Disaster policy and its practice in the united states

KEYWORDS cost of policy, cost of quality, disaster management, emergency ment, federal government, industrial engineering, systems engineering, legislation, mitigation, planning, policy

INDUSTRIAL AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING COLLECTION

William R Peterson, Editor

Disaster Policy and Its Practice

in the United States

A Brief History and Analysis

Andrea M Jackman Mario G Beruvides Gary S Nestler

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Disaster Policy and Its Practice in the United States

A Brief History and Analysis

Andrea M Jackman • Mario G Beruvides

• Gary S Nestler

This book is intended as a history and survey of large-scale emergency management policy in the United States The field of emergency management is relatively new, and rapidly changing

as new technology and technology-dependent societal systems emerge The impacts of past catastrophic events on policy development, and implications of older policy in new markets are discussed

The book also explores non-governmental policies as they relate to for-profit emergency management and professional associations of practitioners For any person working in the field

of emergency management who wonders “why do we do things the way we do?” this book is essential.

Dr Andrea M Jackman has her BS in meteorology and PhD in wind science & engineering, and has worked in disaster science since 2003 She currently works on the software development team for a national disaster mitigation model distributed globally by the U.S government, and conducts research on the cost and effectiveness of federal-level disaster policy.

Dr Mario G Beruvides is an AT&T professor of industrial engineering at Texas Tech University, and director of the Laboratory for Systems Solutions His ongoing research

isomorphological processes, and the application of systems engineering principles to emergency management.

Dr Gary S Nestler has 30 years experience in the emergency management field He currently maintains a license to practice medicine, serves as a captain in his local fire department working with emergency medical services, and remains as an active member of a local law enforcement SWAT team.

ISBN: 978-1-60650-699-8

DISASTER

POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

DISASTER

POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

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ISBN-13: 978-1-60650-699-8 (print)

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Emergency management and the study of disasters is a relatively young industry, beginning in its current form only after the World Wars of the previous century Yet with the ever-increasing complexity of society in the Digital Age, the management and recovery from disasters in recent years have received more attention than ever In a field traditionally belonging

to the military and social sciences, the authors of this book review ing policy and standard practices within emergency management from

exist-an industrial exist-and systems engineering perspective The book explores both the contextual history of managing disasters in the United States, both at the national and local level, and describes how these events influ-enced federal policy development in the latter half of the 20th century Compliance with this policy, and existing challenges with 21st century technology, is further explored, along with recommendations for future policy directions Practitioners of emergency management, and academic researchers who ask the question “is our policy working?” should find the text relevant to their endeavors

KEYWORDS

cost of policy, cost of quality, disaster management, emergency ment, federal government, industrial engineering, systems engineering, legislation, mitigation, planning, policy design, policy, preparedness, quality measures, recovery, response, workforce professionals

manage-c ontents

1 i ntroduction : W hy W e n eed to a naLyze P oLicy

1.1 Why Emergency Management? An Introduction

by Andrea Jackman 11.2 About This Book 4

2 e mergency m anagement in the u nited s tates : 1800–1969 7

2.1 Nineteenth-Century Beginnings 72.2 U.S Disasters in the Early 20th Century 82.3 Duck and Cover! Military Influence and the Cold War 12Websites of Interest 14

3 t he 1970 s : f our P hases and fema 15

3.1 Shifting Government Priorities and Agencies 153.2 Our Four-Phase Cycle: The Industry Standard 173.3 The New Federal Emergency Management Agency 23Websites of Interest 24

4 t he s tafford a ct of 1988—t hen and n oW 27

4.1 The Stafford Act 274.2 Updates to Federal Disaster Management 284.3 The Stafford Act in the 21st Century 31Websites of Interest 34

5 dma 2000 and s ePtember 11, 2001: a s hift from

5.1 Mitigation Gets Its Own Law 355.2 How to Comply with DMA 2000 375.3 Implementation Challenges for DMA 2000 395.4 Industry Impacts of Terrorism 445.5 The National Incident Management System 44Websites of Interest 45

6 h urricane K atrina and PKemra: n eW c haLLenges

6.1 Hurricane Katrina, a Disaster of Perception 476.2 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform

Act of 2006 51Websites of Interest 54

7 c ertifications , s ocieties , and s eLf -a ssessments :

7.1 Process Quality in Emergency Management 587.2 The International Association of Emergency Managers 597.3 Certified Emergency Managers 597.4 The National Emergency Management Association

and Programs 61Websites of Interest 63

8 t he b usiness of d isaster 65

8.1 Background and Challenges 658.2 Risk–Reward Ratio 668.3 System Constraints and Expectations 688.4 Expectations 698.5 Return on Investment—A Case in Point—Georgia 768.6 Analytics and Business Intelligence 80

