Active Directory and Windows Server Audit Specialists Windows Server 2003 Audit Program for Member Servers Monterey Technology Group, Inc.. Active Directory and Windows Server Audit Spec
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Internal Use License Agreement for Windows Server 2003 Audit Program for
Member Servers
This audit program contains Intellectual Property and 1s licensed, copyrighted material owned by Monterey Technology Group, Inc
the publisher of this web site
This audit work program 1s intended for employees of Internal Audit departments As such, you are allowed to use this audit
program during the course your own work and you may copy the findings, risk and recommendations from the Member Server
Control Tests into your own audit work papers and edit as necessary Employees of Information Technology departments may use
this document in a similar manner in preparation for an audit or as a self-assesment tool
Prohibited uses:
° Use by a consultant, subcontractor in providing services to another company or in developing products or services
° Use by an associate ot partner of a public accounting firm
° Distributing this audit program to colleagues Each individual must request a personal copy
° Posting on a website
° Incorporating into a larger work except as provided above
Organization-wide licensing 1s available Contact us for more information
Monterey Technology Group, Inc
179 Dunbar St Suite E Spartanburg SC 29306 (866) 749-2048
info@montereytechgroup.com
‘Table of Contents
Member Server Evidence Collection 2
Member Server Control Tests 19
Control Framework Mappings 44
© 2002-2007 Monterey Technology Group, Inc
www.montereytechgroup.com, www.ultimateWindowsSecurity.com
v2006.05
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Member Server Evidence Collection
All evidence on this worksheet is member server specific —1.e the evidence can potentially be different on each member server
Therefore a copy of this worksheet should be filled out for each relevant member server in the domain or sample thereof
Evidence collection methods:
e Command line Commands in this work program will not modify any setting Most commands require administrative authority
but the parameters used guarantee their operation is read only We suggest creating a text file at the beginning of your evidence
collection to receive the output of these commands Using the >> redirection feature as indicated in the guidance below will cause each command’s output to be appended to this file
e Screen print We recommend collecting all your screen prints into a single file with WordPad Pressing Alt-PrintScreen will copy
the current window (instead of the entire screen) to your clipboard ‘Then you can paste the screen print into WordPad For projects requiring many screen prints we recommend Snagit from www.techsmith.com
Evidence collection items are sequenced so as to avoid switching between programs unnecessarily
© 2002-2007 Monterey Technology Group, Inc v2006.05
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screen prints Run notepad.exe and create
a new file named evidence.txt
or similar
Enter the name of the computer, the date and your name
Save and close the file
Open Accessories\Word Pad and create a new file called screenprints.rtf Keep this file open so that you can paste screen prints into it
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4 | List of services Command line: sc query type=
service state= all >>
evidence.txt where evidence.txt
is the name of the file that
receives the output of the
command
SERVI CE_NAVE: AeLookupSvc
DI SPLAY_NAVE: Appl i cation Exper i ence Lookup Service
~ TYPE 20 WNB2_ SHARE PROCESS STATE : 4 RUNNI NG
( NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, | GNORES_SHUTDOMW) ) WNS82_ EXI T CODE : O (0x0)
SERVI CE_EXIT_COCDE : 0 (0x0) CHECKPO NT > 0x0 WAI T_HI NT : 0x0 SERVI CE_NANVE: Al ert er
(NOT _STOPPABLE, NƠI PAUSABLE, | GNORES_SHUTDOW)) )
WNð32 EXIT CC : 1077 (0x435)
SERVI CE_EXIT CODE : 0 (0x0) CHECKPO NT : 0x0
WALT HINT : 0x0
5 | List of shared Command line: net share >> Sh Re R k
folders evidence.txt where evidence.txt are name source emaf
is the name oftheflethai | - receives the output of the C$ C: \ Def ault share
command E$ E: \ Def ault share
| PCS Rerot e | PC
When analyzing evidence, note: | The conmand conpl et ed successfully
Ignore SYSVOL, IPC$, NETLOGON, ADMIN$, C$, D§$, E$ and other drive-letter-dollar- sign shares
6 | Share For each share in previous ohare name Giá edEocunt S
