Towards a northeast asian security community implications for koreas growth and economic development

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v

1 Introduction: Towards a Northeast Asian Security

Community and the Role of North Korean Negotiation Tactics 1Bernhard Seliger and Werner Pascha

Part I Prospects for a Northeast Asia Security Framework

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean

Confederation and the Contour of a Northeast Asian

Security Community? 13Key-young Son

3 Envisioning a Northeast Security Framework: The Korean

Peninsula 27Scott Snyder

4 Korea as a Focal Point of the Security Concerns

of Northeast Asia: A Geopolitical and Historical

Perspective of the Present Scenario 39Brahm Swaroop Agrawal

Part II Features of a “Peace Dividend”

5 The Unification Mythology and Reality of the North–South

Divide 63Andrei Lankov

6 Features of a Peace Dividend for the Two Koreas 73Paul Chamberlin

7 Peace Dividend and Regional Stability on the Korean

Peninsula: Focusing on the South–North Korea

Cooperation Fund Allocation 99

B Jeong

vii

viii Contents

Part III Implications for North Korea’s Economy

8 A Peace Dividend for North Korea? The Political Economy

of Military Spending, Conflict Resolution, and Reform 129Bernhard Seliger

9 Implications for the North Korean Economy of Moving

Toward New Modalities for Northeast Asian Security 149Bradley O Babson

10 Financial Cooperation with North Korea: Modalities and Risks 161Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland

11 Inter-Korean Cooperation in Special Economic Zones:

Developments and Perspectives 175Ralph Michael Wrobel

Part IV Implications for South Korea’s Economy

12 Toward a Northeast Asian Security Community:

Implications for South Korea’s Economic Growth 189Deok Ryong Yoon

13 The Development of a Northeast Asian Security

and Economic Community 207Soon Paik

14 Fractured Strategic Alliance, Restructured Economic

Cooperation: Korea at the Helm of the Emerging Northeast

Asian Order 217Jitendra Uttam

15 An Institutional Approach to Peace and Prosperity:

Toward a Korean Fisheries Community 239Martyn de Bruyn and Sangmin Bae

Index 259

Brahm Swaroop Agrawal M.L.B Government College, Jiwaji University,

Gwalior, India, brahmagrawal@yahoo.com

Bradley O Babson John’s Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,

US-Korea Institute, Washington, DC, USA, bradbabson@aol.com

Sangmin Bae Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA, sbae@neiu.edu Martyn de Bruyn Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA,

mdebruyn@neiu.edu

Paul Chamberlin Independent Scholar, paulfchamberlin@gmail.com

Stephan Haggard Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific

Studies, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA, shaggard@ucsd.edu

B Jeong Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University

of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, jon.jeong@gmail.com

Andrei Lankov Kookmin University, Seoul, South Korea, anlankov@yahoo.com Marcus Noland Peterson Institute for International Economics, Senior Fellow at

the East-West Center, Washington, DC, USA, mnoland@piie.com

Soon Paik U.S Department of Labor-Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington,

DC, USA; Washington Baptist University, Annandale, VA, USA,

paik.soon@bls.gov

Werner Pascha Department of Business Studies, The Institute of East Asian

Studies of Duisburg-Essen University, 47048 Duisburg, Germany,

werner.pascha@uni-duisburg-essen.de

Bernhard Seliger Hanns Seidel Foundation, Seoul Office, 140-886 Seoul,

Republic of South Korea, seliger@hss.or.kr

Scott Snyder Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation, Washington,

DC, USA, snydersas@gmail.com

ix

Ralph Michael Wrobel Faculty of Economics, West Saxon University of Applied

Sciences, 08066 Zwickau, Germany, ralph.wrobel@fh-zwickau.de

Deok Ryong Yoon Korean Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul,

Korea, dryoon@kiep.go.kr

List of Figures

6.1 North Korea at night 786.2 Rates of economic growth for North and South Korea 797.1 Regional comparison of military spending (Unit: million USD) 1037.2 Military expenditure of United States and countries in East

Asia (Unit: million USD) 1047.3 Research framework: The transition process in triangle

domain and the role of the peace dividend on the Korean Peninsula 1077.4 Stages of peace stabilization and research focus 1087.5 South–North Korea Cooperation Fund appropriated and allocated 1127.6 Trend of the South–North Korea Cooperation Fund allocation 1147.7 Trend of humanitarian assistance by the South Korean

government, nongovernmental, and international organizations 1158.1 The triangle facing North Korea 14511.1 North Korean Special Economic Zones 17612.1 ROK: Country credit rating by Moody’s 19112.2 Survey on North Korea’s influence in decision making

to invest in Korea 19212.3 CDS Korea (five year) (2001/9∼ 2007/12) CDS (Credit

Default Swap) Premium for governmental bond for foreign

currency with five year maturity 19312.4 Premium for governmental bond in US dollar due 2013

(2003/5∼ 2007/12) 19312.5 Railway connection between TKR, TSR, and TCR 19512.6 Eurasian railway network 197

xi

List of Tables

6.1 ROK & DPRK fertility rates Note: Replacement is 2.1 76

6.2 ROK & DPRK lifespans 76

6.3 Median ages – ROK, DPRK, USA 76

6.4 Total ROK population 77

6.5 Estimated military Spending as a percentage of GDP 88

6.6 Selected ROK and DPRK military resources (As of December 2006) 89

7.1 Comparison of military expenditures by country 103

7.2 Trends of military expenditure by country (Unit: U.S Million Dollars) 118

7.3 South–North Korea Cooperation Fund implemented for projects of nongovernmental or private organizations 119

7.4 Military expenditure by region (Unit: U.S Million Dollars) 120

7.5 South–North Korean Cooperation Fund added by year (Unit: 0.1 Billion S Korean Won) 121

7.6 South–North Korea Cooperation Fund allocation trend (Unit: 0.1 Billion South Korean Won) 122

7.7 Trend of humanitarian assistance by South Korean government/nongovernmental/international organizations (Unit: 0.1 Billion S Korean Won) 123

7.8 Expenditure of South–North Korea Cooperation Fund (Unit: 0.1 Billion S Korean Won) 124

8.1 Reduction of military forces in Germany, 1989–2010 134

8.2 Military spending, selected countries 135

8.3 Active-duty military personnel, selected countries, 200 136

8.4 Military spending, selected countries and world 136

11.1 Total Mount Kumgang tourists per year 177

11.2 Kaesong Industrial Complex master plan (as of 2006) 178

12.1 Reconnected sections of inter-Korean roads and railways 196

12.2 Possible routes of gas pipelines 196

12.3 Gaeseong Industrial Complex 198

12.4 State of main mineral resource possession 199

12.5 Estimates of unification costs 201

15.1 Inter-Korean dialogue on maritime affairs and fisheries 252

xiii

Chapter 1

Introduction: Towards a Northeast Asian

Security Community and the Role

of North Korean Negotiation Tactics

Bernhard Seliger and Werner Pascha

The spectacular rise of the South Korean economy in the past half century hasbeen duly highlighted as one of the most successful cases of economic developmentworldwide The rise of the hard-hit Korean economy after the crisis of 1997/1998,and its resilience in the current economic crisis that started in 2008, have added tothe well-deserved admiration for the “miracle on the Han river.” However, amongthe factors curbing South Korea’s economic growth perspectives has been, from thevery beginning of its rise, the coexistence of the difficult brother, the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”) While during the Cold War this coex-istence had to be accepted as inevitable, after the end of the Cold War, there werehopes this obstacle to further growth could be overcome, either through the collapseand absorption of North Korea into South Korea, or through enhanced cooperationwith North Korea, which would gradually decrease its threat potential and supportpeaceful relations

However, neither the first nor the second solution has become a reality yet WhileNorth Korea survived the collapse of communist regimes elsewhere around theworld, it suffered from a period of tremendous hardship for its people, resulting

in widespread famine At the same time, its external stance was alternating betweenunprecedented rapprochement – for instance, it participated in two summit meet-ings with South Korea and it allowed the establishment of the Kaesong IndustrialComplex – and unprecedented levels of aggressiveness with the development oflong-range ballistic missiles and nuclear devices, among others Addressing theNorth Korea threat was no longer a national issue; it had become an internationalone Multilateral talks to improve the situation, the four-party talks and later six-party talks, came into existence as ad hoc measures to cope with the nuclear crisis.The idea of a Northeast Asian security community was born

There are five major reasons why the North Korea issue became a multilateralissue: First, drawing up a reliable, enforceable and verifiable security arrangementgoes beyond the capabilities of North Korea and, more importantly, South Korea

B Seliger (B)

Hanns Seidel Foundation, Seoul Office, 140-886 Seoul, Republic of South Korea

e-mail: seliger@hss.or.kr

1

B Seliger, W Pascha (eds.), Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community,

