Koreas quest for economic democratization globalization, polarization and contention

3D Difficult, dangerous, dirty CCEJ Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice CSGE Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Elections CVT Continuous Vocational Training DUP Democratic United

FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRATIZATION

Globalization, Polarization and Contention

E D I T E D B Y Y O U N G M I K I M

Youngmi Kim

EditorKorea’s Quest for Economic DemocratizationGlobalization, Polarization and Contention

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I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS), whose Korean Studies Promotion Service (KSPS) Grant (AKS-2011-BAA-2105) made this book project possible Drafts of the chapters were presented at the Korean Studies conferences held at Central European University in Budapest (Hungary) in 2013 and 2014, organized as part of the ‘Global E-School in Eurasia’ project supported

by the Korea Foundation

note on RomAnizAtion

In rendering the Korean language in the Latin script, we use the Revised Romanization of Korean approved by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Korea in 2000 However, when historical material is pre-sented the McCune-Reischauer system is also used

Youngmi Kim and Sunhee Park

Hyug Baeg Im

Hyung-A Kim

contents

7 Civil Society and Democracy in South Korea:

Antonio Fiori and Sunhyuk Kim

Albert L Park

Luicy Pedroza and Hannes B Mosler

10 Female Immigration by Cross-Border Marriage:

Kyungmi Kim

11 The Coming Age of South Korea: Power, Influence

Virginie Grzelczyk

12 Conclusion: The Promise of People-Led Change

Youngmi Kim

About the Editor

Youngmi Kim is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Asian Studies

at the University of Edinburgh (UK) She previously worked at Central European University and University College Dublin Recent publications include articles in Electoral Studies and the monograph ‘The politics of coalition in South Korea: Between Institutions and Culture’ (Routledge, 2011)

Email: youngmi.kim@ed.ac.uk

Contributors

Antonio Fiori is Associate Professor and Delegate for Asia and Oceania

at the University of Bologna (Italy) His articles include “Hedging in search of a new age of non-alignment: Myanmar between China and the USA” (The Pacific Review, 2015), “Seventy Years after World War II: Comparing Europe and Northeast Asia’s Security Architectures” (Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2015)

Email: antonio.fiori@unibo.it

Virginie Grzelczyk is a lecturer in international relations at Aston

University, UK and holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Maryland Her book ‘North Korea’s New Diplomacy: Challenging Political Isolation in the 21st Century’, will be published by Palgrave in 2017

Email: v.grzelczyk@aston.ac.uk

editoR And contRibutoRs

Hyug-Baeg Im is Professor at Korea University in Seoul, South Korea He

received his MA and Ph.D in political science from the University of Chicago

He went on to serve as an EC Member, IPSA, the Director of Institute for Peace Studies and the Director of BK21 Research Corps at Korea University.Email: hyugbaeg@daum.net

Hyung-A Kim is Associate Professor, School of Culture, History and

the Language, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University Recent publications include, “President Roh Moo-Hyun’s Last Interview and the Roh Moo-Hyun Phenomenon in South Korea”,

Journal of Contemporary Asia, (Dec 2016).

Email: hyunga.kim@anu.edu.au

Kyung-Mi Kim received her Ph.D from EHESS (School for Advanced

Studies in Social Sciences) in France She is teaching at Paris Diderot University (Paris VII) Her research focuses on the role of the State defining the “mixedness” in the Korean family institution

Email: kyungmi@wanadoo.fr

Sunhyuk Kim is Professor and Vice President for International Affairs

at Korea University He received his Ph.D from Stanford University in

1996 His articles include “Administrative Reform in South Korea: New Public Management and the Bureaucracy” (2015) and “NGOs and Social Protection in East Asia: Korea, Thailand and Indonesia” (2014).Email: sunhyukk@korea.ac.kr

Hannes B Mosler is Assistant Professor at Freie Universität Berlin He

holds a Ph.D in political science from Seoul National University His

recent publications include the co-edited volumes Quality of Democracy

in Korea (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming), Facets of 130 Years German-Korean Relations (Peter Lang, 2017), and Länderbericht Korea

(bpb, 2015)

Email: Hannes.Mosler@fu-berlin.de

Albert L Park is associate professor of history at Claremont McKenna

College (Claremont, CA) He is the coeditor of Encountering Modernity: Christianity in East Asia and Asian America and the author of Building a Heaven on Earth: Religion, Activism and Protest in Japanese Occupied Korea.