9 e mergency m anagement 2020: t he c urrent s tate of

r esearch and P oLicy r ecommendations for the f uture 83

9.1 The Next Five Years 839.2 Future Policy and Research Directions 84

l ist of f igures

Figure 3.1 The cycle of the four phases 23Figure 3.2 Four phases of emergency management at all levels

of government 24Figure 4.1 Stafford Act declaration process Renken (2016) 31Figure 4.2 Number of declared major disasters in the United States

Renken (2016) 32Figure 5.1 HMP completion percentages for the continental

United States, 2007 40Figure 6.1 National response structure prior to 2007 as

self-reported by FEMA 53Figure 6.2 National response structure following PKEMRA-driven

changes in 2012 as self-reported by FEMA 53Figure 8.1 Capabilities needed for effective incident, event

or emergency management 68Figure 8.2 Situational awareness functional model 72

l ist of t ABles

Table 3.1 The four phases of emergency management 18Table 6.1 PKEMRA legislation breakdown 52Table 8.1 The use case challenge 70Table 8.2 Situational awareness functionality 72Table A.1 Definitions of natural hazards Source: NOAA-NWS

Glossary; as referenced by glossaries of the National Climatic Data Center and incorporated into SHELDUS 87Table A.2 Required actions for multi-jurisdictional HMPs 89Table A.3 Summary of literature defining the response, recovery,

and mitigation phases of emergency management 92

i ntroduction : W Hy W e

n eed to A nAlyze P olicy in

e mergency m AnAgement

1.1 WHY EMERGEnCY MAnAGEMEnt? An

IntRODUCtIOn BY AnDREA JACKMAn

A hundred years ago, the field of emergency management did not exist The same can be said for many other disciplines that arose in the 20th century, as well as technological advances and products of the rapid mod-ernization and eventual digitization of our society Yet, our field becomes more critical with each of the advancements in both society and technol-ogy The more advanced systems we have to support our daily lives, the more tightly these systems become interwoven, and the more our depen-dence on them grows What might have been an unreported non-incident a hundred years ago—a minor flood or loss of telephone lines—could today cause significant disruption and be broadcast globally through online media Studying our management of such disruptions is essential, and a policy provides a measuring stick by which to do just that As this book will show, the implementation of an existing policy provides a chance to measure our progress, and the development of a new policy provides an opportunity to shape our reactions

When I was eight years old, my family lived in Hiroshima, Japan My parents and I lived in a fifth floor apartment in a residential neighborhood

of one of the safest and most orderly countries in the world One weekend

in the fall, my mother and her friend planned to take a trip to another city

to do some shopping The weather forecast called for a miserable, windy, and rainy fall day—a mild typhoon was near the coast—so she planned to

be on the train and indoors while my father and I stayed home

As the end of the weekend got closer, the forecast changed The typhoon had strengthened, and was likely to come ashore Dad and I kept an eye on the sky from our apartment as clouds darkened, the wind picked up, and a steady rain started to fall Nobody seemed particularly alarmed, although this was years before the Internet and 24-hour news cycle that surrounds hurricanes and typhoons today My father had some fluency in Japanese and tried to pick up bits and pieces of information from television and radio, as well as the police officer with a megaphone driving down the street giving instructions for staying safe My mom, who had already boarded her return train, found that it was not moving

as quickly as usual and she thought they might be late getting back to Hiroshima station—something very unusual on the high-precision bullet trains

The sun went down as the storm picked up, and Dad and I watched sheets of rain, and occasional pieces of corrugated roofing, blow sideways down the street The wind rattled our windows and blew the screens back and forth, making loud banging noises Never a fan of startling noises

or severe weather to begin with, I was getting more and more uneasy as the evening went on The husband of my mom’s friend phoned us to say

he was going to try to get to the train station, just down the hill from their house, to try to get some information about the trains and see about picking up his wife and my mom on what was clearly going to be a late arrival My mom and her friend, meanwhile, were experiencing intermit-tent power outages on the train, which had stopped moving They were able to piece together bits of announcements from the train conductor to figure out that they were parking in a tunnel for the night until the train could proceed safely Years later, the two women enjoy telling the story of how they found the last bit of food available on board and shared it: a stale tray of noodle salad and a warm beer

Back in Hiroshima, it was getting close to midnight, and there was nothing left for us to do but try and get some sleep Dad brought me into his room and tucked me in bed while he sat up watching the weather out-side I woke up a few hours later in pitch darkness, with no memory of having fallen asleep My dad was gone Not just gone to sit in the living room, but gone from the apartment I looked for him and realized the power was out Trying to calm myself down, I thought perhaps he had gone to get my mom My mom! Where was she? Was she safe? Had my dad tried to get her and something happened? I picked up the phone and started to dial our friends’ house to see if they were there, but the phones were out along with the power Feeling helpless and terrified, I thought the best thing I could do was stay locked in the apartment and wait, under the

safety of a few blankets, and hope none of the larger bits of flying debris smashed through the window.

