The art of persuasive communication, fourth edition

Communication and persuasion: A democratic setting LOOKING AHEAD After reading this chapter, you will be able to, among other things: • defi ne and describe persuasion using communicatio

www.jutaacademic.co.za Johann C de Wet

This fourth edition of The art of Persuasive Communication – A process situates contemporary

persuasive practices against the background of the rich history of rhetoric and within the setting of a

democratic state.

The work is theoretically well-grounded and considerate of the practical dimensions of persuasion –

from its broad starting points in an interpersonal setting to its manifestation as mass persuasion or

propaganda in the wider political sphere Contemporary examples, including rhetorical discourses of

South African statesmen, are provided to facilitate understanding.

Throughout, the author addresses critical issues that are important to communication science scholars

and practitioners, as well as those active in related disciplines such as political science, sociology,

social psychology and rhetorical studies In fact, the book should be helpful to potential persuaders and

persuadees across the broad spectrum of society It will give persuadees a better chance to identify

persuasion and defend themselves against the unscrupulous.

There is much new material in the fourth edition, especially with regard to the role of social media;

leadership, political language and persuasion; and rhetorical criticism, including constructing the

rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor.

Professor Dr Johann de Wet, author, co-author and editor of numerous academic titles, is currently

attached to the Department of Communication Science at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein,

South Africa He teaches, and consults on, persuasive communication, political communication and

