Why do all care for China’s financial reform? China’s outstanding growth performance justifies optimism And yet, such huge saving and investment ratios should yield even higher growt
Trang 1China’s banking reform:
Issues and prospects for the
future
Alicia García Herrero*
Bank of International Settlements Representative Office for Asia and the Pacific
CASS, Beijing June 7, 2007
Trang 2Roadmap to the presentation
1 Why do all care for China’s financial reform?
2 An assessment of the banking reform so far
A Restructuring of SOCBs
B Financial liberalization
C Regulation and supervision
3 How are banks doing?
4 Suggestions for future steps
Trang 31 Why do all care for China’s financial reform?
China’s outstanding growth performance justifies optimism
And yet, such huge saving and investment ratios should yield even higher growth
► Banking system is the pillar (over 80%) but does not function properly: potential misallocation of resources
► But also a lot of self-financing key (60% ) and
informal financing: risky!!
Success of ongoing bank reform key:
– For China’s economic development
– For the rest of the world given China’s size & interlinkages
Trang 42 An assessment of the reform so far
a Restructuring
Organized in three waves, each of them with:
Recapitalization
Disposal of non-performing loans (NPLs)
Partial privatization
Issuance of subordinated debt
Trang 5a Restructuring (con’t)
Large capital injections to 3 of the 4 largest banks (state-owned commercial banks)
– In three waves 20-24% of 2004 GDP injected in the
banking system:
– Not really a bail-out since
– Howeer, different public/semi-public entities covering the costs
• Distribution of costs not very transparent
Trang 6a Restructuring (con’t)
Even larger disposal of bad assets: NPLs transferred to Asset
Management Companies (AMC):
– In first wave, bilateral transfer:one AMC per bank
– Disposal of assets aiming at highest recovery value and not
speed:
• Not much recovered: about 10% of total face value
– Financing: 45% financed by PBC credit and 10 year bond issued
by AMCs
• Not very high yield and doubts about payment: no explicit government guarantee:
• Involvement of CB could eventually constrain monetary policy although international reserves are a big cushion!
• Fragmentation of government bond market
Trang 72 An assessment of the reform so far
b Financial liberalization
1 Introducing market practices:
– Reduction in reserve requirements and in their
remuneration
• Steady reduction in liquid assets although still high
– SOCBs given more responsibility for lending decisions
• Some credit quotas removed
– Private ownership: joint-stock commercial banks and city
commercial banks starting 1999
– Also foreign more recently with WTO commitments
Trang 8b Financial liberalization (con’t)
2 Liberalizing interest rates
– first money and bond market
– then loans
– finally deposits but not completed:
• Corridor of 330 bp or higher: cannot be reduced!
• Lack of competition but helps profitability
Trang 9b Financial liberalization (con’t)
0 2 4 6 8 10
12
14
16
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Reference rate on deposits (1 year) Reference rate on loans (1 year) Ceiling rate on loans (1 year) Lowest rate on loans (1 year)
330 bp
Difference between lending and deposit rates
Trang 10b Financial liberalization (con’t)
3 Opening up to foreign competition:
To greenfield investment due to WTO commitment
– However difficult to grow organically in such a large country – Administrative difficulties to open affiliates can also slow
down growth of foreign ownership
Sharp increase in foreign participation through strategic
partnerships in 3 large state-owned banks
– But still no control
Different to
Trang 11b Financial liberalization (con’t)
4 Steps towards capital account liberalization:
More on inflows than outflows
– Although more steps taken recently for the latter mainly to stem off pressures towards exchange rate appreciation
Domestic transactions in foreign currency strongly regulated
– Limited foreign exchange exposure although rapidly
increasing
Much faster liberalization in Latin America
Trang 123 How are banks doing?
All in all enormous improvement
•Banks are better capitalized but still poor for
international standards
•Also for private banks (joint stock and city commercial
banks)
•Rapid asset growth without new capital
•Only recently surge in subordinated debt
•Still in banks’ hands through interbank
•Also IPOs and exposure to foreign rules (HK stock
exchange)
•Asset quality much better but still poor compared to
international standards
•Slightly less than 10% of total assets are NPLs)
Trang 133 How are banks doing? (cont’)
Efficiency slightly lower than international standards but not a big issue
Profitability, instead, clearly low
– Particularly if one considers guaranteed interest rate corridor! – Recent improvement in large state-owned banks but even
worse in joint-stock and city commercial banks
Quite different from Latin America, spreads even higher and also profitability
Trang 143 How are banks doing? (cont’)
García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabarbara (2006) analyze empirically the main drivers of the improved –albeit still low - profitability of
Chinese banks :
– Increased capitalization
– Higher bank efficiency
– Lower bank concentration and market size
JSCBs – More private ownership
– High real interest rates and inflation also help
Trang 154 Conclusions
A On bank restructuring
– Need for clear diagnosis of underlying problem: government
interference
– For NPL stock problem:
• Transfer of NPLs should be accompanied by capital injections up to the required solvency ratio to comply with Basel I and with precise timetable
• Necessary for soundness but also to improve its profitability
• Clarify how AMCs will pay against NPLs received and status
of debt issued (only implicit guarantee)
Trang 164 Conclusions (con’t)
A On bank restructuring
– For NPL flow problem
• accelerate SOEs’ restructuring
• Help from financial liberalization to evaluate risk and price it
properly
• Need for better risk management procedures (capacity building)
– Regarding privatization, only solvent and viable institutions should
be privatized
• Transfer control might the quickest way to improve
management
– Does not need to imply majority ownership
• Even if the State retains control: same level playing field
Trang 17 4 Conclusions (con’t)
B On financial liberalization
– By the handbook in sequencing of financial liberalization but needs to be finalized!
– Completion of bank restructuring important for further
liberalization:
• If incentive structure does not change, liberalization may not be reflected in banks’ behaviour.
• And if it does: reduced spread because of stronger
competition: fall in profitability
• Even more dangerous if real interest rates and inflation
Trang 18B On financial liberalization (con’t)
– Further capital account liberalization as a consequence
of more flexibility of exchange rate regime
• For the risk of capital outflows to be minized
important to have completed domestic financial liberalization and the restructuring
Trang 194 Conclusions (con’t)
B On financial regulation and supervision
Important strides particularly in regulation but enforcement an issue
– Particularly for capital adequacy!
– The spirit of the low probably more important than the letter of the
law
Better corporate governance: Strengthened functions and
accountability of board of directors
Better bank management techniques, particularly risk management
Before foreign exchange controls lifted:
– Rregulations for foreign exposure need to be enhanced
– Also deposit insurance scheme
Better and wider external and internal auditing
Trang 204 Conclusions (con’t)
So far so good, even amazingly fine but reform needs to be completed
as soon as possible : why?
:
1 Always better to do it in good times with high growth, strong fiscal position and international reserves
– Very different from Latin America
2 Growing challenges
– WTO poses challenges for Chinese banking system and also some sectors in the economy (agriculture, etc)
• Liberalization process will probably reduce interest rate spreads
– Also fast growth in credit could end up in new NPLs!
– Particularly if borrowers are the same…