I woke up early in the morning to find both my parents returned My mom’s bullet train had limped into Hiroshima station around 4 a.m as the storm was dying down My dad had gone to get her, but failed to wake me

up or leave a note explaining his absence, much to my mom’s and my own horror We were safe and unharmed, but were soon evacuated to a hotel when it was discovered our neighborhood would be without water, power,

or phone service for the next few days

I maintained an interest in weather and the natural sciences through school, and in college, decided to major in meteorology It seemed if

I understood what was happening in the atmosphere around me, I would

be less likely to find myself alone and completely in the dark—literally and figuratively—in the middle of a raging storm One afternoon during

a junior-year internship with the National Weather Service in Indiana,

I felt a familiar uneasiness Conditions were ripe for severe weather and

my bosses were issuing tornado watches I tried to stay out of the way

as storms began popping up and I expected mayhem Surely, ers would be running around, making urgent and animated phone calls, shouting over each other and the howling wind But, instead of a chaotic, panicked forecast room, I watched seasoned professionals talk to each other as though it was a pleasant sunny day They quietly issued warnings after measured discussion on whether or not radar signals were strong enough to indicate possible tornadoes, took calls from trained spotters and answered questions from sheriffs, and calmly made recommendations for ensuring citizen safety No alarm bells went off, no lightning struck our building, and not a single person raised their voice I did the only thing I could think of to make myself useful and brought everyone lunch, all the while thinking that if this was how professionals conducted themselves in life-threatening situations, maybe there was a place for me in emergency management

forecast-People across many disciplines come to emergency management in their own ways, including my co-authors from industrial engineering and holistic medicine What I learned from my typhoon experience and my day at the National Weather Service, then later a career in studying natural disasters and their management, was that, often in our society, disasters are what we make of them Many times, they are just afterthoughts; blips

on an otherwise smooth road of business-as-usual They do not happen a lot We do not like to think about them happening We have little natural inclination to prepare for them, or try to mitigate what we cannot see (and might go a lifetime without ever seeing) Humans much prefer to react, to

embrace panic, to watch dramatic news coverage, or convince ourselves that nothing worse has ever happened to anyone We wait for that low probability even to come along, assuming it never will On a national and industry-wide scale, our policy is not only a reflection of that, but in turn, drives our decisions, keeping us right where we feel comfortable in a con-stant state of reaction On top of that, we love to make our lives as simple and comfortable as possible, which means tight dependency on technol-ogy and services The more complex our society becomes, the more vul-nerable we are to a disaster wiping everything out.

Emergency management is a young and under-researched field, but an important one It is critical that we understand ourselves in this environ-ment and stop designing ourselves into vulnerable systems Policy is one way to drive the practice you want to see, which makes understanding it essential to understanding emergency management now and in the future

1.2 ABOUt tHIS BOOK

This book seeks to provide a comprehensive background and discussion

of all major national policies in emergency management, from a titioner’s perspective Academic references are also provided for rec-ommended further reading, if you are interested in the implementation

prac-of emergency management and its policy from a research perspective Chapters 2, 3, and 4 discuss the history of emergency management and its policy in the United States, from the earliest days of our country to the birth of modern emergency management practices at the end of the last century Chapter 5 discusses an important shift in thinking toward preparation and mitigation, and Chapter 6 discusses the recent impact of new mobile and digital technology and how it gives far more visibility into disasters than previously known Chapters 7 and 8 step away from the government perspective that dominates policy and discusses emergency management policy found within the industry and commercial sectors Chapter 9 discusses the future of emergency management and recommen-dations for future considerations and research in the practice

The authors of this book come from diverse backgrounds, as is ing critical in new, cross-disciplinary fields such as emergency manage-ment Dr Andrea Jackman earned her degrees in meteorology and wind engineering and continues to work with special emphasis on natural haz-ards and their impacts on the built environment Dr Mario Beruvides comes from a background of industrial engineering, with special interest

prov-in system design and the prov-interactions of humans and systems Dr Gary Nestler has 30 years experience in the emergency management field He currently maintains a license to practice medicine, serves as a Captain in his local fire department working with emergency medical services, and remains as an active member of a local law enforcement SWAT team.

soci-of military forces in minor, yet ongoing conflicts only scratch the surface

of differences between then and now regarding emergency management

A largely informal system was put into place around 18031 where federal assistance could be obtained, quite literally, through special acts of Congress only This was to be used only as an absolute last resort, after all other possible resources had been exhausted In addition to the difficulty

of even obtaining such assistance, past studies have noted that, because the system was so reactive and administered solely by the massive yet brand new federal government, it was plagued by delays and complications in actually delivering the money to the affected area To make matters worse, the funding was frequently designated by Congress only for specific pur-poses While this may still remain the case in modern emergency man-agement, there are at least mechanisms and industry standards in place

1 Kreps (1990).

today, such that federal funds can be apportioned with little confusion or disagreement about how they are to be used, such as recovery funds being used exclusively for long-term temporary housing In the 1800s, no such mechanisms existed.