Second edition 1991

Third edition 2010

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Preface xi

Chapter one: Communication and persuasion: A democratic setting 1

1.1 Introduction: On communication 2

1.2 Persuasion as a process of communication 4

1.2.1 Forms of persuasion: A brief synopsis 5

1.2.2 Persuasion as art and science 6

1.3 Persuasion in the service of democracy 7

1.3.1 Democracy as a form of government 7

1.3.2 Democracy as ideology 9

1.3.3 Democracy and freedom 11

1.3.3.1 Individual freedoms and democracy 12

1.3.3.2 Freedom of thought and discussion 13

1.3.3.3 Freedom in a democracy: The underlying communicological idea 15

1.3.4 Democracy and equality 15

1.3.4.1 Tocqueville’s warning 16

1.3.4.2 Equality in a democracy: The basic communicological idea 17

1.3.5 Freedom versus equality 17

1.3.6 Questions for South African and other communities 18

1.4 Persuasion and ethics 21

1.4.1 Ethical persuasion: A question of approach and culture 22

1.5 Resistance to persuasion 24

1.5.1 Creating a social consciousness and self-consciousness of persuasion 25

Chapter two: Persuasive communication: The historical context 28

2.1 Introduction: The Greek roots 29

2.2 Plato’s criticism of rhetoric 29

2.3 Aristotle’s view of rhetoric 31

2.3.1 Rhetoric as an art 32

2.3.2 Artistic proofs and the enthymeme 34

2.4 The Romans and the classical tradition 36

2.5 Further historical development of rhetoric: A brief overview 37

Chapter three: Broad starting points of interpersonal persuasion 43

3.1 Introduction 44

3.2 Verbal messages 44

3.2.1 Consider human emotions 44

3.2.1.1 Attitudes 44

3.2.1.2 Needs 45

3.2.1.3 Consistency 47

3.2.2 Be rational 48

3.2.2.1 Evidence 48

3.2.2.2 Reasoning 50

3.2.2.3 Argumentation 51

3.2.3 Show credibility 55

3.2.3.1 Expertness 55

3.2.3.2 Trustworthiness 55

3.2.3.3 Goodwill 55

3.3 Non-verbal messages 56

3.3.1 Objectics 57

3.3.2 Proxemics 57

3.3.3 Chronemics 58

3.3.4 Haptics 58

3.3.5 Kinesics 58

3.3.6 Oculesics 59

3.3.7 Vocalics 59

3.4 Key questions and answers 60

Chapter four: Theories of interpersonal persuasion 65

4.1 Introduction 66

4.2 Attitude change theory 66

4.3 Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour 67

4.4 Learning theories 68

4.4.1 Classical conditioning and Skinnerian behaviourism 68

4.4.2 Social learning theory 70

4.5 Consistency theories 70

4.5.1 Balance theory 71

4.5.2 Congruity theory 71

4.5.3 Cognitive dissonance theory 71

4.5.4 Belief hierarchy 72

4.6 Social judgement–involvement theory 73

4.7 Elaboration likelihood theory 74

Chapter five: Persuasion, mass and social media, and public opinion 77

5.1 Introduction: A changed circumstance 78

5.2 Traditional theories of mass media effects 79

5.3 The role of the traditional news media 83

5.3.1 On defining news 83

5.3.2 Towards an integrated approach to understanding news selection 84

5.4 Social media 86

5.5 Public opinion 89

5.5.1 Solid, fluid and gaseous public opinion 89

5.5.2 Characterising public opinion 90

5.6 A model and a sequence of mass persuasion 93

5.6.1 Rank’s model of persuasion 93

5.6.2 Monroe’s motivated sequence 95

Chapter six: Perspectives of propaganda 98

6.1 Propaganda: A historical orientation 99

6.2 The traditional perspective of propaganda 101

6.2.1 The basic techniques 103

6.2.2 The difference between democratic and totalitarian propaganda 104

6.3 Bureaucratic propaganda 105

6.4 Ellul’s view of propaganda 107

6.4.1 Ellul on democracy’s need of propaganda 112

6.4.2 Ellul’s contribution 113

Chapter seven: Leadership, persuasive language and politics 117

7.1 Leadership 118

7.1.1 On transformational leadership 118

7.2 Language and politics 120

7.3 Political persuasion: Language styles and settings 121

7.3.1 The oratory setting 122

7.3.2 The small group bargaining setting 124

7.3.3 The assembly debate setting 126

7.3.4 The non-violent resistance setting 127

7.4 Directed political language 131

7.4.1 Shifting patterns in key words and phrases in South Africa 134

Chapter eight: Image and persuasive political campaign management 139

8.1 Persuasion, politics and image management 140

8.1.1 Political image, identity and personality 140

8.1.2 The art of image management: Goffman’s view 140

8.1.2.1 Defensive measures in the art of image management 142

8.1.2.2 Protective measures in the art of image management 142

8.1.3 A case for news media diplomacy 143

8.2 Persuasion and political election campaigns 145

8.2.1 On political campaigns and movements 145

8.2.2 The candidate 147

8.2.3 The style and arrangement of a formal political speech 148

8.2.3.1 Style 149

8.2.3.2 Arrangement 150

8.2.4 Campaign management 151

8.2.4.1 Research 151

8.2.4.2 Strategy formulation 152

8.2.4.3 Fund-raising 156

8.2.4.4 Advertising and media use 156

8.2.4.5 Debate planning 159

Chapter nine: Persuasion and political debates 162

9.1 Introduction 163

9.2 Arguments for and against debate 166

9.3 Content and relational strategies 167

9.3.1 Content strategies 167

9.3.2 Relational strategies 168

9.4 Debate tactics 169

9.4.1 Verbal tactics 169

9.4.2 Non-verbal tactics 172

9.5 Debate effects 173

9.5.1 The concept of the debate winner 174

Chapter ten: Persuasion and political negotiation 178

10.1 The concepts of political negotiation and bargaining 179

10.2 Negotiation as a peaceful alternative to political conflict 179

10.3Negotiation styles and skills 181

10.4 A joint problem-solving approach as the ideal 182

10.4.1 A win-win strategy 183

10.5The role of a mediator 186

10.6International political negotiation 187

10.6.1 Diplomatic persuasion: Complicating factors 190

10.6.1.1 The role of interests 190

10.6.1.2 The role of power 191

10.6.1.3 The role of ideology 191

10.6.1.4 The role of propaganda 192

10.6.1.5 The role of trust 193

Chapter eleven: Rhetorical discourses of South African statesmen 195

11.1Introduction 196

11.2 FW de Klerk’s historic speech, February 1990 196

11.2.1 The text of De Klerk’s opening address 197

11.3 Mandela and De Klerk on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, December 1993 210

11.3.1 The text of Mandela’s acceptance speech 211

11.3.2 The text of De Klerk’s acceptance speech 215

11.4 Nelson Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994 222

11.4.1 The text of Mandela’s inaugural speech 223

11.5 Thabo Mbeki on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001 226

11.5.1 The text of Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU 226

11.6Jacob Zuma’s inaugural address, May 2009 235

11.6.1 The text of Zuma’s inaugural speech 236

11.7Critiquing political discourses 241

11.7.1 Focusing on structure 243

11.7.1.1 De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening address, February 1990 243

11.7.1.2 Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001 244

11.7.2 Focusing on the use of the Aristotelian artistic proofs 244

11.7.2.1 De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening address, February 1990 245

11.7.2.2 Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994 249

11.7.3 Focusing on worth and Nilsen’s four-part method 250

11.7.3.1 Mandela and De Klerk’s acceptance speeches, December 1993 251

11.7.3.2 Mbeki’s address on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001 252

11.7.4 Focusing on outcomes 255

11.7.4.1 Zuma’s inaugural address, May 2009 256

Chapter twelve: Persuasion and the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor 261

12.1Introduction 262

12.2A rhetorical imprint 262

12.2.1 Focusing on lines of argument 263

12.3Constructing a rhetorical imprint 264

12.3.1 Deconstructing the data 264

12.3.2 Building the interpretation 264

12.4Dr Van Zyl Slabbert as a public rhetor 265

12.4.1 Van Zyl Slabbert’s lines of argument 267

12.4.1.1 From South Africa’s options: Strategies for sharing power (1979:1–30; 120–153) 267

12.4.1.2 From The last white Parliament (1985:105–143) 268

12.4.1.3 From Van Zyl Slabbert’s 1985 parliamentary speeches (in Hansard: 22–44; 409–411; 686–694; 1282–1283; 3114–3119; 3728; 3862–3867; 4910–4918; 7100–7110) 270

12.4.1.4 From The system and the struggle (1989:7–22; 44–83)

(which includes chapters written between 1975

and 1985) 272

12.4.2 Discussion and summation 273

12.5Van Zyl Slabbert’s rhetorical imprint 276

References 279

Name index 291

Subject index 294

This fourth edition of The art of persuasive communication – A process is a

revision and expansion of the third edition published in 2010

As argued before, apart from the vast scholarly interest shown in persuasive

communication throughout the centuries, persuasion also stimulates much

wider interest This is due to its broad social significance, among other things

After all, the ‘in-groups’ in society are always interested in how persuasion

can be used to cement their privileged positions, while the ‘out-groups’ see

persuasive communication as a non-violent means of effecting change, so that

they too can enjoy a better life While most of us want to be effective

persuaders, we should recognise that we are always victims of persuasion as

well Thus, the original motive for writing about persuasive communication

remains the same: It has pervasive existential relevance

There are two things that separate this book from others in the field First, it

attempts to situate most of the critical issues within the theoretical framework

of a democratic society Secondly, it provides examples related to South

Africa’s transition to democracy and beyond With regard to the practical

application of persuasion, this book focuses mainly on one-to-many

persuasion It does so by situating persuasive practices against the rich

background of rhetoric

While the text does not, of course, set out to convey all the insight on the

topics discussed, it aims to provide useful knowledge to both potential

persuaders and persuadees – to potential persuadees in the sense that it will

give them a better chance to identify persuasion and defend themselves

against the unscrupulous

A large part of this edition is devoted to persuasive communication in politics

The choice of politics is deliberate With regard to its rhetorical base and

organisational variables, political communication has been rather neglected

by South African communication scientists, partly because it is a relatively

new sub-discipline of communication science Moreover, throughout the ages

rhetoric has identified itself as a powerful political instrument that functions

as a form of art

Many years ago, a critical reader of an earlier edition reminded me that I

should emphasise somewhere that, after much has been said and written,

human beings are persuaded only as far as they consider it to be in their own

interests I agree, but where persuadees are reluctant to be persuaded (also for

their own good), the persuader can attempt to make them believe that it

would be in their own interests to do as he/she has suggested That is the real

art of persuasion Art implies the ability to do something – to influence, in

this case Creating identification between the persuader and persuadee is

crucial to the process, as Kenneth Burke would say But persuasive

communication is also a science, since it involves theories or creative

explanations of how processes occur as they do

How does this edition differ from the third edition?

• The arrangement of the contents has been revised to facilitate greater

understanding

• New contemporary examples related to South Africa have been included

• There is much new material, especially with regard to the role of social

media; leadership, political language and persuasion; and rhetorical

criticism, including constructing the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor

Johann C de Wet

Bloemfontein, South Africa

July 2016

Communication and persuasion:

A democratic setting

LOOKING AHEAD

After reading this chapter, you will be able to, among other things:

• defi ne and describe persuasion using communication science

terminology

• explain different forms of persuasion

• situate persuasion in a democratic context and relate its relevance

for South African society

• relate persuasion to ethics

• understand the various ways that the individual can resist

persuasion

1.1 INTRODUCTION: ON COMMUNICATION

The word ‘communication’ originates from the Latin communicatio, which

has two major meanings (Gepp & Haigh, 1935:102):

1 Making common, imparting

2 Taking your audience into your confidence

Our focus is on the first meaning of communication The linking of ‘making

common’ and ‘imparting’ seems to suggest that making common implies not

so much ‘reducing to one’ as achieving mutual understanding through

imparting ideas

The concept of communication is defined and used in different ways in the

literature of communication science But it is often reduced to mean the process

of expressing and interpreting messages – of imparting ideas – between

communicator and recipient, with the aim of coming to mutual understanding

on certain subject matter

Such a basic understanding implies the presence of a timeless and durable

structure that characterises all forms of human communication, a structure

that Van Schoor (1979:13) calls the communication ‘triptych’ The structure

consists of a communicator, a medium in which a message is embedded, and

a recipient Also rightfully implied in this definition is the active role of the

communicator and recipient, the recipient being not just an object to be

manipulated by the communicator

Communication always takes place within a given social circumstance or

context

Communication has various forms: intrapersonal, dyadic, small group, public,

mass and vertical communication These are defined as follows:

• Intrapersonal communication refers to an individual’s ability to think, feel

and use language for understanding and expressing ideas It sometimes

also refers to a dialogue held within the self, as ‘intra’ in the word

‘intrapersonal’ means ‘within’

