The coupling vicious cycle
Disadvantaged and resource poor farmers in the Mekong Delta or anywhere else are the least benefited from model farmer based extension system. They are this way because of insufficient resource contribution and “knowledge stock” to ensure the success of the model, either for technical demonstration or research purposes. The well known classical developmentalist model of low saving, low investment, and low income decently illustrates the poverty vicious cycle of resource-poor farmers in the Mekong Delta. In the context of increasing knowledge diffusion for agricultural production more regulated by good quality, environmental change adaptation, and sustainability principles, poor resource farmers are once again “left out”. They are trapped in a twin economic and knowledge poverty vicious cycle (see Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5: Small-holder farmer’s coupling economic and knowledge poverty vicious cycle
Source: Own presentation
Crops are seen as the subsistence means for poor farmers; however, they cannot afford production inputs.
To start crops, they have to go into debt to buy agricultural materials from rural traders. They have to pay higher prices plus an extra interest payment once the crop is harvested:
Farmers have to pay 2-3% of the total amount for interest. For example, retailers sell one box of fertilizer costing 550.000VND to those who are able to make instant payments. However, for those who are in debt to retailers to get the box of fertilizer, they have to pay an extra amount of 10.000 VND (560.000VND for the product) and incur an interest of 3% of total price for each month (Interview 174, farmer, male, Thot Not, 18.10.2010).
Owners of agricultural material stores decide the prices of paid and unpaid products and farmers have no right to ask about product prices. This year, farmers sell rice at a good price. The rice price is higher, which makes prices of other products increase. Agricultural material stores also increase prices of agrochemical products. One bottle of pesticide originally costing 20.000VND is increased by 21.000VND. However, farmers resign themselves to buy it. (Interview 253, Farmer Association senior, male, Binh Thuy, 17.11.2010).
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In-debt farmers also become dependent on retailers in terms of cultivation and pest management technology application. In several cases where agrochemical traders cannot even provide them with the pesticide as timely and accurately as requested, farmers have to accept alternatives recommended by retailers which are usually new products with attractive promotions. However, those recommended products are found to be ineffective at disease control. Farmers have to use more pesticides for disease treatment. Overusing agrichemical products causes crop damages and increased costs for farmers:
Farmers want to buy a certain pesticide (co vit) but retailers introduce them to another pesticide that is newer and cheaper. Farmers unhesistantly agree with the retailer’s recommendation as they are unable to make the payment for pesticide. Retailers sell farmers new poor-quality products instead of the products requested by farmers to receive commission from wholesalers. Poor-quality products are ineffective and not resilient to diseases (Interview 221, senior official & extensionist, male, Thoi Lai, 2.11.2010).
Upon harvesting crops, farmers hastily sell rice regardless of its price due to their debt pressure. Normally, the price of rice sold after the completion of crop is low. Better-off farmers store rice, monitor the market fluctuation, and sell rice when its price is good. Thus, better-off farmers earn more profits while poor farmers are unable to escape from this vicious financial trap. (Interview 245, farmer, male, O Mon, 12.11.2010):
Rice has to be sold regardless of its price. Upon harvesting, farmers gain little profit, they pay off debts to retailers. The rest is very small and only enough for a half-year of living expenses. Thus, they are always in financial difficulty (Interview 161, farmer, male, Vinh Thanh, 13.10.2010).
I would call this kind of debt environmentally “bad debt” because it strengthens the farmer’s “crop- termed” mentality that crops have to be secured at all “prices”. New sustainable agriculture technologies clearly have no ground in which to develop in this cycle.
The vicious knowledge cycle presents an eloquent argument. The resource-poor farmer clearly has low accessibility to new knowledge and technology. On one hand, it is because of farmer’s poor resource availability. Further, many poor farmers cannot manage to interrupt their daily hired work to attend classes of which the results are equivocal. On the other hand, their participation is restricted in the model-based knowledge diffusion system. Their limited prior knowledge and participation in training courses lead to their low acquisition and application capacity of new knowledge and technology to enhance their productivity. As a result, they earn low income from crops. With low income, they can hardly make a good investment for the next crop.
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Double marginalisation: Model-based extension transfer in ethnic communities
Two cases of ethnic minority communities who live in marginal situations61 in Tra Vinh and An Giang are presented at two levels of analysis: intra-community and inter-community, respectively. I argue that the benefits of minority development and extension projects, in the name of the common good, are reaped by just a few powerful elites, either Kinh, ethnic minorities, or mixed groups. Poorly designed and monitored extension projects that ignore power relations and are biased in their beneficiary selection vigorously back up and strengthen the local-level structural power inequity. This pushes ethnic minorities to the second layer of marginalisation.
Case study: Rum Soc’s agricultural club: “It is our club, where is our voice?”
Rum Soc village in Cau Ke district of Tra Vinh province is demographically dominated by Khmer people, and is one of the province’s most disadvantaged villages. In May 2002, Rum Soc village’s agricultural extension club was established with the approval of the local authority. The club functions as an organised and recognised group of local farmers, with a mandate to receive, apply, and further diffuse new technology and knowledge in rice and agricultural production among members and towards the wider minority community. The club comprises 71 members, with 32 Khmer farmers registered. At all levels the government and its professional agencies, such as the provincial plant protection department, have provided intensive agricultural development projects to local ethnic farmers via the club. The club has also become a reliable demonstration site of up-scaling experiments by research institutes and universities, such as the transformation from triple rice to double rice plus one corn crop or the introduction of bio- insecticides. Several club members were funded by the local authorities to participate in long-term training courses and study tours organised by researchers. Now most of the club members can produce verified rice seed to meet local demand and provide other localities with filled orders. New technical adoption leads to better savings from input reduction, higher productivity, and accumulative income for club farmers.