However, overall, the government during the 19th century was not concerned with matters of civil assistance; even in military conflicts, locals who were not killed, captured, or forced to flee were expected to handle the cleanup and move on Of course, some separate assistance was avail-able from “private, voluntary agencies,” such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, YMCA, convents, churches, immigrant brotherhoods, and other social groups, but this was largely provided at the discretion of the individual groups and certainly without any legal governance or coop-erative management processes in place

2.2 U.S DISAStERS In tHE EARLY

Believed by modern meteorologists to have been a Category 4 ricane, the storm that hit Galveston in 1900 remains the deadliest natural disaster in U.S history The island of Galveston was completely submerged

hur-by storm surge, destroying any and all construction at the time and ing at least 6,000 lives On the 100th anniversary of the event, the Houston Chronicle published a narrative of the days before, during, and after the storm, which included numerous notable items from a policy perspective.2First, the city of Galveston tried for three days to manage the carnage on its own Some residents of Houston and other nearby areas volunteered

claim-2 www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/1900storm/644889.html(retrieved June

16, 2015).

their time, but by far, the removal of debris and especially the excessive amount of corpses was done by African-Americans forced at gunpoint, a tragic and regrettable indication of the prevailing cultural mindset of the time After the initial three-day period, Mayor Walter C Jones “made an appeal to the people of the United States for immediate aid.” But, com-munication lines in and around Galveston had also been destroyed by the storm When a ship finally was able to dislodge itself from wreckage and sail to Texas City, a telegram was immediately sent to Washington, D.C.,

to notify President McKinley that “Galveston is in ruins” and nearly 500 people were thought to be dead.3 McKinley’s response is not documented, but numerous narrative sources indicate that most people in D.C thought Mayor Jones was exaggerating Fortunately, the mayor’s earlier appeal to the general population was taken more seriously and informal assistance began to arrive An online version of the Texas Almanac4 notes in detail the donations received by Galveston from the American public and even some international leaders, although none specifically from the Texas state government or U.S federal government The almanac, among numerous other sources, goes on to note that Galveston’s local government largely took control of relief and reconstruction efforts, personally directing Clara Barton and the American Red Cross in distribution of supplies, and later, embarking on the construction of a massive seawall, which remains part

of the island today

In today’s society, the reaction (or inaction) of the state and federal governments might be viewed as a callous oversight, a shameful lack of regard for responsibility or humanitarian concern Given the current role and mission statement of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) FEMA’s , there may be some truth to that view However, any ill feelings toward these governments are conspicuously absent from many accounts of the hurricane With a different era, came different expectations

In the spring of 1927, disaster struck again This time, it was a slow-building flood of the Mississippi River caused by an unusually high volume of rain Rivers from California to Tennessee overran their banks, and many areas recorded monthly precipitation totals in feet rather than inches With drainage funneling toward the Mississippi, it was only a mat-ter of time before the levees and dams—whose quality of construction was varied at best—began to fail along the entire length of the river, some-times gushing at rates higher than Niagara Falls Similar to Galveston,

3 Green, N.C 1900 Story Of The Galveston Flood Baltimore: R H Woodward

Company p.126 Retrieved July 15, 2009.

4 http://texasalmanac.com/topics/history/galvestons-response-hurricane-1900.

African-Americans were unfortunately brought in at gunpoint to attempt fortifications While not officially as deadly as the Galveston hurricane, the losses to property and livelihoods are difficult to overstate.

On April 22, 1927, a levee burst 12 miles upriver of Greenville, Mississippi The entire town, formerly a prosperous farming community, was covered in 10 feet of churning flood waters Greenville was only one

of the many towns in trouble A PBS American Experience timeline of the event states that “for 60 miles to the east and 90 miles to the south” of Greenville, people were left stranded on rooftops and in trees.5

Like Galveston, a local government committee was set up to direct relief efforts; however, the socio-political climate in Mississippi created numerous problems Relief efforts were largely overseen by the wealthy, white plantation owners who controlled the town and region, while the majority of the flood victims were poor African-Americans Boats were arranged by one committee member to move African-American refu-gees to dry ground, but another committee member—unbeknownst to his colleague—limited the use of the boats to white women and children only The Red Cross similarly provided relief supplies, but African-Americans were again ordered to act as labor for distributing supplies to white fam-ilies first The Flood Relief Committee further set up refugee camps on

a narrow strip of dry levee space for the black families who were denied boat access, however, soon requested assistance from the National Guard, who in turn, began robbing and assaulting camp residents Once again, while tragic, the racial elements of governmental response cannot be sep-arated from a historical analysis of the events It is likely that because the Mississippi Flood predates the modern emergency management practice

of conducting after-action reviews, our only information on the events are those that emphasize the most sensational or tragic aspects of the disas-ter It is reasonable to assume that not every government entity or even individual responded with cruelty or racism, yet these are the stories that survive through historians to best illustrate the mindset of the time.Clearly, expectations for federal involvement were still low com-pared to today’s standards However, President Calvin Coolidge had

a new resource on hand in 1927: his trusted Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover In an excellent and detailed popular history of the year

1927, author Bill Bryson describes not only Hoover’s involvement with the Mississippi Flood, but much about the man behind the work as well.6

5 www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/flood/.