• Dyadic communication happens only between two people This is

communication in its most basic sense, and it is generally agreed that here,

in the dyadic setting, the force of persuasion is at its strongest

• Small group communication takes place in small groups, usually ranging in

size from three to about 12 members Small group communication is used to

enable people to accomplish things together, such as solving problems or

making decisions Examples of small groups are committees and the family

• Public communication refers to a situation in which a communicator (for

example, a public speaker, an entertainer or a lecturer) does most of the

talking, while several dozens to several hundreds or thousands do most of

the listening The relatively face-to-face nature of public communication

allows recipients to participate actively in the communication process

through their occasional responses to what the communicator says Such

responses also enable the communicator to make on-the-spot adjustments

to the message

• Mass communication is mediated; it involves various media, which range

from the now traditional (such as newspapers, radio and television) to

fairly new media (such as bulk e-mails and SMSs and the internet), in order

to transmit messages to an almost unlimited number of recipients The

concept of ‘mass’ in ‘mass communication’ has a quantitative meaning – it

refers to the number, rather than the nature, of recipients who are reached

• Vertical communication is seen as your communication with a God or higher

being However, in the organisational or corporate world, vertical

communication (as opposed to horizontal communication) refers to the

usually downward flow of communication in the hierarchical structure

This book speaks of forms of communication rather than contexts of

communication The author takes this position because, for example, the

nature or quality of your message transmission with another person, the

quality of your dyadic communication with another, depends on the context

in which it takes place But it is still dyadic communication To speak of a

context of communication when referring to dyadic communication would

not allow for the different circumstances in which dyadic communication can

take place

The literature sometimes refers to levels of communication The forms of

communication noted above do function at various levels, namely:

• Intrapersonal level

• Interpersonal level (for dyadic, small group and public communication)

• Mass level

• Vertical level

Communication can take place with or without words When we communicate

or persuade intentionally without using words, we communicate or persuade

non-verbally The use of non-verbal messages in the process of persuasion is

discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3

1.2 PERSUASION AS A PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION

Persuasion predominates in our life-worlds In every field of human existence,

be it at the dyadic, group or public level, people are confronted with persuasion

and take part in it

Moreover, persuasion pervades human communication in all its forms: in

intrapersonal, dyadic, small group, public, mass and vertical communication

With regard to intrapersonal communication, we speak of self-persuasion,

when a person takes an active role in persuading him-/herself to think or act

in a certain way (cf Bettinghaus & Cody, 1994:79ff.)

Of course, persuasion can be studied in various other disciplines and

sub-disciplines, such as social psychology But it is fundamentally a process of

communication (cf Benoit & Benoit, 2008:7ff.) – its natural home is

communication science

Like communication, persuasion is defined and used in various ways

However, for our purposes, persuasion in its ideal state may be defined as a

process of communication in which a communicator succeeds in voluntarily

forming, sustaining or changing the attitudes and/or behaviour of a recipient

or a group of recipients in accordance with what the communicator intends

by his/her message

The following words and phrases in this working definition need to be

emphasised:

• A process of communication There is expression and interpretation of

messages when persuasion occurs The process and effect of such

expression and interpretation may take place fairly quickly, or over a

period of time Moreover, as in the case of communication, a timeless and

durable structure is present in the persuasion process This structure, or

‘triptych’, consists of a persuader (communicator), a medium in which a

message is embedded, and a persuadee (recipient)

• Voluntarily The recipient is not forced into being persuaded He/She

always has the right to choose, even though the choices are sometimes

very limited

• Forming, sustaining or changing Persuasion is used not only to change (as is

the general perception), but also to sustain or to maintain, or even to

intensify, the attitudes or behaviour of recipients

• What the communicator intends As in the case of communication, persuasion

is intentional – it always has a purpose.

A situation becomes persuasive through the focus on accomplishing something

predetermined and directional with regard to recipients For this reason, not all

communication can be regarded as persuasion Engaging in small talk with a

friend, for example, which is a form of dyadic communication, may have

nothing to do with being persuasive – of accomplishing something

predetermined and directional

Persuasion directs itself at problems of, or opportunities for, human action in

the areas of the contingent and the probable Therefore persuasion concerns

itself with human affairs

Persuasion seeks to adapt ideas to people and people to ideas We may see this

process as a continuum that runs from the comprehensive adaptation of ideas

at one extreme — ‘telling people only what they want to hear’ – to full

regeneration of ideas at the other extreme, expressed in terms such as ‘facts

speak for themselves’ Persuasion normally functions closer to the more

moderate centre of the continuum, away from the extremes Here, on the one

hand, in order for recipients to be accommodated, difficult and unfamiliar

ideas have to be modified without being distorted or invalidated, while on the

other hand recipients have to be prepared, through the breaking-down of

their prejudices and ignorance, without being deprived of their judgements

(Bryant, 1953:23)

1.2.1 Forms of persuasion: A brief synopsis

There are many forms of persuasion Arguably, the more important forms are

education, seduction, sanctions, manipulation, blackmail, propaganda,

indoctrination and psychological warfare (Finn, Weich & Rensburg, 1983; cf

Brown, 1963)

• Education broadly revolves around helping recipients (such as learners and

students) to understand why they do what they do, whereas in persuasion

it is not essential for the recipient to understand why he/she acts in a

certain way

• Seduction, often used in advertising and public relations, aims partly to

persuade the recipient to surrender to spending money Think of a beautiful

model promoting a new perfume or a charity fund-raising campaign

during the festive season, respectively

• Sanctions are measures applied to ‘enforce’ obedience to rules and laws,

and may be put in place overtly or covertly During apartheid, South Africa

was overtly subjected to international sanctions

• Manipulation has broad relevance and may be viewed as the successful

attempt by the communicator to use the recipient as an object to be

exploited, by, for example, using his/her charm to get what he/she wants

• Blackmail is severe manipulation in that it is the act of putting pressure on

a person or a group to do something they do not want to do, for example by

threatening them or making them feel guilty

• Propaganda, a highly problematic form of persuasion, is usually addressed,

for good or bad purposes, to the group or the many (the masses) rather

than to individuals For this reason, the terms ‘mass persuasion’ and

‘propaganda’ are often used interchangeably (Propaganda is discussed in

detail in Chapter 6.)

• Indoctrination refers to the systematic teaching of beliefs and attitudes to a

person or a group without providing contrary messages, thus ensuring

that there are few alternatives, if any Indoctrination is often practised in

totalitarian states and in religion

• Psychological warfare takes place when the persuader is dealing with a

foreign adversary whose morale he/she seeks to destroy by psychological

means The idea is that the opponent should begin to doubt the validity of

his/her beliefs and actions This type of warfare flourishes during war, but

it is also practised in peacetime, for example as we see in the ongoing

tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds

Although persuasion is often used for dishonest ends, there is no doubt that

human beings cannot live without it This is because people are continually

confronted with choices, whether real or fictional, and want to be comfortable

with what they think should be done, or is to be done, about a given matter

1.2.2 Persuasion as art and science

Persuasion is an art, because it relates to the capability of doing something

(persuading someone, which of course also requires thought) and involves

probabilities rather than certainty – we cannot know exactly what the effects

will be if the persuader uses this or that particular technique

But persuasion is also a science, as it relies on theories to explain why people

may be persuaded by a communicator Science is the pursuit of ‘truth’, while

a theory is a creative interpretation or explanation of why processes (or

events) occur as they do In short, a theory is a way of knowing A theory of

persuasion attempts to interpret and explain how persuasion works A theory

of communication also attempts to interpret how communication takes place

A theory consists of two parts:

1 Basic concepts (words or phrases that have a particular meaning in a

given context)