The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-9657-2_1,

C

 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

2 B Seliger and W PaschaSecond, almost all conceivable arrangements would involve guarantees or economicsupport measures that would also be beyond the means and power available to thetwo Koreas Third, solving the North Korea issue in whatever way would haveserious implications for the strategic interests of a number of major powers, includ-ing the United States and China It would be nạve to assume that these powerswould simply accept any bilateral solution; whatever it may be, so it is meaning-ful to include them in a transparent, effective way from the start Fourth, the 1953armistice has left North and South Korea in a formal state of war North Korea inparticular does not accept the South as a sovereign state While this formal dis-pute may not be one of substantial significance, it would and indeed does makenon-multilateral frameworks extremely difficult and volatile Fifth and finally, apartfrom the costs that might have to be borne, any solution might also create an upsidepotential not only for North and South Korea, the so-called “Peace Dividend,”but also for other economies, particularly those in the Northeast Asian region.For instance, resource availability, transport infrastructure, and energy disposabil-ity would be very much affected if North Korea were put on the “economic map”

of the region once again A security framework for the Northeast Asian region thuscreates considerable positive and negative externalities for other countries, making

a multilateral framework desirable and unavoidable at the same time

Would and should this multilateral framework be a regional or a more passing, possibly global one? As most of the external economies are realized onthe regional level – treating the United States as a “regional” power in this con-text – it is more or less that the security framework should be a regional one as well.While it cannot be denied that other countries do face some external economies, themarginal advantages of including them in the discussions would probably be offset

encom-by the diseconomies of having more actors at the negotiating table Moreover, onlythe regional powers are able to play a meaningful role in the core security-relatedtopics, because only they possess the military means to project that influence to theNortheast Asian region in a decisive way

However, it is one of the main arguments of this book that the global nity or other regions of the world may not only have a legitimate interest in what

commu-is happening in Northeast Asia, but that they may have something to contribute.First, precisely because they have less military clout and vested self-interest, suchexternal players may be more acceptable as go-betweens Second, they may havesome expertise or experience to contribute to solving the security disputes of theregion Europe’s experience with overcoming the deeply entrenched resentmentscaused by the two World Wars, its use of humanitarian action in international diplo-macy and the widespread involvement of non-state players immediately comes tomind in this context Against this background, on October 15, 2008, an outstand-ing group of scholars and policy-makers from Korea, the United States, and Europecame together at the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, DC, to discuss theways “Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community? Implications for Korea’sGrowth and Economic Development.” The revised papers debated during this con-ference form the core of this conference volume, enriched by some later outsidecontributions

1 Introduction: Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community and the Role 3When discussing the possibilities of a security framework or, in an institution-alized form, security community, in Northeast Asia, it is important not to fallinto the trap of wishful thinking, which so often has characterized approaches toNorth Korea as well as other isolated countries and resulted in disappointment Atleast, this was the point of departure of all the open-minded discussions during theWashington workshop It appeared that a key point for any progress toward a secu-rity framework for the Northeast Asian region has to rest on an understanding of howNorth Korea enters such negotiations and accompanying processes Therefore, as areminder of Northeast Asian realities, this introduction provides a short overview ofNorth Korean negotiation tactics guided by century-old Korean adages.1

Ni jukgo nae jukja (You Die! I Die!)

Nothing can describe the relations between North and South Korea better than thisexpression frequently heard in standoff situations North Korea, for a long time, had

an army perceived to be better equipped, trained, and motivated than the forces of itsSouthern counterpart, which, due to American involvement, had a great advantagebecause of its access to the most advanced warfare technologies The decline ofthe North Korean economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end ofeconomic aid also brought a deterioration of the North Korean army, which wasable to concentrate and specialize in certain fields (as the steady increase of specialtroops in comparison to the general army shows) In particular, the leadership found

a powerful, though ambiguous weapon, namely the nuclear devices that it developedthroughout the 1990s and 2000s, which were complemented by the development ofballistic missiles of medium and long range

To be able to use these new weapons as a credible deterrent against outside forces

as well as a possible tool for the extortion of economic aid, a credible threat toactually use the weapons had to be communicated This, to a considerable extent,explains the otherwise almost inexplicable outburst of violence at times, when NorthKorea at the same time pursues obvious tactics of negotiations and rapprochement,like in the early phase of President Barack Obama’s administration, when a nucleartest clearly alienated the new US administration “You die! I die!” implies that NorthKorea is willing to use force, possibly even risking self-destruction, with so muchcredibility that no one dares to challenge its claim

Baejjaera! (You Can Slash Open My Belly)

When someone grabs and swallows a contested piece of (rice-) cake, the only sibility to take it back from him is to slash open his belly Is the opponent willing

pos-to resort pos-to this and thus raise the stakes pos-to a level that will make the opponent back

1 All of the following Korean proverbs were taken from Choe and Torchia ( 2002 ).

4 B Seliger and W Paschadown? Developing nuclear and ballistic weapons plus carrying out smaller provoca-tions on the ground also enhances the first-mover advantage in provocations: Whenholding an employee of Hyundai Asan in Kaesong for alleged derogatory comments

on the leader or shooting a tourist in Kumgang Mountain resort, or when ing tensions in the West Sea (the Yellow Sea), North Korea can be confident thatthe surrounding powers, in particular South Korea, and also the United States andJapan, will be very careful and restricted by the nature of their democratic govern-ments in order not let the conflicts escalate The first mover, North Korea, can almostalways gain something through provocations The relatively lower value of humanlife, being it national citizens or people from a different nation, also supports a dar-ing approach by North Korea, since such audacity cannot be matched by an equallydaring democratic government

heighten-Mule ppajinnom guhaejuni bottari naenora handa

(When I Saved Him from Drowning, He Criticized Me

for Not Saving His Baggage As Well)

The North Korean negotiation history is full of examples of it accepting internationalaid, such as during the time of the Cold War from the Soviet Union and China, andsince the mid-1990s from the international community, while, at the same time,distancing itself from the donations and criticizing them as too small This tactics ispartly a result of the wish to remain independent from any aid donor It is moreoverinstrumental in the internal debate about autarky of the country, and it also raisesthe possibility of a race-for-aid among donors willing to increase their donations tooutmatch the seemingly insufficient aid from other donors criticized by North Korea.The latest example for such a technique was the response to the South Korean offer

of corn aid in the autumn of 2009, which was at the same time accepted by NorthKorea, but ridiculed as too little and niggardly

Mot meokneun gam, jjilreona bonda

(Poking Holes in Persimmons That He Cannot Eat)

While North Korea is not as completely independent from the outside world as

it makes its citizens believe and would like to make the international communitybelieve, it is much less dependent on achieving tangible economic results for its cit-izens than the neighboring countries For a long time after the Korean War, whenthe economic conditions in North Korea were improving due to reconstruction byforced savings and external aid rather rapidly, North Korea hoped to be permanentlyricher and more attractive than South Korea Since the mid-1970s, this illusion hasfaded and in the 1990s, the catastrophic results of isolationism, failed central plan-ning, and aid dependence became fully exposed during a major famine, called the

“Arduous March” in North Korea However, North Korea did not concede its loss in

1 Introduction: Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community and the Role 5the ideological battle, but simply changed the battle ground: From around the year

2000, it argued that economic development in the South, which by now had becomewell-known through channels like visitors to and from China or smuggled DVDsfrom the South, was bought at the price of tainting the racially and politically pureKorean people with the evil influences of foreign countries Thereby, it took up oldprejudices against foreign involvement dating back centuries

Gaemiga jeongjanamu geondeurinda

(It’s Like Ants Trying to Topple an Oak Tree)

Poverty and famine notwithstanding, North Korea sees itself as a pillar of stability

in a world full of enemies The lesson learned from the collapse of Eastern Europeand of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s is that all kinds of compromise – underthe slogans of peaceful coexistence and gradual rapprochement – ultimately lead

to the downfall, not the stability, of authoritarian regimes Therefore, North Korearidicules its enemies as ants trying to topple an oak tree Still, its leadership also hasthe vigilance of someone fearing that one day the tree might succumb to the outsideattacks This results in a hardened stance, not so much for ideological reasons, whichare almost completely absent from North Korea’s diplomacy, but rather for the fear

of inviting cracks in the pillar on which North Korea stands

This short overview of North Korean negotiation tactics and considerationsshows that North Korea has a certain interest in sustaining tensions with its neigh-boring states and can even gain from this The history of the last two decades showshow well poverty and aggressiveness were used to secure aid from very unlikelysources, like food aid from the United States, which, for a long time, has been one

of the most important donors Along with food aid from the United States, NorthKorea has received generous unspecified monetary transfers from South Koreangovernments trying to avoid the collapse of North’s government Nevertheless,the unbending stance regarding cooperation, the unending military and diplomaticprovocations, plus the repetition of tactics to get rewards for issues already agreedupon and paid several times in the framework of the six-party talks leads to a certainfatigue of donors, negotiation partners, and even allies In South Korea, in particularthe step-by-step increase of tensions by North Korea during the presidency of LeeMyung-Bak eventually led to a strategic answer

Yubimuhwan (Be Prepared and You Won’t Have a Crisis)

It is not clear how much this proverb reflects the reality of the recent position ofthe South Korean government toward North Korea, let alone, whether this reflects amore sobering disposition in South Korea at large whose opposition parties cer-tainly diverge from the government view in important respects However, there

is by now a widespread caution in all proposals put forward by North Korea or

6 B Seliger and W Pascha

by international negotiators when promoting improved relations between the twoKoreas Such caution is certainly comprehensible, since it allows a realistic appraisal

of cooperation possibilities However, there is a danger that relations could rapidlydeteriorate to another state of affairs more appropriately circumscribed by the lastproverb cited here

Michingaeneun mongdungyiga jegyeok

(You Should Deal with a Mad Dog with a Bat)