6 Bryson, B 2013 One Summer: America, 1927 New York, NY: Doubleday See

Chapter 3.

Understanding Hoover is nearly as important to the history of disaster management as the flood itself Coming from a humble background rid-dled with tragedy, he eventually worked his way up to partner at a major international mining firm and was prominently stationed in London at the outbreak of World War I (WWI) The United States requested his assis-tance in evacuating Americans from Europe, then leading the relief efforts

in Belgium To say he performed ably would be a gross understatement Bryson notes that Hoover managed, over the course of two-and-a-half years, to “find and distribute $1.8 million worth of food a week, every week…and deliver it to people who would have otherwise gone unfed.” From Belgium, his projects only got bigger Hoover essentially managed all American food production during WWI, and then returned to Europe

to oversee relief efforts for around 400 million people once the war ended

It was no surprise that Hoover earned a favorable public reputation, along with the nickname “The Great Humanitarian.”

It was also no surprise that when the National Guard and the local Flood Committee in Greenville, MS, were completely overwhelmed, Hoover was put in charge Appointing Hoover to this role seems to be the only action by President Coolidge and the federal government in response

to the floods, which was still one thing more than President McKinley did for Galveston Hoover went to work much in the same way he had

in Europe, through ruthless efficiency, with detailed instructions down to spacing between individual beds inside relief camp tents, and a tireless effort of self-promotion However, the Great Humanitarian was now 10 years removed from relief efforts in Europe, and was enjoying being the leader of several national efforts in Washington, sometimes well outside his jurisdiction in Commerce Hoover knew he was a frontrunner now for the presidency and spent considerable time making sure everyone knew of his great acts in Europe and the United States While his pub-lic image was wildly favorable, Hoover developed a reputation among co-workers as a prickly and compassionless self-promoter The feelings seemed to be mutual, and Hoover, especially, seemed to dislike the people

he was known for helping As Bryson notes from several sources, between Hoover’s adventurous global mining travels, opportunities to work with victims, becoming a massive political force, and living to be 90 years old, Hoover seemed to have “experiences as rich and memorable as any [man] has ever enjoyed, and was moved by none of them.”

With so much time dedicated to maintaining his image as the Great Humanitarian, conditions in Hoover’s camps along the Mississippi quickly degraded His instructions were widely ignored due to the impos-sibility of implementing them Donated supplies and relief funding was

squandered or hoarded Disease and violence were widespread Much like Galveston, however, the federal government and its representatives seemed impervious to blame, possibly again due to low expectations, although Hoover’s management of his public image was also a likely contributor Hoover initiated investigations into the camps, and accord-ing to the Public Broadcast System (PBS), even appointed a “Colored Advisory Committee” consisting of prominent African-Americans The newly formed committee confirmed the findings of maltreatment and mis-management Instead of taking any action toward improving conditions, Hoover offered the committee African-American land reforms, should

he become president The committee agreed in exchange for keeping the reports quiet In 1928, Hoover got his wish and won the presidency and promptly revoked all of the promises made in Mississippi Eventually, conditions all across the Mississippi Delta would spark violent standoffs

in Greenville and other affected areas, causing mass migration northward

by many African- Americans After nearly six months at flood stage, the Mississippi River Delta would never return to the economic prosperity enjoyed prior to the flood

The legacies of Galveston and the Mississippi Flood demonstrated

a number of new concepts for federal involvement in disasters Good or bad, it was clear from both incidents that there was a lot of room for the federal government to provide assistance, yet there were zero mechanisms

in place to formalize or streamline this process Whether that assistance should come in the form of financial aid, dispatch of personnel, takeover

of relief management, or simply as a cheerleader for fundraising among the American population is not clear Second and perhaps most signifi-cantly, Hoover and Coolidge demonstrated with their treatment of the Mississippi Flood that natural disaster management was essentially iden-tical to war The U.S flood victims were indistinguishable from European war refugees Whether intentionally shaped or not, this perception would influence American disaster management for the remainder of the century

2.3 DUCK AnD COVER! MILItARY InFLUEnCE AnD tHE COLD WAR

As Herbert Hoover’s presidency continued into the 1930s, natural disasters would begin to take a backseat in American government The Great Depres-sion, beginning in 1929, and the Second World War, beginning in 1939, shaped nearly all activities of the federal government for decades to come

When World War II ended in 1945, the Cold War was only just beginning Active warfare on battlefields had ended, and many countries turned their efforts to rebuilding However, global tensions existed along the former axes of allegiances The United States in particular was on constant high alert against a revival of Nazi or Communist ideals from former enemies, particularly Russia.