2 Statements concerning the relationships between these concepts

A theory is different from a model A model is a graphic representation of a

phenomenon, such as persuasion Because by its nature the model highlights

only certain aspects of the process under investigation, be it persuasion or

simple communication, it is a limited representation A model of persuasion

would show how persuasion takes place – in graphic form, and in an incomplete

or simplified way A theory of persuasion, by contrast, is much more

comprehensive, because it focuses on more of the aspects of the process under

investigation

Persuasive communication, like all scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines,

can be studied from different angles In examining persuasion in this book,

we take the functional approach: Persuasion is seen to function in the service

of something, in this case in the service of a democratic society

1.3 PERSUASION IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

For a democracy to work and to survive, it must rely on persuasion, whether

in settling disputes, selling ideas and products, or changing people’s attitudes

This applies to interpersonal relationships, organisations, public relations,

advertising, print and broadcast journalism, politics, public speeches and

debates, religion and the arts, among others Persuasion is therefore integral

to the functioning of a democracy

The presence of persuasion in the context of a modern democracy immediately

raises questions as to the nature of the concept of democracy itself After all,

‘democracy’ is a contested term – its proper usage is continually debated The

term is most often used to refer to a form of government, even though strictly

speaking it is more of a procedure designed to place a government in office

and to establish a public order in which diverse legal interests are harmonised

and balanced We focus on this sense of democracy, as well as on democracy

as an ideology and a way of life that relates to humans as existing beings

1.3.1 Democracy as a form of government

The word ‘democracy’ or demokratia is derived from the Greek demos (the people),

and it was taken in ancient Greece to mean literally ‘the power of people who

qualify as citizens’ Here, the word ‘people’ has a very particular meaning The

Greeks did not include slaves in their conception of people (see Van Zyl Slabbert,

1991) And for the Greeks demos meant the people in the sense of ‘the common

people’ or ‘the ordinary man’ or, simply put, ‘the poor’ – not in the modern sense

of ‘the people as a whole’ or ‘every member of society’

The ancient Greeks are often regarded as the founders of democracy when

the concept is used to mean a form of government, but antiquity ultimately

rejected this form of government (Wolheim, 1975:109) It did not last even in

Athens, and famous thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle opposed it because

for them equality of political opportunity and freedom for the individual to do

as he/she likes were the salient characteristics of democracy.

Democracy as a form of government, as practised today, is a product of the

19th and 20th centuries In ancient Athens there was a form of ‘direct

democracy’, in which ‘all’ citizens participated in decision-making, by voting

and accepting a majority verdict But except for this, authoritarianism of

some type prevailed throughout the world until after the American and

French revolutions of the late 18th century

A characteristic of all authoritarian systems is the denial of significant political

rights or privileges to most members of the body politic Consequently,

minority rule prevails in the sense that ultimate, and immediate, control of

the government is confined to a small proportion of the total adult population

Policies are decided by officials who are legally and politically responsible not

to the general public, but only to the minority who enjoy a monopoly of

governmental power

The American and French revolutions were influenced by the ideas of the

Enlightenment, and especially by ideas propagated by the great French

philosophers of the 18th century In particular, Rousseau’s assertion that the

individual exists prior to the state, and thus has rights that are in no sense

dependent on the will of any ruler, was a major contribution to democratic

thought during this period (Barbrook, 1975:115–116)

However, the Western conception of democracy – as a form of government

created by the will of the majority of citizens – was not accepted unconditionally

during the 19th century In fact, 19th century thought is pervaded with a fear

of democracy, on the grounds that it could lead to a ‘tyranny of the majority’

(see Arblaster, 1984:264–283)

To speak of democracy as a form of government is also to distinguish

arrangements and actions in society as characteristics from a normative

perspective (see Connolly, 1983:29–34) In contemporary Western thought,

democracy is seen as ‘representative’ or ‘indirect’ (as opposed to ‘direct’

democracy), in which the people choose, for example by voting for,

representatives who are then answerable to them, but who are also directly

involved in the practice of government, usually without further consultation

(Raphael, 1979:146ff.; Scruton, 1982:115–117) The term ‘democracy’ in this

sense is usually reserved for political systems that accept certain basic

normative assumptions These may be divided into three broad categories:

1 Government should reflect the people’s electoral will and choice – hence

the constitutional provision for regular elections, usually by the universal

right to vote, by secret ballot, with representatives of at least two parties

standing for election

2 Basic individual freedoms (other than political rights) should be

recognised by government These freedoms include freedom of speech,

information and the press; freedom of assembly; freedom of association;

religious freedom; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment

3 These freedoms should be exercised according to the rule of law The rule

of law may be described as a doctrine which prescribes that no power can

be exercised except according to procedures, principles and constraints

contained in the law (The law must obviously be directly or indirectly

representative of the people’s will.) Moreover, any citizen can find redress

against any other, however powerfully placed, and against the officers of

the state itself, for any act that involves a breach of the law This implies

that (governmental) powers are kept separate, that is, an independent

judiciary and an executive separately elected or responsible to an elected

legislature

The idea of an independent political public sphere operating as an intermediary

system between state or government and society in a democracy has long been

propagated by the German sociologist and philosopher Juergen Habermas

Habermas (2006) notes that the political public sphere should be instrumental

in forming considered public opinions through, among other matters, diversity

of independent mass media and through general access of inclusive mass

audiences to the public sphere Habermas (2006) suggests that ‘the different

weighting citizens of different nations assign to either rights and liberties, or to

inclusion and equality, or to deliberation and problem solving, determines how

they see themselves as members of their political community’

1.3.2 Democracy as ideology

Along with nationalism, socialism and communism, democracy may be regarded

as a fundamental ideology in our age The term ‘ideology’ is an anglicised version of

the French word idéologie, and it was invented in the late 18th century by a school

of thinkers called les idéologues led by Destutt de Tracy This concept was first used

to describe a new ‘science of ideas’ (Cox, 1969:10)

After Napoleon accused the ideologues of advocating revolutionary ideas,

ideology gained the additional meaning of abstract, impractical or fanatical

theories, which of course gave the concept a negative connotation This view

became more widely accepted, especially after the appearance of The German

Ideology by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1939 Here, ideology acquired

the meaning of ‘false consciousness’, that is, a state of mentality that does not

keep track, or is a distortion, of social reality (see Larrain [1982:35–67], and

Marx & Engels [1939])

This mainly negative connotation has gradually disappeared, but ideology

continues to be linked with socio-political ideas and officially sanctioned

doctrines of society acquired in the past three centuries

Today ideology generally refers to a system of socio-political ideas that social

groups aim to implement practically in a given society These ‘ideas’ are

characterised by elements of:

• valuation – cherished ideas

• actuality – ideas relating to the present

• belief – believed, rather than proven, ideas (Ellul, 1973:116).

In connection with democracy, these ideas have to do with the individual’s

natural right to control the government of the day (a cherished idea relating

to the present) through regular elections and the exercise of basic freedoms in

accordance with the rule of law The idea that this natural right is recognised

only in a democracy, and that democracy is therefore the best form of

government, is an idea that is believed rather than proven

In African philosophy, democracy relates to socialist goals and aims, and has

a communal focus According to Senghor (1998:443):

[t]his is a community-based society, communal, not collectivist We are

concerned, here, not with a mere collection of individuals, but with people

conspiring together, conspiring in the basic Latin sense, united among

themselves even to the very center of their being, communing through their

ancestors with God, who is the center of all centers

Thus, in the working out of our “African mode of socialism”, the problem is

not how to put an end to the exploitation of man by his fellow, but to prevent

its ever happening, by bringing political and economic democracy back to

life; our problem is not how to satisfy spiritual, that is, cultural needs, but

how to keep the fervour of the black soul alive It is a question, once again, of

modernising our values by borrowing from European socialism its science

and technical skill, above all its spirit of progress

The Western conception of democracy focuses on differences between parties in

which the winner reigns supreme through the ballot box By contrast, the

African conception of democracy upholds unity through consensus and dialogue

as the ideal Everyone ideally has the right to participate in the dialogue and

decision-making Respect is given to the individual who contributes to unity and

justice in dialogue, which may lead to a kind of coalition process

In former president Thabo Mbeki’s (2001:149–157) definitive speech on the

New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), democratic principles

and institutions, as well as popular participation and good governance, are

clear objectives for the continent (see Chapter 11 Section 11.5.1) Mbeki

(2001) calls for African leaders to adopt the true spirit of democracy in which,

among other things, human rights are protected and people-centred

development and market-orientated economies predominate In this call, a

mixture of traditional Western and African approaches to democracy comes

to the fore (Mbeki, 2001)

