Power sharing in deeply divided places

In consequence, law or public policy may be dictated in the interests of the faction as long as its control is maintained. tem-Defi ning Power Sharing, Deeply Divided Places, and Well-

in Deeply Divided Places

IN THE T WENT Y- FIR ST CENTURY

Brendan O’Leary, Series Editor

All rights reserved Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written

permission from the publisher.

Published by University of Pennsylvania Press

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Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Power sharing in deeply divided places / edited by Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary — 1st ed.

p cm — (National and ethnic confl ict in the twenty-fi rst century) Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8122-4501-1 (hardcover : alk paper)

1 Ethnic groups—Political activity 2 Minorities—Political activity 3 Representative government and representation 4 Ethnic confl ict—Political aspects 5 Cultural pluralism—Political aspects

I McEvoy, Joanne II O'Leary, Brendan

JF1061.P68 2013

320.90089—dc23

2012041497

Hodgson

1 Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places:

An Advocate’s Introduction

PART I POWER SHARING AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

2 Electoral Rules and Ethnic Repre sen ta tion and

Accommodation: Combining Social Choice and Electoral

4 Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation

PART II HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FORAYS

INTO POWER SHARING

5 A Th eory of Accommodation Versus Confl ict:

With Special Reference to the Israel- Palestine Confl ict

6 Th e Success of Religion as a Source for Compromise

in Divided Empires: Ottoman and Safavid, Past and Present

7 Geopolitics and the Long- Term Construction

of Democracy

8 Courts, Constitutions, and the Limits of Majoritarianism

PART III CONTEMPORARY POWER SHARING QUESTIONS

9 A Revised Th eory of Federacy and a Case Study of

Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia

10 We Forbid! Th e Mutual Veto and Power- Sharing

Democracy

11 Northern Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact,

Identity, and Leadership

Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places:

An Advocate’s Introduction

Brendan O’Leary

Th e Mafi a makes off ers that cannot be refused In one peace pro cess a tician was once accused of making off ers that no one could understand ( O’Leary 1990) Do these statements explain the diff erence between power and power sharing? Is power coercive capacity, whereas power sharing is incomprehensible?

poli-Power sharing is not incomprehensible, but it is frequently stood To aid comprehension a comparison is useful In standard En glish, power is the ability to act, to be able to produce an intended eff ect (Russell

misunder-1992 [1938]) Th e powerless lack the capacity to do things they might want to

do Th e powerful are in the opposite situation Power sharing, therefore, suggests spreading access to the capacity to get things done Power is also a synonym for authority, jurisdiction, control, command, sway, or dominion,

as well as the capacity to persuade, induce, constrain, oblige, or force It lows that power sharing minimally means widening the access of persons

fol-or groups to the same domains fol-or attributes In standard usage power is also

“a possession,” “held” by those with authority or infl uence over others, pecially public offi cials, governments, offi cers, managements, or establish-ments who constitute what Paul’s Letter to the Romans described as “the powers that be.” Power sharing, therefore, broadens membership of “the powers that be.” It also requires that the included parties have access to key and observable “decision making.” Th ere must be no important “non– decision making” taking place off stage, that is, no hidden possessors of power who

es-control the agenda or exclude some issues from being addressed. Th ere must instead be an open and negotiable public agenda among the power- sharers, or at least among their leaders Any suppression of (controversial) issues must be mutually agreed upon among those who share power.

Th eorists contrast “power to” and “power over” (see Morris 2002; Parsons 1969). “Power to” is ability, “power over” is domination Th e contrast resem-bles that between “positive- sum” and “zero- sum” relationships “Positive- sum” power is joint, collaborative, or cooperative All gain from its exercise, even if the benefi ts are not the same for all “Zero- sum power,” by contrast, de-scribes a distinct antagonism: if power could be mea sured, then A’s gain and B’s loss would sum to zero Positive- sum and zero- sum conceptions do not exhaust the logical possibilities of power relations Th e exercise of power may generate net losses (a “negative sum”) or the mutual ruin of the con-tending parties It may create winners and losers; there may be disparities in benefi ts among the winners as well as in losses among the losers; and only one party may gain, while the others experience no net losses. Power shar-ing, for its proponents, is defended as “power to.” It enhances collective ca-pacity; it is “positive sum.” Th ose who share will gain from a constructive way of making public decisions, from which all stand to gain, notably through the preservation of order and peace Critics, by contrast, suggest that power sharing shapes public life at the expense of other and better kinds of politics— more competitive, individualist, or harmonious

Th e opposite of power sharing is power’s monopolization by a person, faction, group, or ga ni za tion, or party On inspection, it is usually true that the chief power- holder has to delegate some power to or ga nize and maintain the monopoly But to delegate power is not to share it Th e principal who delegates requires the delegated agent to perform specifi ed tasks and may withdraw the mandate

Monopolies of power exist, at least formally, in tyrannies, despotisms, military autocracies, monarchies, lordships, papacies, theocracies, and one- party dictatorships Th ey also exist, however, in democracies, a more unset-tling idea To say that democracy may coexist with monopolistic domination requires no commitment to theories suggesting that behind the façade of electoral competition lies the power of a ruling class or a power elite (see, e.g., Miliband 1980 [1969]; Domhoff 1990; Mills 1956) For example, no matter how competitive or free elections may be, critical po liti cal power can

be monopolized between elections by the incumbent president, prime ister, cabinet, and nominated judges associated with the dominant party,

min-ethos, or ideology Even a temporary domination (between elections) is nevertheless domination, and the opportunities for elected leaders to domi-nate their societies against widespread or deeply held public preferences are signifi cant (see, e.g., Nordlinger 1981, 92– 94, 111– 12, 130– 32).

Th at democracy might lead to domination was the theme of the anny of the majority,” which deeply concerned eighteenth- century republi-cans, such as James Madison, and nineteenth- century liberals, such as Alexis

“tyr-de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill Th ey were mostly preoccupied, ever, with the impact of that possible tyranny on the individual’s property and liberty (including the individual’s religious beliefs) rather than on national, ethnic, or linguistic minorities as such (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay

how-1987 [1788]; Mill 1997, 5– 6, 81– 82, 192– 94; de Tocqueville 1988 [1835, 1840], vol 1., chap 7, esp 250ff )

Democracy is, however, also straightforwardly compatible with the porary) tyranny of a minority, especially democracies with institutions that encourage the “winner” to take all For example, an ideological faction, not supported by a majority of voters in a country, may nevertheless control a cabinet, which in turn controls a party, and which in turn controls a legisla-ture In consequence, law or public policy may be dictated in the interests of the faction as long as its control is maintained.

(tem-Defi ning Power Sharing, Deeply Divided Places, and

Well- Ordered States

Th ese considerations suggest the following broad defi nition of power sharing: Any set of arrangements that prevent one agent, or or ga nized collective agency, from being the “winner who holds all critical power,” whether temporarily

or permanently Th is suggestion explains why the synonyms of power sharing usually include the following generally positive connotations: “co ali tion” or

“cooperative” government and “consensual” and “inclusive” decision making Critics of power sharing just as powerfully insist upon negative connotations

Th ey refer to power- sharing arrangements as “rudderless” or “leaderless,” and they complain of “stalemated,” “deadlocked,” or “blocked” decision making

Th e general defi nition of power sharing just suggested is broad if not vague

It does not, for example, specify how power is shared among the parties It is capacious enough to include arrangements such as the Roman Republic’s executive, based on the annual election of two consuls, and its tribunes, who

were able to veto legislation; ancient Sparta’s two kings and ephorate; the

mercantile republican aristocracy of Venice; and the Institutes promoted by

Calvin in Geneva. Th ese are examples of power- sharing arrangements, and the defi nition thereby displays a key advantage: it does not presume that all power- sharing arrangements are virtuous by our current standards A defi ni-tion is of considerable merit if it makes it possible to approve or disapprove

of the use to which power- sharing systems are put

In this book our authors’ attention is mostly on contemporary power- sharing systems Th e major exception is Benjamin Braude’s discussion of limited power- sharing provisions under the Ottoman and Safavid empires (Chapter 6) In contemporary po liti cal science, to summarize a very large literature, power sharing is defi ned both by a regulatory goal and by specifi c instruments Th e goal is the arrangement of po liti cal institutions to prevent the monopoly, permanent or temporary, of executive, legislative, judicial,

bureaucratic, military, or cultural power Four principal sets of instruments

accomplish this goal

1 Th e fi rst are overtly po liti cal bodies (executive, legislative, judicial,

and administrative) or ga nized to ensure both “shared rule” and “self-

rule” among the relevant agents Th ese po liti cal bodies are or ga nized through partly self- governing communities or territories, or both Diff erently put, and as we shall elaborate below, these po liti cal bodies may be consociational (based on communities) or federal (based on territories) Th ese bodies usually respect some combination of the prin-ciples of parity, proportionality, and autonomy