permissions evidence item run: net share Romer 7 nà Ủ 68
[sharename] >> evidence.txt Maxi mum users No limit where evidence.txt is the name oes Vanual hị ba t
of the file that receives the Per m ssi on BUILTIN Administrators, FULL
output of the command
Ignore SYSVOL, IPC$, NETLOGON, ADMINS, C$, D§, E$ and other drive-letter-dollar-
sign shares Everyone, READ
The comrand compl eted successfully
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7 | Listing of all Command line: net user >> U \\ CALADAN
local user evidence.txt where evidence.txt | FS8f accounts Tor \\ CALADAN
accounts isthe name ofthefilethat = | -
receives the output of the vimware_user Adm ni st rat or ASPNET
, The comrand compl eted successfully
8 | Document 1 Determine from IT staff if Ki nam Adm ni st rat or
properties for built-in account Administrator Comrent Built-in account for administering the comput er/ domain
has been renamed If so, substitute account name
administrator,
guest and any
other local below
accounts 2 Command line: net user
selected by administrator >>
auditor evidence.txt where
evidence.txt is the name of the file that receives the
output of the command
3 repeat previous step but replace administrator with
guest
4 Examine list of user accounts
from previous evidence item and identify any additional
accounts that have been created besides:
Administrator Guest SUPPORT_*
IUSR_*
IWAM_*
e ASPNET
If additional accounts exist,
repeat step 2 for each
account If there are too many accounts use a sample
Password Password Password Password
User may Workstations all owed Logon scri pt
User profile Hore directory Last logon Logon hours all owed Œoup Menber shi ps Goup renber shi ps
Local
G oba
000 (Syst em Def aul t )
Yes Never 10/22/2005 2:03 PM Never
10/23/2005 2:03 PM Yes
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Command line: net localgroup >>
evidence.txt where evidence.txt
is the name of the file that
receives the output of the
* Net work_ Conf ¡ gur ati on Cper at or s
“Performance Log Users
“Performance Monitor Users
10 Document 1 Command line: net Alias name adm ni s† r at 0r s
members of all localgroup administrators Sonnet er / domai wom nistrators have conpl ete and unrestricted access to the
local groups >> evidence.txt where
evidence.txt is the name of Menber s
output of the command bosshogg
2 repeat previous step for:
e Backup Operators
e Power Users
e Telnet Clients
e Network Configuration Operators
Remote Desktop Users
e Examine list of groups from previous evidence item and identify any groups created besides the default groups shown
in the previous evidence item example S3 DGROUP\ Domai n Adm ns
The comrand compl eted successfully
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Evidence item | Guidance Example
41 Password policy | Command line: net accounts >> Mec’ user 5 oot i dong te time expires’: never
and lockout evidence.txt where evidence txt Maxi mum password age (days): Unlimited
policy is the name of the file that M ni mum password | engt h: 7
receives the output of the Length of password history rai nt ai ned: None
Lockout observation w ndow (m nut e3) : 1440
The comrand compl eted successfully
42] Identify principle | Command line: cacls [folder C:\sis BUILTIN Adm ni strat ors: (Ql) (Cl) F
folders that path] >> evidence.txt where NO ra roan SYSTEM (1) (Cl) F
contain evidence.txt is the name of the file CREATOR OWER: (C1) (Cl) (IOF
important that receives the output of the BUILTIN Users: (Q)(C1)R
information and | command and where [folder path] BUILTIN Users: (Cl) (speci al access: )
document is the full pathname of the folder in FI LE APPEND DATA
permissions question (e.g
c:\documents\hrdocs) BUILTIN Users: (Cl) (speci al access: )
FI LE_WAl TE_DATA
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Evidence item | Guidance Example
43] Document Command line: gpresult /scope
: Mcrosoft (R) Wndows (R) Qerating System Goup Policy Result tool v2.0 whether group computer Iz >> evidence.txt Copyright (C) Mcrosoft Corp 1981-2001
policy is being where evidence.txt is the name of
used to secure | the file that receives the output of | Created Qn 5/25/2006 at 11:09:12 PM
the system the command
RSCP data for S3DŒHRCLUPradmn on A3 :
Connect ed over a sl ow li nk?:
Logging Mode
CS Type: Mcrosoft(R) Wndows(R) Server 2003, Standard Edition
OS Conti gur ati on: Merber Ser ver
QS Versi on: 5 2.3790 Terminal Server Mode: Rerote Adm ni stration
Site Narre: Def aul t - First - Si t e- Name
Roam ng Profile:
Local Profile: C:\Documents and Settings\radmn
No COMPUTER SETTINGS
CNEA3, QUEAppl i cat i on, QU=Ser vers, OCorput ers, QUQbj ect s, DC=s3dgr oup, D0@=com Last time Goup Policy was applied: 5/25/2006 at 11:03:25 PM
Goup Policy was applied from a4 s3dgr oup com Goup Policy sl ow link thr eshol d: 500 kbps
Applied Œoup Policy Chị ects Server Policies
Speci al Exceptions For A3 Wb Server Def aul t Domain Pol ¡i cy
The follow ng GPO were not applied because they were filtered out Local Goup Policy
Filtering: Not Applied ( Enpt y) The computer is a part of the follow ng security groups BUI LTI N\ Adm ni strators
Ever yone
BUI LTI N\ Users
NT AUTHORI TY\ NETWORK
NT AUTHCRI TY\ Aut henti cated Users
This Qgani zation
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Evidence item | Guidance Example
44] Document IP Command line: netsh ipsec Poli cy Name Server (Request Security)
Security Policy static show policy all >> Description For all |P traffic, always request security using K
evidence.txt where evidence.txt Last Mbdified 2/12/2005 1:03:03 AM
is the name of the file that tài gnec NO
Polling Interval 180 m nutes
Policy Narre Firewall Rules
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15 Audit policies Administrative Tools\Local
Security Policy: Capture screen print of Security Policy\Local Policies\Audit Policy Alternative: use auditpol utitlity
from Windows Resource Kit
Command line: auditpol >>
evidence.txt where evidence.txt
is the name of the file that
receives the output of the
3 Security Settings {39 Account Policies
=) Local Policies
Cũ Audit Policy (39 User Rights Assignment {9 Security Options () Public Key Policies
(} Software Restriction Policies
® IP Security Policies on Local Cc
JÌ _
Policy = / | Security Setting
29 audit account logon events
4 audit account management
9 audit directory service access
9 audit logon events
9 audit object access
9 audit policy change
9 audit privilege use
9 audit process tracking
9 audit system events
«|
Success, Failure
Success, Failure Success, Failure
Success, Failure Success, Failure
Success, Failure
Success, Failure Success, Failure Success, Failure
+i
Windows Resource Kit
Command line: ntrights >>
evidence.txt where evidence.txt
is the name of the file that
receives the output of the
P Securty Settings Poky : [ Securky Setting
% GD Accourt Potcies Bl acenss thes computer frome the network Everyone, ASPNET, Adkarestr ators, Liters Power Users, Backup Operators
= C@ Local Pokcies Zz) Act as part of the operating system
* GD Aud Pộcy L@ Securty Optees
4 Gy Pubk& Key Pohodez
D User Rights Assignmer +) 2) Software Restriction Poko 0D P Secusty Podeins on Loxe
33] Add workstations to domain
#3] tt: mẹmery quotes for a process
33) Mlow logon through Terminal Senaces
Bl tack up flies and denctories Ea) bypass traverse checking Za) Change the system time 22) Create o pogetie
|Creske a toknn db/e<t Zz) Creste gobal objects Ei) Create permanent shared objects
#3]Detxs) pcog anz
LOCAL SERVICE NETWORK SERVICE, Aceresty shors Admaretrators Remote Desitop Users Acearedty ators tachi Operators
Cveryore, Aceurestr ators Users Porer Users Backup Operator Acris ators Power Users
Ze) Derry logon as 0 service
BP Deny logon locally
SP Dery logon theough Terminal Services
®%1-5-21-601074242-316931221é-233344037-1 131
*S 1S 21681074242 316991 2216 238748971131
BE) Erntic compete oned user accourts to be try Be) reece ctatdown from 4 renote system Ea) Generate seoury sudks Ei) impersonate 2 chert after authentication Ba) ircrease scheculing prinky BE) Load and uriond device drivers
Soc ages in memory Plog on as @ batch job
PP Log on as 2 service
$2)L09 on beally
BE) eeunge axiting and cmcurty log Zz) Mody Firmmevare errrincnment vahses Zi) Perform vokime matenance tasks
£2) Protte singe process
BE) rolte sy teen performace
Eels computer from docking ation Ez)Replace 4 process level token
— fles and drectories
4
Au#ez với Mor<
LOCAL SERVPOLALTWORK SERVICE ASPNET Achnirestr ators, SERVICE
esetơralors
Adar icty ators, anes Powenr Ucers
LOCAL SERVPOLALTWORK SCRVICL Administrators Backup Operators
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Capture screen print of Security Policy\Local Policies\Security Options
Fle Action Wew Hợp
B Local Securty Settings
=l#J xJ
BD Accourk Potcies Bl accoures: admirets stor account Qatus taMdm4
2 Local Policies Sz Accourts: Guest account status Cieabled
GS Aust Pokey $$) Accounts: Unt local account use of blank pas Enabled
D User Ritts Assigrmer BZlaccourts: Rename administraker account Argewrestr shor