Achille Mbembe (2009), an influential African historian and political

philosopher who was born in Cameroon but now resides in South Africa,

suggests that in many African countries the masses feel that democracy has

betrayed them They believe that they are still powerless and bent on survival

(Mbembe, 2009) The law and constitution in many African countries have

made a mockery of freedom (Mbembe, 2009) The idea that Africans held

during the first half of the 20th century, if they could rid themselves of

colonialism and become independent, was of a (democratic) state in which life

would be humane and governed by ethics (Mbembe, 2009) Instead, in many

cases, independence brought about domination by a few, and the self-interest of

those in power replaced ethics (Mbembe, 2009) Freedom was abandoned in

favour of domination, corruption and violence, explains Mbembe (2009)

The above description of democracy focuses mainly on its governmental and

ideological nature But democracy’s aims are most clearly concerned with a

person’s quality of life, as manifested in human freedom and equality and,

concomitantly, as manifested in a person’s ability to communicate freely with

others and the world In short, any communicator in a democracy has the

right to try to persuade the recipient of his/her point of view (within the limits

set by the law) The recipient, in turn, has the right (the freedom) to choose

whether he/she wants to accept the communicator’s point of view

We now turn to the respective principles of freedom and equality underlying

the (Western) concept of democracy

1.3.3 Democracy and freedom

Freedom is absence of restraint The principle has negative and positive

connotations: the former conveyed in the expression ‘freedom from’ (for

example, legal restraints or racial discrimination), the latter in ‘freedom to’

(for instance, realise your aims or to express your views in public)

All too often, the negative side of freedom has dominant concerns We feel

that just ‘freedom from’ is not enough for freedom to prevail The quest on

the road into the unknown, uncertain and insecure is also part of freedom

After all, since we do not always know what is best for us, we explore in order

to find solutions Freedom (as the absence of restraint) is therefore always

freedom from some possible restraint and freedom to do what you want or

choose to do provided that you do it responsibly, and do not encroach upon

another person’s freedom (Scruton, 1982:180–181; cf Raphael, 1981:81)

1.3.3.1 Individual freedoms and democracy

It is argued above that certain individual freedoms are indeed essential to

democracy: rights of direct or indirect participation in the process of

government; freedom of speech, information and the press; freedom of

assembly; freedom of association; and religious freedom

These freedoms are granted because they conform to basic liberal ideas

associated with Western democracy, such as:

• belief in the supreme value of the individual (and thus not of the state)

• belief that the individual has natural rights – rights that belong to all human

beings by nature, such as the right to life and to control government

• belief that these natural rights exist independently of government, and

ought to be protected by and against government

• recognition of the supreme value of an individual’s freedom (see Beck,

1979:47–64)

The relationship between democracy and liberalism is not as natural as we

might expect, despite ‘liberal democracy’ being such a common term that we

tend to imagine the two constituent principles having always operated in

harmony In fact, throughout history there have been tensions between the

advocates of democracy and liberalism Democracy, in its original sense of

rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the bulk of

the people, emphasised equality and was regarded by liberals as a ‘bad’ word,

fatal to individual freedom and to the civilised living that liberalism stands

for However, since the 20th century liberals have come to view Western

democracy not as an end in itself, but as a means of preserving freedom of the

individual, to secure a maximum of freedom for citizens (see Arblaster,

1984:75–79)

‘Freedom’ (of the individual) also implies that to which you have a right (with

its concomitant obligations), and ‘right’ in turn implies ‘right to choose’

(‘Freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are sometimes used interchangeably But ‘liberty’ is

normally used in English to refer only to ‘social freedom’, that is, freedom

from restraint by the action of other people; it is not used in the sense of

freedom to choose – see Raphael [1981:82].)

This right (or freedom) to choose also distinguishes human beings from

animals For instance, a human being can choose to commit suicide, an

animal cannot Choice is the selection of one possibility among several More

than one possibility or course of action must be open to a person before that

person can be said to have a choice – you must not be prevented by physical or

psychological causes from having at least two genuine options

Absolute freedom, however, is an unattainable ideal; legal and societal

constraints – such as custom, tradition and public opinion – prevent it Also,

to the extent that you are ‘duty-bound’ to respect the freedom of another,

freedom is limited rather than absolute Moreover, if all people were absolutely

free to do as they pleased, the extent of an individual’s actual freedom would

be measured by his/her power to do what he/she wanted and by his/her ability

to resist invasive action by others and the law The term ‘power’ is used

broadly here – in the Weberian sense – as the chance of an individual realising

his/her own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others

who participate in the action (Weber, 1982:80)

1.3.3.2 Freedom of thought and discussion

In a democracy, a person’s ‘freedom to choose’ also implies that we have a

right to think whatever we want – hence the principle of freedom of thought

Any attempt to impose thoughts on an individual or to stop him/her choosing,

through law, is doomed to failure

This right to think whatever we want does not, however, mean that such

thoughts are entirely our own In fact, your thoughts can never be regarded as

a product just of your own deliberation, free from external influences of any

kind Thinking is conditioned, for instance, by social circumstances and by

various propaganda practices that flourish in a democracy Nevertheless we

can make many of our thoughts our own by living them, by attaching meanings

to them

In theory, by adhering to the principle of freedom, a democracy attempts to

provide the individual with a wide variety of viewpoints, which in turn give

him/her an opportunity to choose the viewpoint that pleases him/her the

most – for example through the doctrine of the freedom of the press, among

others But press freedom, understood broadly as meaning that the mass

media should not be under governmental control, does not guarantee that the

individual can choose a particular viewpoint among many Private media

groups may all propagate the same view (on the merits of the free enterprise

system, for instance) to the exclusion of other viewpoints

Freedom of thought is an evasive but necessary ideal for a democracy In the

essay On liberty, written in 1859, John Stuart Mill advocates complete freedom

of thought and discussion within the political order Mill (1975:50–51) bases

his argument on four grounds:

Firstly, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we

can certainly know, be true To deny this is to assume our own infallibility

Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly

does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion

on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by collision of

adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being

supplied

Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth;

unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested,

it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of prejudice,

with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds

And not only this, but fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in

danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the

character and conduct; the dogma becoming a mere formal profession,

inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth

of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience

As Levi (1959:37–46) suggests, Mill advocates such freedom of thought and

discussion in order to foster free development of individuality Individuality

incorporates the elements of spontaneity and diversity, and the latitude of

choice, provided by the very freedom of thought, expression and discussion

(mutual criticism) (Levi, 1959)

Consciousness of individuality is a fairly recent phenomenon in human

history Historically, human beings have been regarded as social animals It

was only in the Renaissance that the individual and his/her needs began to

move closer to the centre of human thought Mill (1975) was thus in line with

post-medieval tradition, which he carried forward when he stressed the

unique importance of the individual He did not imply that the individual was

something apart from, and unrelated to, the society in which he/she lived and

of which he/she was a product (Mill, 1975) His point was that each individual

has a unique set of personal qualities significantly different from those of his/

her fellow men and women, qualities which must be prized and encouraged

for their creative potentialities (Mill, 1975)