2 Th e second are security bodies: militaries, which normatively face outward for defense; police, which face inward to preserve order; and intelligence agencies, which engage in lawful surveillance and threat assessments Security bodies must be or ga nized so that power sharing within the po liti cal bodies is meaningful

3 Th e third are economic policies, principally wealth- sharing formulae, that reinforce the power sharing within the po liti cal bodies through some combination of the principles of parity, proportionality, and autonomy that also apply within the po liti cal bodies

4 Th e fourth are policies and practices that preserve cultural pluralism Modern power sharing deliberately avoids the full- scale integration

or coercive assimilation of “cultures” within the polity; that is part of its monopoly- rejecting ethos

Th e last set of instruments may be called “cultural protectionism,” both by their critics and their proponents Th ey distinguish modern power- sharing systems from the ancient, medieval, and early modern examples cited above: the Romans, the Spartans, the Venetians, and the Calvinists never intended to promote cross- cultural power sharing within their republics In modern power- sharing systems, “cultures,” and their evolution, are not left to the free market or subject to the governing diktats of the largest group Instead (at least some key components of) the cultures of the parties to the power- sharing system are protected Th e overall power- sharing settlement may promote an inclusive overarching shared public identity, but that identity must comple-ment rather than wholly replace the previously existing “cultures.”

“Cultures” is put in quotation marks because agreeing what is entailed in

“culture” is highly contested. As employed here culture encompasses the languages, national and ethnic traditions, religions and philosophies of life, customs, mores, and the ethos of peoples As used here, no supposition is made that par tic u lar cultures are homogeneous, intrinsically holistic, static, wholly authentic and unaltered transmissions from antiquity, or mutually exclusive.

It is, however, usually true that in deeply divided places at least some key agents believe that their “cultures,” in whole or in part, are threatened by others.Contemporary power- sharing systems promote the coexistence of at least some cultures Th is idea is partly refl ected in the language of “multi-culturalism.” But to anticipate some false and facile criticisms, modern

power sharing does not promote all cultures (e.g., headhunting, tribal

scar-ring, genital mutilation of males or females, or foot- binding) Nor does it presume to freeze the cultures of the contending parties as they were when the power- sharing settlement was made Rather, modern power sharing, through “encoded pluralism,” enables the partners to the po liti cal settle-ment to have the power to govern changes in their own cultures— through autonomy (self- rule) and through joint agreement with others (shared rule)

“Cultural protectionism” works not through the wholesale freezing of tain practices but through empowering specifi ed groups to control their own cultural evolution— both autonomously and jointly

cer-“Deeply divided places” has more obvious connotations than power ing, but warnings are in order “Places” is a better expression than “societies” because it is a mistake to presume that a divided place contains just one soci-ety; that may be an issue in deep dispute, and a deeply divided place may be characterized by rival, parallel, or segregated societies In a deeply divided place there may be more than one “civil society,” and their relations may be

shar-far from civil All moderately complex societies are divided (stratifi ed) in ways that may matter po liti cally, for example, by age cohorts, by sex or sexual preference, or by income, wealth, class, and status But within deeply divided places these standard stratifi cations are superseded, or profoundly rein-forced, by further divisions of nationality, ethnicity, race, tribe, language, or religion Deeply divided places are, as the designation suggests, sites of actual

or potential “civil” or intergovernmental wars Th ey are where genocide, nic expulsion, or coercive assimilation are threatened, or have taken place; they are the places for which power sharing is oft en recommended

eth-Th ere needs, however, to be some prospect of “stateness” or ity” for power sharing to work as a recipe for deeply divided places. States matter more than societies in building inclusive power sharing because they defi ne societies and their possibilities. Impersonalized institutions that have some degree of centralized and procedurally governed po liti cal deci-sion making characterize functioning states Th ey have coercive capacities to ensure security: they can regulate all instruments of potential public violence and prevent or inhibit their own agents from being predators Th ey express authentic legal authority over persons, property, and their movements, and are recognized as such entities by their citizens, civil society organizations, and other states Th rough self- help or alliances they can defend themselves Lastly, functioning states are defi ned by their recognized sovereignty over their terri-tory and its accompanying prerogatives: control over entry and exit of persons and entities If states lack these capabilities they cannot protect human rights, promote human development, be inclusive, or share power eff ectively Credible power sharing requires credible commitments to governability

“governabil-Conversely, failing and failed states are personalized: previously nated by rulers, a family, clan, or clique, which did not distinguish public from private realms Th ey have become “kleptocracies,” governments of thieves, before or during the collapses of their regimes Th ey lack coherent, institutionalized, rule- governed patterns that inhibit predation Th e “rul-ers” are indeed predators Th ey have usually lost their monopoly on the regulation of coercion and are challenged by guerillas, paramilitaries, ter-rorists, Mafi osi; they may be invaded, looted, and occupied by other states

domi-Th ey neither make nor enforce law Th ose over whom they have failed to rule despise them as much as they fear them Th ese properties of failed states remind us that inclusion and power sharing work best within well- ordered states Power sharing, inclusivity, and human development require more than the diff usion of the right values; they need the soil of functioning

states because they are unlikely to grow in “anarchia.” Order, or its likely realization, is therefore a key condition of power sharing in a deeply divided place, a negotiated order that brings widespread human security.

Th omas Hobbes was right to emphasize the necessity of order for a worthwhile human life but deeply wrong to mandate everywhere an au-thoritarian solution or a sole sovereign Unlike Hobbes, we know that our states are far more lethal than the alleged “war of all against all,” and for that reason alone we need to prevent them from becoming Leviathans Power sharing is one route to controlling the violence of states, not just the violence

of civil wars States are the most powerful agencies of exclusion, and ments the major murderers in human history; and many state- builders and nation- builders have been people- killers and nation- killers (Connor 1972) Rudolf Rummel has calculated that in the twentieth century governments killed nearly 170 million people within their borders, a fi gure that exceeds those killed in wars between states (Rummel 1997) Genocide— killing peoples because of their presumed ascriptive characteristics— has been more com-mon than most countries’ offi cial histories acknowledge, and governments have been the major perpetrators: the list is not confi ned to Ottoman Turkey, Nazi Germany, and Interahamwe Rwanda “Politicide”— killing those deemed

govern-po liti cal opgovern-ponents— has also been recurrent in modernity Th e Soviet Union, especially under Stalin, was the major killing regime of the last century: nearly sixty- two million may have perished under its yoke Maoist China was oft en as brutal, killing over thirty- fi ve million people “Democide”— the killing of peoples— is the ultimate form of exclusion, and government its major agency Governments have also or ga nized, encouraged, or not stopped the expulsion of whole categories of persons from their land borders or their shores— people whom they have helped defi ne as undesirable, nonindige-nous, non- national, or disloyal Th e twentieth century is justly described not just as one of death by government but as one of expulsions, of the

“cleansing” of populations Governments have also been the prime tects of policies of discriminatory control: or ga niz ing dominant national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups, and disor ga niz ing and subordinating others through systematic discrimination, what we are now encouraged to call “exclusion.”

archi-Th ese should be commonplace thoughts Regrettably, they are not suffi ciently appreciated States defi ne people’s life chances, and it is to their prac-tices that we must look to see how greater inclusion, promised by power sharing, may best be facilitated Exclusion, in the regulation of national, ethnic,

