Strategic corporate negotiations a framework for win win agreements

Pruitt 1981 and Raiffa 1982 put the emphasis not only on tion as a joint decision-making process between several interdependent parts, but rather on the differences between the interests

Andrea Caputo Strategic Corporate

Negotiations

A Framework for Win-Win Agreements

ISBN 978-3-030-15478-3 ISBN 978-3-030-15479-0 (eBook)

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information

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pub-Cover illustration: Pattern © Melisa Hasan

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

University of Lincoln

Lincoln, UK

Written by Richard Cyert and James March in 1963, A Behavioral Theory

of the Firm still represents, without doubt, a catalyst book in the study of

how dominant coalitions take strategic decisions; in fact, since its tion, many strategic choices have started to be substantially considered as negotiated processes On this basis, and especially because of the current hyper-complexity featuring our socio-economic system, understanding

publica-how strategic negotiations de facto happen, and publica-how they could happen

better, represents an important and lively area in the research on and tice of corporate decision-making

prac-Win-lose and win-win scenarios, BATNAs, Reservation Prices, and third parties, but also heuristics, cognitive biases and the personality of who negotiates: in this exciting, constantly evolving, scientific context, this book written by Andrea Caputo (Lincoln Business School) contrib-utes to the addressing of these simple, but meaningful, research questions: How can negotiations be currently conceived? How and why do they occur? How can the strategic negotiations be improved, in terms of results for all (not just some of) the parties involved?

The reading of this book can be enjoyable for both scholars and tioners The former can find it useful because it constitutes an appropriate mix of theory and empirical evidence; this is also, thanks to the reported qualitative case study analysis, regarding the important negotiation that recently occurred between Fiat and Chrysler The latter, at the same time, can find it valuable because it represents an easy-to-read, instructive, tool-

practi-kit for enlarging the pie in many of the daily negotiations that happen in

the corporate world at the top decision-making level

Andrea has been the first graduate, then doctoral student, whom I have supervised at the University of Rome Tor Vergata; he has a passion for and interest in negotiations that started when he was a boy I am so proud and happy that this passion, together with hard work and intellectual curiosity over time, has supported him in achieving international recognition in this field.

January 30, 2019

reFerence

Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm Englewood

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

This work is intended as an attempt to answer the following questions, through a careful analysis of the literature and the study of a business case: How can strategic corporate negotiation support competitive advantage? What is the effect of the entry of third parties in a strategic corporate negotiation initially configured as bilateral? Can such entrance of third parties bring the strategic corporate negotiation from distributive to integrative?

The book consists of six chapters

The first chapter, based on a review of the current literature on tion, provides the theoretical basis for the concept of negotiation The concept of negotiation could be defined as a joint decision-making pro-cess, between two or more individual or collective actors, which identifies the features that characterize the negotiations and the fundamental ele-ments of the negotiating structure: the parts, the subjects, and the interests.The second chapter reflects on the possibility of strategically manipulat-ing the elements of the negotiating structure, deepening the theme of multilateral negotiations The doctrine has identified three dimensions with respect to which multilateral negotiations differ from bilateral nego-tiations: scope, complexity, and heterogeneity Multilateral negotiations therefore appear to be complex social interactions due to, on the one hand, the configuration of the preferences of several parties and, on the other hand, interpersonal dynamics that increase in complexity in line with the increase in the parties involved Negotiators can benefit from ampli-tude, complexity, and heterogeneity The existence of a negotiating con-figuration with several parties, often having different and mostly

complementary interests, leads to the achievement of very satisfactory agreements.

The third chapter investigates the relationship between strategy and negotiation, contextualizing the importance of negotiation for strate-gic success

The fourth chapter introduces the industry in which the business case

is introduced: the automotive industry This industry analysis is carried out starting from the elements of structural weakness in the sector Strategic steps for crisis management are identified, deepening the theme of cross- sectoral cooperation A theoretical analysis of this topic is provided, based

on existing literature and historical analysis, investigating past cooperation agreements in the automotive sector

Once the reference context has been identified, the analysis of the business case is introduced in the fifth chapter, with an illustration of the methodology adopted and of the most relevant results achieved about the negotiation, and therefore the role of the third parties, between Fiat and Chrysler

From the experience of Fiat and Chrysler, it is possible to draw ing research cues for the future, regarding the role played by third parties

interest-in negotiation, presented interest-in the concludinterest-ing sixth chapter

December 2018

1 A Theoretical Framework for Negotiation 1

3 Contextualizing Negotiation in Strategy 47

4 Cooperation in the Automotive Industry Prior to the 2009

5 Case Study: The Fiat–Chrysler Negotiation in 2009 83

6 Conclusions 117

Fig 1.1 Composition of the negotiation process 11

Fig 1.3 Classification of negotiations’ typologies 26 Fig 2.1 Graphical representation of the RBC model, based on Weiss

(1993) 39 Fig 2.2 Graphical representation of behaviors in the RBC model, based

Fig 2.3 Graphical representation of influencing conditions in the RBC

Fig 3.1 A triangle-shaped framework of the essential characteristics of

strategy 50

Fig 5.3 Graphical representation of interests and their influences (Caputo

2012) 110 Fig 5.4 Modification of the negotiating structure (Caputo 2012) 113 Fig 6.1 A graphical application of the OMoN model to the Fiat–Chrysler

Table 2.2 Attribution of a percentage weight to the stakeholders 37 Table 2.3 Utility matrix for the construction of a negotiation portfolio 37

Table 4.2 Strategic paths and ways of implementing the company in

adaptation 76 Table 5.1 Chrysler sales in the ten years prior to 2009 94 Table 5.2 Fiat–Chrysler negotiation main milestones 96 Table 5.3 Preliminary agreement between Fiat and Chrysler 104 Table 5.4 Stakeholder map of Fiat and Chrysler 105

© The Author(s) 2019

A Caputo, Strategic Corporate Negotiations,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15479-0_1

A Theoretical Framework for Negotiation

Abstract The Latin word negotium is the negation of otium and

origi-nally meant the nonexistence of leisure Since ancient times, the term brought with it the recognition of an activity, and more properly of a work activity There are many theories that have been studying the phenome-non of negotiations, and this chapter aims to provide an appropriate sum-mary of those theories to serve a theoretical framework for the book First,

an attempt was made to provide an overview of the meaning of tion provided by the literature, and then review the main disciplinary areas approached to the study of negotiations, until reaching the theory of negotiations, to which the work refers to Once the disciplinary fields of study and reference have been identified, starting from the general charac-teristics of the negotiations, the field has been narrowed down to the spe-cific subject of the book, thus arriving at multilateral negotiations

negotia-Keywords Negotiation • Literature review • Theory

The Latin word negotium is the negation of otium and originally meant the nonexistence of leisure Since ancient times, therefore, the term brought with it the recognition of an activity, and more properly of a work activity

The main definitions proposed by the literature are quite different among them They qualify for a more or less broad conceptualization and the accentuation of certain characteristics to the detriment of others.Garrone (1914), in La Scienza (The Science), debuted in this regard:

“Conceived and decided a deal, it is necessary to establish relationships, or conduct negotiations, either verbally or in writing, with one or more peo-ple, to possibly arrive at conclusion of it Depending on the case, the negotiations will be made with suppliers, customers, ship-owners, etc., and will embrace proposals, counter-proposals, observations, discussions, orders, confirmations.”