For Mill (1975), there is no real freedom for a person in a democracy if

conflicting interests cannot be recognised without the individual being

victimised either in his/her relations with the institutions of government or in

his/her personal claims against the pressures of mass sentiment

As Alexis de Tocqueville (1951) expounds in Democracy in America, Mill

emphasises that the threat to individual freedom in a democracy lies not so

much in the mandates of law, but in the pressures of public sentiment, which he

fears will also lead to intellectual stagnation The pressure of public sentiment

that enhances conformity, Mill (1975:15) warns, is an evil that tends to grow

more formidable People, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, impose their

own opinions and inclinations as a rule on others (Mill, 1975) Furthermore,

this is so energetically supported that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by

anything but want of power, and that power is not declining but growing

(Mill, 1975)

Mill’s (1975) pointed remarks seem to suggest that an individual’s freedom in a

democracy could also depend on his/her ability to demand and receive the right

to seek alone (if necessary) the truth about any matter that interests him/her

Dahrendorf (1979) may say that such ability would increase an individual’s ‘life

chances’ in a democracy (see also Boraine’s [1991] reference to ‘life chances’)

Dahrendorf (1979:34) describes life chances as opportunities for individual

action arising from the interrelationship between ‘opinions’ (possibilities of

choice) and ‘ligatures’ (bonds, such as family or community, that the

individual has been born into or has acquired) An individual’s life chances

could increase or decrease, depending on the relationship between his/her

options and his/her ligatures – the fewer ligatures and the more options, the

greater his/her life chances Although Dahrendorf (1979:38) does not equate

freedom with life chances, he notes that they are ‘closely related’, in that

freedom is about giving an individual opportunities to choose

1.3.3.3 Freedom in a democracy: The underlying communicological idea

Theoretically, then, in a democracy, freedom (as a principle with active

connotations) revolves around providing an individual with opportunities to

make meaningful choices about his/her existence

The democrat is prepared to make his/her own mistakes rather than to be

directed by someone else, even though that person may have superior wisdom

The basic idea of freedom here is that self-direction – choosing and expressing

for yourself in a responsible manner – is far preferable to having decisions made

for you and imposed upon you by another (see Dewey, 1963:53–55)

1.3.4 Democracy and equality

Some degree of equality is essential to a democracy (Raphael, 1979:183ff.;

Schulz, 1977:110–114) This is generally seen as including the following:

• Equality before the law This means that the rights of all individuals in a

democracy are subject to a sovereign legislative body (such as Parliament)

and to no other factor (such as race or class) Naturally, there is never full

equality before the law For instance, children and people who are

considered to have a mental health condition are treated differently from

adults of sound mind Neither does legal equality guarantee that all

individuals are equally able to take full advantage of the rights conferred

For example, some people, by having superior education or more money,

may be in a better position to exercise their legal rights than the poorly

educated or those with much lower funds This has given rise to the

distinction between de jure equality and de facto equality: rich and poor

have equal rights in law, but it would be wrong to claim that they have

equal power to enforce those rights

• Political equality This means that there should be equality in the ability to

vote someone into office, and to stand for election to office yourself Such

political rights should not, for instance, be confined to the rich and the

well born Political equality, like legal equality, never exists absolutely For

example, children never have the vote – it is usually the norm that only

adults have the right to vote In the United Kingdom, for instance, certain

offices of state (notably that of sovereign) are hereditary and not open to

everyone, while in the United States, you can become president, among

other things, only if you were born in that country In conferring the vote

on ‘all’ adults, democracy presupposes the view that all adults generally

have the ability to exercise their vote A form of factual equality is implied;

that is, that every adult (excluding those with a mental health condition)

has the ability to form a political judgement and to make a rational political

choice – which, of course, may not in fact be true

• Equality of opportunity This means that all individuals should be given the

same opportunity (such as in the field of education) to develop whichever

personal talents they have and to make whichever unique contributions

they can Equality of opportunity lies at the very heart of democracy Of

course, despite favouring equal opportunity, democracy still has many

inequalities, such as those of income, wealth and power

Some kinds of equality are unattainable, it seems safe to assume Differences

in individuals’ intelligence, talents, temperaments and physical characteristics,

as far as we know, are inherent in humankind

1.3.4.1 Tocqueville’s warning

Tocqueville (1951:11) pointedly warns that equality can be taken too far and

can result in a situation where people are prone to be ‘lost in the crowd’ of

their fellows; they lose respect for their own freedom and soon become

grossly indifferent to the free expression of individual thought

As legal, political and social conditions became more equal for people in 19th

century America, Tocqueville (1951) notes, Americans seemed more and

more to take pride not in their individuality, in their freedom, but rather in

their sameness He suggests that this is because the principle of equality is

partly based on the notion that there is more intelligence and wisdom in a

number of men united than in a single individual and that the interests of the

many are to be preferred to the few (Tocqueville, 1951 Vol 1:255–256)

Moreover, Tocqueville (1951) proposes that democracy in 19th century

America had, in the sacred name of the majority, raised up a tyranny over the

minds of men as oppressive and as formidable as any in history: the tyranny

of the majority However, it is important to recall that Tocqueville had an

aristocratic bias; he argues throughout Democracy that uniformity, conformity

and mediocrity are fixed returns of egalitarian (democratic) society

(Tocqueville, 1951) (see also Aron, 1970:9)

On specific tendencies created by the principle of equality, Tocqueville (1951

Vol 2:288) notes that ‘the one [tendency] leads men straight to independence

and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a

longer, more secret, but more certain road to servitude Nations readily

discern the former tendency and are prepared to resist it; they are led away by

the latter, without perceiving its drift’

1.3.4.2 Equality in a democracy: The basic communicological idea

Theoretically, in a democracy the principle of equality conventionally relates

to equality before the law, political equality and equality of opportunity,

bearing in mind that there will always be differences in, for example, the

talents and temperaments of individuals The idea behind these forms of

equality seems to be that all people should be treated with ‘fairness’ in a

democracy A truly democratic society would then, as Dahrendorf (1961:

182–185) suggests, combine a maximum of equality of circumstances with

a minimum of equality of character

Equality in a democracy would prevail if individuals had equal opportunity to

participate and to be involved as self-conscious subjects in the communication

process Mutual respect, spontaneity and awareness of the other as an

individual would be prerequisites for people to participate in communication

in this way

1.3.5 Freedom versus equality

One of the essential conditions of a democratic state is the free play of

conflicting opinions – the right of all people to freely disagree

Consequently, we would presume that a democratic state would also respect

the line between the power of the majority and the rights of minorities

(including dissident minorities) In fact, no state can afford to disregard

individual differences, conflicts of interest and diversity of needs in devising

satisfactory solutions for the many problems that arise in all communities

Equality is a great leveller Equality makes it exceedingly difficult for one

person or a few people to oppress the many, but in turn it makes it just as

difficult for one person to be free from the oppression of the many

Equality by itself is not ideal If all people were equally wretched, equally

poor or equally powerful, the equality would be of no benefit; in this sense,

people may be more equal in a totalitarian regime than in a democracy

The point is that if people say they want to be free and equal their demand for

freedom often puts a limit on their demand for equality (see Lipson, 1986)