If relations reach a point in which there is simply an exchange of threats and

“pinpricks,” discussing the possibilities of a security community becomes simplymeaningless – at least for the time being Tensions in the West Sea in 2009 and

2010 have the danger to push relations to such a point Considering this imminentdanger, the analytical issue turns considerably more humble: What incentives – pro-vided by a multilateral framework – can prevent North Korea from acting in a waythat results in South Korea freezing toward any further rapprochement? In this con-text, it is important to see that North Korea is often described as “irrational” inits international negotiations It is certainly true that North Korea suffers from atremendous shortage of qualified diplomats and does occasionally seem disoriented.(Here, we cannot discuss the issue any further whether North Korea can be seen

as a single actor, epitomized in the person of the leader Kim Jong-Il, or whetherdifferent centers of policy-making, including the armed forces, would have to beconsidered.) Still, “irrationality” is not a meaningful category for describing thepolicy at large Simply, North Korea uses a different yardstick for foreign policysuccess (or national interest) North Korea is less focused on peace and security in

a traditional sense (increasing the GDP or national welfare), which are the typicalbenchmarks used by democratic states and often, implicitly, by scholars to measure

a country’s success Rather, North Korea measures success by its ability to signalfirm leadership, and to survive as a coherent regime Given this background, a dis-cussion of the chances for a security community or security framework for NortheastAsia might be considerably restricted in its options, but much more realistic in itsoutcomes

The chapters of this volume address four topics The first part explores theprospects for a Northeast Asian Security Community The second part focuses onthe economic implications Parts III and IV discuss North Korea and South Korea,respectively More specifically, the first part of this volume looks into the prospectsfor a Northeast Asian security framework Key-Young Son in his contribution pointsout that a Northeast Asian security framework, different for example from the secu-rity environment shaped in Europe during the Cold War, is based on intraregionalissues, such as territorial and historical issues and the ability of the region to copewith nationalist fervor, rather than on an alliance to counter external threats.Such a security framework could evolve from the current balance of power inNortheast Asia It might include the closer cooperation of the two Koreas leading

to a confederation, and Son is cautiously optimistic about this, citing the gradual

1 Introduction: Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community and the Role 7reduction of tension and joint projects between the two Koreas Scott Snyder startshis paper with the observation that Northeast Asia, in security terms, remains

“under-institutionalized.” He then discusses the possible ways toward security eration in Northeast Asia Ironically, North Korea, the country most contributing toregional conflicts, also could become the biggest promoter of multilateral securitycooperation in the region, and this could emerge from the six-party talks BrahmSwaroop Agrawal reviews the history of Korea’s security challenges and its answer,seclusion In his opinion the strategic criticality of the Peninsula for its neighbors

coop-is a reason for the still unresolved conflict, more than the nuclear capability ofNorth Korea itself, since dominant powers of the region do not want to loosen theirgrip on it

Will security cooperation and the possibility of peace in Northeast Asia benefitthe economy of the region, and in particular, Korea’s? This question is raised inthe second part of the volume, which discusses features of a “peace dividend” forNortheast Asia Andrei Lankov takes a sobering view on the issue of a peace divi-dend, doubting a gradual convergence of North Korea with the South and pointingout that a potential collapse of North Korea will leave South Korea with no otheroption than to accept the burden of unification, under whatever circumstances atthe time He proposes a confederation-cum-immigration control, real estate salescontrol, and land reform in North Korea, a general amnesty as well as affirmativeaction for North Koreans as measures to cope with the economic and social effects

of unification on South Korean terms Paul Chamberlin views the issue of a peacedividend for the two coexisting Korean states and points out that it will be mucheasier for South Korea to realize the peace dividend than for North Korea Absentmajor systemic reform, North Korea will not be able to absorb a peace dividend Forexample, reductions of the military personnel only make sense if the inflow into thelabor market can be used productively Bok-Gyo Jeong looks into the interaction ofgovernment, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies to understandthe possibility of change toward more peaceful relations between the two Koreas

In particular, he focuses on the role of the South–North Korea Cooperation Fund,established by the South Korean government to support cooperation projects.The third part of the volume deals with the implications of a possible NortheastAsian Security Community for the North Korean economy Bernhard Seliger warnsthat the concept of a “peace dividend,” which became popular during the final years

of the Cold War, and refers to the possible long-term benefits of lower militaryspending, is not entirely applicable to North Korea The reason is that from a polit-ical economy point of view, “military first” policy and military spending shouldnot be seen as entirely related to the external security threat for North Korea, butare equally dominated by domestic policy considerations, in particular regime sur-vival In this sense, the hope for a peace dividend might be premature, as long

as the fundamental use of security crisis for regime survival in North Korea doesnot cease

Bradley O Babson points out that, despite the formidable obstacles that stillpersist, the prospect that a Northeast Asia Security Community might provide astable, long-term foundation for peace and prosperity in this critically important

8 B Seliger and W Pascharegion is a goal worth pursuing He argues that from the perspective of maintainingits national sovereignty and pursing economic development, it would be greatly inNorth Korea’s interest to reform its political and economic system to improve pro-ductivity and attract foreign capital as well as to build export-oriented economicrelations with all its neighboring countries A Northeast Asia Regional SecurityCooperation architecture could be designed to provide a crucial underpinning forsuch a vision of North Korea’s future; this could support the necessary transitionfrom an inward-oriented economic system to an outward-oriented one However,

he admits that it is hard to imagine how a regional security cooperation ment could, in fact, succeed unless North Korea is willing to undertake the criticaltransformations required to participate and benefit from genuine regionalism.Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland look into financial cooperation with NorthKorea and discuss how such cooperation can be designed in a way to encouragelong-run change in the North Korean system All cooperation with North Koreashould be based on the ultimate objectives of moderating North Korean behavior,encouraging reform, and increasing private financial flows to the country, both in theform of foreign direct investment and commercial bank lending Aid should seek tocomplement and encourage such private flows, not provide a substitute for them.They point out that a multilateral approach to aid for North Korea, feasible in amultilateral Northeast Asian Security Community, can cope better with the moralhazard problems inherent in a purely bilateral approach to relations with NorthKorea

arrange-Ralph Michael Wrobel studies the inter-Korean cooperation in special economiczones and takes a critical stance toward the now-defunct Mount Kumgang SpecialTourism zone, which provided no incentives for change in North Korea He con-trasts this with the Kaesong Industrial Complex, where economic cooperation takesplace and important new skills can be acquired by North Koreans through the jointventure

The fourth and final part looks into implications of the concept of a NortheastAsian Security Community for South Korea’s economy Deok Ryong Yoon arguesthat South Korea’s economy is burdened in multiple ways by the division of theKorean Peninsula, directly in terms of military spending and the costs of the divi-sion, and also through isolation from the Asian continent and by prospective costs

of unification with an economically crippled North Korea Yoon hopes that a peaceregime on the peninsula may reduce these costs and open new opportunities foreconomic growth, using the limited economic potential for South Korea

Soon Paik analyzes the potential impact a Northeast Asian Security Communitymight have by developing scenarios related to how such a regime could evolve and

by discussing its implications for Northeast Asian economic institutions JitendraUttam also looks at Northeast Asian economic cooperation and the institutionalframework and argues that the current state of strategic disequilibrium in theregion has eroded long-held barriers that have hindered regional economic inter-action Several initiatives have, according to Uttam, a direct correlation with the

1 Introduction: Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community and the Role 9shifting strategic priorities in the region, including the joint declaration on tripar-tite cooperation; the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), supported by the UNDP; theNortheast Asia Economic Council; Northeast Asian Energy Community; ChiangMai Initiative (CMI); and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (AMBI) With “real-ists” in retreat, “idealists” have envisioned a freight corridor connecting Europeand East Asia via a vast trans-Siberian railway network, and “functionalists” seethe connection of enormous resource-rich regions of the Russian Far East with theresource-poor global manufacturing core that comprises Japan, Korea, and China.This would put the Korean Peninsula into the center of Northeast Asian economiccooperation and present enormous benefits to the South Korean economy.

The last chapter by Martyn de Bruyn and Sangmin Bae discusses the role of tutionalized cooperation for trust building among governments While the six-partytalks and the Kaesong Industrial Complex with its uneven contributions from Northand South Korea (one party provides labor, the other management) are evaluated

insti-as a limited success, de Bruyn and Bae propose cooperation in the field of ping and fisheries industries, in which both Koreas could build a balanced, equalpartnership Even modest integration of the nations’ shipping and fisheries sectorswould substantially improve the level of trust between the two sides, while provid-ing essential goods and development to the malnourished North As the coal andsteel community was only a start for the European Union – clearly implementedwith the greater goals of peace and prosperity in mind – so can the integration ofthe fisheries industry provide a similar starting point in the search for equally loftygoals for the Korean peninsula, the authors hope

ship-The conference “Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community? Implicationsfor Korea’s Growth and Economic Development” at the Korea Economic Institute

in Washington, DC, on October 15, 2008, and this volume would not have been sible without the aid of many persons and institutions, all of whom the editors thankfor their contributions First of all, generous funding and continuous support camefrom the Strategic Initiative for Korean Studies of the Academy of Korean Studies(AKS) and its Director, Dr Do-Hyun Han This publication appears as a contribu-tion to the Modern Korean Economy book series funded by the AKS Initiative TheKorea Economic Institute in Washington, DC, not only hosted the conference butalso helped to prepare the publication of this volume Thanks go to the president ofKEI, Jack Pritchard, to former Vice President James M Lister, to Nicole Finnemann,and others at the institute for making the conference a wonderful event The editorsMary Marik and David Kendall helped to bring the texts into a more readable form.For two years, Sarah Kohls of the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation Korea had been plan-ning, organizing, and arranging for the conference and publication, together withaid from other staff in Seoul Last, but not least, all authors and contributors to thevolume made this an exciting and worthwhile endeavor: thank you all

pos-At the time of finishing the manuscript of this volume, there are new clouds anddoubts regarding inter-Korean cooperation; after the closure of the Kumgangsantourism complex and tensions in the West Sea, culminating in the tragic sinking of

10 B Seliger and W Pascha

the South Korean corvette Cheonan, a new ice age between the two Koreas seems

possible Nevertheless and possibly even more than ever, the search for a stablesecurity framework for Northeast Asia as a precondition for peaceful economiccooperation and development will go on We sincerely hope to make a small contri-bution to the ongoing debate in the chapters of this volume, as part of a much largereffort to secure peace and development in Northeast Asia

Reference

Choe, Sang-Hun, Torchia, Christopher (2002) How Koreans Talk A Collection of Expressions Seoul: Unhaengnamu.