-linguistic, and religious diff erences, is the product of coercive tion and special treatment of privileged communities: counting some catego-ries of persons and communities “in,” as members, and others “out.” Genocide, expulsion, and the unilateral partition of territories are ways of homogenizing peoples that are now internationally outlawed, even if the laws are dishon-ored If international norms against genocide and expulsion are rigorously enforced, through diplomatic engagements, economic sanctions, military em-bargoes and interventions, and the international criminalization of geno-cidal offi cials, then the worst forms of exclusion may eventually be halted or inhibited But success in these endeavors requires moral universalism and a

homogeniza-re orientation of the fohomogeniza-reign policies of the ghomogeniza-reat powers so that both their policymakers and domestic constituencies see the prevention and punish-ment of genocide and expulsion as in their interests We are far from there

Th e record of recent history is, however, mixed: it need not occasion despair Reforms and sanctions against exclusionary practices— against discriminatory racist, religiously intolerant, and xenophobic regimes— had major successes in the last century Th e undermining of apartheid in South Africa had both international and domestic sources, both moral and po liti-cal causes Decolonization, desegregation, autonomy, the advancement of language rights, and civil rights movements were signifi cant elements in the more inclusionary advances of the twentieth century Power sharing is one

of the most important instances of enhanced “inclusion,” and it was ized in the last century and in this one It is a standard prescription for pro-tracted national, ethnic, and communal confl icts in deeply divided places, especially ones focused on antagonistic self- determination claims, but it is not the sole one; and no sensible advocate of power sharing assumes it is a panacea Power sharing in deeply divided places is the subject of this collec-tion of essays Our contributors address variations in power- sharing sys-tems and the instruments used to calm deeply divided places to make them more peaceful, civil, and stable, and to provide credible commitments to well- ordered demo cratic states

revital-Constitutionalism: The Separation of Powers, Competing

for Power, and Power Sharing

Democracy can operate as a tyranny of the majority, and as the tyranny of a monopolistic faction, and therefore may worsen sociability and civility among

the contesting peoples in a deeply divided place (McGarry 2010b) One sponse to such fears is to suggest that well- designed “constitutionalism” will block such tyrannies through protecting some core rights of citizens from potential violations by the governing majority (or faction) or from the stifl ing

re-of individuality by crushingly conformist public opinion Constitutionalism also works through making offi ceholders publicly accountable, requiring them to follow rule- governed and transparent procedures in their per for-mance of their functions and through dividing public authority among mul-tiple offi ces and institutions Is constitutionalism therefore the relevant way

to control monopoly? Is constitutionalism the key to power sharing?

Power sharing is indeed normally constitutionalized, that is, encoded in formal constitutions, written agreements, treaties, or charters, but that does not mean that all constitutions are power- sharing systems, especially regard-ing the management of cultures Constitutions in principle may assign term- limited authority to use power in a monopolistic fashion to a person, faction, party, or role, for example, “Th e President shall exercise the full plenitude of the executive power for a seven year term of offi ce.” Th e constitution may grant emergency powers to a single- person executive, which may include provision for the suspension of basic rights, and fundamental freedoms, or dramatic “war powers.” A constitution may mandate that there is just one nation, one religion, one language, one ethnicity as the basis of eligibility for citizenship A constitution may mandate that the territory of the state is indi-visible, thereby blocking the formation of federal regions A constitution may

be nonamendable, or powerfully entrench some identities at the expense of others Th e 1982 Constitution of Turkey has many of these features

But even when constitutions are more pluralistic they need not be power- sharing systems If constitutional rules permit the domination of one person (faction, party, or national, religious, or ethnic group) over all the key institutions that shape major po liti cal decisions (and nondecisions), then the abuse of po liti cal power is possible A powerful president or prime minister, backed by a regularly electorally endorsed party, may lawfully ex-ecute the powers of the offi ce, promote legislation that refl ects the prefer-ences of the dominant nationality, race, religion, or linguistic group, and fi ll the judiciary and administration with their appointees Th e “rule of law” is therefore oft en the rule of the dominant majority (or faction) Periodic elec-tions may not prevent such domination Accountability to some of the elector-ate, or to the courts, may not protect visible minorities, especially if the laws (and the constitution) have been draft ed according to majority preferences

Courts staff ed by appointees of an executive and legislature controlled by the same party may not act as guardians of individuals’ rights, let alone collec-tive minorities Constitutionalism per se does not prevent cultural homogene-ity from becoming the hallmarks of policy and the state Constitutionalism, formal or informal, is probably a necessary condition for successful power sharing across cultures, but it is defi nitely not suffi cient Indeed modern power sharing is conceived of by some of its supporters as a necessary sup-plement to constitutionalism, required to prevent the monopoly of cultural power, and especially required by large minorities.

Another way to make much the same argument distinguishes three remedies for despotic power found primarily in liberal thinking, namely the division of power, competition for power, and power sharing. All these three ways of preventing despotic power may be constitutionalized, al-though it is the separation or division of powers that is historically associ-ated with “constitutionalism.”

The Separation of Powers

In the liberal po liti cal tradition, infl uenced by the arguments of quieu and James Madison, and strongly present in American federalism, the separation of powers holds a famous place. Here dividing po liti cal power is seen as critical to preventing despotism Th e tradition commends separat-ing executive, legislative, and judicial institutions Inhibiting a monopoly of power, especially in the executive, avoids kingly dictatorship Th e separation

Montes-of civilian from military power, Montes-of nomination from appointment, Montes-of police powers to arrest and interrogate from the judicial power to prosecute, of federal governments from state governments, or local governments from central governments are less recognized but just as important parts of the same logic To divide power is to prevent its abuse; to check power with power controls public offi cials Ambition tempers ambition

Some think that properly or ga niz ing the division of power to prevent domination is what really matters in deeply divided places (see Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Roeder 2007) A well- structured division of power, they say, inhibits national, ethnic, or communal majorities— or minorities— from dominating others Instead of one majority, multiple majorities, or no major-ity, may be created By placing power in diff erent institutions, with diff erent electoral procedures, and with staggered timings of elections, for fi lling key

offi cials, diff erent persons and diff erent majorities (or pluralities) in diff erent institutions may claim demo cratic mandates and thereby check one another Proponents of integration and assimilation oft en make this claim Th ey cel-ebrate the creation of dual executives (a president, and a prime minister and cabinet), a dual legislature (a house of representatives and a house of states or regions, or an elected house and a house of experienced experts), and autono-mous legal institutions (perhaps with both a supreme court and a constitu-tional court) For such advocates, separating powers is power sharing as well

as pow division because they think that the separation of powers in diff ent institutions obliges power- holders to work cooperatively in anticipation

er-of the checking and balancing capacities er-of the others

One tempting response to this apparently persuasive rhetoric might be

to observe that the well- attested division of powers in the U.S Constitution proved compatible with institutionalized and racialized slavery between

1787 and 1860; racism and a white tyranny over blacks in the deep South from the 1880s until the 1950s; and the termination, expulsion, and demo-graphic erosion of Native Americans in an unfi nished pro cess of destruc-tion Th e U.S Constitution has also proven wholly compatible with regular eruptions of persecutions of immigrant and religious minorities Far from

always supporting pluribus, the Philadelphia Constitution has enabled the

unum of the dominant people palpably to take charge and avoided neither

the tyranny of the majority nor the tyranny of faction While that rebuttal is

in order, it would be too quick a response because it does not address the relevant diffi culty: it is a feature of our concepts that the expressions “power sharing” and the “division of powers” can be construed as synonyms by the informed, as well as the less well informed In constitutional advisory work

in Iraq, for the Kurdistan Region between 2003 and 2009, and in Sudan for the United Nations in 2009– 10, I experienced the diffi culty in the fl esh and

in texts “Power sharing” in En glish would be translated into Arabic and then later translated back into En glish by another person to confi rm that all negotiators and their advisors agreed the meaning of the relevant text More oft en than not when translated back, “power sharing” would emerge as “the separation of powers.”