For example, any attempt to achieve equality in wealth for all citizens would

surely result in a form of totalitarianism To keep people equal in wealth, in

spite of their unequal abilities, differing work performance and varying

aptitudes, would require a degree of all-round regimentation surpassing

anything that a dictator has yet achieved

Although democracy implies that certain freedoms, such as freedom of

speech, are conferred equally on all people, in the final analysis it has to be

decided which is the more important: freedom or equality

In this respect, we may be inclined to agree with Dahrendorf (1961) that a

person’s freedom must be the supreme goal Applying equality (of people) as

an all-embracing principle leads to the degeneration of humankind: It

prevents individuals from developing their personal capacities (which are

always qualitatively unequal) to the greatest possible extent, thus sacrificing

individuality for the sake of equality

In communicological terms, applying equality as an all-embracing principle

would obstruct a person’s power of individual expression, since it aims to

make people think and do alike People tend to become the same, rather than

becoming self-conscious subjects It would be in order if equality implied that

everyone could communicate on an equal subject footing so that they are able

to actualise themselves

1.3.6 Questions for South African and other communities

As argued, the principles of freedom and equality should reign supreme in a

democratic state But the right to freedom is not an absolute right, and

absolute equality is unattainable

The principle of freedom, from which freedom of expression, press freedom

and religious freedom are all derived, has limitations, obligations and social

responsibilities in a democratic state There is no legal or moral escape

from them

Broadly speaking, communication practices in a democratic state are always

influenced by social circumstances, which include the prevailing

politico-ideological and religious climates at a given time Let us take the 2005 furore

in South Africa over cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad as an

example The disturbance began in Denmark when an author was unable to

find anybody willing to illustrate a book about Muhammad The Danish

newspaper Jyllands-Posten regarded this as evidence of a Muslim threat to free

expression, and commissioned and published a series of cartoons of the

prophet to make a point (Kruger, 2006) In South Africa, the weekly Mail &

Guardian published one of the cartoons and was vehemently criticised by the

Muslim community The editor later apologised, after she and her family had

received death threats A High Court interdict was granted preventing any

further publication of the cartoons in South Africa Many commentators

shouted that press freedom was under threat

A more recent example occurred in 2015 when Islamist gunmen killed 12

staff members of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris for

publishing controversial cartoons of Muhammad

The point, however, is that the press or mass media must also abide by

constraints on freedom in a democratic state, because they are part of that

state – they do not function outside of it This would apply to any

communicative practice that, for example, promotes ‘hate speech’ (see

Gelber’s [2002] work on the subject) or the ridicule, insult or denigration of a

widely practised religion

A position, albeit a conservative one, on the issue suggests that an apology for

publishing the cartoons or other insulting material does not have ramifications

for freedom of expression or press freedom Freedom sometimes has to be

balanced against other values, such as intercultural harmony, which

legitimises encroaching upon it

When choosing to rely on (press) freedom to defend particular communicative

actions, individuals and institutions need to consider true human

responsibilities in the process of verbal and non-verbal communication, also

with regard to religious issues Too many wars have raged, and are still raging,

in the name of one or other religion or religious denomination

Intercultural sensitivities are, and have been, rife in South Africa for many

decades Communication practitioners should know this and should strive to

take others’ viewpoints into consideration Balance is an overriding concern

In communicating interculturally, use of the ‘free word’ or illustration must

be approached circumspectly The free word can cause major conflict, and

has indeed done so Those who use the free word to wound the honour or

pride of others shoot with words (Esterhuyse, 2004)

This can be said while fully appreciating the fact that without press freedom

a democratic state cannot exist Citizens must be kept informed about

socio-economic and political circumstances that influence their lives Public

opinion is formed mainly by events that the press and other media have made

publicly known Citizen involvement in the interpretation of news is necessary

for the effective functioning of public opinion And an active public opinion

steers democratic practices The press, as the fourth estate, is part of this

process

This implies that the press must be able to do its work fearlessly – in freedom,

but also with the necessary responsibility to achieve the democratic ideal

The press must be the watchdog and not the rag doll of government

As Merrill (2004:17) notes, press freedom usually leads to best journalism

practices: Freedom is needed for maximum news coverage, for the discovery

of truths and for diversity of information

The challenge facing the principle of equality in South Africa does not lie in

the idea of political equality discussed above, or in equality before the law,

but in the idea of equal opportunity in the land

Stories abound of the deep divisions between the so-called ‘haves’ (in-groups)

and ‘have-nots’ (out-groups) in South Africa For example, many of the

winning entries in a journalism competition held over more than a decade

show that the South African state has continued to grapple with inequalities:

the exploitation of the poor by the rich, the plight or hardship of disabled

people, the plight of the poor in informal settlements and rural villages, and

the devastating effects of HIV/Aids on especially the poor

Inequalities will have to be bridged as soon as possible if political stability is

to be maintained over the medium and long term The divide between rich

and poor is not simply a racial one, as in apartheid South Africa – it is also

class-based While political transformation has taken place in many spheres,

the challenge of economic transformation for the benefit of most, if not all,

has yet to be realised

Perhaps the greatest threat to the democratic South African state is the

pervasiveness of violent crime, which mocks the principles of freedom and

equality This country has one of the highest crime rates in Africa Each day

South Africans are the victims of murder, rape, robbery and hijacking Violent

crime against children is especially horrifying Other contact crimes against

citizens of all walks of life continue unabated Among many citizens, there

seems to be very little respect for law and order, and for the life of other

human beings

The principle of freedom in this context seems to be operationalised as ‘doing

what you want’ without taking the other person into consideration With

such freedom comes a climate of unhappiness where, as the then president

Thabo Mbeki noted in 2007, ‘communities live in fear, closeted behind walls

and barbed wire, ever anxious in their houses, on the streets and on our roads,

unable freely to enjoy our public spaces’

Likewise, the principle of equality is distorted Violent crime offenders have

become more equal than others through their disregard for the dignity or

property of others and for (often) escaping punishment for their crimes

Efforts to bring down the rate of certain crimes, such as theft, and to build the

democratic South African state, are complicated by widespread poverty and

the lack of equal opportunity

Let us turn our attention to ethical issues in persuasion

1.4 PERSUASION AND ETHICS

Ethical issues in persuasion focus on value judgements concerning right and

wrong, or goodness and badness While knowledge of what is right and wrong

is highly problematic, society often teaches us what is right and what is wrong

Throughout history, two macro theories that relate to the study of ethics,

which is the study of moral conduct, have prevailed: teleological and

deontological

Teleological theories focus on consequences, that is, an action (persuasion)

being right or wrong depends on its consequences, irrespective of how the

action was carried out A pragmatic and utilitarian tendency thus prevails

For example, if you punish a learner more harshly than is necessary for not

studying for a test during the year and it has the desired result that he/she

passes the examination at the end of the year, then your persuasive action,

teleologically speaking, would be regarded as ethical

Deontological theories, by contrast, deal with the duties of the participants in

the action (persuasion) For example, it would be ethically wrong for a

Christian person to try to persuade someone to kill another person, thus

going against the Ten Commandments

The process of persuasive communication always carries with it potential

ethical issues, because it:

• involves a persuader (communicator) trying to influence a recipient or a

group of recipients by forming, sustaining or changing his/her or their

attitudes or behaviour

• concerns consciously choosing from among a group of sought objectives

and using persuasive means to achieve those objectives

• necessarily involves a potential judge – any or all of the recipients, the

persuader or an independent observer (Johannesen, 2013:41–42)

Although the relationship between persuasion and ethics is problematic,

three general principles can be posited (cf Bostrom, 1983:14):

• Persuasion can be employed to ethical or non-ethical ends

• Persuasion is used by many types of people, who may or may not have

respect for ethics However, knowledge of persuasive processes is useful in

defending yourself against unscrupulous practitioners

• Ethical issues are often relative, as they can allow for several acceptable

answers The way in which the persuader, persuadee or observer evaluates

the ethics of a persuasive practice depends on the kind of approach

adopted, which in turn is most often governed by the predominating

cultural values

1.4.1 Ethical persuasion: A question of approach and culture

A number of approaches can be adopted when deciding whether persuasion

has been ethical or not (Benoit & Benoit, 2008:45ff.; cf Johannesen, 2013)