Part I Prospects for a Northeast Asia

Security Framework

a regional security dialogue with the participation of 27 countries interested in thepromotion of security in East Asia Does the ARF have any potential of evolvinginto a regional security alliance, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO)? Why does the idea of forming a security community appear controversial

in East Asia, especially in Northeast Asia? Clearly, one of the stumbling blocks

is the presence of the lingering Cold War-like security landscape in NortheastAsia, represented by the two divided states of China and Korea.2 In particular,the Korean divide, described as a major fault line partitioning Northeast Asia intotwo blocs, has been the locus of attention at the turn of the twenty-first centurybecause of North Korea’s development of nuclear and missile programs and the pro-tracted issue of regime survival Though rare in Northeast Asia’s security landscape,two ad hoc multinational talks – four-party talks (1997–1998) and six-party talks(2003–?) – have been convened to address a multitude of problems emanating fromthe Korean divide, highlighting a linkage between the Korean issues and regionalsecurity

Already, economic integration is in full swing amongst Northeast Asian countriesafter the end of the Cold War In contrast, the change of the security landscape hasbeen painstakingly slow South Korea’s diplomatic normalization with the SovietUnion in 1990 and with China in 1992 did not lead to North Korea’s rapprochementwith the United States and Japan As evidence of the lingering Cold War structure,

1T.J Pempel (ed.) (2005) Remapping East Asia: The Constitution of a Region, Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.

2Samuel S Kim (ed.) (2003) The International Relations of Northeast Asia, Lanham, MD:

Rowman & Littlefield.

K Son (B)

Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan

e-mail: skyquick@hotmail.com

13

B Seliger, W Pascha (eds.), Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community,

The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-9657-2_2,

C

 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

14 K SonJapan has been closely aligned with the United States, while China has been a mainpolitical and economic backer of North Korea South Korea’s future alliance politicsappears precarious despite its current alliance with the United States, while NorthKorea and Mongolia have made only ad hoc presence in regional dialogue.

As before, the region’s two strongest states, China and Japan, have been stuck

in a bipolar rivalry, jockeying for a better position in a regional leadership game.Here, national identities loom large China, once called the “Middle Kingdom,”does not identify itself simply as one of the Northeast Asian countries Being theworld’s third largest country in terms of territorial size after Russia and Canada,China ranks No 2 in the world in terms of its gross domestic product only after theUnited States.3Boosted by the population of 1.3 billion and robust growth potential,China has sought to ensure its “peaceful rise” with multiple engagements with dif-ferent parts of the world If China had played a main role in organizing the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) to address inter-state issues, such as conflicts onshared borders, with a group of countries located north and west of it, it is likely toseek to create a similar security mechanism in Northeast Asia Like China, Japandoes not want to nurture its identity purely as one of the Northeast Asian states.Being the world’s No 3 economic power, Japan once aspired to change its iden-tity from that of an East Asian country to one of the West despite its geographicalfixation in Northeast Asia.4As evidence that it has recovered from a decade-longrecession at the end of the twentieth century, Japan returned to the world financialstage in 2008 by taking over parts of major US financial institutions, such as MorganStanley and Lehman Brothers The US financial troubles, sparked by the subprimemortgage crisis, showed that Japan’s major financial institutions are equipped withexpertise, as well as the purchasing power, far ahead of such fast-growing economies

as China and India.5All in all, the identity dynamic of China and Japan has giventhem a sense of exceptionality, making it hard for them to cooperate to build aregional community

This chapter sheds light on a scenario in which this bipolar rivalry could evolveinto a dynamic three-way system of competition and cooperation in parallel withthe emergence of a Korean confederation.6 This scenario is based on the beliefthat it would be virtually impossible to enter into any genuine dialogue to form

a regional security community in Northeast Asia, as long as North Korea persists

3 See the CIA World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ch.html

4 Gerrit Gong (1984) “The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society,” in Hedley Bull and

Adam Watson (eds.) The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5New York Times, 24 September 2008.

6 For instance, Sejong Institute identifies 2020 as a year for the formation of a Korean

confedera-tion See Chung Sung-jang (ed.) (2005) Hankukui kukajollyak 2020: Taebuk tongil (South Korea’s

State Strategy 2020: Unification with North Korea), Seoul: Sejong Institute Carl E Haselden,

Jr forecasts that the political settlement on unification could be reached by 2015 See Carl E.

Haselden, Jr (2002) “The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast

Asia,” Parameters 32: 120–7.

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean Confederation 15

as a state posing threats to its neighbors.7In the process of forming a community

in Europe or North America, there has been no state that considers one or morestates in the prospective bloc as an enemy Beyond this security dimension, NorthKorea’s international isolation has created a grid lock hampering transportation andtraffic between the continental and maritime countries in Northeast Asia This gridlock has brought about far-reaching economic woes not only to ordinary NorthKoreans but also to those in the northeastern provinces of China, which had beendenied opportunities of growth comparable to the other economically bustling parts

of China.8Therefore, the transformation of North Korea into an open society will

be a blessing to the Northeast Asian countries, facilitating multilevel exchange andcooperation

Initially, the emergence of a Korean confederation will touch off a further alist or integrationist movement affecting Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture

nation-in northeastern Chnation-ina and Mongolia beyond it, given that their ethnic, culturaland linguistic affinity could facilitate interactions on various levels.9 Surely, thisdevelopment will irritate the Chinese government and provoke Chinese national-ism, raising political tension in the short term Already, a series of history projects,sponsored by the Chinese government, provoked nationalist uproars in South Koreaand Mongolia because they aimed to give a revisionist look at the history of Chinaand its neighboring countries to incorporate the ancient history of the neighboringcountries as part of China’s Cyberspace in China and South Korea has been abuzzwith the accusations of one another’s alleged nationalist or imperialist ambitions,occasionally spilling into bilateral diplomatic negotiations However, the efforts toaddress these long-overdue issues between the concerned countries will become

a golden chance to make reality checks on the boundaries of nationalism and tofoster ways to establish a security regime to tackle various interstate issues as aprelude to the formation of a security community So far, these bilateral negotia-tions and regional integrationist moves have been overshadowed by hard securityissues emanating from Cold War-style political tension, such as the North Koreannuclear crisis

In this chapter, I am optimistic about the two possibilities: the formation of aKorean confederation and its positive role in the creation of a Northeast Asiansecurity community My arguments sound teleological, but teleology returned tothe discipline of international politics with, for instance, Alexander Wendt arguingstrongly in favor of the establishment of a world state as the final stage of various

7 Myung-lim Park (2004) “Tongbuka pyonghwagongdongcheui hyongsonggwa chonmang (The formation and prospects of a peace community in Northeast Asia),” available at http://220.72 21.30/pub/docu/kr/AG/08/AG082004XBL/AG08-2004-XBL-001.PDF

8 Yanbian University Professor Kim Kang-il attributed economic backwardness in China’s three

northeastern provinces to the Korean division See Yonhap News, 2 October 2008.

9 The idea of the Korean-Mongolian confederation is already being circulated on various occasions with seminars on the topic being organized and a maverick South Korean presidential candidate arguing on a TV program that the Korean–Mongolian unification should come first before an inter- Korean unity.