Th ere are philological and etymological similarities between sharing and division that explain this confl ation: through dividing, aft er all, people

or groups receive shares But power sharing and the separation of powers are distinct, albeit potentially intersecting, notions Power sharing man-

dates both coordinated jointness in shared decision making and autonomy

in group or territorial decision making Th e separation of powers, by trast, does not prescribe a coordinated policymaking system Rather under the separation of powers, policy and order are expected to emerge (if at all) from the clash of ambitious power- holders scattered across multiple institu-tions, and the separation is not or ga nized to facilitate group or ga ni za tion Power- sharers seek to share power across national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups through their representatives making joint decisions in executives, legislatures, and judiciaries; power- dividers seek to break up the formation of such groups and to individualize what they disparage as com-munal politics As we shall see, power- dividers are mostly integrationists— only centripetalists, whom we shall shortly describe, express the desire to compete as advocates of power sharing But though they say that they sup-port sharing power, centripetalists rarely wish to institutionalize autonomy among encompassing national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious communities,

con-or to have their representatives jointly share power within an executive; what they want is power sharing among politicians incentivized to be mod-erate toward others who are diff erent from them Th at said, there can be a power- sharing co ali tion within a federal or central government that respects

a formal separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial tutions, and between the federal/central government and the regional/local governments, and related variations

insti-The Competition for Power

In the liberal tradition, found also in its “constitutionalist” wing, there is a distinct focus on how public offi cials “win” powerful positions, be they executive, legislative, judicial, or bureaucratic Competition, as in the market-place, is seen as a way of preventing nefarious monopoly In this tradition, competition for executive and legislative posts should occur through elections Liberals, especially outside the United States, are more doubtful about elec-tions to judicial and administrative positions, for which they generally favor competitive meritocratic appointment through professional associations and transparent and reviewable procedures Th e minimal defi nition of rep-resentative government is a po liti cal system in which offi cials compete for authoritative positions in free and fair elections for citizens’ votes; in which elected offi cials hold offi ce for limited terms, make laws, and give orders to unelected offi cials within constitutional norms that ensure accountability—

both through the ballot box and recourse to the courts. Given these ises, the competition for power is a sine qua non of demo cratic government.

prem-Th e division of powers and competition for power are established and telligent principles But on their own, advocates of power sharing submit, they are unlikely to calm deeply divided places and may cause confl ict Where the competition for power resembles an ethnic, religious, or linguistic census, elections may not check governments; rather they may encourage the tyr-anny of the majority Th e combination of the separation of powers and the competition for power may also be conducive toward the oppression of na-tional, ethnic, and religious communities Aft er all, the competition for power expresses or creates majorities— and such majorities may be constructed from national, ethnic, or communal cleavages A sustained majority from the same community may win control over all major offi ces and governments— even

in-if the powers of those offi ces and governments are divided and checked— and then propose and implement discriminatory public policy or biased conceptions of merit

Integrationists and assimilationists oft en prescribe the division of ers and the merits of the competition for power but oft en presume that a nation of individuals is in existence, or that one should be built Th ey may forget (or ignore) that many states are multiethnic and multiconfessional— and that many are pluri- national—and thereby pass over the fact that the competition for power (with or without the division of powers) may be a recipe for confl ict in deeply divided places. Sri Lanka has not wanted for a separation of powers or for elections Neither has Kenya nor Northern Ire-land To commend procedures that advance the position of nationalizing majorities when there are rival national self- determination claims is parti-san or, alternatively, utopian It is partisan when one community seeks to nationalize the state or region in its image on no better claim than might (numbers) makes right; it is utopian when (potentially or actually) antago-nistic communities are expected or instructed to fuse Partisans and utopi-ans have had opportunities many times in the last two centuries, too oft en producing bloodbaths Th at is why many contemporary liberals commend power sharing as a supplementary approach to avoiding the worst outcomes

pow-in pluri- national, multiethnic, and multireligious states

Power sharing, however, commends not only the sharing of power but

also the division of power and the competition for power Power sharing

should add to rather than subtract from the liberal, constitutional, and cratic experience Power sharing commends “co ali tion” as a considered way

demo-of doing things, but not as a wholesale substitute for the division demo-of power or competition for power.

If Rudolf Rummel’s calculations in Death by Government are even

ap-proximately correct, the last century was the most lethal in human history Power sharing claims to off er some prospect of reducing domestic lethality and war in human aff airs Th e argument for power sharing is more sophis-ticated than acknowledging that what cannot be won on the battlefi eld is best allocated through a shared forum and a shared executive Power-

sharers follow Rousseau’s declared method in Th e Social Contract that

com-mends taking “men as they are, and laws as they might be,” but because they

do not seek just one community they reject Rousseau’s par tic u lar proposals

as disastrous, namely inalienable, indivisible, and absolute sovereignty, the rejection of partial associations, and one vigorous homogenizing civic reli-

gion Power- sharers do not seek a social contract among a unifi ed people;

they seek social contracts for sociability among divided communities or between territorial governments Th e fi rst of these possibilities leads to what are called “consociational” directions; the second leads toward territorial or federative power sharing Th ese two possibilities can be combined in com-plex forms, as we shall see

Power Sharing, Participation, Accommodation,

and Their Alternatives

Power sharing is intended to enhance eff ective and peaceful po liti cal ticipation, especially by minorities In eff ec tive participation by majorities is rarely a major cause of violent confl ict in an established democracy, though

par-a mpar-ajority’s potentipar-ally negpar-ative repar-action to more eff ective ppar-articippar-ation by minorities may cause violence— the “backlash” phenomenon. What fol-lows assumes that the relevant majorities are demographically and elector-ally dominant, an assumption that needs to be relaxed in deeper analysis. All other things being equal, we may assume that more eff ective po liti cal partici-pation is desirable, for example, through electoral mobilization, interest- group

or party membership, or through institutionalized functional or territorial autonomy.

Power sharing is intended to hold the existing state together with the tive participation and consent of its minorities, unlike strategies of genocide, expulsion, partition, and control It may also bind states together, through

ac-confederations, to prevent war recurrence over deeply divided places It should always be considered in the light of the possible alternatives. Geno-cide and expulsion are terminating and terminal strategies Secessionists, when reasonable, wish to convert their status into that of majorities inside their own sovereign state Th eir leaders and followers logically reject prom-ises of better participation or power sharing in a unitary, a union- or a federal state, either because the historical record shows the promises lack credibility,

as for the people of South Sudan, or because the merits of in de pen dence weigh the expected benefi ts of greater participation in the existing state Partitionists seek to divide territories to control confl ict; in executing this strategy they invariably off end at least one national or ethnic community’s conception of its homeland, oft en more than one ( O’Leary 2007, 2011) When sincere, partitionists promise better participation in all the post- partition entities, promises unfulfi lled in the historical record Controllers, by con-trast, seek to or ga nize the dominant and to disor ga nize the subordinate— and the potentially insubordinate Th ey wish to block eff ective participation

out-by minorities in the core regime that matters and to confi ne what ever ticipation they enjoy to subordinated social organizations or to co- opted or indeed trivial institutions (Lustick 1979; O’Leary and McGarry 1996, chap 3) Mea sured by these alternatives, power sharing merits a hearing, though it

par-is never the sole strategy available or on off er

To understand power sharing fully we must compare it with its ently reasonable alternatives, not just the grim prospects of genocide, expul-sion, partition, and coercive assimilation To do so, we may distinguish among strategies that respect the equality of human beings and minimal human rights by their degree of tolerance of heterogeneity (in race, language, eth-nicity, religiosity, and nationality) At one extreme homogeneity is insisted upon in the aptly named “assimilationist” strategy; at the other end, recogni-tion of heterogeneity may reach the point of accepting that it is better that the state be downsized Policy and institutional instruments are logically linked

appar-to where policymaking elites’ preferences fi t on this scale (see Figure 1.1)