For example, a human nature perspective on ethics assesses behaviour as

ethical when the essence of human nature is preserved – such as allowing

recipients to make rational decisions A legal approach requires comparing

current laws and regulations with the persuasive techniques used In South

Africa, it is illegal and thus unethical to make direct comparisons between

commercial products in advertisements One may not advertise that a certain

(named) soft drink is better than another (named) soft drink A religious

approach may involve judging persuasion in terms of the use of lies, slander

and bearing false witness – which the Bible forbids A situational approach (or

relativism), which focuses on contextual factors to determine an ethical

evaluation, may involve matters such as whether urgency justifies the means

used by the persuader

The most important point is that ethics is related to culture, and thus good

human conduct (persuasion) in one culture may be regarded as bad behaviour

in another culture

The concept of culture has different meanings At first, culture denoted a

noun of process: the culture (cultivation) of crops or the culture (rearing and

breeding) of animals In the late 18th century it became, especially in German

and English, ‘a noun of configuration or generalisation of the “spirit” which

informed the “whole way of life” of a distinct people’ (Williams, 1981:10)

The term evolved from the older emphasis on an ‘informing spirit’ – ideal or

religious or national – to a more modern emphasis on a ‘lived culture’, which

has been determined mainly by ‘designated social processes – usually

particular kinds of political or economic order’ (Williams, 1981:11)

According to Williams (1983:43–52), there are three definitions of culture:

1 The ideal definition, in which culture is ‘a state or process of human

perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal values’

2 The documentary definition, which describes culture as the ‘body of

intellectual and imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human

thought and experience are variously recorded’

3 The social definition, in which culture is ‘a description of a particular way

of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and

learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour’

This book adopts Williams’s (1983) social definition of culture as ‘a whole way

of life’ of a given human group, or as Maletzke (1976:409) puts it, ‘the

distinctive way of life of a group of people, their designs for living’ This

definition enables us to deal with ethical issues that emanate from the values

implicit and explicit in a particular way of life found here and now in society,

and that find expression in the process of persuasion

In situating the relevance of culture for ethics and persuasion in

communicological terms, we may say that the goodness or badness of

persuasive communication is often influenced by the social circumstances

(culture) in which the process of persuasion takes place

Judgement with regard to the ethical nature of persuasion may operate

ideologically as well Would not a Marxist regard persuasive communication

in the service of capitalism as unethical?

Possibly the most clear-cut statement that we can make about the ethics of

persuasion is that persuasion is ethical in so far as it is an alternative to force,

coercion or violence for purposes of producing a community of minds about a

given subject

1.5 RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION

This chapter has focused on the concepts of communication, persuasion and

democracy, as well as on the ethics of persuasion Persuasion, as a process of

communication, is the lifeblood of a modern democracy, a society in which it

is most relevant This is because a democratic social system, as argued, does

not rely predominantly on the use of force or coercion – as authoritarian

societies tend to do A person has the freedom or the right to choose whether

he/she wants to be persuaded by others In other words, a person in a

democratic society is theoretically quite capable of resisting persuasive  efforts

There are various ways in which the potential persuadee may resist persuasive

attempts The recipient can ignore, rebut or reject outright the arguments of

the communicator The recipient may also intellectualise, supplant and

generally rationalise the information with which he/she does not agree, or

deny that the information is important when he/she perceives it as a threat to

his/her own position

A further, widely used way of protecting individuals against persuasive ideas

is proposed by McGuire (1961) He suggests that you can be ‘inoculated’

against persuasive attempts (McGuire, 1961) In this context, inoculation

essentially means exposing people to arguments against their attitudes and

then refuting those arguments Thus, having heard various arguments against

their attitudes demolished, individuals may be better equipped to withstand

later attempts at persuasion For example, in a speech presented to his/her

constituents, a political party candidate may first list all the so-called good

points that his/her opponents are making The candidate then breaks down

these points, clarifying for the constituents what they are to argue when

confronted with opposing views In effect, the candidate has attempted to

inoculate his/her constituents against the political arguments of opposing

candidates

The foregoing techniques that relate to resisting unwanted attempts at

persuasion in a democratic society presuppose that much of the population

has a social consciousness and self-consciousness of persuasion Where social

consciousness and self-consciousness of persuasion are lacking, we may

suggest guidelines for creating such consciousness

1.5.1 Creating a social consciousness and self-consciousness

of persuasion

For a social consciousness of persuasion to be created, persuasion must

capture people’s attention and awaken their interest In other words, people

must form their own mental image of the state of affairs brought about by the

nature and scope of persuasion In forming this mental image, three

dimensions of a social consciousness of persuasion can be posited Each is

coupled with a motif and leads to a clearer understanding of the persuasion

phenomenon These dimensions and their concomitant motifs are derived

from Berger (1963) Such a social consciousness of persuasion could trigger

the start of self-knowledge, for self-knowledge also entails knowledge of the

circumstances in which you find yourself

The first dimension of a social consciousness of persuasion is characterised by

the debunking motif Here a person is interested in looking some distance

beyond the commonly accepted, popular or officially defined goals of human

actions It presupposes a certain awareness that human events have different

levels of meaning, some of which are hidden from the consciousness of

everyday life Or it may even presuppose a measure of suspicion about the way

in which human events, whatever they may be, are officially interpreted by

those in power, or accepted by most people It is, in short, a person’s attempt

to ‘see through’ communicative interactions

The second dimension of a social consciousness of persuasion incorporates

the motif of unrespectability Here ‘unrespectability’ means that a person, in

appraising communicative interactions in democratic society, judges these

interactions not only from the world of middle-class respectability, which is

most often regarded as the ‘best’ view of the world (the one that should be

taken seriously), but also from the perspective of other or ‘unrespectable’

views in society A person should thus, in some measure, be detached from

the taken-for-granted postures of communicative interactions and be involved

in a holistic evaluation of the situation

The third dimension of a social consciousness of persuasion is characterised

by the relativising motif Technological innovation and the growth of the mass

media, including social media, have provided people with insight into other

cultures and their communicative interactions This exposure has led to a

form of cultural imperialism through which the receiving culture has come to

accept many of the cultural products (including the communicative

techniques) of the sending culture, even though fundamentally these cultures

represent contradictory meaning systems Through the motif of relativising,

people acknowledge that not only identities but also ideas are relative to

specific social circumstances

Having established a social consciousness of persuasion, it is then imperative

that the individual alone must determine his/her place within his/her

circumstances (within the persuasion milieus) In other words, the individual

must determine the implications of his/her circumstances – the implications

of persuasion – for his/her own existence

This is partly what Mills (1959) has in mind in his concept of the sociological

imagination (or the communicological imagination – Mills [1959:19] suggests

that it does not matter whether ‘sociological’ is replaced with another term)

The communicological imagination is a ‘quality of mind’ or ‘mental attitude’

(Jansen, 1980:31) that helps the individual to understand persuasion, among

other things, in terms of its meaning for his/her own life and for other people

Mills (1959:5ff.) believes that the individual can understand his/her experience

and gauge his/her fate only by locating him-/herself within, among other

things, the persuasion milieus This must be done before he/she can help

others to understand their circumstances In short, Mills (1959) advocates a

form of self-consciousness that promises an understanding of the intimate

realities of ourselves in connection with larger realities, such as persuasion

In the next chapter, persuasive communication is situated in its historical

context

A REMINDER

• Persuasion is a process of communication

• Persuasion is both an art and a science

• Persuasion is most relevant in democratic society

• Persuasion can be used for ethical and non-ethical purposes

• McGuire’s (1961) inoculation theory explains how potential

persuadees can come to resist persuasive attempts