16 K Sonpolitical projects of the human civilization.10Teleology often marries history, which

is a story of humans and their groupings, who are not just the agents of materialpower, but the incarnation of ideas and discourses Though it is one of the weakestNortheast Asian states, South Korea has been recently saturated with the idea ofthe so-called “greater Korea,” with its film and drama industry increasingly featur-ing inter-Korean rapprochement and nostalgic renditions of once powerful Koreankingdoms, which had prospered in the territories of contemporary China and Russiamore than 1,000 years ago, often described as “old lands,” or “lost lands” in a form

of irredentism The process of forming a Northeast Asian security community willgain momentum when China and a future Korean confederation institutionalize theircontacts to find a political solution on many pending issues, including this, andJapan, regarded as a regional “intermediary” for American hegemony, is convinced

it is time to deeply engage with these two historical rivals.11

Given the identities and pending issues affecting the Northeast Asian countries,

an emerging security regime in Northeast Asia will be designed to address ily intraregional challenges, such as territorial and history issues and accompanyingnationalist fervor, rather than becoming a form of multilateral alliance to counterexternal threats.12This is because the states in Northeast Asia need to alleviate thenegative side of nationalism and control an arms race in parallel with the forma-tion of a Korean confederation and the readjustment of US security commitments

primar-in Northeast Asia It appears primar-inevitable for the United States to review its stretched military commitments” in the wake of its unprecedented financial crisisaffecting its global status, with mounting predictions on hegemonic transition.13

“over-In the face of these external and internal challenges, as well as out of their desire

to maintain economic prosperity and unhampered cultural exchange, I argue thatthe Northeast Asian countries would have no option but to create a regional secu-rity regime with an “Asian face,” similar to the SCO, rather than NATO or theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) The SCO is a multi-national security organization under the twin leadership of China and Russia, butits refusal to grant the United States an observer status touched off the suspicionthat it might be an anti-Western alliance However, the Northeast Asian version

of the SCO is likely to take more equal and open approaches to its members andthe outside powers, such as the United States and Russia, because Japan and SouthKorea, regarded as pro-Western countries, would work to harmonize both Asian andWestern values in the process of institutionalizing decision-making processes.The formation of a security regime in this region is likely to result from the suc-cessful confluence of the six-party talks and some regional integrationist initiatives,

10Alexander Wendt (2003) “Why a World State is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9(4): 491–542.

11Peter J Katzenstein (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium,

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p 1.

12For various types of a regional order, see Kim, The International Relations of Northeast Asia, p 53.

13The Observer, 28 September 2008.

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean Confederation 17such as the three-way summit talks amongst China, Japan, and South Korea under-way since 1999.14 Already, it is a norm that the leaders of the three countrieshold a separate meeting of their own from the ASEAN process Therefore, whatare needed to create a security regime as a basis for a future community are theefforts to institutionalize these fledging contacts by establishing principles, rules,and decision-making processes.15As a name for this future security entity, I proposethe Pyongyang Cooperation Organization because the establishment of a securityorganization in Northeast Asia will mark the dramatic transition of Pyongyang fromthe capital of a “problem state” to the “Brussels” of Northeast Asia In sum, thischapter will highlight a process in which the current intraregional balance-of-powersystem in Northeast Asia would evolve into a “cooperative security regime” viathe formation of a Korean confederation.16 This chapter will first illustrate thecurrent debate on forming a Northeast Asian security community Second, it willexplore the notion of a Korean confederation in the making Third, it will elabo-rate on the role of a Korean confederation in creating a Northeast Asian securitycommunity.

Why a Northeast Asian Security Community?

Northeast Asia is arguably one of the most rapidly transforming regions in the worldbecause of China’s rise as an economic and political power, Japan’s transforma-tion from a “peace state” to a “normal state,” and the possibility of Korean unity.Depending on the use of different yardsticks to measure the continuity and change

of the region in flux, many commentators have diametrically different ideas on thecharacteristics of the region Tsuneo Akaha, for instance, dismisses the idea of call-ing Northeast Asia a region as groundless, because it is not only devoid of regionalinstitutions and transnational actors, but saturated with interstate rivalries, histori-cal grudges, and divided states.17 Earlier, Aaron Friedberg argued that East Asia

is “ripe for rivalry” with a potential of leading to great-power conflicts.18Despitethese warnings, however, the region has enjoyed peace and security, as well as eco-nomic prosperity, in an unstable post-Cold War world.19 Could this level of peace

14 Soung-chul Kim (2008) “Multilateral Security and Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia,”

Sejong Policy Studies 4(2): 265–98.

15 For the definition of a regime, see Steven Krasner (1982) “Structural causes and Regime

Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36(2): 185–205.

16 Eunsook Chung (2005) “Cooperative Security Regimes: A Comparison of OSCE and ARF,”

Sejong Policy Studies 1(1): 183–239.

17Tsuneo Akaha (ed.) (1999) Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention, New York: St Martin’s.

18 Aaron L Friedberg (1993/1994) “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,”

International Security 18(3): 5–33.

19Kim (2003) International Relations of Northeast Asia; David C Kang (2003) “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27(4): 57–85.

18 K Sonand security and the burgeoning economic ties amongst Northeast Asian countries

be sufficient as a foundation for the creation of a regional security community?Perhaps, Northeast Asia might not need a NATO-like organization, created in

1949 to counter an external enemy, the Soviet bloc In particular, Japan is againstsuch an idea because of its current alliance with the United States and internalrestrictions imposed by the so-called Peace Constitution.20 However, the sheerabsence of a security framework has already become one of the most notable secu-rity challenges to the region, because it could not be ruled out that the mistrust ofone another’s intentions could snowball into a political crisis and an armed conflict.What are the main problems putting the region’s security at stake? First, there aretwo divided states in the region, which do not renounce the use of military forces

at times of contingencies Partly because of the potentialities of unification wars,South Korea and Taiwan are heavily dependent on US security guarantees Second,the US’s bilateral military alliances with Japan and South Korea divide the regioninto the two blocs of the haves and have-nots of US bases, posing another chal-lenge to the discussion of a Northeast Asian security community Depending onthe transformation of North Korea and rapprochement between China and Taiwan,the United States will face internal and external pressures for a substantial with-drawal of forces and a change in the missions of its basing.21In this juncture, theUnited States needs to play a constructive role to dispel some concerns that thesole superpower, which has to accept its weakening presence in this region, wouldbecome an “impediment” rather than a “facilitator” to regional security coopera-tion.22Third, the Cold War grievances, as well as pre-Cold War ones, are still intactwith diplomatic normalization talks between North Korea and the United States andbetween North Korea and Japan making no meaningful progress Fourth, there aremany cases of conflicting territorial claims amongst most of the countries in theregion: the Northern Limit Line on the Yellow Sea between North and South Korea;Dokto/Takeshima between South Korea and Japan; Senkaku/Diaoyu between Japanand China; and Kuril Islands/Northern Territories between Russia and Japan Fifth,there are many cases of nationalist disputes accompanying territorial claims andconflicting interpretations of both ancient and modern history During the latter half

of the twentieth century, the two Koreas and Japan sporadically clashed over how

to interpret Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula At the turn of the first century, China and South Korea entered into another round of disputes over theinterpretation of ancient history mainly covering the identity of old Korean empireswhich had thrived in the northeastern provinces of modern-day China more than1,000 years ago

twenty-20 See “The Future of Regional Stability and Regional Security Mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific

Region,” Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan,

and Center for Military and Strategic Studies, General Staff of the Armed Forces, Russia, NIDS Joint Research Series No 2, March 2008, Chapter 3.

21Haselden, “The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia.”

22T.J Pempel (2007) “Regionalism in Northeast Asia: An American Perspective,” Regional Integration in Northeast Asia: Issues and Strategies, A Policy Paper, University of Incheon.

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean Confederation 19With no solution in sight, many inter-state issues, such as North Korea’s nuclearand missile programs and Japan’s justification of its imperialist history through therevision of textbooks, remained controversial, often hampering political dialogue.With the public debate getting heated sporadically on history issues in China, Japan,and South Korea, the governments of the concerned states found themselves in a del-icate position, sometimes becoming the instigators of the nationalist clashes and, atother times, falling victim to them Nevertheless, these centrifugal forces did notdeal a blow to the growth of economic and cultural ties amongst these NortheastAsian countries The volume of trade amongst China, Japan, and South Koreareached about US$ 400 billion in 2007, one sixth of the total amount of trade ofthe three countries, effectively establishing one another as major trading partners.23

In particular, China emerged as the largest trading partner for both Japan and SouthKorea in 2007.24Second, cultural exchange is in full swing, with the popular culture

of Japan and South Korea sweeping across the region and China emerging as a newforce and major consumer in the entertainment sector.25

As part of efforts to sustain the economic and cultural ties, the concerned tries shared a need to create a regional security framework, as demonstrated bythe establishment of a working group within the framework of the six-party talks

coun-to address the issue of “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.” The party talks will become a long process to address various issues affecting NortheastAsian security, as well as nuclear issues Back in 1996, the United States and SouthKorea put forward the idea of organizing four-party talks with China and NorthKorea with the aim of replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peacetreaty Its first meeting was held in Geneva in December 1997 after several rounds

six-of time-consuming preparatory sessions to build trust amongst the dialogue ners Despite six rounds of talks, which lasted until June 1998, the four countriesfailed to make any meaningful progress because of the fundamental discrepancies intheir approaches toward security on the Korean Peninsula While the United Statesand South Korea sought a minimalist approach, such as tension reduction and con-fidence building, North Korea reiterated its traditional, maximalist demands that

part-a pepart-ace trepart-aty be signed between the United Stpart-ates part-and North Korepart-a, excludingthe South, and the US troops be withdrawn from the South Though billed as thefirst strategic dialogue between the United States and China to discuss a regionalsecurity issue,26 the four-party talks were proven inappropriate to handle theseissues because of the deeply entrenched security dilemmas on the Korean Peninsula,

23 See the speech of South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon at http://news.mofat.go.kr/ enewspaper/articleview.php?master=&aid=685&ssid=11&mvid=479

24 See the website of the Japan External Trade Organization at http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/ releases/20080229066-news

25 David Leheny (2006) “A Narrow Place to Cross Swords: Soft Power and the Politics of

Japanese Popular Culture in East Asia,” in Peter J Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds.) Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp 211–33; Katzenstein (2005) A World of Regions, pp 162–7.