Assimilationist strategies encourage eff ective po liti cal participation solely

on the majority’s terms: Join us and you can be part of us and cease to be a structural minority. Th ey may work when targeted at migrants who have left their homelands and who wish to be assimilated, and where the domi-nant people welcomes egalitarian assimilation to take place If the two groups

wish to tango, assimilation occurs, either through acculturation, where the

minorities adopt the dominant majority’s culture, or through fusion and

amalgamation, where a novel collective identity is formed from a blend of the previous ingredients, including through extensive exogamy. Since Alexan-der the Great’s wedding of his Macedonian companions to the princesses of the Persian empire, formal and ambitious fusion strategies have been rare, and rarely successful Fusions happen more than they are planned, as in Spanish- speaking America Both acculturation and fusion have been evident

in the Americas since 1492 and part of the histories of settler states elsewhere, such as Australia; but acculturation has also been present in immigrant- welcoming states, such as France was— when it wished to have as many citizens

as Germany

Assimilationists emphasize majoritarian institutions for democracy, including single- person executive presidencies and winner- takes- all electoral systems in single- member districts (WTA- SMD), or expressly majoritarian electoral systems such as French- style double- ballot or two- round systems (TRS), or the majoritarian preferential vote in single- member districts, of-ten known as the alternative vote (AV) (Th e varieties of electoral systems are lucidly appraised in Bernard Grofman’s chapter.) Formally, assimila-

tionists emphasize inclusive civic citizenship: Nous n’avons pas de minorités,

mais seulement des citoyens ou des étrangers More circumspectly, they

in-sist that their states only have po liti cal minorities, which are capable of coming governing majorities if they become electorally persuasive To establish homogeneity, assimilationists oft en seek to ban (minority) ethnic, religious, or linguistic parties and encourage the building of “national par-ties” based on programs, doctrines, and interests (Bogaards 2008) Assimi-lation is especially benefi cial when voluntary, but if one or more party is a reluctant groom or bride, then diff erent forms of coexistence may be de-manded Power sharing is one of these

be-Integrationist strategies, by contrast, do not seek the full cultural

homog-enization of minorities Th ey confi ne their homogenizing ambitions to the

“public sphere,” as its proponents call it (following Habermas 1992; Calhoun 1992) In the public sphere, a common public language, public symbols, and common party politics are preferred Integrationists are relaxed about the

Figure 1.1 Scaling tolerance of diff erence among demo cratic elites.

Insistence on Homogenization Recognition of Heterogeneity

private preservation (and indeed the dynamic development of) minority tures but do not hesitate expressly to bar them from the public domain A duly elected Gaelic Irish nationalist and self- professed po liti cal republican may be admitted to the UK Parliament but must address it in En glish, if not the Queen’s En glish, and the republican must recognize the constitutional mon-archy before being admitted to the fl oor of the house Integrationists seek, at least in their own estimations, to design public institutions— executives, par-liaments, courts, public mass media— to be inclusive, even if they recognize that they cannot be entirely culturally neutral Th ey encourage minority participation in public life; they do not oblige minorities to abandon their cultural identities, but they are expected to leave their cultures at the doors

cul-to public places in the way some institutions and peoples expect visicul-tors cul-to leave their shoes Minorities may be mono the ist, polytheist, or atheist in the synagogue, mosque, or club; they may be monolingual, bilingual, polylin-gual, or nonlingual in the bedroom; and they may be “ethnic,” fused, cosmo-politan, or plain dull in the kitchen; but respect is expected for the codes of the formal public culture Th e sincere integrationist seeks to strip the state

of as much of its inherited cultural presumptions as possible, but there are limits Even Habermas’s ideal speech takes place within a language, and at least one person may need translation help (as all do with Habermas).Table 1.1 indicates the preferred goals, forms of party and party system, views of federalism, preferred po liti cal institutions, and favored electoral systems typically found among three types of integrationist: a (recognizably French or Turkish) republican, a (recognizably 1960s British Labour) social-ist, and (a recognizably current U.S or Canadian) liberal Republican and socialist integrationists are strongly hostile to minority ethnic, linguistic, and religious parties, preferring national and class orientations, respec-tively Th ey favor party and electoral systems that discourage minority party formation and voting for ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority parties Republicans and socialists are strong majoritarians Liberals, however, have feared “tyrannies of the majority,” by which they have usually meant usur-pationist labor movements, or religiously superstitious and ill- educated masses, rather than those of nationalizing majorities Accordingly, they have generally preferred the constitutional division of powers and the cre-ation of multiple “nonmajoritarian” regulatory institutions to unrestrained sovereign parliaments Republicans and socialists dislike federalism if it weakens the center and its distributive and egalitarian powers; by contrast liberals favor “national federations”— because they may constrain socialists,

protect markets and liberties through power- dispersal, yet emphasize one nation.

Accommodationist strategies are synonymous with power- sharing

strat-egies Th ese favor the formal public recognition and or ga ni za tion of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, as the Latin etymology of “accommo-

date” and its cognates suggests— namely, ad (toward) and commodare (to make fi t), in turn derived from commodus (suitable) Genuine accommoda-

tion requires the po liti cal recognition of more than one ethnic, linguistic, national, or religious community in the state and aims to secure coexis-tence, though its proponents may occasionally support downsizing, seces-sion, or even partition, if accommodation is impossible Academic supporters

of power sharing are not, contrary to their critics, “primordialists” who lieve that national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups have existed since time immemorial. Accommodationists insist, however, that such groups’ identities, and diff erences from one another, are oft en resilient, durable, and hard, rather than malleable, fl uid, soft , or quickly transformable, as suggested

be-by self- styled “social constructionists,” who are oft en unconscious of their assimilationist or integrationist biases Where divisions are enduring, advo-cates of power sharing believe that attempting either assimilation or integra-tion is unjust, and unfeasible, unless much blood is shed, and that is usually counterproductive

John McGarry and I believe there are four distinct forms of demo cratic power sharing in real- world strategy and academic commentary, now known as “centripetalism,” “multiculturalism,” “consociation,” and “territo-rial pluralism.” Each of these sees itself as a mode of power sharing, and each is briefl y treated below (see also Table 1.2) Th e order refl ects, from left

to right on the scale in Figure 1.1, the willingness of the respective advocates

of these strategies to embrace national minorities on their own agendas, with centripetalists being the least enthusiastic and territorial multinational pluralists the most keen

Th e centripetalists are the closest to integrationists Th ey see themselves

as responsible realists, though they regard some integrationists as wishful thinkers, except regarding policy toward voluntary immigrants Th ey are skeptical of romantic multicultural celebrations of diff erence Centripetal-ism involves prescriptions fi rst clearly articulated by the po liti cal scientist and legal scholar Donald Horowitz and a small number of other scholars who have followed in his tracks Centripetalism emphasizes “convergence” toward the center, or “bringing together,” and is usually juxtaposed by its

proponents to consociation, which is seen as generating centrifugal or fi siparous politics (in my view, contentiously and oft en inaccurately) Cen-tripetalists claim majority- rule institutions may be tempered through “vote pooling” to facilitate the election of moderate ethnic politicians capable of reaching out to other ethnic communities (Harris and Reilly 1998; Reilly 2001; Reilly and Reynolds 1999) Th ey counsel against electoral systems that they think favor ethnic partisans and oft en condemn proportional repre sen-

s-ta tion (PR) electoral systems, particularly party- list PR with low thresholds,

or the single transferable vote (STV) in multimember constituencies with a signifi cant number of seats because they permit “extremists” to fl ourish “Vote pooling,” according to its proponents, should require at least some winning candidates to obtain votes from ethnically diff erent voters and encourage campaigns focused on centrist moderate voters in heterogeneous constitu-encies Such systems should “make moderation pay” (Horowitz 1989, 1991).Centripetalists advocate two approaches to electoral system design Th e

fi rst relies on territorial “distributive requirements,” which is considered especially useful for presidential elections An electoral college is an exam-ple A majority of the electoral college votes need not be the same as a major-ity of the pop u lar vote and may obligate successful candidates to focus their campaigns across a range of member states (and, by implication, groups) Horowitz’s favorite example is presidential elections in Nigeria circa 1979 Th e then new constitution stipulated that a winning presidential candidate needed

at least a plurality of the pop u lar vote and at least a quarter of the vote in at least two- thirds of the nineteen states, and tacitly required any competitive presidential and vice- presidential team to appeal across the north and south

of Nigeria and, minimally, to at least two of its three largest ethnic nities Th e second approach is the frequent advocacy of the “alternative vote,”

commu-a mcommu-ajority- preferenticommu-al voting system thcommu-at ccommu-an be used for both legislcommu-ative commu-and presidential elections: the winning candidate must win an absolute majority

of fi rst- preference votes or a majority of votes aft er the transfer of lower- order preferences from the ballot papers of eliminated candidates (Bean 1997; Lijphart 1990; see also Allison McCulloch’s and Bernard Grofman’s chapters

in this volume).