Frequently mentioned as minority-based, the village club however actually comprises a group of high- productivity farmers coalesced around and led by a Kinh farmer. As a result, the club’s growth has consolidated the inherent leadership position of the Kinh and their premier role in making decisions related to the club’s collective issues. No Khmer members have taken any positions in the management
61 Vietnam comprises 54 ethnic groups, of which the ethnic majority Kinh makes up approximately 87% with the remaining 13% divided into 53 other ethnic minorities. The minority groups are notably characterised by remoteness, language barriers, degraded infrastructure, high poverty rate, poor education, low social status, and limited access to employment, public services and political power (van de Walle and Gunewardena 2001). Since doi moi (renovation) in 1986, an array of policies, programmes and projects have been implemented to empower people, in particular ethnic minorities. One of the most applausive achievements is a reduced poverty rate from over 60% in 1990 to less than 10% in 2010. Nevertheless, ethnic minorities remain poorer and more disadvantaged than the majority Kinh community, elucidated by their lack/lower return of endowments and/or community characteristics (Baulch et al.
2007).
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board. This absence was blamed by Kinh managers on the limited communication abilities and low education of Khmer farmers. From the club leaders’ perception, it has already been a success of the club to encourage the simple membership of Khmer farmers. Selected farmers who participate in long-term training courses, learning tours, and higher-level conferences are thus only individuals from the management board. Ultimately, it is Kinh managers who prominently represent and make decisions for the majority of Khmer farmers. Khmer members are only passive participants within a club intended to make their collective voices to be raised and heard.
Case study: An Loi: model village versus normal village
An Loi in An Giang province is characterised by the typically unfavourable conditions of a remote ethnic minority village. The determinants that have made this Khmer community attract the attention and support of upper authorities and agricultural extension workers include its easily-accessed geographical location, high concentration of skilful farmers, and wide network of retired higher-level cadres.
Agricultural technology projects have thus prioritised farmers from the village to participate in building farming models. The village has been recently designated as one implementation site of a national project promoting an alternative approach in agriculture extension. With the support of the commune, an agriculture extension club was established on the same principles as in the Rum Soc case. Our interviews indicated that local farmers, especially the club members, have acquired and adopted the latest farming technologies promoted in the delta. A village farmer proudly explained “This village is taking the lead in high productivity agriculture in the district thanks to numerous training courses and support by the governments” (Interview 321, farmer, male, An Giang, 11.03.2011). The village became widely known after several local farmers were commended as nationally “good” farmers. The village has therefore received disproportionately large amount of knowledge, technology, and financial transfers from minority- mainstreamed projects in the region. An Loi has been labelled a model village, an example of minority development success within the administrative area where local authorities and agricultural officials have concentrated their efforts.
Ta On is an adjacent minority village. By contrast with An Loi, households in Ta On are economically poor and socially marginalised. Their main source of livelihood, agricultural production such as rice and vegetable cultivation and fish rearing, is dependent upon natural conditions and traditional farming techniques inherited from their parents and developed through their own experiences. A young local farmer expressed his satisfaction with his current rice productivity during our interview; however such a yield seems a failure in comparison to many An Loi appliers of advanced cultivation technologies. Ta On villagers have obtained few chances to join in agricultural extension and research activities. Despite our few observations that new farming techniques are diffused from the model village to other farmers in neighbouring fields, new knowledge seems to stay within the model village’s boundary.
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The Rum Soc’s agricultural club case reveals that the outcome of substantial technology transfer projects that ignore the Kinh-driven formation history and power structure of the club seems to detract from the overall objectives and priorities of minority-centerd development. Indeed, such projects have further internalised the long-standing, hierarchical positions (cf. Schad et al. 2011, 95) and “knowledge as power”
practices of the Kinh managers into the Khmer-focused group. In An Loi, there is an unequal distribution of development project sources between model and typical minority communities. The practices have been embraced by the bureaucratic structure and decision-making of local governments and unconnected extension projects whose managers look only for successful outcomes. It is neither the intention of this discussion to debase positive outcomes of ethnic development efforts in practice nor to debate ambitious contributions to the literature of local elites and community development that power elites as a strategic group appropriate development resources to bolster their wealth and power. What is significantly important from our findings is that social polarisation in ethnic communities is seemingly reinforced and obscured by tokenism practices of many actors, thus making it hardly visible to minority development policy-makers. Multiple separate development interventions are managed within their sole log frames,
“hard issues” focuses, and consequentialist orientations. Local authorities based on the hierarchical power structure maintain their performances of formalism and “exaggerated achievements” by strenuously constructing local development models; accordingly, beneficiary selection becomes biased and local participation becomes merely lip service.
In short, at whatever interventional levels, the participation of local groups, considering their heterogeneity and complexity of living conditions, power relations and needs, should be an integral part of planning, implementation, and evaluation processes. Such projects should aim, besides concrete materialised objectives, towards local empowerment and ownership and create dialogical and learning spaces for those who are involved to promote holistic reflection and representation of local development as well as develop lessons learnt and alternatives that are ethnically informed.