od Securty Optiere Baccourts: Rename guest occourt Gms
4) (DJ Softuure Restriction Poke Đ]A.xk: at the xicssk cỀ QioệxAi cự teen objets Drcablied
MP Seaurty Pekcins on Loce Ea) Aad: Aad the use of Backup and Restore Dreabled
Ee) Audk: Stet down system immediately # unatl Disabled
EXJOCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Seon Not defined BB)OCOM: Machine Louch Restrictions in Securi., Not defined Zz) Devices: Allow undock without having tolog on Disabled Za) Devices: Allowed to format and eject remove Administrators Ex]Devices: Prevent users trom installing printer Enabled BE) Devices: Restrict CO-ROM access to locally bo Disabiied
Be devces: Rewrit floppy access to locally ogg Orcablind Zz) Devices: Uruigned driver ratallaton behavior — Warn but allow installation Ez] Domain controller: Allow server operators to Not defined Ex]Domain controller: LOAP server signing requir Not defined BE) Domain cortroier: Refuse machine accourt p Not defined J BE) Ooman member: Dagtaly eexrypt oF ag one Orcablied
#Ÿ]Doewe member: Requre strong (Windows 2 Disabled Bi) rteractive logon: Oo not deplay last user name Disabled Ea) irteractive logon: Oo not requre CTRL *ALT Disabled BE) ter antive &
Be) rte tive logon: Mescange title for uumes att Not defined Ze) irteractive logon: Number of previews logons 10 lagons Ee) interactive logon: Promek user to change pas 14 days Ba] irteractive logon: Requre Domain Controfer Disabled
BE) rterantive logan: Regaee wnat cord Not defined
n: Message teat for users ott
Bo) reer active logon: Smet card renoval bebuvior Lock Workstation Ze) Microsoft network cheek: Ovgtally sigh comers Oteabled
ee network dent: Oigtalhy sign commu Enabled
4
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Evidence item | Guidance Example
systems in use Management\Disk Management:
© + mịm| ®@|
=) Computer Management (Local) Yolume | Layout | Type | File Systd’s| Status | Capacity | Frel
=-j§ System Tools 9 (c:) Partition Basic NTFS ẹ Healthy (System) 55.88GB 26
(fj) Event viewer c5})IP53(D:) Partiian Basic CDFS Healthy 17MB 0M
(4) #87 Local Users and Groups
Online
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Evidence item | Guidance Example
19.} Security log 1 Computer Management\Event 2) x}
Log size
Mawimum log size: |5l2 KB
When maximum log size is reached:
© Overwrite events as needed
20.| Save a copy of Computer Management\Event
the event log Viewer
Use the EVT format
Right click on Security log and select Save Log File As
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Evidence item | Guidance
21.| Security patch 1 Download MBSA from
status www.microsoft.com/mbsa
2 Run MBSA against the server with the “Check for security updates” option enabled
Important:
e Disable “Configure
computers for
Microsoft Update and scanning prerequisites”
se Do not check
“Advanced Update Services options:”
Optionally, enable
e Check for Windows
administrative vulnerabilities
e Check for weak passwords
e Check for IIS administrative vulnerabilities
e Check for SQL administrative vulnerabilities
3 When MBSA displays the report, save the report using the Print or Copy links on the left of the MBSA window
Weeem
GO Pick 8 computer to scan
Gl Pick mulighe computers to sean
© Pick 2 vecurty report to view
OO Views » security ippoet
1000.99 nhafsec MTG - CALADAN (12:2-2005 10-45 AM]
12/2/2005 10.45 AM"™ Mictosoll recommends scanning on o weekly bass Ther seport 176 days old
209292
See Also ] Metoseht Bareine Seounty Analyzer Help
Macroseft Update
Potential Risk [Ore or mere noercatcal checks tated |
DB (b4 Mxzosoet B sss&nm S&c:z#y
Analyoet
© Microsoft Securty Web ste
'Wrskesee Secuky 1 eeenice packs ot update rouge se mersing
What wat scanned eo detal: = How to comect ther
Administrative Vulnerebiities
Parewoed
Exqeoter Scere uiee accourts (2 of 6] have norvexpiing pascwceds
What wat ccanned Recut detal: Hows to comect ther
Windows ‘Windows Firewall ic disabled and has exceptions configured
Freral What war scanned Peru detals How tocomect this
bitrate Preincas cecunty repost Eirvles xem mm oẩ (oeerkrvver xrvf mslelev cơ WEry ccơnge đợc
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Evidence item | Guidance Example
22.| Determine Depends on antimalware solution
antimalware Use interview, examine services,
controls add/remove programs and the
(antivirus) interface of the antimalware
product
e What product is used
e Is the software up-to-date and operational
e Is the malware signature database up-to-date?