26Mainichi Shimbun, 6 August 1997.

20 K Sonthe status of US troops, and the format of dialogue, which excluded Russia andJapan.27

At present, the ARF is playing a role as a regional security dialogue, but theoverblown membership makes it difficult to develop into a working framework ofsecurity In a fresh initiative, which is unrelated to the ASEAN process, China,Japan, and South Korea started to organize a trilateral foreign ministers’ meetingfrom 2007 with South Korea hosting its first meeting in Jeju Island in June Thethree countries also agreed in 2007 to organize a trilateral summit on a rotationalbasis So far, these meetings were held on the sidelines of other international forums,such as ASEAN Plus Three It is encouraging to see the three Northeast Asiancountries embarking on dialogue amongst themselves, but still this fresh initiativehas a long way to go before producing any tangible framework of security Prior

to the first three-way summit, the sudden resignation of Japanese Prime MinisterYasuo Fukuda in September 2008 and political tension between Japan and SouthKorea over territorial and history issues clouded the feasibility of the initiative.28Furthermore, this initiative is unlikely to produce a genuine security mechanism, aslong as North Korea and Mongolia are sidelined and the participating states shunthe institutionalization of this process

In addition to the membership issues of North Korea and Mongolia, it is difficult

to predict how to accommodate the United States and Russia in this Northeast Asiansecurity community.29 Given the US military presence and alliances with Japan,South Korea, and Taiwan and the location of Russia’s Far East as an integral part

of this region, the two superpowers could claim a membership status This bership issue would partially depend on how the current rounds of six-party talks

mem-on North Korea’s nuclear programs would proceed to address the issues of securitymechanism in Northeast Asia and what kinds of constructive roles the United Statesand Russia can play to foster regional cooperation

The Rise of a Korean Confederation

This section will illustrate the notion of a Korean confederation, which would prise the two Koreas aligned loosely or closely with other areas in Northeast Asia.The reason why I am optimistic about the formation of a Korean confederationstems from the post-Cold War history, which has already witnessed gradual tensionreduction and the introduction of joint business and tourist projects between thetwo Koreas.30 At present, it is hard to discuss when Korean political elites would

com-27Jin-kyoo Yoo (2000) Sajahoedam gyonggwawa pukhanui hyopsangjollyak (The Progress of the Four-Party Talks and North Korea’s Negotiation Strategy), Seoul: Korea Research Institute for

Strategy.

28Yonhap News, 2 September 2008.

29Kim, International Relations of Northeast Asia, pp 11–12.

30Key-young Son (2006) South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy, London: Routledge.

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean Confederation 21embrace this vision of “a greater Korea” and whether this highly risky idea is fea-sible in the face of China’s objection When he returned home just after a summitwith North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il in June 2000, South Korean PresidentKim Dae-jung vaguely hinted at this idea by introducing the vision of building the

“Iron Silk Road” through which South Korea could reach Europe via North Korea,China, Mongolia, or Russia President Kim’s vision was based on the emergence of

a Korean confederation, facilitated by the linkage of railroads bringing together thecommunities of ethnic Koreans

The formation of a Korean confederation, regardless of whether it might be ther aligned with the Korean autonomous region in China or Mongolia, would beone of the important variables in the debate of forming a Northeast Asian commu-nity Already, the Final Report of East Asia Study Group, submitted to the ASEANPlus Three meeting in Cambodia in 2002, did not mention either North Korea orSouth Korea.31As proposed by President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea, this reportenvisioned Korea as a single entity as a member of an East Asian community

fur-In this juncture, why do we need to think of a confederation rather than a unifiedstate? Despite the presence of a nationalist zeal for unification, an increasing num-ber of South Koreans favor gradual political and territorial integration by averting asudden collapse of North Korea.32As demonstrated in the transfer of power fromthe progressive forces to the conservative forces in the 2007 presidential election,the Lee Myung-bak government shifted its policies vis-à-vis North Korea, creatingcontroversies between the two Koreas and amongst South Koreans with differentopinions However, South Korea’s general public is steadily in favor of a gradualunification through the promotion of exchange and cooperation In an opinion sur-vey in 2008, 54.8 percent said the speed of unification should depend on the socialand economic situations of South Korea, while 28.4 percent supported the existence

of two states based on the idea of peaceful coexistence.33Only 14.4 percent favored

a speedy unification accompanying substantial costs

At present, there are some scenarios on North Korea’s change in the future, if weexclude the possibility of a collapse that could take place under the circumstancesbeyond prediction, just like the fall of the Berlin Wall First, North Korea could enterinto a closer economic integration with South Korea, which could be the end prod-uct of a joint inter-Korean business initiative, already in progress at the KaesongIndustrial Complex Second, North Korea might become a satellite state of China

in the wake of a pro-Beijing military coup and introduce a Chinese-style economicchange.34 Third, North Korea might be a US-friendly state as a result of the suc-cessful completion of the six-party talks and diplomatic normalization Under anyscenario, however, the end of North Korea’s international isolation could lead to a

31 See the Final Report at http://www.aseansec.org/viewpdf.asp?file=/pdf/easg.pdf

32New York Times, 20 October 2004.

33Donga Ilbo, 15 August 2008.

34See one of The Australian (16 October 2006) articles published after North Korea’s nuclear test,

titled “China may back coup against Kim”.

22 K Soncloser economic and social integration with the South, given its various advantages,such as ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity, and geographical proximity.The actual political process is also in the direction of forming a confederation,

as demonstrated in the agreement of the first summit between President Kim jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il in June 2000 The joint declaration, issued after thesummit, reads, “Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South’s pro-posal for a confederation and the North’s proposal for a federation of lower stage asthe formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promotereunification in that direction.” Even though there had been no follow-up negotiation

Dae-on this issue between the two Koreas, the agreement itself has been regarded as asignificant step forward in the sense that the two Koreas reached a kind of consensus

on the future direction in managing the prolonged division

Another variable in the formation of a Korean confederation is whether the unity

of the Korean Peninsula and its nationalist zeal could erupt out of the peninsula andinto some parts of China and even Mongolia Already, the Beijing government haspaid a keen attention to the issue of irredentism, often uttered by Korean national-ists in their use of such expressions as the “restoration of old lands.”35According toAndrei Lankov’s report, the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China’s JilinProvince, about a half of South Korea in size, saw the dwindling number of ethnicKoreans from 60 percent of the population in 1952 to 36 percent in 2000 as a result

of the Chinese government’s assimilation policies and the ethnic Koreans’ tion to the other developed parts of China or even South Korea Even though ethnicKoreans identify themselves as Chinese, they keep Korean culture and language,leaving open the possibility that they could forge a closer link with a confederalKorea in the future To many of the ethnic Koreans who are originally from NorthKorea, the economic hardship of their fatherland was a disgrace, whereas the pros-perity of South Korea has been interpreted as a new opportunity Therefore, theformation of a Korean confederation will not only lead to the economic development

migra-of North Korea but also substantially increase economic opportunities in Yanbianand its neighboring areas

Beyond China, there have been a series of debates on the possible formation of

a special political and economic link between South Korea and Mongolia, giventheir ethnic, cultural, and linguistic similarities As one of the interesting devel-opments, scholars and specialists from the two countries organized a seminar inSeoul on March 20, 2007, entitled “Significance of Confederation between Koreaand Mongolia.”36 The Mongolian Embassy in Seoul was responsible for invitingthe speakers from Mongolia Since diplomatic normalization in 1990, the two coun-tries have promoted multilevel exchange, including summit talks Presidents KimDae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun visited Mongolia in 1999 and 2006, while MongolianPresidents Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat and Natsagiin Bagabandi visited South Korea in

35Andrei Lankov (2007) “The Gentle Decline of the ‘Third Korea’.” Asia Times, 16 August.

Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IH16Ad01.html

36Shindonga, 1 June 2007.

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean Confederation 23

1991 and 2001 The economic complementarities of the two countries are one ofthe magnets for increasing exchange and cooperation Mongolia, dubbed the secondlargest landlocked country in the world after Kazakhstan, has a small population

of 2.9 million with rich natural resources When he was a presidential candidate,President Lee Myung-bak was upbeat about the possibility of forming a confedera-tion with Mongolia because South Korea could find it easy to provide a significantamount of economic assistance to Mongolia, given its small population and thepossibility of a high synergy effect.37

In security and political areas, the rise of China, which could be translated intoboth challenges and opportunities to South Korea and Mongolia, encouraged the twocountries to enhance cooperation, if not a balance-of-power coalition against China.The Chinese government’s history projects, which aimed to give a new look at thedefinition of ancient Chinese kingdoms, have embarrassed the historians and ordi-nary people of the two countries As China’s demand for oil and natural resources

to sustain its economic growth attracted the attention of global trade watchers, thetwo countries have been concerned about the developments in which the Chinesegovernment and specialists in history have opted for the cultural appropriation ofthe histories of the neighboring countries

While it is making no visible progress from the standpoint of actual cal processes, the idea of a “greater Korea” has been increasingly explored bySouth Korea’s film and television industries With the freedom of expression intro-duced with the end of the authoritarian rule, the South Korean entertainmentindustry has extensively explored two themes in the past decade: inter-Koreanrapprochement and heroism of ancient Koreans in Manchuria Amongst Korean

politi-movies dealing with inter-Korean rapprochement are Joint Security Area (2000),

Whistling Princess (2002), Taegukgi: Brotherhood of War (2003), and Welcome

to Dongmakgol (2005) Themes related to Koguryo (37 BC–668) and Palhae

(698–926), two Korean empires which once ruled Manchuria and the northernpart of the Korean peninsula, and nostalgia of Koreans’ lives in Manchuria dur-ing Japan’s colonial rule were featured by such period dramas and films as

Yongaesomun (SBS period drama, 2006), Taewangsasingi (MBC period drama,

2007), Taejoyong (KBS period drama, 2008), Jumong (MBC period drama, 2008),

Paramuinana (KBS period drama, 2008), Dachimawa Lee (2008), and The Good, the Bad, the Weird (2008).