Ceccanti (1962) identified the methods of negotiation as “the teristics of the series of behaviors that precedes the birth of a relationship, and which are directly relevant to this effect” with a view to achieving a commercial exchange

charac-Rubin and Brown (1975) define negotiation as the process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle what they must give and take, or perform and receive in a transaction between them

Zartman (1977) defines it as a joint decision-making process between two or more parties in order to combine conflicting positions in a sin-gle decision

Gulliver (1979) introduces in his definition the novelty of the concept

of interdependence between the parties In fact, negotiation includes a set

of social processes leading to interdependent joint decision-making by negotiators through their dynamic interaction with the another For the author, negotiations are such a dynamic process of exploration in which change is inherent: changes in each party’s assessment of its requirements,

in its expectations of what is possible, preferable, and acceptable Analysis

of negotiation is necessarily the analysis of process and change within the ineluctable interdependence of the negotiating parties

Pruitt (1981) and Raiffa (1982) put the emphasis not only on tion as a joint decision-making process between several interdependent parts, but rather on the differences between the interests of the parties and the resulting conflict between opposing positions

qualifica-Lax and Sebenius (1986), examining the previous literature, consider negotiation as a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by two or more parties

In recent years, some Italian scholars have attempted to provide a nition of negotiation that includes as many features as possible

defi-Rumiati and Pietroni (2001) write that negotiation is a process of action between two or more parties in which one tries to establish what

inter-each one should give and receive in a reciprocal transaction aimed at reaching a mutually beneficial agreement Negotiation is therefore a way

of resolving possible divergences of interest when each of the parties has

to and is willing to give something of value to the other

In contrast, Giudici (2004) focuses on negotiation process as a complex phenomenon which includes psychological, behavioral, sociological, and economic elements This approach is characterized by the presence of divergent interests It consists of those interrelations between the indi-viduals aimed at changing the initial situation of expectations, contractual power relations, availability to mediation, and objectives

Mariani (2009), in a practice-oriented book, explained how tion presents a system for making collective decisions and takes the form

negotia-of a process that, in case negotia-of success, results in a joint decision, taken by two

or more actors at the same time Negotiation is a process that involves two

or more parties, characterized by different interests and preferences but linked by at least one common problem that they undertake to resolve satisfactorily Those parties rely exclusively on their own bargaining power and on the one deriving from their interactions, by exchanging material or immaterial resources in order to reach an agreement

And finally, Gatti (2008), qualifying the negotiation both as a way to make joint decisions between several parties and as a process, defines it as

a joint decision-making process, between two or more individual or lective actors

col-Considering the above, it is clear that the literature has tried to build over time a definition that contains the widest spectrum of characteris-tics Although some theories exposed the possibility of negotiation even with one individual, therefore within itself However, this type of nego-tiations are not the focus of interest for this book Therefore, most defi-nitions have been reported concerning the theories of economic and organizational negotiations

At this point, it is necessary to explore the field of the subjects that have approached the study of negotiations and, therefore, the theories that have been developed

The different approaches to the study of negotiations are varied and diverse, both as regards the disciplinary fields and the developed theories This is because negotiations are an object of investigation and research

which is interesting for many disciplines Among the disciplines that deal with the study of negotiations, there are, for example, psychology, sociol-ogy, political science, legal sciences, anthropology, computer sciences, mathematics, statistics, economics, and business economics.

Due to the variety and interdependence of the disciplines that study negotiations, it is easy to qualify its study as a field with a strongly inter-disciplinary nature (Gatti 2008) The nature of negotiations touches aspects of human behavior; therefore, its study cannot be separated from such variety of disciplines fundamental to the understanding of human behaviors and interactions In this regard, it is therefore obvious that eco-nomics studies draw from other disciplines, which in turn have influenced each other

Yet, in 1927, Zappa recognized the importance and inevitability of the interdisciplinary nature of business economic studies, not only concerning the aspects of the organization more directly related to the dynamics of human behavior, but also those related to the business economy and microeconomics

Such microeconomics, statistics, and mathematics are the first steps of the study on economic negotiations, with various models of game theory

As seen from the various definitions above, a negotiation activity is nized by everybody as a particular decision-making process The related studies, therefore, are placed in the broader context of studies on decision- making processes

recog-Drawing on the studies carried out by Raiffa et al (2002), Gatti (2008) presented a synoptic framework concerning the various theories pertain-ing to the field of decision-making studies According to this framework, the studies on decision-making processes are divided into two macro areas, which are identified from the number of decision-makers involved: theo-ries of individual decision-makers and studies exploring collective decision- makers In turn these two macro areas are divided according to the different theories that have been developed

The framework also shows the distinction based on the basic tion adopted: normative, descriptive, and prescriptive Finally, the main disciplines that contributed to the formation of the aforementioned theo-ries are reported

orienta-Such classification, displayed in a schematic and synthetic way, allows

us to have a first glance in the context of studies in the field of tion and how several theories have contributed to the development of the others

negotia-1.2.1 Normative, Descriptive, and Prescriptive Approaches

to Study Negotiations

Before going on to briefly describe the details of the main theories on negotiation, it is useful to explain the main approaches adopted to study the phenomenon

Over the years, within the scientific community, there has been a debate

on which orientation should prevail for the study of decision-making cesses The three contenders were the normative, the descriptive, and the prescriptive orientations

pro-The first, the normative, is based on some classical economic concepts such as objective or absolute rationality and concepts of maximization and optimization It studies how an idealized human being, therefore perfectly rational (according to the utilitarian logic capable of attributing a prefer-ence value for each state of reality and ordering these values to always choose the absolutely best configuration) and perfectly informed (on their own alternatives and consequences), should act in making its decisions It

is assumed that individuals act in conditions of perfect knowledge and according to a logic of profit maximization; this is known to be purely ideal and absolutely unreal The expression, widespread in the Anglo- Saxon literature, which sums up the principles of this orientation is “how decisions should be made”