The federal government sprang into action E L Quarantelli, one of the early leaders in disaster sociology, described the beginnings of disas-ter research as “almost exclusively supported by the U.S.A military organizations with very practical concerns about wartime situations.”7

He notes that these “organized research activities [occurred] from about

1950 to 1965” and their primary goals were civil organization in time situations, under the assumption that “morale is the key to disaster control” and “effective disaster control includes the securing of confor-mity to emergency regulations” and “the reduction and control of panic reactions.” From the language being used, it is abundantly clear that the federal government regarded enemy attack as the primary, perhaps only cause of true disasters requiring management No one had time to think about hurricanes when a nuclear attack from Russia could happen any day It is not hard to imagine that the military personnel conducting the research referenced by Quarantelli were less than 10 years removed from active combat, and had at least some experience in managing civil-ian populations under attack From this approach was born the well-known “Duck and Cover!” campaign of the 1950s, seemingly designed

war-to perfectly meet the criteria listed earlier for getting your civilians war-to control their panic and keep a high morale while doing what you asked them to do

The federal government took further action during the 1950s by undergoing several reorganizations within the Department of Defense.8Section 3.3 provides the various agencies that were created, dissolved, and merged during the 1950s and 1960s Although few permanent advances were made during this time in disaster management, federal involvement,

or policy, it seemed at least a foundation was being built for our modern system of emergency management The 1970s would prove to be a decade

of significant advancement, with the creation of policies, industry dards, and agencies that are still in use today

stan-7 Quarantelli (1987).

8 Kreps (1990).

WEBSItES OF IntERESt

Houston Chronicle—Policy Perspective on Galveston, TX Hurricane of 1900: http://web.archive.org/web/20071217220036/http://www.chron.com/disp/story mpl/special/1900storm/644889.html (Retrieved June 16, 2015).

Texas almanac:

http://texasalmanac.com/topics/history/galvestons-response-hurricane-1900 PBS American Experience timeline—Greenville, Mississippi Levee incident: www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/flood/

or pressing concern Attention turned back to the home front, and it looked very different from before the wars The standard of living had skyrock-eted; technology, education, and social attitudes were growing and chang-ing like never before Why had we been so worried about bombs, anyway? Why were we still depending on a general somewhere and special acts of Congress to help us through floods and tornadoes?

These same questions were weighing on the federal government, but some major barriers to a nationally defined role went as deep as the very philosophy on which America was founded The American system of government could be used to both help and hurt emergency management

in the policy arena Most people familiar with emergency management agree that the role of local-level emergency planning within the national emergency management framework is one of great importance Federal government provides direction and goals for local planners, but primar-ily serves as a financial supporter when governments are unable to meet these goals Likewise, the state acts as a regional conduit between federal and local government, providing aid to its local jurisdictions as needed This concept, known as shared governance, is a reflection of American attitudes about self-governance and is found in nearly every major sector

of society from health care to justice In their book exploring policy mentation issues within the federal government, May and Williams cited,

imple-as an example of this mindset, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which marked the first time in U.S history that the federal government assumed a direct funding role in public education.1 Although American government was deliberately designed in this fashion, May and Williams note the dilemma it can cause:

On the one hand, federal officials have a strong stake in promoting hazard mitigation and preparedness but little direct control over the effectiveness of such efforts On the other hand, in the aggre-gate, sub-national governments and individuals owning property

in hazardous areas directly control the effectiveness of mitigation and preparedness policies, but for the most part actions consistent with such policies are low on their list of priorities

Clearly, further changes were needed The hands-off approach of the federal government had arguably saved tax dollars, but likely cost lives The duck-and-cover approach may have saved lives had it ever been used, but was specific to such a narrow range of possible disasters that it did not seem practical, should another Galveston Hurricane or Great Mississippi Flood occur and impact our now thoroughly modern society

So, in 1974, the Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act The broad goal of this legislation was to address the antiquated system described in the previous chapter and to provide the federal government with more power to grant aid in the immediate aftermath of a disaster The Act states its intent as “to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government” to state and local governments during times of disaster.2 While vague by today’s standards, the Disaster Relief Act laid the groundwork for what would later become the standard process for major disaster declarations by the President, appropriating federal funding for assistance in response and recovery to areas affected by a disaster, and the gentle encouragement of local governments to mitigate and prepare for disasters, as well as work to reduce reliance on federal assistance where

at all possible It was a huge step forward considering the informal and chaotic processes of prior years, yet was still indicative of an industry in its infancy Amendments would not begin until more than ten years later with the Stafford Act of 1988, and later chapters will address the need for

1 May and Williams (1986, p 22).

more updated policies that better suit the way disasters are managed in the 21st century.