Dynamic of Three-Way Cooperation in Northeast Asia

In the discipline of international politics, there have been debates over polarity, such

as “Is bipolarity more stable than multipolarity?” Neorealist Kenneth Waltz viewedthat bipolarity is simple, thus reducing the chances of miscalculation, while DavidSinger and Karl Deutsch argued that a multipolar system tends to be stable because

37Donga Ilbo, 18 May 2006.

24 K Sonuncertainty encourages decision-makers to make calculations in consideration ofthe larger number of actors involved.38 Bipolarity between the United States andthe Soviet Union, as witnessed during the Cold War, demonstrated a long-standingrivalry and competition by the time one party lost its status In a similar way, China, ahegemonic contender, and Japan, the world’s third largest economy and key alliancepartner of the United States, have been stuck in political rivalry in spite of risingeconomic interdependence China is an emerging hegemon, working to build itsown structure of international security, as demonstrated in its leadership in orga-nizing and developing the SCO, a security mechanism of six countries – Russia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – and four observers – India,Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan The grouping, often billed as an anti-Western alliance,was originally built to address problems between China and its bordering states butexpanded into a regional security framework to discuss such issues as separatism,terrorism, and extremism, timed with Uzbekistan’s entry in 2001 and attendance ofthe observer states.39In the wake of a failure in its imperialist integrationist project,dubbed the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, in the early twentieth century,Japan has been often compared to Britain in terms of its identity vis-à-vis the UnitedStates and its continental neighbors Because of its military alliance with the UnitedStates and entrenched distrust toward continental powers, Japan finds it difficult toenmesh itself entirely in a regional security framework.

Therefore, the emergence of a Korean confederation is likely to become a newvariable with a potential of shifting this rivalry How could a Korean confedera-tion contribute to creating a Northeast Asian security community? The answer lies

in a set of ideas or policies this Korean confederation is likely to pursue First, aKorean confederation is likely to take an independent path in foreign and militaryaffairs in a departure from South Korea’s substantial reliance on the United Statesand North Korea’s dependence on China.40South Korea has already started a pro-cess to secure wartime operational rights from the United States, whilst seeking todissolve the Combined Forces Command to promote autonomy in military decisionsand actions Therefore, the emergence of a Korean confederation will contribute toshifting the current political rivalry between pro-American forces (Japan and SouthKorea) and anti-American forces (China, North Korea) Second, a Korean confed-eration will seek the role of an honest power broker between the United States andChina and between China and Japan When he mentioned South Korea’s role as

“a balancer,” President Roh Moo-hyun sought to illustrate South Korea’s shifting

38Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill; David Singer and Karl Deutsch (1964) “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics

16(3): 390–406.

39Alyson J K Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy (2007) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Policy

Paper No 17.

40See Hankyoreh’s (2 January 2002) interview with Professor Chen Pengjun of Beijing University,

who highlighted the possibility of a unified Korea taking an equidistance, peace-oriented, neutral diplomacy.

2 From a Fault Line to a Catalyst: An Emerging Korean Confederation 25identity from an alliance partner of the United States to a new power broker in thisregion However, Roh was forced to retract it because the international and domes-tic observers dismissed it as unfeasible, given South Korea’s political capabilityand dependence on its alliance with the United States as a bedrock of deterrenceagainst any threat from North Korea Third, a Korean confederation, depending onits diplomatic skills and economic viability, could be a catalyst in accelerating thedebate of forming a Northeast Asian security community As a minor power com-pared to China and Japan, a Korean confederation will resort to multilateralism as

a way to ensure its security So far, both North and South Korea concentrated theirdiplomatic activities on winning a competition of legitimacy to emerge a standardbearer of the Korean nation Once confederated, the two Koreas are likely to devotethemselves to creating a system of cooperative security in the way that, in Europe,Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg formed the Benelux trade agreement andbecome an active supporter of European integration with their bigger partners, such

as Germany, France, and Italy.41 Already, South Korea emerged the most activeplayer in promoting the idea of a regional community, with President Kim Dae-jung’s initiatives giving birth to the East Asian Vision Group and the East AsianStudy Group

Though complicated, the three-way system of competition and cooperation has apotential of speeding up the process of multilateral diplomacy The emerging Koreanconfederation and the shifting roles and partial withdrawal of US military bases inthis region will galvanize international and regional efforts to address a new set ofpolitical, military, and ideational challenges, such as territorial and historical dis-putes and accompanying nationalist uproars, an arms race to fill the vacuum left

by the partial withdrawal of US military bases, and the questions of identities andnorms regarding how a state should see itself in relation to the other states in thisregion and what standard of behavior might be appropriate in response to shift-ing identities To ensure the continued economic growth and cultural exchange,the Northeast Asian states are likely to intensify dialogue to avert any crisis andestablish a modus operandi to reduce political tension

The institutionalization of cooperation on multiple levels amongst the NortheastAsian countries and interested external powers will be one of the priority tasks tohandle old and new security challenges In this way, the six-party talks and thethree-way meeting of China, Japan, and South Korea could be regarded as two ini-tial steps in this direction These initiatives are expected to take shape in the form ofthe Northeast Asian version of the SCO as a subregional grouping of countries shar-ing a common history and borders, but still endowed with a more enhanced level

of equality and openness than the SCO Even though it can borrow some ideas onconfidence building measures from the OSCE, the emerging Northeast Asian secu-rity community, which I proposed to call the Pyongyang Cooperation Organization,will be different from the OSCE, an inter-regional grouping of 56 states stretching

41Gérard Roland (2007) “European Integration: What Lessons for Northeast Asia?,” Regional Integration in Northeast Asia: Issues and Strategies, A Policy Paper, University of Incheon.

26 K Sonfrom Vancouver to Vladivostok It is argued that Pyongyang is the right city

to accommodate this organization’s secretariat, since Beijing, Tokyo, or Seoul isunthinkable because of the identity-driven rivalries of the regional powers On theother hand, Pyongyang could emerge as a new center of regional diplomacy, timedwith North Korea’s diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japanand large-scale development projects to follow, sponsored by the United Nationsand other international agencies Given a set of norms established in the multilat-eral talks in East Asia, especially in the ASEAN process, the member states ofthis security community will likely resort to inter-governmentalism, valuing theprocess of consensus-building and avoidance of legalistic approaches, rather thansupranationalism, witnessed in the European integration process.42

42 Amitav Acharya (2004) “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and

Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58(2): 239–75.

frame-of 1991.3Susan Shirk established the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue in 1993with financial support from the US government as a Track Two process that wouldsupport the development of an official regional security community.4However, none

of these proposals gained traction at that time as a viable official, institutionalizedmechanism for multilateral management of Northeast Asia’s security problems.Despite the fact that regional security frameworks have flourished in manyother parts of the world, Northeast Asia, in security terms, remains “under-institutionalized.” This point is particularly notable in comparison to the regional-ized structures for security cooperation that have developed in other regions, includ-ing the Organization of African States, the Organization for Security Cooperation

in Europe, and the Organization of American States The ASEAN Regional Forum,established in 1994, is the organization that comes closest to providing a venuefor multilateral cooperation on security issues, but thus far this conference has not

1 Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr ( 1995 ).

2 Roh Tae Woo ( 1990 ).

3 James A Baker, III ( 1991 ) and Don Oberdorfer ( 1991 , p A36).

4 The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue accessed at http://igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/asia_pacific/ neacddefault.php , on October 7, 2008.

