PART III POSTCONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN PRACTICE
C. Security Sector Reform: Building National Law Enforcement and
4. Iraq: Demobilisation without Disarmament
Security Council Resolution 1483 required the occupying powers to take on the effective administration of Iraq, “including in particular, working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of condi- tions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future”.753 The subsequent resolution also called “upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of Iraqi police and security forces”, while authorising the deployment of a “multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”.754 The overall security situation in Iraq was disastrous and had not been anticipated.755 The deteriorating security situation culminated in August 2003 when 22 people, including 15 UN staff members and Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Melo, were killed in one of
749 International Crisis Group, ‘Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency no Quick Fixes’, Asia Report No. 123 (2 November 2006).
750 Annex I, Afghanistan Compact.
751 Annex I, Afghanistan Compact.
752 See ‘Unfinished business in Afghanistan’, International Herald Tribune (22 June 2008), p. 6.
753 SC Res. 1483, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), para. 4.
754 SC Res. 1511, UN Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003), paras. 13 and 16.
755 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2003/1149, supra note 163, para. 23.
the most tragic attacks on UN personnel in the organisation’s history, resulting in the complete withdrawal of almost all international personnel.
The UN mission was not mandated to take an active role in security issues.
Although the idea of deploying an international civilian police force under UN leadership had been briefly envisaged, the idea has been quickly abandoned.
The UN was asked only to “encourage international efforts to rebuild the capac- ity of the Iraqi civilian police”.756 In addition to the fact that under the laws of occupation maintaining law and order is the primary responsibility of the occupying forces, the Secretary-General feared that deploying an international police force would only lead to a parallel law enforcement system, detrimental to the re-establishment of security in Iraq.757 It was therefore decided that the UN would limit its role to ‘advising’ the CPA and the Governing Council on the training curricula.758 Unlike the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry had not been disbanded, and could therefore be relied upon with regard to policing issues. Although an Iraqi Police Service existed at the CPA’s arrival, it was ineffective and ill-equipped.759 In addition, ‘de-ba’athification’ left both the police service and the Ministry without senior officials.
Training commenced rapidly, and in January 2004 the first 500 newly trained police officers graduated.760 Training equally started for senior positions within the Police Force.761 Police reform has nevertheless been described as inadequate, as the priority was placed upon quick training courses to enable trainees to replace foreign troops in the maintenance of law and order.762
One major blunder was the CPA’s decision to disband the Iraqi army.763 Soon after its arrival, the CPA decided on the dissolution of a wide list of formal enti- ties, including the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other regular military services, the Republican Guard, the Special Republican
756 SC Res. 1483, UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), para. 8 (h).
757 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2003/715 (17 July 2003), supra note 160, para. 51.
758 Ibid., para. 52.
759 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley, supra note 716, p. 44.
760 CPA Press Release, ‘New Police Officers Join Ranks of Iraqis Protecting Iraq’ (30 January 2004).
761 CPA Press Release, ‘Thirty Iraqi Police Officers Graduate from Leadership Training Course’
(29 May 2004).
762 Domisiewicz, R., ‘Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq’, in Ebnửter, A. H. and Fluri, P. H., After Interventionism: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable local Ownership (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), p. 169.
763 See also Forman, J. M., ‘Striking out in Bagdad. How Postconflict Reconstruction went Awry’, in Fukuyama, supra note 543, p. 204. See also Kouchner, supra note 568, p. 437.
Guard, the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Emergency Forces.764 In complete disregard of experience gained in the other cases discussed, soldiers and Ministry employees were dismissed. This resulted in a complete security vacuum.
In addition, since, obviously, these soldiers were neither demilitarised nor rein- tegrated into Iraqi society, this had serious consequences for both the economic and social status of former soldiers and arms possession throughout the country.
Although some have argued that this decision was not as such unwise, as it could have facilitated the swift rehabilitation of the security sector,765 the absence of an alternative security force to maintain security throughout the country resulted in a catastrophic deterioration in the already fragile security situation. The dissolu- tion of the former Iraqi Army was not accompanied by a demilitarisation and reintegration programme, as the CPA opined that the defence institutions could not be transformed.766 The advantages of a DDR programme were nevertheless obvious. Not only would it have permitted the security situation to be stabilised, but many of the former soldiers could also have been immediately reintegrated into the new Iraqi Army. The remaining former soldiers could then have been helped by a reintegration programme.