Centripetalists support the “conciliatory potential of federalism” cause it may undercut support for secessionists But their reasons show the limits of their willingness to accommodate nationalism among minorities Federalism, they argue, may disperse power away from the center, thus inhibiting authoritarianism; quarantine confl ict at the local level (such as

be-Muslim- Christian disputes over sharia law in northern Nigeria); provide training for future central politicians to engage in ethnic bargaining at the local level; and promote cross- cutting politics through facilitating inter- and transethnic alliances based on common regional interests and facilitat-ing intragroup divisions and group proliferation within regions (Horowitz

1991, 214, 2007, 1985) On federations, Horowitz’s ideas are close to those of

“national federalists,” for example, for both South Africa and Iraq he mended strong po liti cal centers He has also supported the forced partition

com-of federative entities dominated by large ethnic communities, even against their will, to prevent regional majoritarianism Horowitz commends Nige-ria, where I grew up, as a paradigm case: the Nigerian First Republic was (primarily) made up of three regions, dominated by the Yoruba, Ibo, and Hausa- Fulani, respectively Nigeria’s military dictators subsequently forci-bly restructured the federation into twelve, and then nineteen states (Th ere are now thirty- six states, and perhaps forty- six soon.) Some are dominated

by the three large communities, some by other smaller minorities, and some

by no single community None of the big three now commands an grated contiguous homeland region In contemporary Iraq, followers of Horowitz recommended a “national federation” based on the eigh teen gov-ernorates established under Saddam Hussein’s Baathists and hoped that it would be imposed by the American- led Co ali tion Provisional Authority (Wimmer 2003– 4; for similar ideas, see Dawisha and Dawisha 2003 and Makiya 2003) Th ey believed that it would divide the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shiite Arabs among several diff erent governorates respectively, and thereby promote intercommunity and cross- provincial alliances, as well as

inte-an inclusive Iraqi national identity.

Horowitz himself comes close to integrationists in several respects: he seeks to promote transethnic identities, to disadvantage politicians who fo-cus exclusively on their own communities, and to favor those who “can fi nd ways of transcending their own ethnic affi liations” (1991, 207) Yet it is dif-

fi cult to see how a single- person presidential executive can fully represent distinct communities, as opposed to representing what they may share, un-less the person is of mixed origins, such as President Obama However, Horowitz is clearly not an integrationist (though some of his followers are):

he does not favor engineering social mixing or the wholesale privatization

of culture and has argued for bi- and multilingualism, and other forms of public support for minority cultures, in diff erent contexts He favors at least some self- government for minorities, particularly small ones that do not

threaten the state, though not “national self- government,” and his vote- pooling ideas are sincerely aimed at promoting some interethnic power sharing, al-beit through a co ali tion of moderates, and albeit he strongly prefers trans-ethnic to ethnic parties.

Multiculturalists go closer toward meeting the aspirations of minorities;

they affi rm the desirability of protecting multiple communities in both

pub-lic and private realms Recognition is their theme. In most of North ica and much of Western Eu rope, multiculturalism is not practiced literally

Amer-or pervasively Th at would mandate the full promotion of public schools for all cultural minorities in their languages, including programs designed de-liberately to allow immigrants to retain their language of origin and other forms of cultural autonomy, such as those advocated by the Austro- Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer and promoted today in a limited way in Hun-gary, Estonia, and parts of Rus sia (Hanf 1991; Bauer 2000) Western multicul-turalism, by contrast, has aimed, generally, at the promotion of a mainstream public culture that is less one- sided, assimilationist, or conformist than previously Th e idea has not been to support immigrants in publicly estab-lishing their own separate po liti cal institutions or parties but to tolerate diff erences in private domains while actively promoting integration and mixing in common public institutions through, for example, programs of

En glish as a second language and the provision of hospital and other public ser vices in the minority language Th e object is to assist minorities in adap-tation, and is oft en closer to acculturation than fusion Th is is how one may understand decisions to allow Muslim schoolgirls to wear headscarves in public schools in the United Kingdom, to change public school curricula to refl ect citizens’ multicultural origins in the United States (Takaki 1993), and

to permit Sikh police to wear turbans in Canada Th is “multiculturalism” does not advocate public support for cultural communities to remain en-duringly viable and separate for the long term

A full- blooded, so to speak, multicultural strategy in Eu rope and North

America, by contrast, would accommodate non- Western and illiberal

prac-tices Th e American brand of multiculturalism, the absorption of all tive features in the cultures of the world, has been satirized by Stanley Fish

posi-as “boutique multiculturalism” (1999), which resists the force of the culture that is allegedly appreciated at precisely the point at which it matters the most to its committed members Western multiculturalists, according to Fish, tolerate other cultures but only until they challenge liberal principles: child marriage, the inferior status of women in public or marriage laws, or

clitoridectomy are out of the question It is true that many Western Eu

ro-pe an multiculturalists display a rather shallow tolerance of immigrants from the eastern part of the Eu ro pe an Union, juxtaposing their own alleg-edly liberal nationalism with eastern or Balkan ethnic nationalism, deemed

to be exclusivist, based on endogamous marital practices (“tribal”), hostile

to group interaction, and segregationist

Such multiculturalism, we may suspect, is integrationism in disguise and, may, in certain limited circumstances, be no bad thing “Credible mul-ticulturalism,” by contrast, insists on two arrangements that require some minimum public support, through legislation or expenditures, and that re-ject the banning of po liti cal parties based on ethnicity, language, or religion Both require some power sharing First, public “respect” for a group’s self- government in matters the group considers important amounts to parity in recognition; second, some broad application of the principle of proportional repre sen ta tion of all signifi cant groups in key public institutions follows, not necessarily through quotas but certainly through public targets to enable the diverse repre sen ta tion of groups, such as in the military, in elite educa-tional institutions, and the judiciary Th e formula, “community recognition + proportionality,” is the minimum mark of credible multiculturalism Whether autonomy requires public support for some form of autonomy, es-pecially in educational institutions, is controversial: most, however, argue that multiculturalism requires “community autonomy + proportionality.”

Consociation is rightly associated with the innovative work of Arend

Li-jphart, which he acknowledges revives a tradition found in the works of Althusius and indeed the “Austro- Marxists” of the Habsburg empire To the multicultural formula, “autonomy + proportionality,” consociation adds two further elements, namely, “cross- community executive power sharing”

and “veto powers.” A cross- community power- sharing executive joins

rep-resentative elites from diff erent communities to manage and prevent

con-fl ict. Consociation does not require every community to be represented in the executive, or that everybody within a par tic u lar community support all

of its representatives in the government, or that all ethnic parties be present

in the executive “Complete consociational executives,” what Lijphart scribes as a “grand co ali tion,” may be distinguished from “concurrent exec-utives,” in which representatives of the majority within each of the main partner groups is in government, and “plurality executives,” in which at least a plurality of each signifi cant group’s representatives are in govern-ment ( O’Leary 2005a; McGarry and O’Leary 2006a)

de-More rigid consociations, constructed amid high historic mistrust or ter deeply violent antagonisms, may endow each partner to the consociation with veto powers, enabling them to prevent executive, legislative, or constitu-tional decisions that threaten their fundamental interests Sometimes execu-tive power sharing and proportionality rules grant every major community

af-de facto veto powers Where they do not, however, minorities usually seek formal veto rights; for example, in Belgium the cabinet has parity of repre-sen ta tion of Flemish and French speakers and operates by consensus Like-wise, autonomy sometimes accomplishes de facto veto provisions through the formation of a jurisdiction dominated by a given community that can nullify federal law (though it may be vulnerable to interventionist courts) Consociations do not need to be rigid; “opt- out” provisions that do not block others from pursuing a certain policy and that result in institutional and policy asymmetries may be distinguished from “veto rights.”