In contrast, the second approach concerns the descriptive orientation and wants to describe the real behavior of individuals Hence the Anglo- Saxon expression “how decisions are made” or “how real people decide”

It is therefore studied how individuals make decisions in a satisfactory logic deriving from their own limited rationality Such concepts, intro-duced and initially developed by Simon (1957), are clearly opposed to the maximizing logic and absolute rationality The concepts of Simon have given life to the behavioral approach, adopted by many scholars (e.g., Cyert and March 1963, and the organizational theory of decisions) in order to study the actual behavior of individuals, and therefore of organi-zations, and how they take their decisions

According to Simon, the capacities of the human mind in ing and solving complex problems are far inferior to the magnitude and complexity of the problems; therefore, it is impossible to have a perfectly rational objective behavior or even a good approximation of it Without the possibility to maximize, however, the man seeks a sufficiently good solution Simon defines, in contrast to the perfectly rational economic

understand-man, his man as the administrative understand-man, who tries to satisfy, that is, to choose a satisfactory course of action, good enough The administrative man recognizes that the world he perceives is a model, drastically simpli-fied, of the infinite and always reborn confusion that constitutes the real world.

Finally, as for the prescriptive orientation, it is focused on providing indications on how individuals could decide better than they do (Gatti

2008) and therefore “how decisions could be made better” The aim of this orientation is to seek a theory that is useful to individuals who are limited to rational (real), through pragmatic advice calibrated on the char-acteristics of the decision-makers and the problems that are gradually being addressed This consultancy activity must act as a synthesis between the descriptive and the normative approach with the aim of being con-cretely useful, by identifying rules of rational behavior that can be trans-lated into real behaviors Bell et  al (1988) underlined how the three orientations should not be considered as alternative but as complementary

in order to grasp and exploit the possibilities of interaction

1.2.2 Theories on Individual Decision-Makers

As stated previously, the present work is not intended to analyze the plinary field that has approached the study of individual decision-making processes However, it is particularly necessary to identify which are the main disciplines on this field The two main doctrines that have analyzed the individual perspective of decision-making processes are decision the-ory (or decision analysis) and behavioral decision theory

disci-The first one, of normative orientation, has a purely mathematical and statistical configuration (since 1700–1800 with the studies of Bernoulli, Bayes, and Laplace) and has been particularly used for the development of

a wide range of economic theories, ranging from the disciplined amends

of the microeconomics to those of finance and business economics Howard Raiffa, a very important scholar of trading theories, has played a prominent role since the beginning of his career in these fields, with par-ticularly important contributions to game theory

The doctrine of behavioral decision theory, which has a descriptive entation, is instead coming from mainly psychological studies, also with important uses in many disciplines related to the economy Examples are the behavioral theories of consumers (as regards marketing) and also the theories about investors behavior in the financial markets (Shiller 2005)

ori-1.2.3 The Negotiation Theory and Other Theories

One of the first approaches to decision-making processes characterized

by a collective of decision-makers was, doubtless, game theory Game ory, dating back to the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern of 1944, deals with the analysis of strategic interactions between decisions and between decision-makers (called players), endowed with absolute rational-ity and motivated by maximizing logic Players have preferences differenti-ated from the outcomes and have a partial control of the situation, limited

the-to their actions; they usually have a perfect knowledge of the situation, of the alternatives, and of the possible moves of the adversaries Often the knowledge of the outcomes’ “values” and of the distribution of the prob-abilities of adversaries’ action is also assumed

The basic orientation is symmetrically normative (Raiffa et al 2002) because it identifies the “moves” that are excellent for all players, limited

to a purely theoretical and abstract sphere, without any attempt to adapt

to reality

Since the early 1960s, some scholars (Rapaport, Schelling, Walton, McKersie …) highlighted the fact that game theory did not seem a com-plete tool for the analysis of real decisions, especially for analysis of nego-tiations According to Sebenius (1992), game theory had been particularly useful for understanding the functioning of repeated negotiations in highly structured situations This provided important guidelines, princi-ples, and hypotheses on the negotiation process, but at the same time, revealed its important limitations over time

Game theory, according to these scholars, seems to imply some limits

in the negotiation field, which can be summarized in three points: (1) it provides too many balances; (2) it does not take into account limited rationality; (3) it does not take into account the information asymmetries and power relationships that trigger in situations Therefore, its use in real negotiation situations seems limited

The other side of the coin was the psychological and sociological ies, but even these studies in the economic field seemed to impose limits due to the excessive size and particularization of the considered issues and scarcity of economic uses

stud-Therefore, a third way was sought, the one of negotiation analysis, which took into account socio-psychological aspects, such as limited ratio-nality and power relations, together with purely economic aspects.

The first works in this regard can be considered two: the one of Fisher and Ury of 1981, closer to and influenced by the psychological and behav-ioral doctrine; and the one of Raiffa of 1982, closer to game theory and the mathematical-statistical disciplines Later, many other works followed

in the footsteps, including the 1986 work of Lax and Sebenius, which contributed to the creation of a strand in the managerial field

Initially, negotiation studies had developed mainly following personal experiences (Raiffa, Sebenius, Zartman) of scholars, in most cases, in political negotiations, such as the experience of Sebenius in the negotia-tions of the 1970s for the drafting of the law of the sea

Most of the aforementioned works were the result of in-depth studies and laboratory experiments carried out at Harvard University, within the Program On Negotiation (PON) The work by Raiffa (1982) is a sum-mary of the laboratory and classroom results carried out during the uni-versity and post-graduate courses in the field of negotiations It is surprising the creation of a real scientific laboratory to study, by combining psychol-ogy and statistics, the real behaviors during simulated negotiations.All this contributed, and is still contributing, to the construction of a theory of negotiations, of a prescriptive orientation, which develops a syn-thesis between “what is” and “what should be” The developed theory of negotiations implies non-perfectly rational actors with emotional and cog-nitive limits, without a perfect and common knowledge of the situation, and therefore of the possible interests and behaviors of the counterpart, which do not pursue optimal solutions (Gatti 2008) It is no coincidence that the title of Raiffa’s work is “The art and science of negotiating”, admitting both the scientific component and the most strictly psychologi-cal and attitudinal component of “knowing how to negotiate”

It emerges that the theory is less quantitative and more qualitative, with a lower degree of mathematical formalization, which allows for greater practical utility and diffusion with respect to game theory Furthermore, a new and important aspect is that negotiation theory takes into account the entry of facilitators (mediators or arbitrators) in the negotiation process The study of such facilitators, often referred as exter-nal third parties, is not limited to the only investigation of their impact on the given negotiation, but rather provides operational suggestions and best practices for facilitators to do their role Another fundamental characteristic, identified by Raiffa and colleagues, is the possibility of

cooperating and forming coalitions (in the case of negotiations involving more than two parties).