S Snyder (B)

Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation, Washington, DC, USA

e-mail: snydersas@gmail.com

27

B Seliger, W Pascha (eds.), Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community,

The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-9657-2_3,

C

 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

28 S Snydermobilized action to address regional conflicts and is particularly weak in its capacity

to address Northeast Asian problems

There are many different reasons that experts offer to explain the failure ofNortheast Asian countries to establish an official regional security framework.Some say that Northeast Asia’s character as the nexus for great power interactionsmakes a regionalized security arrangement particularly difficult to establish.5Othersattribute the failure of regional security mechanisms to take root to historical lega-cies; for instance, the perpetuation of a divided Korea is widely perceived as havingprevented the cold war from ending on the Korean peninsula or in Northeast Asia.Among those who focus on the intractability of the conflict on the Korean penin-sula as a reason why a multilateral security mechanism has not evolved, some blameNorth Korean intransigence, while others suggest that the US alliance is the primaryobstacle that stands in the way of a multilateral security community in NortheastAsia Still another explanation points to deeper historical legacies deriving from thescars of Japanese imperialism and the failure of Japan and the other countries tofully come to terms with the effects of that experience.6

The failure to develop official regional security cooperation stands in starkcontrast to the economic regionalization that has developed along with China’s eco-nomic rise Intra-Asian trade flows have risen from less than 30 percent in the 1980s

to over 40 percent today These trade flows initially followed regional investment

in China as a low-cost center for production of goods destined for US markets,but increasingly components are manufactured for sale in home markets or as ameans by which to gain a foothold in China’s growing consumer market.7So far,there is little evidence that economic regionalism is having spillover effects intothe security realm Likewise, functional cooperation on issues related to the envi-ronment, transnational crime, or other nontraditional security issues has grown, buthas not yet been sufficient to support the development of an official region-basedmechanism for addressing common security interests

Pragmatic approaches to the construction of Northeast Asian regionalism havefocused less on the obstacles that have prevented germination of a multilateral secu-rity arrangement and more on the complexities surrounding which country is bestpositioned to play a leadership role in promoting such a framework – or the rea-sons why various regional actors are disqualified from being able to play such aleadership role Even if a satisfactory political leader were to emerge, there areactive differences on what would constitute a suitable agenda for such a frame-work and the extent to which – in an Asian context – institutionalization of such aframework would be desirable For all of these reasons, efforts to date establish a

5 For instance, realist international relations theory would argue that Northeast Asia should be a

hotbed for great power rivalry and conflict See Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry?”International Security Vol 18, No 3 (Winter, 1993–1994), pp 5–33.

6See Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, Gi-wook Shin, Daniel C.

Sneider, Walter H Shorenstein Stanford, CA: Asia Pacific Research Center, 2007 ), Samuel S Kim, ed ( 2003 ), and Gilbert Rozman ( 2004 ).

7Gi-wook Shin, in “Cross Currents”, op cit., pp., and Chen Xiangming As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

3 Envisioning a Northeast Security Framework: The Korean Peninsula 29Northeast Asia-focused structure or to envision an agenda practical or compellingenough to launch a fully formed regional institution dedicated to addressing securityissues multilaterally have not been successful From this perspective, prospects forestablishing a regional security mechanism in Asia might seem dim.

North Korea’s Role in Promoting a Security

Framework in Northeast Asia

Despite pessimism regarding factors that have inhibited the development of aregional security architecture in Northeast Asia, it is possible to have hope for such aframework based on the halting, ad hoc efforts in that direction that have been opera-tionalized during the past two decades, with each effort building on past experiencestoward the establishment of a full-scale framework for multilateral management ofregional security issues in Northeast Asia

Ironically, North Korea – as the actor that has catalyzed common concerns thathave created a basis for cooperation among the other parties in the region – might beregarded as the biggest promoter of multilateral security cooperation in the region.When the North Koreans threatened to pull out of the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty in 1993, the United States initiated a bilateral dialogue with the DPRK,but the resulting Agreed Framework could not be implemented by the UnitedStates alone without support from its allies The Agreed Framework called forthe establishment of a multilateral consortium named the Korean Peninsula EnergyDevelopment Organization (KEDO), to implement the terms of the deal The factthat the bilaterally negotiated Geneva Agreed Framework required a multilateralstructure to pursue its own implementation provided clear evidence that a US-ledbilateral approach to solving North Korea-related issues, while necessary, was byitself insufficient KEDO was a practical step forward in forging multilateral cooper-ation to meet North Korea’s energy security needs as a solution to the North Koreannuclear crisis, but as an exercise in building regional cooperation, the core member-ship was incomplete KEDO’s governing board included representatives from Japan,South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, but China and Russiadeclined to participate.8

Subsequently, the Four-Party Talks were established in the late 1990s by theUnited States, China, and North and South Korea in an attempt to promote con-fidence building measures and move from an armistice to a peace regime on theKorean peninsula But the Four-Party Talks did more to promote Chinese cooper-ation with the United States and South Korea than to make progress on problemsinvolving North Korea A third form of multilateral cooperation during this periodinvolved the establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group(TCOG) among the United States, South Korea, and Japan This group did much

to overcome differences among allies in support of the Perry process in the late1990s, as all parties supported cooperative efforts to engage North Korea in more

8 Scott Snyder ( 2000 ).

30 S Snyderactive cooperation on the basis of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy Suspicionsabout covert North Korean nuclear efforts at Keumchangri (later proved unfounded)and North Korea’s Taepodong launch in 1998 catalyzed the establishment of TCOG

to address differences in policy priorities among the three countries.9

In the context of the second North Korean nuclear crisis that developed as aresult of concerns that North Korea was pursuing a covert uranium-enrichment path

to the development of nuclear weapons in 2002, the ongoing Six-Party Talks wereestablished as a means by which to include major regional stakeholders in a coop-erative effort to address the security challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclearweapons pursuits Early in the crisis, it became apparent that the United States had

no option for unilateral action through military means, so President Bush cast thesecond crisis as a “regional issue,” and the Six-Party Talks were established, withChina taking the lead role as host and mediator for the process.10This time, all theregional stakeholders were represented in the forum, but the dialogue itself madelittle initial progress due to a combination of US reluctance to engage with NorthKorea and North Korea’s continued focus on the United States

During the second Bush administration, US chief negotiator Assistant SecretaryChristopher Hill was able to obtain authority to negotiate bilaterally with the NorthKorean delegation in the context of the Six-Party Talks Following intensive nego-tiations during July–September of 2005, all parties agreed to a September 19, 2005Joint Statement of Principles for addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis Thedocument contained few concrete measures, only pledges that the various sideswould move forward on the basis of “words for words” and “actions for actions.”The Joint Statement marked the first time that the regional stakeholders had iden-tified and articulated the minimum common rhetorical objectives that through jointaction and implementation might in the future bind the parties together as a “securitycommunity.” The common objectives identified were the (1) the denuclearization ofthe Korean peninsula, (2) normalization of relations among all the regional stake-holders, (3) economic development (focused on North Korea), and (4) peace on theKorean peninsula and in Northeast Asia The rhetorical shared objectives that mightconstitute a Northeast Asian “Security Community” had been identified, but it wasnot yet clear that the parties were willing to take action in pursuit of those objectives

In retrospect, the Joint statement marked the inauguration of a rhetorical ment to collective action in the service of these four objectives, but circumstancesrelated to the Banco Delta Asia issue, through which North Korean funds werefrozen in a Macao-based bank suspected of facilitating money laundering, preventedthis rhetoric from being translated into action.11

commit-North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test and the drive for a UN Security Councilresolution 1718 imposing economic sanctions on North Korea appeared to toss aside

9 Dennis C Blair and John T Hanley (Winter 2001 ).

10 Press Conference with President George W Bush ( 2003 ).

11 The text of the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks may be found at http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm , accessed on May 22, 2007.

3 Envisioning a Northeast Security Framework: The Korean Peninsula 31any prospect for further negotiations related to the North Korean nuclear issue.But within weeks of the test, Chris Hill had returned to Beijing for several rounds

of bilateral and multilateral talks, which eventually resulted in the February 13th

“implementing agreement,” which carefully calibrated delivery of one million tons

of heavy fuel oil or equivalent and a US pledge to begin the process of removingNorth Korea from the list of terrorist sponsoring nations and ending application ofthe Trading with the Enemy Act in return for North Korea’s shut down and disabling

of its Yongbyon facilities and a “complete and correct” declaration of North Korea’sexisting nuclear facilities as a first step toward denuclearization Implementation ofthis agreement dragged to the end of the Bush administration, with the prospect thatadditional steps toward the objective of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula willhave to be dealt with by a successor administration, presumably within the context

of the Six-Party framework

Beyond the North Korean nuclear issue, it is likely that North Korea’s struction and integration into the regional political, economic, and security orderwill remain a focal point for active regional cooperation in the economic and polit-ical spheres for some time Multilateral cooperation in the areas of energy securityand economic development are already being developed on the basis of a sharedassessment of North Korea’s economic development needs, and many of those needsare being responded to in the context of the Six-Party Talks There have also beennascent multilateral efforts such as the Tumen River Area Development Project topromote regional economic development in Northeast Asia as a way of both mit-igating renewed tensions and positioning for possible economic development andintegration of North Korea, Northeastern China, and the Russian Far East with therest of Northeast Asia Those efforts are poised to enjoy success only if it is pos-sible to finally address the core sources of instability and insecurity on the Koreanpeninsula and in North Korea

recon-South Korean Views of Multilateral Security Cooperation

Both liberal and conservative administrations in South Korea have shown supportfor establishment of a regional security architecture in Northeast Asia As mentionedearlier, Roh Tae-woo proposed a Six-Party Consultative Conference for Peace inNortheast Asia in 1988 Kim Young-sam’s policy initiatives were linked to global-ization, but he also promoted a two plus two arrangement and supported Four-PartyTalks in the mid-1990s as steps toward multilateral cooperation to deal with NorthKorea

Under the progressive administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun, theidea that South Korea could be a catalyst for promotion of regional cooperationwas linked to and regarded as mutually supportive with inter-Korean reconcili-ation Kim Dae-jung promoted the East Asia Vision Group and was an activepromoter of multilateral cooperation to address regional security issues, in part toensure that there a positive regional environment existed in support of the SunshinePolicy