Initially established 1999 by G7 Reaction to the Asian crisis 1997/98 Finance ministers and central bankers Dialogue on global key economic issues Heads of states since 2008 Washington,
Trang 1Peter Wahl
World Economy,
Ecology &
Development Association
Trang 21 Hiistory, structure, governance of the G-20
2 The G-20 and global governance
3 The G-20 and the financial crisis
4 Perspectives
WEED - PeWa
Trang 3Chapter 1
Hiistory, structure, governance of the G-20
Trang 4Initially established 1999 by G7
Reaction to the Asian crisis 1997/98
Finance ministers and central bankers
Dialogue on global key economic issues
Heads of states since 2008
Washington, London, Pittsburgh, Toronto
Seoul, France, Mexico
WEED - PeWaReaction to the crisis 2008
Trang 5Member states
US Canada
France Germany Italy UK Japan
Russia
Australia
Brazil Mexico Argentina
Trang 6Zur Anzeige wird der QuickTime™
Trang 7The G-20 is not inclusive
It aggravates the marginalisation of the UN
Trang 8Zur Anzeige wird der QuickTime™
Dekompressor „“
benötigt.
„The East India Club, in the heart of London’s clubland,
As a private club, only open to members and their guests, the
club still provides a refuge and meeting place for busy young
men and their more seasoned seniors.“
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In terms of theory of democracy the G-20 is a Club
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Trang 10Chapter 2
The G-20 in the system of global governance
Trang 11Is the G-20
a global economic government?
„We designated the G-20 to be the premier forum for our
international economic cooperation.“
Trang 12Governance is not Government
• mix of formal and informal cooperation of
different types of actors (governments, multilateral
institutions, private sector, civil society)
Governance:
• mix of formal and informal
procedures and agreements
opacitycomplexity
• indirect regulation
WEED - PeWa
Trang 13IOSC
Committee
Trang 14The big problem behind
„The crisis is global
But the instruments to solve it are national.“
Joseph Stiglitz
Zur Anzeige wird der QuickTime™
Dekompressor „“
benötigt.
Increasing gap between the transnationalisation of
markets, in particular finanial markets and
the capability of national states to regulate them
Trang 15Disembedding of Global Players from
Regulatory control of the national state
The world of national staates The post-national world of globalisation
Trang 16Emergence of a new, transnational
space beyond national states and
intergovernmental relations
WEED - PeWa
Trang 17„We have lost control.
B Bernanke
What a deluge! What a flood!Lord and master, hear my call!
Ah, which disaster!
Master! I have need of Thee!
from the spirits that I calledSir, deliver me!
Goethe, The sorcerer‘s apprentice
Trang 18There is no international or global
state to regulate markets
Global Governance as a very imperfect
substitute of international statehood
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Trang 19Chapter 3
The G-20 and the financial crisis
Trang 20The assessment of the G20
reform proposals depends on the
analysis of the roots and the
nature of the crisis
Trang 21Some current explanations
Trang 22UNCTAD: „Nothing short of closing down the big
casino will provide a lasting solution.“
„The globalisation of savings has created a world in which everything was given to financial capital and nothing to labour, where the entrepreneur was secondary to the speculator, where the capital owner was privileged above the employees, where the leverage has assumed irrational dimensions All this created a capitalism, in which it was normal to gamble with money, preferably other peoples money, to obtain money easily and extremely fast, without any effort and often without creating wealth or generating employment with these huge
amounts of money.“
Sarkozy in Davos 2010
Trang 231 Dominance of finance over labour/real economy
2 Speculation as dominant business model
3 New type of capitalism
Essence of Sarkozy‘s analysis:
Finance capitalism as a specific version of capitalism
Systemic crisis
Trang 24Traditional role of international financial markets
• providing efficient services payment system for
households and real economy
• providing money for public and private investment -
Trang 25Real Economy
A new system has emerged
Financial markets
Dominance
Trang 26Th e main characteristics of the new system
1 Liberalization of financial markets
2 Weak regulation and supervision (deregulation)
3 Speculation as a central business model
4 Excessive leverage
5 Procyclical („herd“) behaviour
6 Risky new instruments (CDS etc.)
7 High risky institutional investors (Hedge funds
Trang 27Profits in finance higher than in real economy Structural underinvestment in real economyy
Privatisation, pressure on social systems
Negative effect on employment
R E D I S T I B U T I O n
Trang 28General dimensions of the crisis
1 Stability
2 Distribution
3 Democracy/Policy Space
The G20 is focussing only on stability
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Trang 29Pittsburgh: interesting promises
• we confronted the greatest challenge to the world economy in our generation.
• We cannot rest until the global economy is restored to full health, and hard-working
families the world over can find decent jobs
• We want growth without cycles of boom and bust and markets that foster
responsibility not recklessness
• we will not allow a return to banking as usual.
• strict and precise timetables
• move toward greener, more sustainable growth.
Trang 30Pittsburgh areas of financial reform
• Raising capital standards
• capital requirements for risky products and
off-ballance sheet activities
• reduce leverage
• strong international compensation standards
• regulate OTC derivatives
• standards against moral hazard („too big to fail“)
• quota reform in the IMF and World Bank
• strenghtening regulation, supervision, transparency
• measures against tax havens and money laundering
• contribution of finance industry to costs of crisis
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Trang 31• No progress in reform
• Disagreement over exit strategies
• Diplomatic formulars
„We recognize that these measures will need to be
implemented at the national level and will need to be
tailored to individual country circumstances.“
„Working Group on Development to elaborate a development
agenda and multi-year action plans to be adopted at the Seoul
Summit.“
Trang 32The Seoul agenda for financial reform
(„too big to fail“)
FSB report
• Tax Havens
• FASP & FSB
Trang 33Chapter 4
Perspectives
Trang 34Results by now
1 Change in rhetorics of summit discourses, in particular
Pittsburgh declaration erosion of neoliberal talk
2 Consensus to act countercyclically stimulus packages
3 Strengthening of the IMF and the FSB
4 No consensus on further crisis management „exit strategy“
5 No consensus on reform of financial system
Trang 35What can the G-20 achieve?
1 Dialogue, communication among leaders
4 Early warning systems for emerging problems
3 Soft pressure
5 At best, concerted action in case of consensus
2 Learning processes among leaders
But limitations due to manyfold
internal contradictions
Trang 36Contradictions & Heterogenity
• National perspectives and interests are dominant
• Behind the scenery of cooperation geo-politic power
politics, rivalry and the fight for hegemony continue
• Emergence of regional powers and reconfiguration
of the hierarchy in the international system
• Competition/conflict US - China
• Geo-political competition between countries
• Emerging market emerging self-confidence
overshooting of national pride.
Don‘t expect too much!
WEED PeWa
Trang 37Civil society and G-20
• Civil society in rsp Countries should take G-20 on the ir
Trang 38Thank you very much
for your attention
WEED PeWa