The reflection of Sebenius (1992) has a particular importance, which emphasizes some distinctive features of the theory of negotiations in rela-tion to the limits of game theory

Three of these are worth emphasizing:

• assumption of a “radical subjective perspective”: therefore, on the one hand, it is assumed that the evaluation of the probabilities about the events and the related outcomes is left to the parties and not to the configuration of the game; on the other, the subjective percep-tions of the parties have a decisive importance;

• assumption of the possibility that the parties “leave value on the table”: then the possibility of the existence of inefficient agreements

is admitted;

• focusing on the “zone of possible agreement”: with respect to the solution of the game, it is assumed that an area of possible positive agreement is needed to reach an agreement, admitting subjectivity in its assessment

Game theory, therefore, according to this approach, seems to be ited and insufficient in the negotiation field, also for what concerns the so-called cooperative games In cooperative games, communication between the parties and the possibility of making binding and complete agreements is always admitted, assuming that once the agreement is reached, the parties will certainly respect it Conversely, the possibility of a binding agreement is not permitted in non-cooperative games

lim-In both cases, it is not presumed a collaborative spirit between the ties, an assumption that is explicitly made by the negotiation theory, which reflects reality Moreover, in negotiation theory, the limit of the unreality

par-of contractual completeness is exceeded, precisely taking into account the possibility of non-compliance with the agreements reached or renegotia-tion, with the consequent dynamics (Lax and Sebenius 1986; Raiffa 1982) Finally, negotiation theory always assumes the necessity, and not the pos-sibility, of some form of communication and interaction of the parties.Negotiation theory is therefore configured as an overcoming of game theory, from which it draws its foundation, with a different underlying orientation adopted

Even if it is not the subject of this investigation, for the sake of ness of the discussion, it is important to briefly quote the organizational

complete-theory of decisions and the behavioral game complete-theory The organizational theory of decisions has its roots in the behavioral theory of the company, whose main exponents are Simon, March, and Cyert Also important are the contributions of Chester (1938) and the evolutionary theory of the company, which have greatly influenced all scholars of business economics, including the author.

The basic orientation of the theory is common to that of the tion theory but puts the accent of its analysis on organizational behavior Some fundamental aspects are reported, as recalled by Gatti (2008): (1) the ambiguity that pervades organizations; (2) the constant evolution of the organizational decision-making process; (3) incentives, sanctions, and the purpose of survival underlying the decision-making process and its results; (4) repetitive decisions that permeate the activity of numerous participants, especially at a lower level; (5) the pervasiveness of conflict in organizations, essentially conceived as political systems

negotia-From a systemic perspective, the organizational theory of decisions poses numerous insights into deepening regarding internal negotiations within the company, given its focus on the relationships and interactions

of individuals

As for the theory of behavioral games, it attempts to merge the object

of the investigation of game theory with the methods of experimental analysis of psychological matrix, assuming as hypothesis the limited rationality of the actors and a basic descriptive orientation, trying to make the traditional game theory closer to reality

Moreover, in the Italian management school of thoughts, there were numerous studies and theories that dealt with negotiation Approaches are very interesting both in terms of commercial studies, with exponents such

as Garrone, Caprara, and Zappa, and for the management doctrine, such

as Ceccanti

In this section, starting from the theoretical basis analyzed so far, we will proceed with the study of the characters that qualify a negotiation

To start, we report the definition of negotiation given by Gatti (2008)

as a joint decision-making process that takes place between dent actors, who are defined parts of the negotiation; it is established between parties that reveal different preferences and, therefore, partially conflicting interests; it may conclude with an agreement between the parties; it implies a confrontation between the actors, with reciprocal

communication and exchange of material and immaterial resources; it has

an opportunistic nature; it involves a creative research activity

As a process, the negotiation activity consists of qualifying characters, process steps, and process structure It is considered of particular interest, for the purposes of this work, the deepening of every character of the negotiation and of the structures; as regards the phases, nevertheless, we will proceed synthetically (Fig. 1.1)

In the diagram below, we divided, according to Gatti (2008), the acteristics that qualify the negotiations in terms of assumptions, methods, and nature of the negotiation process (Fig. 1.2)

char-Characters

qualifying

negotiations

Negotiation phases

Negotiation structure

Fig 1.1 Composition of the negotiation process

Conflict of interests

Potential agreement

Ways Communicationand resources

1.3.1 The Conditions: Interdependence, Conflict of Interests,

and Potential Agreement

The conditions, interdependence between the parties, conflict of interests, and the potential of an agreement, are elements necessary but not suffi-cient to enable the negotiation process to take place The lack of a condi-tion affects the beginning of the negotiation and, therefore, its existence

1.3.1.1 The Interdependence

The first character reported by the definition emphasizes the existence of

a relationship of interdependence between the parties

Thompson (1967) indicated that the interdependence related to the internal relations within a company can take three forms:

• generic interdependence, a situation in which each component gives

a discrete contribution to the whole, and each one is supported by the whole, consequently although without direct interaction, the result of each part is influenced by the performance of the other parts;

• sequential interdependence, where direct and sequential interaction

is necessary between the parties, the output of one is the input of the following and so on, so the action of each part is directly influenced

by the upstream part and directly influences that downstream;

• mutual interdependence, a situation in which the outputs of each part become the inputs of another, so there is both an accumula-tion and a serial aspect, and the peculiarity is the reciprocity of interdependence

Given this definition of the concept of interdependence in the tion real, the pursuit of objectives and the satisfaction of parties’ interests depends on, and is therefore conditioned by, at least in part, the behavior

negotia-of one or more other parties, and vice versa

Strategically, every choice of an actor is influenced by the past and future choices of others, and in turn influences them As a consequence, the negotiation outcome is strongly conditioned by this process of recip-rocal conditioning