Consociationalists fl esh out the formula of “autonomy and ity.” Community self- government is perhaps a clearer description than “au-tonomy” because territorial autonomy is distinct from “pillarization,” the system Lijphart described as prevalent in the Netherlands until the mid- 1960s, that is, parallel pillars of Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liber-als, “equal but diff erent” (Lijphart 1975) Consociational autonomy rejects the hierarchical ranking of partly self- governing groups, such as those evi-dent in Islamic empires— described in Braude’s chapter— apartheid, and sys-tems of control, but it allows for separate personal laws on marriage and inheritance, separate schooling and university systems, and separate publicly funded media Provided adult membership and use of such institutions is voluntary, liberal consociation is possible Territorial autonomy is generally supported by consociationalists (Lijphart 1979), but since it is distinctly char-acteristic of governance in federations or union states, it is examined below

proportional-Th e combination of territorial autonomy with consociational arrangements

at the confederal (or federal or union center) is not uncommon; it notably may be used to describe the Eu ro pe an Union (Chryssochoou 1994, 1997, 1998; Taylor 1993). Autonomy in consociations mandates public support for the maintenance of diverse communities, both now and into the future, but, contrary to its critics, it does not prevent voluntary de- pillarization; it does require that the pillars de- pillarize by their own consent

Consociationalists commend proportionality throughout the critical components of the public sector— not just the executive but also the legisla-ture, the judiciary, administration, the police, and the army; that is, they

insist on “representativeness” in all salient po liti cal institutions alism and merit- based impartiality occur, and are legitimate but in deeply divided places are only feasible once representativeness has been met Con-sociationalists prefer PR electoral systems or, where that is not possible, systems that achieve similar outcomes, for example, “set- asides” or “quotas.”

Profession-Th ey diff er over the merits of par tic u lar PR systems— or, rather, over which ones should be encouraged in par tic u lar cases Lijphart generally favors list- based proportional repre sen ta tion (list PR) because it facilitates discipline and control by party leaders and eases the making and maintenance of con-sociational bargains But it may have drawbacks: with a low threshold, list

PR may enable hard- liners to wreck consociational deals because they can form their own party and win support without reducing the vote and seat share of their ethnic bloc Th e STV version of PR has a higher eff ective threshold than most forms of list PR, given that constituencies rarely com-prise more than six members, and therefore may inhibit fragmentation and facilitate transfers in favor of candidates and parties prepared to maintain power sharing ( O’Leary 1999a, 1999b, 2002; see also Evans and O’Leary 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Mitchell, O’Leary, and Evans 2002, 200; Mitchell, Evans, and O’Leary 2009).

Consociation can be demo cratic or authoritarian; formal or informal; liberal or corporate (McGarry and O’Leary 2007) In an authoritarian con-sociation, such as the Yugo slav federation, a communist elite from each na-tionality jointly controlled the federal government but was not demo cratically representative A demo cratic consociation, by contrast, has open elections among competing elites, but each sizable community is represented in the executive along complete, concurrent, or plurality patterns A formal conso-ciation is entrenched by constitutional or statutory law, as in the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, but consociation may be or ga nized through informal convention, for example, the Swiss “magic formula” for allocating seats on the federal collective presidency (Steiner 1970) A corporate consociation accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria and tacitly assumes that group identities are and should be fi xed and that groups are both inter-nally homogeneous and externally bounded (e.g., in Lebanon, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Belgium, and Cyprus at various junctures) Critics assail such constitutional primordialism A liberal consociation, by contrast, allows groups (and individuals) to self- determine their or ga ni za tion and repre sen-

ta tion It rewards what ever salient po liti cal identities emerge in demo cratic elections, whether these are ethnic, religious, linguistic, or based on other

criteria South Africa’s transitional power- sharing arrangements (1994– 96) allocated deputy presidencies and cabinet seats based on party strengths in seats won, not on ascriptive characteristics Northern Ireland’s 1998 Agree-ment combines both corporate and liberal elements Its fi rst and deputy

fi rst ministers are guaranteed to one nationalist and one unionist Th e other ten ministers, by contrast, win offi ce through an allocation algorithm, the d’Hondt method, which is liberal or “diff erence blind” ( O’Leary, Grofman, and Elklit 2005) Consociationalists generally commend formal over con-ventional arrangements, especially when deep divisions generate security preoccupations Academic consociationalists are supporters of demo cratic and liberal consociations, though they are (unfairly) accused by integration-ists of being “undemo cratic,” “illiberal,” “essentialist,” and “primordialist.”

Territorial pluralists, by contrast, seek to manage heterogeneity through

a pluralist federation or union A pluralist federation is polynational, is tralized, and has consensual or consociational decision making in its federal government Its internal boundaries respect nationality, ethnicity, language,

decen-or religion— it is “polynational.” Where the federation- wide majdecen-ority is a jority in every federative entity, there is an integrated national federation, as

ma-in the United States, Germany, Australia, or the Latma-in American federations Where all, or most, of a minority are a self- governing majority within its own single federative entity, as in Quebec, we have by contrast a pluralist federa-tion Between these polar types there exists an ambiguous federation, con-sisting of ethnic, linguistic, or national minorities divided across several federative entities, in each of which they may be majorities Where such federations originate from the partition of nations without their consent, as occurred in Nigeria in the late 1960s, they should be categorized as national federations, and sometimes as not- so- disguised systems of “control,” in-tended to block secession Where, by contrast, such a pattern developed or-ganically, as with Switzerland’s language communities, two of which are divided across several cantons, we have a federation that is polylingual but not polynational

Pluralist federations vary in their pluralism Fully pluralist federations entail three complementary arrangements Th e fi rst is signifi cant and con-stitutionally entrenched autonomy for federative entities, both in the consti-tutional division of powers and in resource allocation Th e federal government cannot unilaterally rescind the powers of the federative entities Second, a pluralist federation may have consensual, indeed consociational, rules within the federal government, including its executive ( O’Leary 2005b)

Consensual federations create strong second chambers representing the constituent regions and have strong regional judiciaries and a regional role

in the selection of federal judges Th ey do not create strong single- person executive presidencies or senates that are mirror images of the house of rep-resentatives Th ird, they are fully polynational, with a pluralist rather than monist conception of sovereignty— fl owing from multiple peoples not one, recognized in the constitution/treaty, fl ag(s), and symbols and in offi cial bi-lingualism or multilingualism Th e federation is multihomeland, a partner-ship between or among distinct peoples A polynational federation oft en permits asymmetric institutional arrangements

Pluralist territorial accommodation extends beyond the federation mat Some “union states” recognize historic nationalities and their boundar-ies Th is is the apt way to characterize the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Den-mark, and perhaps India In each case, jurists and constitutional tradition privilege a centralized sovereignty and treat autonomy as a rescindable gift

for-of the central po liti cal institutions, but the state is or has become a composite that respects historically incorporated territories and grants them extensive autonomy and sometimes national recognition In union states, territorial institutions of self- government are more likely to exist across only part of the state Such asymmetry may result from majorities being happy with govern-ment from the state’s central authorities while minorities insist on distinct self- government (McGarry 2010a) Th us Zanzibar has home rule within Tanzania, but there is no analogue to Zanzibar’s institutions in Tanganyika: the Union parliament is its parliament Th e UK has home rule institutions in Northern Ireland and Scotland, but Westminster is the sole parliament for

En gland, and the sole body entitled to pass primary statutes for Wales, which has a National Assembly with limited powers to amend them Denmark grants home rule to Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, but the common par-liament is also Denmark’s When autonomous and asymmetric institutions are entrenched, through the constitution or an international treaty, there may exist a “federacy,” namely a unit of government that enjoys a distinctive federal relationship with the state (the core of which may be a federation, a union state, or a unitary state), in which neither governmental unit can uni-laterally alter the other’s powers (see Alfred Stepan’s chapter in this volume).Some academics and leaders of nationalities argue that what we may call standard territorial pluralism is not enough: it is too statist and cannot ad-equately meet the demands of mobilized national communities partitioned

by, or spread across, state borders, such as the Azeris, Basques, Irish, Kurds, Magyars, and Serbs Th ey are not satisfi ed by consociational or pluralist ter-ritorial accommodation and seek to establish or reestablish po liti cal link-ages across state borders, that is, cross- border institutions, ranging from functional cooperation to confederal bodies Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, Magyar minorities in Romania and Slovakia, the Turkish minority

in Cyprus, Serbian minorities in Bosnia- Herzegovina, and Austrian norities in Italy (South Tyrol) seek or have cross- border links with their

mi-“kin- state.” Comprehensive territorial power sharing encompasses state as well as intrastate institutions.