23.| Document Interview
security log e Is the security log streamed to
collection, central security log server in
monitoring real time?
If not, is it periodically
collected/transferred to security log server? With what frequency?
What monitoring and reporting takes place at the central log server?
What is the archival process
at the central log server?
If there is no central log server, are these operations performed locally?
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e Browse the web
e Use MS office, Adobe other
document based applications
e Work with content downloaded
from the Internet except from
trusted vendor sites? Is all such content scanned for viruses
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Member Server Control Tests
Test Name Guidance Finding Risk Recommendation
1 | Check physical Member Server Evidence 1 and 2 Insufficient Physical access toa Implement consistent security controls physical computer allows physical access control
access attacker to for all member servers controls for | compromise the
member computer Sensitive server or business critical
information, operations or
transactions hosted
on this server could
be exposed to fraud, divulged, corrupted,
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Test Name Guidance Finding Risk Recommendation
2 | Is security log Member Server Evidence 17 Currentlog | Audit trail and Allocate the log to
large enough and size and compliance evidence | 199MB (299 on Windows configured to Log size should not exceed 199MB (299 on Windows Server overwrite could be lost resulting | Server 2003) and
overwrite 2003) to prevent corruption and instability settings do in hampered configure it to “overwrite appropriately? not provide | investigations, as needed”
It isn’t secure or practical to expect the local security log to be maximum compromised the archive of security events for a server It’s impractical assurance regulatory because most servers generate much more information than of log compliance, ability to Use a log management can be kept long term on the local system (a maximum of integrity prosecute intruders solution that provides
as short as possible to minimize opportunity for tampering
Preferably security events should be streamed in real time by a local agent to the log server See NIST Special Publication 800-92
In such an environment, the local security log should be viewed as a Staging point for the collection to the central log server and the goal should be for the local security log to be allocated enough space to hold events between collections — including longer intervals if the collection process temporarily breaks
Recommendation: Simply allocate the log to 199MB and configure it to “overwrite as needed”
e = Ability to archive older activity
e Supports separation
of duty between operational administrators and staff tasked with
monitoring Unless the system is configured to “shutdown immediately on
audit failure”, avoid “Do not overwrite events, clear log manually” for several reasons:
e If the log fills, it stops logging events until cleared
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Test Name Guidance Finding Risk Recommendation
This forces you to clear the log regularly If new events are regularly collected to the central log server there’s no need to clear the security log — it just overwrites as needed This in turn allows you to avoid clearing the log which in turn allows you to monitor for and treat any occurrences of event ID 517 (log cleared) as suspicious evidence of log tampering
3 Is there sufficient | Member Server Evidence 23 Security log | Without a process in Implement a process for
security log? It is impractical and unrealistic to expect administrators to of member member server archival of security log
manually review Windows security logs due to the cryptic servers is security log attacks nature of the logs, the volume of information and the number of | insufficient | could be ongoing
See Randy Franklin Smith’s Selecting
management requirements
and how to analyze Windows security
Windows servers on a typical network
Yet most corporate information security policies and compliance legislation require log archival and monitoring
The only solution is a log management product that provides centralized collection, monitoring, reporting and archival
Management Solution Special Report at www.UltimateWindowsSecurity.com for more details on log
For detailed recommendations on what should be monitored Log Secrets course at www UltimateWindowsSecurity.com
the Right Log
logs see the Security
without organization’s knowledge
Audit trail and compliance evidence could be lost resulting
in hampered investigations, compromised regulatory compliance, ability to prosecute intruders, compromised audit trails
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Test Name Guidance Finding Risk Recommendation
4 | Check for latest Member Server Evidence 21 Member New security bugs are | Keep member server up service pack and server is not | discovered every to date with the latest security updates | Analyze security updates reported as missing by MBSA patched month Many exploits | service pack and security
Determine if any of these updates address vulnerabilities likely | against can only be prevented | updates Consider using
to be exploited on this server given its role, installed services current by loading the Windows Server Update and network exposure vulnerabilitie | associated update As | Services to automate
S networks become patch management
Sensitive or business
Critical information,
operations or transactions hosted
by that server could
be exposed to fraud, divulged, corrupted,
or deleted
Follow testing and limited rollout best practices to reduce risk of
destabilizing network due
to defective fixes
Subscribe to security notification service from Microsoft