Interdependence therefore sets limits to the behavior of the actors Numerous laboratory experiments, such as those carried out by Raiffa (1982), have questioned the desirability of having certain behaviors, whether they are positively or negatively judged by the parties, in relation

to their effect on the other parts

But interdependence not only manifests itself and is nurtured in tiation but represents, as already mentioned, a presupposition This is because, following Ceccanti (1962), it should also be considered as com-munication There could be no negotiating process between the parties if they did not communicate in some way; indeed, probably these would not even meet, or even consider negotiating something, not knowing what or with whom.

nego-For the purposes of this work, we cannot fail to note that dence and interaction between companies is a significant feature of the current socio-economic structure In particular, as will be referred to below, companies need to cooperate with each other in order to respond

interdepen-to the competitive pressures that the processes of globalization have accentuated

The dynamics of negotiation and interdependence are therefore ured as the daily bread of companies and managers, more than in the past The activity of companies as well as the one of institutions is increasingly conditioned by the context and behavior of the other actors We are increasingly seeing the effects, both positive and negative, of widespread generic interdependence in and between markets, nations, and continents

config-1.3.1.2 The Conflict of Interests

The second assumption that qualifies a decision-making process as tiation is the conflict between the interests of the parties involved As will

nego-be seen in more detail in the paragraph on negotiating structures, the interests of the parties and their respective evaluations constitute one of the elements of the negotiating structure (Lewicki et al 1992)

The difference, however, between a generic decision-making process and a negotiation is not so much due to the configuration of the interests

at stake, present in both cases, but rather concerns the evaluation that the parties have of the same issues and therefore the degree of contraposition (conflict) that is between the positions of the parties Therefore, these interests do not have to be perfectly aligned or completely opposed (Rubin and Brown 1975) Since, in the first case, we would have a mere problem- solving activity, in the second, we would not have, as we shall see later, the requirement of the potential agreement, since there is no room for negotiation

On problem-solving activities, there is a theoretical dispute about whether or not it is a negotiation process It is evident that for the defini-tion of the negotiation process chosen in this work, it was not decided to

configure them as such However, we believe that problem solving is an important part (or tool) in the negotiation process.

Gatti (2008) proposes a distinction between conflict as a situation and conflict as an activity In the first case, we refer to the meaning of conflict

of interests, understood as a divergence of views, and as such having a neutral perspective In the second case, we mean the conflict as the activity

of interaction, meeting, and comparison between parts of a relationship, and can have positive or negative connotations depending on the case.The concept of conflict meant in the present work is broad and neutral Therefore, we do not propose evaluations regarding the positivity or nega-tivity of the conflict, but rather the mere difference between the assess-ments of the interests at stake of the parties We consider the objectives of the parties not completely aligned and not completely opposed

Conflict is an element that characterizes negotiations both as a situation and as an activity The conflictual situation is configured as a prerequisite for negotiation, while the conflictual activity reveals itself as a moment of negotiation, placing itself at the base of the communication and carrying out of the negotiation process

1.3.1.3 The Potential Agreement

It has been said, therefore, that a certain level of conflict and divergence between the interests that cannot be completely opposed or convergent since it is necessary for the decision-making process to be qualified as negotiation At this point, the third and last prerequisite of negotiation can therefore be introduced: the possibility of reaching an agreement

It is important to underline how in the theory is made reference not

to the “need” to reach an agreement, rather to the “possibility” that it could be reached Probably no negotiator would sit at the negotiating table knowing for sure that he could not reach an agreement Therefore,

an outcome of non-agreement is always conceivable, but there must be

a probability assessment, although minimal, that the negotiation come leads to a satisfactory agreement By satisfactory agreement, we mean an agreement that potentially meets the interests and objectives of the parties

out-The assumption of the potential agreement is strongly linked to those

of interdependence between the parties and the conflict of interests If understood in a virtuous sense, it is easy to imagine how the interdepen-dence of the parties has the function of facilitating the identification of the potentiality of the agreement, just as a configuration of the interests that

are not completely opposed, as already mentioned, represents a necessary condition because there is a potential agreement.

From the previous statements emerges the need for a willingness to negotiate between the parties, a consequence of the triad of assumptions Without the parties’ willingness to negotiate, it will be impossible for a negotiation process to begin or exist, in a way that would have a satisfac-tory outcome for the parties involved

1.3.2 Negotiation Procedures: Communication and Exchange

The fourth qualifying character of the negotiations concerns the field of methods of carrying out the negotiation and is configured as the activity

of communication and exchange of resources and information

The communication and exchange of resources and information between the parties, as mentioned above, is a consequence of the interdependence between them and is necessary for the negotiation process to be carried out.The theme of communication, the one of resources and information exchange, has always been considered unique in the literature on negotia-tions It could not be otherwise because the exchange to take place requires communication, and by communicating, even implicitly, we exchange information Therefore, it is impossible to separate the two sides

of the same coin

The negotiation process, in order to take place, not only requires munication and exchange of information and resources but is strongly influenced by them In this regard, Rubin and Brown (1975) stated that the negotiators were highly influenced by the information they were able

com-to obtain, which in turn influenced the other party with the information they intended to release Thus, there is a mutual interdependence during the negotiation process due to this continuous exchange of information and, moreover, due to the methods of carrying out the communication process (Raiffa 1982)

On this subject, Gulliver (1979) identified two processes that are taneously deployed during the communication and exchange process:

1 the cyclical process, which consists of the repeated exchange of information between the parties, with consequent reciprocal influ-ence on their assessments, expectations, and objectives;

2 the development process meant as the progress of the negotiation toward its outcome

On the one hand, the parties will initially communicate and exchange information and resources needed for the conduct of the negotiation pro-cess There are many examples in literature: the parties will need a place and the necessary equipment to negotiate; if a group of negotiators does not reside in the place of negotiations, they will have to proceed with their transportation and accommodation The examples are innumerable and let us understand, as we will see with reference to the phases of negotia-tion, that a pre-negotiation will have to be carried out to establish the aspects of the actual negotiation.