3.2 OUR FOUR-PHASE CYCLE: tHE InDUStRY StAnDARD

Academic research in emergency management was undergoing a lar shift In 1963, Ohio State formed the Disaster Research Center The center would later move to the University of Delaware in 1985, but for several years, it remained the only specific center dedicated to disaster management Then, in 1974, both the Natural Hazard Center at the Uni-versity of Colorado-Boulder and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) were formed Both academic centers focused on sociological research, continuing the traditions initiated by the military in prior decades, and still maintain an emphasis on the discipline to this day.Building on the preliminary research done in the new academic area, the National Governor’s Association (NGA) undertook research for a report of its own, published in 1979 Their definition of the practice is remarkably simple and still stands as the industry definition more than 30 years later According to the report, emergency management is defined as:

simi-[A] state’s responsibility and capability for managing all types of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numer-ous agencies The comprehensive aspect of [emergency manage-ment] includes all four phases of disaster or emergency activity:

mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery It applies to

all risks: attack, man-made, and natural, in a federal-state-local partnership.3

The four phases listed—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery—serve as the current model of emergency management, which are widely utilized among practitioners, and are considered the starting point for all policy and program design for all types of hazards at all levels of government.4 However, the NGA authors did not define their ground-breaking phases, only offered suggestions and sample actions for each phase:

3 NGA (1979), as cited in Phillips (2003).

4 Jackman (2008).

1 Mitigation—assessing the risk posed by a hazard or potential ter and attempting to reduce the risk.

disas-2 Preparedness—developing a response plan based on the risk assessment, training response personnel, arranging for necessary resources, making arrangements with other jurisdictions for sharing

of resources, clarifying jurisdictional responsibilities, and so on

3 Response—implementing the plan, reducing the potential for ondary damage, and preparing for the recovery phase

sec-4 Recovery—re-establishing life-support systems, such as repairing electrical power networks, and providing temporary housing, food, and clothing Recovery is assumed to stop short of reconstruction.5The foundation laid by the NGA Report was carefully researched and expanded upon following publication Two detailed studies in 1985 expanded further on definitions of each phase, and evolution to today’s terminology is summarized in Table 3.1.6

Table 3.1 The four phases of emergency management

Author Preparedness Response Recovery Mitigation

of secondary damage, and minimizing problems for recovery operations.

Providing immediate support during the early recov- ery period necessary to return vital life-support systems to minimum operation levels, and continuing

to provide support until the commu- nity returns to normal.

Deciding what

to do where

a risk to the health, safety, and welfare

of society has been deter- mined to exist and imple- menting a risk-reductive program.

5 Petak, as cited in Waugh (1994).

6 Jackman and Beruvides (2013a).

(Continued )

Author Preparedness Response Recovery Mitigation

ing life- support sys- tems, such

Re-establish-as repairing electrical power net- works, and providing temporary housing, food, and clothing.

Assessing the risk posed

by a hazard

or potential disaster and attempting

to reduce the risk.

of life and property, assistance requests,

at regular intervals

County, state, and federal designate aid, collect and analyze reports,

Assess damage and formulate short- and long-term goals for rebuilding, including costs, needed equipment, and aid opportuni- ties; ask for public input and improve rebuilt structures where pos- sible; create schedule All levels except city should identify and

Conduct annual risk and vul- nerability assessment with public involvement Identify and formulate mitigation goals and assign to appropriate agencies County, state, and federal offices should monitor incoming reports and progress, allocate necessary

Table 3.1 (Continued)

(Continued )

Author Preparedness Response Recovery Mitigation

implement opportunities for inter- jurisdictional aid.

resources, identify opportunities for inter- jurisdictional cooperation, and report

to the next highest level Waugh,

an gency, which save lives, minimize property damage,

emer-or improve recovery (e.g., emergency manage- ment plan activation, activation of emergency systems, emergency instructions

to the public, emergency medical assistance, manning Emergency Operations Center(s) (EOCs), reception and care, shelter and evacua- tion, search and rescue).

Short-term activities that restore vital life-support systems to minimum operating standards and long-term activities that return life

to normal (e.g., debris clearance, contamina- tion control, disaster unem- ployment assistance, temporary housing, and facility resto- ration).

Activities that reduce the degree of long-term risk to human life and prop- erty from natural and manmade hazards (e.g., building codes, disas- ter insurance, land-use management, risk map- ping, safety codes, and tax incentives and discen- tives)

Table 3.1 (Continued)

(Continued )

Author Preparedness Response Recovery Mitigation

Response also includes the execution

of gency plans and actions

emer-to support short-term recovery.

The ment, coor- dination, and execution of service- and site- restoration plans; the reconsti- tution of government operations and services;

develop-individual, private- sector, nongovern- mental, and public- assistance [housing and restoration]

programs;

long-term care and treatment of affected per- sons; [social, political, environ- mental, and economic restoration];

tion of] les- sons learned;

[identifica-postincident reporting;

and opment of [mitigation]

devel-initiatives.

Activities providing

a critical foundation

in the effort

to reduce the loss of life and prop- erty from natural and manmade disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster and providing value to the public by creating safer communi- ties [F]ix the cycle of disaster dam- age, recon- struction, and repeated damage These activities

or actions will have a long-term sustained effect.