Email: Albert.Park@ClaremontMcKenna.edu

Sunhee Park is Assistant Professor at Aarhus University in Denmark

She received her Ph.D in Political Science from Florida State University Her publications appear in the American Journal of Political Science and International Studies Quarterly

Email: sunhee.park@ps.au.dk

Luicy Pedroza is a Research Fellow at the GIGA -German Institute

of Global and Area Studies Her research focuses on the political

inte-gration of migrants She is leading the Project Every Immigrant Is an Emigrant: How Migration Policies Shape the Paths to Integration She

holds a Ph.D from University of Bremen and Jacobs University

Email: Luicy.Pedroza@giga.hamburg

Doowon Suh is professor and a chair of the Korean Studies Program

of the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University He was awarded Ph.D in sociology from the University of Chicago, M.Sc from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and MA and BA from Korea University

Email: dwsuh@korea.ac.kr

3D Difficult, dangerous, dirty

CCEJ Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice

CSGE Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Elections

CVT Continuous Vocational Training

DUP Democratic United Party

EPS Employment Permit Scheme

FKTU Federation of Korean Trade Unions

FTA Free Trade Agreement

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNI Gross National Income

GNP Grand National Party

GWS Great Workers’ Struggle

HCI Heavy and Chemical Industries

HMWU Hyundai Motors Workers’ Union

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

ITS Industrial Training System

KBS Korea Barometer Survey

KCTU Korean Confederation of Trade Unions

KFEM Korean Federation of Environmental Movement

KOICA Korea International Cooperation Agency

KPL Korean Peasants League

KWDI Korean Women’s Development Institute

KWHL Korean Women’s Hot Line

KWPA Korean Woman’s Peasant Association

MIKTA Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey and Australia

MTU Migrants’ Trade Union

MWKW Migrant Women, Korean Women

NBLS National Basic Livelihood Security Act

NCOTU National Council of Occupational Trade Unions

NCTU National Congress of Trade Unions

NCTUR National Conference of Trade Union Representatives NFP New Frontier Party or Saenuri Party

NIS National Intelligence Service

NLL Northern Limit Line

NPS National Pension Service

ODA Overseas Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PSPD People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

RDA Rural Development Administration

THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence

TINA There Is No Alternative

UPP Unified Progressive Party

USAMGIK American Military Government in Korea

WMHC Women Migrants Human Rights Centre

Fig 4.5 Predicted probability of supporting conservative party

(Gyeongsang province vs Jeolla province) 80 Fig 12.1 Wealth share of top 10% for regions and selected

list of figuRes

Table 10.1 Number and percentage of cross-border marriages

Table 10.2 Number of Korean cross-border marriages according

to nationalities of foreign spouses 2000–2014 236 Table 12.1 Wealth pattern within countries, 2016 284 Table 12.2 Wealth shares and minimum wealth of deciles

and top percentiles for regions and selected

list of tAbles

Hell Joseon: Polarization and Social

Contention in a Neo-liberal Age

Youngmi Kim

Innovations in information technology and the greater availability of social media and applications such as Kakaotalk (the Korean instant-mes-saging application used by tens of millions in the country and globally), Twitter, Snapchat and Line have transformed not only how Koreans communicate, but also the way in which grievances are aired and discon-tent is channelled from virtual discussions to demonstrations in public spaces, ultimately blurring the divide between online and offline politics (Kim 2009) Metaphors have been drawn between the contemporary ail-ing and the conditions of many Koreans under the late Joseon dynasty,

which ruled the Korean peninsula from 1392 to 1910 Hell Joseon is the

widely-used pejorative term used to compare current societal structure to class-based Joseon (also spelled as Chosun) Korea in the 19th and early

20th centuries The gap between haves (kap, indicating those with power

in society) and have-nots (eul), or those ‘born’ into eating with golden

or silver spoons and the increasingly larger segment of society eating

with ‘clay spoons’ (heuksujeo), is becoming wider These terms are used

to express the popular anger at the divisions within, the polarization of

and the deepening inequality in society The scandal of the ‘nuts rage’1

and privilege of the ‘very few at the top of society’ and the widespread outrage such conduct sparks among ordinary citizens Though much larger in magnitude and in its political significance and implications, the

‘Choi Soon-sil gate’ of 2016–2017, where the embezzlement of former Park Geun-hye’s confidant of several decades and the briberies compa-nies had to pay for access and favour, is ‘merely’ the latest episode in a series The impeachment of the former president, which was prompted

by the scandal and demanded by millions of citizens that took the streets

of Seoul every Saturday over several cold weeks in the fall and winter of

2016, is of high symbolic significance Privilege, entitlement and abuse are widespread and lie at the very top of the Korean political and eco-nomic system; however, justice and change can be brought about from below