On the other hand, consequently, the parties will have to communicate and exchange resources also during the negotiation This exchange can be directly linked to the object of the negotiation (e.g., transfers of resources

to guarantee), or it may be tied to the needs of the negotiators to fulfill their role (e.g., the supply of meals, housing …)

Deepening further the field of communication methods, Raiffa et  al (2002) have basically identified three communication settings that the par-ties can put in place during the negotiation process It is important to clarify that in the work, we will refer to the generic “the parties”, but we must not understand it from a perspective of behavior symmetry Moreover, the parties can not only set the communication asymmetrically, but they can change it during negotiation, and it is not certain that the adopted approach is explicitly revealed Studies on the strategic use of communica-tion have produced some conflicting results and have revealed, over the years, that there is no better modus operandi The appropriate style should

be strategically adopted according to the situation It is therefore tant for the negotiators to have a complete mastery of techniques and theory

impor-Full, Open, Truthful Exchange (FOTE) is the setting with which the

parties decide to communicate in a sincere and fully transparent way, ing no secrets from each other It can be said that the parties adopt a fully cooperative behavior

keep-In Partial, Open, Truthful Exchange (POTE), the parts are still sincere

but adopt a partially transparent setting; the parties omit what they do not want to say but what they say is the truth

No Open Truthful Exchange (NOTE) implies that the parts interact in

a completely false way In this case, the parties adopt a non-cooperative behavior, trying to mislead the other party in order to obtain individual advantages

Of particular importance is the relation of cause and effect that the theory has identified between the role of the negotiator, both within the

negotiation and within the part in the case of non-monolithic parts, and the communicative style adopted In essence, it has been identified that the choice of communicative style is influenced not only by the character-istics of the person and the situation, but also by his role The aspect of the role of the parties and of the personality of the negotiators will be dis-cussed in greater detail later in the work.

1.3.3 Nature: Opportunism and Creative Research

The third and last aspect of the features that characterize the negotiations concerns the nature of the same; in turn, this nature is distinguished by being opportunistic and aimed at the search for creativity

Undoubtedly, from the arguments presented on the concepts of flict of interests and communication, it is clear how the negotiation is permeated in its development by the opportunistic behavior of the parties Gatti (2008) defines opportunism, through an excellent metaphor, as the

con-“compass of negotiation interaction”

As the concept of conflict of interests, opportunism should also be understood in a broad and neutral sense (meant as an entrepreneurial spirit) and therefore free from judgments about positivity and negativity This is because all relationships between human beings are permeated by opportunism In the same way, the behavior of companies, seen as systems

of relationships between parties (Cafferata 2009), underpins the same opportunistic tension of the participants

Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the parties participate in a tion process according to a principle of convenience, following a logic of individual rationality Depending on whether this rationality is configured

negotia-as pure or reciprocal, there are behaviors aimed at pursuing satisfactory results for the part independently of the joint result, or, they are oriented toward the pursuit of jointly satisfactory results In this regard, as will be focused later in the discussion of multilateral negotiations, it is illuminating the thinking of Raiffa, according to which, during the negotiations, links are triggered to even external factors/relationships to the specific object that guide the behavior of the parties—for example, the possibility of obtaining joint future benefits or linking with other businesses with the same party Therefore, it is not said that the parties behave selfishly, rather they possess a tendency, even if an opportunistic way, to look for joint results.This allows the connection with the last of the characters of negotia-tions: creative research The creative research activity of joint solutions

underlies the whole negotiation process and differentiates it from other decision-making processes.

In the negotiations, it has been said, the goal is to reach a potential satisfactory agreement jointly; to do this, it is necessary that the parties engage in the search for solutions in order to balance the different inter-ests involved and bring positions closer together Gulliver (1979) notes how negotiation qualifies itself through a dynamism of exploration and learning that leads to changes in interests, objectives, expectations, evalu-ations, and solutions

Many scholars tried to identify the phases in which the negotiation process

is concretely articulated Some acted according to the type of negotiation, others through more generic ways Given the vastness and breadth of the field of investigation, no exact route has been identified, rather a huge num-ber of negotiation models have been reached to explain contingent situations.The usefulness highlighted by Lewicki and colleagues of a study and a model and phase approach is undoubted (1992) However, it is impossible

to identify a univocal way Therefore, the literature has proposed several models to which negotiators can refer to their work in order to do it better.One of the most complete models for phases seems to be the one iden-tified by Gulliver (1979), which sees the articulation of the negotiation process in eight phases:

1 the search for the arena;

2 the definition of the agenda;

3 exploration of the field and clarification of negotiation issues;

4 approach of the details;

5 preparation of the final negotiation;

6 final negotiation;

7 formalization of the outcome of the negotiation;

8 implementation of the outcome of the negotiation

A more concise approach, in which four phases are identified, is that of Graham and Sano (1989):

1 general sounding;

2 specific information exchange;

3 persuasion;

4 concessions and agreement

In both cases, the existence of a preliminary negotiation is recognized for the choice of the rules, the place and the object of the negotiation, followed then by the actual negotiation It is important to specify that the setting up of a phase-based negotiation according to a model does not guarantee the possibility of reaching a satisfactory agreement, although it may facilitate it

of NegoTiaTioNsWhile dealing with a distributive, integrative negotiation, with one or more issues, dealt with by one or more parties, you will have to deal with the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA)

The simplest case is constituted by a two-party distributive negotiation

on one issue, and it can be represented with a bidirectional straight line (monetary axis) Ideally, on one side, there is the part that intends to mini-mize the outcome of the negotiation (buyer) and on the other is the one that wants to maximize it (seller)

The ZOPA also represents the following quantities for each part:

• The open request, that is, the value initially revealed to the other party for the start of negotiations It is usually a much lower (high) value than the buyer’s (seller’s) target As Raiffa (1982) pointed out, even if the point of agreement in this type of negotiations tends to stand around the average between the opening values, opening with

an excessively low (high) value for a part can bring considerable advantages, for example, the indisposition of the other part or even the interruption of the negotiations

dis-• The target price, that is, the value that ideally would be achieved by each party at the close of trading

• The reserve price, that is, the point above (or below) which the buyer (seller) wishes to abandon the negotiations Each bargainer knows his or her reserve price but has only probabilistic information about the other party’s reserve price Very often the parties have an impre-cise feel for their own reserve price and make no formal attempt to assess the probability of the other party’s reserve price

• The point of possible agreement, that is, an abstract estimate of the probable point of agreement, for theoretical purposes.