inter-Normative Disputes over Power Sharing

Accommodation, whether called power sharing or not, is unpop u lar among advocates of a strong central government Nevertheless, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Indonesia, and even France have moved toward sys-tems that accommodate minorities through autonomy, whether through pluralist federations, devolution within pluralist union states, or federacies (e.g., Aceh, discussed by Stepan) States, and international organizations such

as NATO, the OSCE, and the UN, have been prepared to encourage, or even impose, consociation, pluralist federations, and federacies in situations of confl ict and ethnic polarization, including in Northern Ireland, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Iraq, Burundi, and, abortively, in Cyprus On occasion, inter-national organizations, including the Council of Eu rope and Eu ro pe an Union, have moved beyond an integrationist defense of individual rights to-ward a more accommodationist perspective Th eir reluctance to go further is not diffi cult to explain Th e “international” system is composed of states, not nations, and power sharing is most likely to be sought by sizable nationalities that do not control their states, or perhaps only parts of their homelands.What unites advocates of power sharing is the public and private recog-nition of ethnic, linguistic, religious, or national categories and groups (see Table 1.2) Th ey are prepared to address the demands and aspirations of such communities, if necessary at the expense of the politics of indivisible sovereignty, classes, or individuals Centripetalists are positioned toward the integrative end because of their restricted focus on ethnic moderates rather than radicals, their preparedness to partition territorial units belong-ing to large nationalities, and their support for politicians who “transcend”

their ethnic origins Credible multiculturalists strongly value cultural ralism per se and not just as a prudent strategy for achieving po liti cal stabil-ity Consociation is much more accommodationist because it is inclusive toward radicals and because it may incentivize politicians whose appeal is restricted to their distinct community It is more accommodative than mul-ticulturalism because it combines the multicultural institutions of auton-omy and proportionality with the additional devices of executive power sharing and vetoes Territorial pluralism is at the most accommodative end when it converts minorities at the statewide level into majorities within re-gions Th e most accommodative forms of territorial pluralism encompass not just self- government and power sharing in the federal or union govern-ment but linkages between minority- dominated regions and their kin in other states Just as republicanism is the most likely of the integrationist strategies to become coercive assimilation, so territorial pluralism is the most likely of the accommodationist strategies to lead to state disintegra-tion, but the placement of accommodation approaches to the left of the dis-integration arrow in Figure 1.1 should remind us that all power- sharing strategies in a broad sense are aimed at holding states together.

plu-Integrationists charge that power sharing will increase instability, force divisions, and cause violence Th ey assume that narrowly rational po-liti cal elites sow or maintain divisions and that accommodating them will enable them to consolidate their position Institutionalizing par tic u lar iden-tities reinforces allegiance to such elites and may promote resentment among those who are not privileged Integrationists think that ethnocentric elites will not reach— or at least not maintain— centripetal, consociational,

rein-or territrein-orially pluralist bargains because the underlying divisions remain intact; they claim that consociations have broken down or are held together

by external force; and they argue that pluralist federations have had a poor track record Integrationists marshal such cases to argue that power sharing

is unworkably brittle— and dangerous Th ey maintain that integration is more feasible, sometimes arguing that ethnic identities are seldom as long-standing or as deep as accommodationists suggest. Advocates of power sharing are accused of believing in “ancient hatreds,” exaggerating the ho-mogeneity of ethnic groups, ignoring the existence of multiple and cross- cutting identities and the capacity of people to change. Integrationists, by contrast, believe it is realistic and sensible to support progressive, or “bridg-ing,” social forces against divisive elites and to support parties with cross- cutting appeals

Advocates of power sharing respond that promoting integration amid deep diversity creates at best an unstable equilibrium; either assimilation will occur aft er much blood is spilled, or communities will demand special consideration, such as power sharing or, if that is unavailable, secession Without public support, weaker cultures or communities either acculturate,

as hoped by some policymakers, or they react with a backlash, seeking lic redress, subsidies, the institutionalization of their culture in the curricu-lum, po liti cal autonomy, or power sharing Advocates of power sharing are usually skeptical that ethnic identities are universally malleable or superfi -cial, or of recent vintage Th ey argue that the presence or otherwise of deep divisions is a matter of empirical verifi cation and judgment, not to be dis-missed through slogans such as “the myth of ancient hatreds.” Voters in deeply divided places are unlikely to accept standard integrationist protec-tions and may be reluctant to place their faith in cross- cutting po liti cal par-ties, even if the electoral system deliberately makes it diffi cult for minority parties to win offi ce. It is unrealistic, in such settings, to place much faith

pub-in the transformative ability of civil society organizations to counter elite ethnocentrism, precisely because civil society organizations are likely to be ethnocentric—“bonding” rather than “bridging” in character (McGarry 2001), with neither civil nor societal relations Deeply divided places render the goal of social mixing problematic Segregated schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces sometimes exist because they are, however regrettably, pop u lar, and partly because they are considered safe by parents, residents, and work-ers Deliberate “mixing” may be unrealistic within any short period or only likely to occur within stable power- sharing institutions that generate confi -dence in the survival of one’s own community Advocates claim that the track record of power sharing is much better than integrationists allege, but there are notable and heated internal divisions as to which accommodation-ist institutions work best

For example, those who commend territorial pluralism maintain its cess depends on a number of specifi ed conditions being met Failures are not evidence of an inherent fl aw, they are oft en exaggerated, and long peri-ods of success in staunching fl ows of blood are overlooked by the critics Failures may fl ow from remediable design fl aws, external interference, ex-traneous issues connected with managing the transition from war to peace, the coercive origins of a federation or union, or authoritarian rather than accommodative practices It is an error, territorial pluralists believe, to hold

suc-up the former despotic communist federations as evidence that pluralist

federations are bound to fail (McGarry and O’Leary 2009a) tionists believe that Euro- federalists who seek to strip the Eu ro pe an Union of its pluralist institutional characteristics are doomed to ignominious failure: the EU can work only if it combines territorial pluralism and the accommo-dation of its constituencies within its central institutions ( O’Leary 2001a).

Accommoda-Th ere is an intense intra- power- sharing debate between centripetalists and consociationalists over what is most conducive to po liti cal order, and I am not a neutral observer in this debate Horowitz argues that in a consociation it

is unlikely that ethnic group leaders will agree to compromise suffi ciently both to achieve and maintain consociational power- sharing institutions He insists that because consociation is necessarily based on the idea of a “grand co-ali tion” it cannot work: successful consociations are “as rare as the Arctic rose” (Horowitz 2002a, 197) Consociations are said to work, if at all, where they are not necessary, that is, where there are only mild divisions: they “are more likely the products of resolved struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages than they are mea sures to resolve struggles and to moderate cleavages.” Horowitz argues PR electoral systems may exacerbate divided places because they favor sectional appeals and radicals over moderates, facilitate po liti cal fragmentation, and promote “outbidding.” Horowitz also oft en argues for the alternative vote, but these arguments have not won widespread ac cep-tance He understands that his centripetal approach faces an “implementa-tion problem,” that is, antagonistic elites are unlikely to accept institutions biased in favor of moderate politicians He believes that this catch- 22 can be overcome with the assistance of outside forces In 2000, Horowitz suggested that the way out of the dilemma created by the failure of ethnic elites to ac-cept centripetal institutions was for internal parties to put “constitutional decision- making in other hands,” including outside governments and inter-national organizations (277) More recently he called for a “strong Ameri-can push” in a centripetalist direction in America’s reshaping of Iraq, noted that “departing colonial powers left their imprints on new constitutions all over Asia and Africa, and many of these proved durable,” and argued, “[it] is time for the U.S to do the same” (2005 A16) Centripetalists maintain that their implementation problem is no greater than that of consociationalists because both arrangements require intervention Th e diff erence, they claim,

is that centripetal institutions, once implemented, will be self- sustaining and require minimal intervention

Consociationalists regard centripetalism’s emphasis on vote pooling as based on unrealistic assessments of ethnic divisions, especially where these