Korean society is changing rapidly It is also becoming more unequal and polarized Debates over democratization and democratic consoli-dation have given way to others questioning the quality of democracy

in the country Starting from 2012 the term economic democratization, Gyeongje Minjuhwa (to complement the political transition which took

place in 1987) has become a common expression in Korean politics and society Former President Park Geun-hye made achieving economic democracy a central feature of her electoral manifesto back in 2012 (Kim 2014)

The demand for economic democracy and more shared welfare is now

the Zeitgeist in Korea (Yu 2013: 83) And yet, questions remain about

how much Korea’s governments are actively engaged in addressing this issue and what the implications of growing societal divisions are for the social fabric Can Korean society stick together or is it already made up

of different segments that are increasingly disconnected from each other?This book is concerned with understanding the sources of polari-zation in Korean society and the broader political and social dynamics this engenders in order to interrogate the state of Korea’s transition to democracy This is especially timely in light of the scandals that engulfed the higher echelon of Korea’s political establishment and the large industrial conglomerates between late 2016 and early 2017 The con-nivance of politics and business, shady interference from non-elected and non-accountable individuals in policy decisions by the head of the country’s executive and the evolution of ties between politics, business

and the media have all been exposed Through vast demonstrations in Gwanghwamun square, not far from the Blue House (the president’s official home), sustained over several weeks and growing in numbers each time, the public, in turn, reminded outside observers of the con-tentious nature of Korean society and the potential for change that mass popular protests can generate Eventually Korea’s political system was plunged into a deep crisis South Korea experienced the first removal

of a sitting president through an impeachment, and the country went through a void of political leadership at a time of growing tensions with the North and uncertain relations under the new Trump administration The individual contributions reflect how it has changed especially since political democratization and how the deepening inequality is affecting Korean democracy in such crucial times

weAlth concentRAtion, PolARizAtion And contention

In South Korea the largest 10 corporations contribute more than 76%

of the country’s total GDP while more than 80% of the country’s GDP

is contributed by small- and medium-sized businesses in Japan Again,

in Japan, conglomerates like Sony, Toyota and Panasonic contribute less than 20% of the total GDP (Kwon 2013: 19) On the surface level, the GDP seems to closely follow the trajectory of the Chaebols’ per-formance, which may give the impression that all is well in the Korean economy Below the surface, however, a growing number of citizens seem to be struggling to cope with serious economic hardship, as wealth

is concentrated in very few hands According to Nam, 68.5% of the ulation belonged to the middle class in 1996; figures dropped to 58.5%

pop-in 2006 (Nam 2009: 6) Before the fpop-inancial crisis, 70–80% of Koreans believed they belonged to the middle class; after the financial crisis this dropped to 28% (Nam 2009: 9)

Much of the scholarly and policy discussion about the decline of the middle class (and the related aspect of the rise of new classes) revolves around the role and impact of the large industrial conglomerates, the Chaebols The origins of the ‘Chaebol economy’ go back to the poli-cies of the Park Chung-hee administration in the 1960s During this time Chaebols collaborated with the state and the Chaebols could lead the way in the making of Korea’s ‘economic miracle’ thanks to state aid and special benefits and loans allowed by the state, as well as to the sacri-fice of labour in 1970s and 1980s Chaebol business moved from heavy

chemical industry to services and IT industries As the Chaebols’ grip on the market becomes pervasive and manifests itself in every area of daily life from cars and electronics to coffee and bakeries, many now hold the belief that the power of the Chaebols is beyond the state’s control

As former president Roh Moo-hyun mentioned at his annual speech in

2005, ‘power is handed over to market […] and the Chaebols hold a monopolistic position in the market’ (Yu 2013: 79)

This is not to say that wealth is not generated outside of the Chaebol economy, but those who do accumulate wealth tend to do so riding the property market boom Research on income polarization confirms that the polarization is led by non-labour income (Shin and Shin 2007 cited

in Nam 2009) According to the 2007 income inequality index, labour income inequality was 0.7069, twice higher than that of income inequality (Kang 2012: 156) Those who belong to the top 20% of asset owners have a staggering 474 times more assets than those who belong

non-to the lowest 20% (Ibid, 156) In his research Nak-Nyeon Kim ured wealth by the inheritance tax and estate multiplier method, which also shows the top 10% Koreans owning 66.4% of the wealth, while those

meas-below 50% owning only 2% of the total (Business Post October 29, 2015;

Kim 2015: 1)