• The zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) represented between the reserve price of the buyer and that of the seller So, if this is positive, there is a possibility between the parties to reach an agreement that

is considered positive for both

For our purposes, it is useful to further specify the concept of reserve price Introduced by Raiffa (1982), this concept has been repeatedly studied and often contrasted with the concept of resistance point (Blount- White and Neale 1991) In both cases, however, we start from the same point to carry out the analysis: the concept of “best alternative

to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA), introduced in the contents by Raiffa and then detailed in form by Fisher et al (1981) According to these theories, the reserve price is determined by each party through an assessment of the contractual alternatives and the transaction costs asso-ciated with these and the failure to reach an agreement Raiffa proposes

a scientific evaluation by the parties based on rigorous calculations and probability distributions The Blount-White and the Neale, on the other hand, introduce the psychological factor and a series of subjective evalu-ations on the preferences of the agreement or the alternative in the anal-ysis of the parts

It seems useful to arrive at a synthesis that takes into account a ous analysis, psychological factors and, as regards the negotiations that affect the business world, environmental factors In fact, we are increas-ingly witnessing negotiations strongly influenced by the context and by forces, apparently, external to the negotiating object For example, think about the role of the institutions and the trade unions in the negotiations of company merger or closure of a production site

rigor-Gatti (2008) points out that, although the literature has so far focused

on the concept of reserve price, in the real negotiations, the parties’ tive is a very important value The focus on the objective, if not accompa-nied by the careful consideration of the reserve price, generates an anchoring effect to this dysfunctional value for the positive outcome of the negotiation For a conscious part of this, it is therefore also useful to ana-lyze and take into consideration the “zone of aspiration levels” of one’s own and of the other part, that is, the difference between the objectives of the parties

objec-1.6 The sTruCTure of a NegoTiaTioN

By negotiation structure, we mean the set of components and ships between components that underlie the negotiation as a joint decision- making process (Gatti 2008)

relation-One of the first and best moments in identifying the generic ing structure was that of Sebenius in his work in 1986: the author indi-cates four basic elements that can be found in every negotiating situation,

negotiat-be it the simplest or the most complex

• Interests, issues, and positions By implying the existence of parties

with a willingness to negotiate, the author makes a first distinction between the configuration of interests, the issues of negotiation, and the relative positions of the parties The connection between the three elements is rarely simple; as we initially said the negotiations are permeated by the interdependence between the parties and therefore between their behaviors, thoughts, and positions Therefore, we often find ourselves in situations of negotiating impasse due to convergent interests, but to positions that are consid-erably distant and divergent; often incompatible positions hide the same interests So, the author proposes to the negotiators to deeply investigate their own configuration of interests together with that of the other party, avoiding to stay focused only on the initial positions and issues; the issues can be added or strategically removed in the course of the negotiation to meet the common interests of the parties

• Alternatives to negotiated agreement People negotiate in order to

satisfy the totality of their interests better through some jointly decided action than they could otherwise (Sebenius 1992) Sebenius,

taking up Raiffa’s concept of the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, highlights how each part is during the negotiation and

the evaluation phase of the reached agreement, making comparisons with its own best alternative Therefore, the alternative turns out to

be an internalized element of the negotiating structure and as such changes over time and influences the parties in their positions, issues, and interests The author’s advice is to use scientific techniques for the objective evaluation of alternatives It seems undoubted, remem-bering what has been said about the opportunistic nature of the par-ties’ negotiation behavior, that a better alternative achieves a lower

“interest” in continuing the negotiation It is therefore essential for the negotiators, especially for the “most interested” part (or without

a “best alternative way”), to evaluate and know the respective natives and evaluations on the matter.

alter-• Creating and claiming value Sebenius does not adhere to the

distinc-tion, which will be seen later, between distributive (fixed pie) or grative (expandable pie) negotiations His concept is not explicitly starting from the analysis of the negotiation itself but rather from the analysis of the behavior of the parties In this context, a classification

inte-is carried out according to which the parties behave as value creators

or as value claimants So, it is the behavior of the parties that leads the negotiation on a distributive or integrative plan Sebenius imagines a straight line with the two types of negotiators at the ends Valuable creators tend to believe that the most effective negotiators should have sufficient inventiveness and collaborative spirit to reach an agree-ment that looks favorably preferable in relation to their respective external alternatives They behave in a cooperative way, focusing on differences of interests, revealing information to the other party, and approaching the negotiation not as a clash but as a collaborative pro-cess Communication and information exchange, when done prop-erly, can help negotiators create value together The impulse to create value, discovering mutual benefits, requires a certain ingenuity and mastery of a series of techniques and attitudes: techniques and atti-tudes aimed at facilitating that process of creative research implied by every negotiation Fisher et al (1981) are supporters of this line and take as an example the negotiations between Israel and Egypt for the Sinai border, solved thanks to the discovery of the true interests of the parties that were different and a creative solution that was satisfactory for both Finally, value creators argue that common interests must be explored and cultivated with regard to the substance of the negotia-tion To create value, we must find common advantages for each of the participants, where to create value means to enlarge the pie On the other hand, the value advertisers are positioned: these tend to consider the search for common advantages to be of little use, consid-ering that negotiation is a hard and ruthless bargaining (Lax and Sebenius 1986); their orientation is based on the concept of negotiat-ing victory to the detriment of the other party, not admitting the possibility of a victory for both The value advertisers adopt non-cooperative behavior: they start from high demands, they give little by little, they exaggerate the value of the concessions made, they mini-mize those of others, they keep our information confidential, they try

to mislead the opponent, and they adopt a hard and firm negotiation style on their positions and principles The synthesis between the two

“sides” is not simple, as it is easy to imagine and as the theory has amply illustrated: the negotiator is the victim of the dilemma whether

to act as a creator of value or as a complainant The dilemma of the negotiator is a version adapted to the negotiations of the very famous prisoner’s dilemma that is studied in game theory Negotiators get the maximum common advantages in case they have both cooperative behaviors; they get mediocre agreements in case neither of them chooses to cooperate, while in case of asymmetric behaviors, the one who cooperates receives “less” than the mediocre agreement and the one who claims receives “more” than the good agreement This hap-pens because, on the one hand, the tactics to claim value can prevent its creation, and on the other hand, the attempts to create value can

be damaged by the tactics that aim to claim it In the tactical choices, the negotiator is led not to manifest openness and collaboration The literature does not provide a solution to the dilemma: its existence is recognized but at the same time it is recognized that the distinction between creating and claiming is not so clear cut Therefore, the knowledge of negotiation theories and tools, added to a good dose of art in knowing how to negotiate (Raiffa 1982), can limit and some-times eliminate the negative effects of the dilemma