However, soon after the decision, the CPA somehow realised the disastrous effect of its decision, and announced both the start of recruitment procedures for the ‘New Iraqi Army’ and that former Iraqi career soldiers would receive a monthly interim stipend.767 It immediately added that the responsibility for the creation of an entirely new Iraqi Defence Force would be left to the Iraqi Authorities. The Ministry of Defence had also been dissolved and needed to be rebuilt from scratch. Until the creation of a new ministry in March 2004, the CPA functioned as the de facto Ministry.768 Recruitment and training centres were opened soon after the decision to create the ‘New Iraqi Army’.769 Many of the countries participating in the Multinational Force engaged in the training of Iraqi Security Forces. As in Afghanistan, the newly trained battalions nevertheless had a high desertion rate, caused by low salaries and the lack of a clear mission upon completion of the training programme. In addition, the engagement of the military in counter-insurgency activities led to revolt within the New Iraqi
764 CPA Order Number 2, ‘Dissolution of Entities’, CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 (23 May 2003).
765 See Jabar, F. A., ‘Postconflict Iraq. A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy’, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 120 (May 2004).
766 Dobbins et al., supra note 550, p. 198.
767 CPA Press Release, ‘Good News for Iraqi Soldiers’ (23 June 2003).
768 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley, supra note 716, p. 27.
769 CPA Press Release, ‘First Steps towards Building the New Iraqi Army’ ( July 2003).
Army, which was not keen on fighting its fellow countrymen.770 In order to fill the immediate security gap, an Iraqi Civil Defence Corps – renamed Iraqi National Guard – was set up, but its rapid deployment implied that person- nel did not have time to complete their training.771 Training is still continuing for the New Iraqi Army, although, as with the training of the police force, its effectiveness has not been great, as the majority of the courses were shortened to meet the continuing security challenge throughout the country.772
The CPA equally decided to adopt a DDR programme in June 2004, a few weeks before the announced, but questionable, ‘end of occupation’.773 The Order provides for either the integration of former soldiers in the Iraqi Armed Forces, or the retirement or reintegration into Iraqi society of individuals who did not enter the Armed Forces, the latter being limited to militias participating in the political process as identified by the CPA or the ‘Transition and Reintegration Implementation Committee’. In August 2006, the Iraqi Government announced a National Reconciliation Plan, aimed at providing assistance to former members of dissolved entities.774 The International Compact with Iraq further reiterated the Government’s wish to implement the DDR programme contained in the National Reconciliation Plan.775
The lack of comprehensive planning seems to have been detrimental to the CPA’s approach in the security sector. Obviously, the US-led coalition was not prepared to undertake reconstruction efforts with regard to the security sector.
One of the key results of the lack of preparedness was the abovementioned deci- sion taken by the military commander to completely disband the Iraqi military forces. Equally, the coalition did not prepare to take over police activity, which had been left to the unprepared and short-staffed military.776 The impossibility of re-establishing law and order in Iraq is perhaps the biggest failure of the CPA and the Coalition military presence. The security vacuum created in the immedi- ate aftermath of the military intervention can for a large part be attributed to the failure by the intervening powers to prepare for the reconstruction process
770 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley, supra note 716, p. 6 and Dobbins et al., supra note 550, p. 198.
771 See Slocombe, W. B., ‘Iraq’s Special Challenge Security Sector Reform “Under Fire” ’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2005). Slocombe was the security sector advisor to the CPA in 2003.
772 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley, supra note 716, pp. 36 et s.
773 CPA Order No 91, ‘Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq’, CPA/ORD/02 June 2004/91 (6 June 2004).
774 Government of Iraq, ‘National Reconciliation Plan’ (25 August 2006).
775 Iraq Compact, section 3.2.3.
776 Dobbins, J., ‘Learning the Lessons from Iraq’, in Fukuyama, supra note 543, p. 222. See also O’Brien, J. C., ‘Lawyers, guns and money: Warlords and reconstruction after Iraq’, 11 University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 108 (2004–2005).
which would be needed afterwards. Similarly, the failure to integrate local officials within the newly created ministries from the start did not permit sufficient local capacity to be built.777 As the Ministry of Defence had been dissolved in June 2003, and a full transfer of authority to national Institutions had been planned for June 2004,778 the CPA and the Iraqis were left with little time to build a strong Ministry capable of guaranteeing effective control over the military.
The security situation remains the major concern in Iraq; in 2006, a total of 34,452 civilians were killed and 36,685 wounded.779 The International Compact with Iraq restated the need to create functioning, professional and well-trained Police and Defence Forces,780 although in the light of the worsening security situation it remains to be seen whether the Government, even with international assistance, will be able to succeed in this area.