Table 3.1 (Continued)

(Continued )

Author Preparedness Response Recovery Mitigation

*Medical assistance and first aid (EMS)

*Shelter &

Evacuation (S&E)

*Search &

Rescue (S&R)

*Secondary Damage Reduction (SDR)

*Damage Assessment (DA)

*Clean-up (De-con)

*Restoration

of critical systems &

facilities (Restor)

*Providing temporary basic needs (TBN)

*Basic struction (Recon I)

recon-*Improved reconstruc- tion (Recon II)

*Legislative planning (LP)

*Regularly scheduled vulnerabil- ity & risk assessments (VRA)

From reading the phase definitions, it is clear that the four phases are ongoing, whether a disaster has struck recently or not When a disaster does occur, the response phase is immediately activated in an attempt to reduce the immediate, life-threatening impacts As the situation stabilizes, short-term recovery may begin and give way to long-term recovery Many weeks, months, or even years after the initial event, long-term recovery and rebuilding efforts may intertwine with mitigation, as decisions are made not to rebuild in hazardous areas, or to rebuild with improved con-struction techniques In turn, mitigation merges with preparedness activ-ities such as strategic planning Of course, all recovery, mitigation, and preparedness activities are set aside again once the next disaster strikes, and the cycle begins anew (see Figure 3.1)

Recall the NGA added a stipulation to the four phases in their tion of emergency management; that these activities should be carried out

defini-at the local, stdefini-ate, and federal level of government This marked an tional significant development in the field, with formal acknowledgement

addi-of the local and state roles As shown in the previous chapter, the federal government played only a partial role in the management of emergencies, and even then, it was only for major events and exactly what was required

of the federal government seemed to change on a frequent basis

State and local assistance was in even worse condition Going back even to the 19th century, it was assumed that the state and local govern-ments would assist if able, or if not, adversely affected themselves But,

Table 3.1 (Continued)

*Regularly scheduled vulnerability &

risk assessments (VRA)

*Clean-up (De-con)

*Restoration of critical system & facilities

(Restor)

*Providing temporary basic needs (TBN)

*Basic reconstruction (Recon I)

*Activation of Emergency Protocol (AEP)

*Medical assistance and first aid (EMS)

*Threat assessment (TA)

*Resource assessment & acquisition (RA&A)

*Inter and intra-jurisdictional cooperation

*Drills & Exercises (D&E)

*Writing a plan (plan)

*Shelter & Evacuation (S&E)

*Search & Rescue (S&R)

*Secondary Damage Reduction (SDR)

Figure 3.1 The cycle of the four phases.

when the event was not large enough to require assistance through a cial act of Congress, the majority of the burden fell to nongovernmental and charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, churches, and civic groups.7

spe-The increased role of government added further complexity to the already complex cycle depicted in Figure 3.1 The full NGA definition

of emergency management meant emergency managers were not only engaged in multiple cyclic and overlapping activities within the four phases; they were also working simultaneously in different government offices across the country (see Figure 3.2)

3.3 tHE nEW FEDERAL EMERGEnCY

MAnAGEMEnt AGEnCY

As the 1970s came to a close and the NGA defined the new industry that

we recognize today as emergency management, the federal government did more than enact the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 In 1979, FEMA was formed to act on the authority of the President and Congress to provide assistance following a disaster As history demonstrates, however, the organization of emergency response capability within the federal govern-ment shifted frequently

Predecessors to FEMA include: The Office of Civil and Defense lization (1958), the Office of Emergency Preparedness (1961), The Civil

Mobi-7 Jackman and Beruvides (2013b).

Defense Preparedness Agency (1972), and finally, the FEMA in 1979.8, 9Each of these contained multiple suborganizations concerned with differ-ent areas of emergency management, and operated within a wide range of government groups, from the Department of Defense (DOD) to Housing and Urban Development (HUD) It is interesting to note that, as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, FEMA was brought under the auspices of the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and after a controversial response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, CNN reported that a congressional committee was calling for the abolition of FEMA (2006, April 27).

Despite challenges in the 21st century, however, FEMA remains the unified voice of federal-level emergency management, the third and final contribution to modern emergency management from the 1970s

Response Preparedness

City Country COG

FEMA Regional Map:

FEMA Websites for Regional Maps:

Region I, Boston, MA Serving: CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT

Region II, New York, NY Serving: NJ, NY, PR, USVI

Region III, Philadelphia, PA Serving: DC, DE, MD, PA, VA, WV

Region IV, Atlanta, GA Serving: AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN

Region V, Chicago, IL Serving: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI

Region VI, Denton, TX Serving: AR, LA, NM, OK, TX

Region VII, Kansas City, MO Serving: IA, KS, MO, NE

Region VIII, Denver, CO Serving: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY

Region IX, Oakland, CA Serving: AZ, CA, HI, NV, GU, AS, CNMI, RMI, FM Region IX, PAO Serving: American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, Hawaii

Region X, Bothell, WA Serving: AK (Alaska), ID, OR, WA