• Changing the game The last element illustrated by Sebenius is the

one concerning the possibility of changing the game during the negotiation, relevant to the evolution of the negotiation The author points out that the elements presented so far are subject to change during the negotiation—change that, on the one hand, is implicit and natural in the evolution of the negotiations and, on the other hand, can be strategically driven by the parties It is therefore possi-ble to modify the issues in a strategic way both toward creating value and claiming value In both cases, the strategic routes are not abso-lute and net but involve trade-offs on the effects For example, join-ing questions to widen the zone of possible agreement by exploiting the divergences of interests between the parties is undoubtedly a useful strategy to create value, but at the same time, can have nega-tive implications, when it complicates the negotiating activity or destroys the possibility to resolve other issues Symmetrically, the provision or separation of issues can simplify the negotiation process, but can entail complications for reaching agreements on other issues

The same can be said for strategies for claiming value, in addition to the issues the participants can change (this aspect will be examined later on, as the specific object of the work is precisely the effect of the entry of new parties in the negotiation between companies) Furthermore, it is possible to strategically manipulate interests: on the one hand, it is possible to put in place actions in order to evoke interests aiming to create a common value and, on the other hand, it

is possible to avoid interests judged negative for reaching a tory agreement for the parties All these “moves” can also be used as

satisfac-a thresatisfac-at to the other psatisfac-arty; for exsatisfac-ample, by linking new issues satisfac-and new interests, you can anchor the outcome of one negotiation to another in which the other party has significant interests at stake Even in this case, literature does not identify unique and excellent ways Instead, all the possible strategies are defined, trying to create

a culture for the negotiators so that they can use them in the sary moment, putting them on guard of the possible unexpected and negative implications that they may have

neces-Adhering to the setting of Gatti (2008), which makes a synthesis of the theories developed so far, a negotiating structure consists of three funda-mental elements:

• the parts involved;

• the subjects, matters, or issues subject to negotiation;

• the preferences and, therefore, the interests of the parties, which give rise to their positions

This approach allows the classification of negotiations according to the three elements

Number of parties involved This classification distinguishes the two-

party negotiations, bilateral or dyadic, from multi-party or multilateral negotiations (Raiffa 1982) The same distinction can be made for the sin-gle party This, in fact, can be individual or collective, depending on whether to negotiate with either an individual or a group/organization; within it, the group/organization can be configured as homogeneous or not, and in the same way, monolithic or not, depending on whether the decisions taken in the negotiations have to be ratified or not It is undoubted that the increase in the parts or their heterogeneity entails a complication

of the negotiating dynamic, as will be seen in the next paragraph

Number of issues This criterion distinguishes the negotiations

accord-ing to the number of subjects, matters, or topics (issues) in question: it is therefore possible to distinguish the negotiations for a question from those for more questions (Raiffa 1982) Also, the increase in issues, as for the parties, is a complicating factor in the negotiation process; in the same way, however, the increase in the issues may involve bringing the parties closer together, widening the area of possible agreement, and may lead the negotiations from distributive to supplementary Therefore, even if it involves a complication of the negotiating dynamic, this can be counter-balanced by favorable dynamics to reach a better final agreement In this regard, the literature identified three fundamental approaches to dealing with issues through the analysis of experiences in important negotiations: (a) “the one-text approach” used in the Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s (Raiffa 1982), and frequently used in mul-tilateral negotiations, consisting in the drafting, often by a mediator, of an initial draft agreement that takes into account the interests of the parties, which is then submitted, in turn, to the revision of the parties, in a cyclic and continuous process in order to reach agreement; (b) “the question- by- issue approach”, one of the first approaches used in reality and ana-lyzed by literature, frequently used in the case of “simple” negotiations with monolithic parties and not too divergent interests (Raiffa 1982) con-sisting in tackling the issues in a sequential manner, gradually reaching agreements on one issue at a time; (c) “the package approach” is based on grouping the issues into homogeneous classes, then continuing with the negotiation package by package, in a sequential way, this approach can be used if the issues are easily grouped into classes; otherwise, the negotiation for the grouping could become an element of further complication

The configuration of the interests of the parties On the basis of the

clas-sification criterion according to the configuration of the interests of the parties, it is possible to distinguish the negotiations in distributive or inte-grative terms The former are also called win-lose or fixed pie, while the latter are called win-win or expandable pie (Pruitt 1981) Distributive negotiations are set up by the interests of the opposing parties and in con-flict with the subject of the negotiation, which as we said earlier may be one or more issues The main characteristic of these negotiations, widely used in the literature for educational purposes (game theory), is that the object of negotiation is not expandable Consequently, negotiation is focused on the division, and distribution, of the benefits deriving from the subject negotiated The negotiation, therefore, will take place through a

series of concessions of the parties in order to get closer to a satisfactory point of agreement Raiffa (1982), in his laboratory experiments, has identified how statistically the point of agreement falls back on the average

of the values announced as first offered by the negotiators However, other studies emphasize the values of reserve or resistance (Blount-White and Neale 1991) Vice versa, the additional negotiations have the charac-teristic of having a configuration of the interests of the parties that are not totally opposed and above all of having the object of expanding negotia-tion Hence, there is a dual difference with respect to distributive negotia-tions First it is concerning the interests of the parties, which often have different valuations of the subject or different and non-conflicting inter-ests Second is the nature of the subject of the negotiation, which, also thanks to the difference in parties’ views, is changing It is undoubted that the possibility of reaching a better agreement for both parties is more probable in integrative negotiations than in distributive ones In fact, the literature prescribes that negotiators seek to bring the negotiation from

Number of parts involved

Bilateral negotiations

Multilateral negotiations

Number of issues

One-issue negotiations

Multiple-issues negotiations

Configuration

of interests

Distributive negotiations

Integrative negotiations

Fig 1.3 Classification

of negotiations’

typologies

distributive to integrative through ad hoc strategies, an issue that will be further explored in the work (Fig. 1.3).

The aforementioned classification in the current world seems to have a value, albeit of great importance, merely theoretical This is because, as seen in detail in this paragraph and in the final chapter in which the busi-ness case will be discussed, it is very difficult, in the economic field, to find real negotiation situations in which the parties involved are only two, the issue is only one, and negotiation is merely distributive Often indirectly related parties (e.g., the role of trade unions in a merger or business acqui-sition case, or the role of institutions in the negotiations for the construc-tion of a new production site, and so on) have the option, and the interest,

to enter into negotiation and influence its outcome and trend Or, through the so-called arithmetic of questions (Sebenius 1992), the addition or sub-traction of questions often leads to negotiations on different levels from the initial ones, and the link to other questions, albeit external to the object, leads negotiations to be mostly integrative

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