. S/1995/1031 (13 December 1995).
103 See on the achievements of UNMIBH: Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc. S/2002/1314 (2 December 2002).
104 See also on the relation between the experience in Bosnia and Kosovo and East Timor: Bothe and Marauhn, supra note 6, p. 224 and Chesterman, S., You the People – Th e United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 79.
105 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, UN Doc.
S/1995/951 (12 November 1995).
Council, by adopting Resolution 1023 (1995), ‘welcomed’ the agreement and
‘recognised’ the request made by the parties to establish a Transitional Adminis- tration.106 Th e ‘United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium’ (UNTAES) was set up on 15 January 1996 by Security Council Resolution 1037, with both military and civilian components, under the global authority and supervision of a Transitional Administrator. Th e civilian component was to establish a temporary police force, monitor the prison system, undertake tasks relating to civil administration and to the functioning of public services, facilitate the return of refugees and organise elections, assist in their conduct, and certify the results.107 Th e additional tasks of UNTAES included economic reconstruction and facilitating the demining of the terri- tory.108 In order to accomplish the mandate, the Transitional Administrator was granted, alongside important executive powers, some limited legislative pow- ers. As the Secretary-General’s December 1995 Report states: “if there are any areas in which Croatian law has been modifi ed or supplemented by legislation enacted by the local Serb authorities during the period since 1991 or by other law, it would be necessary to establish a programme and modalities for the earli- est possible restoration of the law of the Republic of Croatia. Th e transitional administrator might also need to have legislative power to enact regulations for carrying out the functions attributed to him by the agreement; the validity of such regulations would expire at the end of the transitional period, unless the Croatian authorities decided otherwise”.109
Despite the fact that the experience in Eastern Slavonia has been somehow neglected in the literature, it illustrates important aspects of the international administration paradigm. Th e EasterSlavonia administration is noteworthy because Resolution 1037 was adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As we will see in the next part, international administrations can be based on several provisions of the UN Charter, accord- ing to whether or not the parties involved in the confl ict consented to the establishment of the mission. Th e explicit mention of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is signifi cant, as the mission was also based on an agreement between the parties. However, as in Somalia, in this case, Chapter VII was seen as indis- pensable, not because there was no agreement between the parties, but because the Security Council had to authorise the use of force in order to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement and to make sure that UNTAES would
106 SC Res. 1023 UN Doc. S/RES/1023 (1995).
107 Ibid., Article 11 (a)–(f ).
108 Ibid., Article 12.
109 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1025 (1995), UN Doc. S/1995/1031 (13 December 1995), para. 17.
achieve its mandate.110 Th e experience in Eastern Slavonia equally was gener- ally described as successful, because it managed to reintegrate the territory into Croatia in a peaceful and smooth manner; this was, it should be remembered, its fi rst and foremost task.
110 According to the Secretary-General, “[i]n more hostile circumstances, operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can help to solve commitment and cooperation prob- lems by directly implementing agreements, or raising the costs of violating peace agreements.
In these cases the use of force to resist attempts by the parties to prevent the operations from fulfi lling their mandates should be – and typically is – authorized and resourced in support of or as a substitute for a comprehensive peace treaty, as in the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia or the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively” (Report of the Secretary-General, ‘No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations’, UN Doc. S/2001/394 (20 April 2001), para. 17).