To be clear, the current predicament has not emerged overnight Polarization in Korean society dates back at least as far as the restructur-ing project adopted under the guidance of the IMF following the Asian financial crisis that engulfed the Korean economy in 1997 Neither are inequalities and segmentation unique to Korean society That said, the gap between the poor and the rich has widened considerably as a result

of specific government policies

During the Asian financial crisis the bankruptcies of many large trial conglomerates such as Daewoo, Kia and Hanbo led not only to layoffs and vast unemployment at the time, but also to the shrinking of

indus-a middle clindus-ass where those who lost jobs, security indus-and their position in society could not ‘bounce back’ and lay in a socio-economic limbo in the following decades Some sought to cope by opening small businesses, which engendered a race to the bottom on profit margins and fierce competition in the small business sector, which led to additional losses Lack of start-up capital meant many borrowed large sums of money, incurring significant debt Subsequent business failure translated into even bigger losses and pain This was a predicament that each adminis-tration inherited from its predecessor and one which all failed to tackle

From rags to riches: Government-labour relations in Korean post-war

history and the advent of neo-liberal policies

Some context as to why and how the Korean government and society has come to this point is needed to understand the discussion that follows Under authoritarian rule workers are not allowed to form organized unions The Chun Doo-hwan government (1980–1988) was determined

to deter unions from political participation, cracking down on their laboration with political actors such as student activists, opposition intel-lectuals or political parties However, this did not prevent unions from resorting to strikes, demonstrations and a whole variety of repertoires of contention to voice its demands (Im, this volume, Chap 2) In fact, the contentiousness of Korea’s labour and its contribution to the country’s democratization is well noted in the literature (Lee 2011) The civilian (but former military) government of Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) made some concessions to the workers, while maintaining the pluralist com-pany unionism introduced by Chun Doo-hwan Because of the inter-nal fragmentation of the unions each of them had to negotiate with its own firm to improve the workers’ conditions and work environment Under the highly pluralized unions the Chaebols become responsive to the militant unions within their own companies and provided an occu-pational welfare system in the form of housing or subsidizing children’s education or offering extra training and leisure This fragmented union-ism and the Chaebols’ response resulted in large gaps in the welfare sys-tem between what was happening in large firms and situation with the small and medium-sized companies that could not afford such schemes (Kim and Lim 2000 cited in Im, this volume, Chap 5) As Im notes, Korea’s labour unions came to be characterized as ‘a mixture of plural-ist company unionism and paternalistic company welfarism’ (ibid.) During the Kim Young-sam administration (1993–1998) wages contin-ued to rise through the unions’ negotiation with the Chaebol compa-nies; the wage rate in heavy and chemical industries reached such a level that it started to hamper the sector’s competitiveness in the export mar-ket As the Korean economy became more integrated into the global economy, labour reform became necessary to meet the standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries With the reform initiatives, the KCTU (the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions) led by Chaeya (or known as Jaeya, extra-institutional) labour

col-movement activists were also invited alongside the main union (FKTU—Federation of Korean Trade Unions), which is recognized by the gov-ernment and business, to meet in the Presidential Commission on the Labour-Management Relations Reforms, though this failed to bring about effective labour governance to manage challenges from democra-tization and globalization (Im, this volume, Chap 5) The Kim Young-sam administration’s rigorous implementation of such policies ended with the Asian financial crisis and a number of large companies such as Hanbo Steel, Kia Motors and Halla Heavy Industry went bankrupt.The crisis changed the politics of Korea (Kim 2011) The pro-labour presidential candidate Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) adopted an ideology built on a neo-liberal social and economic model as a way proposed by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to handle the financial crisis in South Korea Although Kim Dae-jung promised market liberalization and democratization, the match between the two was far from unprob-lematic Market liberalization needs a flexible labour market, while an insecure labour environment undermines democracy The Kim admin-istration launched a tripartite commission as a forum where labour, business and government were supposed to deal with the demands of

a globalized economy, labour rights and democratized work relations; however, the restructuring program was mostly focused on business effi-ciency, sacrificing labour rights The administration ran out of alterna-tives Despite the electoral promises, Kim Dae-jung was unable to side with the labour union and followed the IMF-guided restructuring pro-gram The IMF had its way and the Chaebols also benefited as flexibility was introduced into the labour market At this point the unions faced

a dilemma, especially the more ‘outsider’ union, the KCTU, as on the one hand they could have joined the commission, while on the other, they would have become a partner in an effort that saved the Chaebol-centred economy The commission reached an agreement in early 1998

on major issues such as flexible layoffs, legal union activities, recognizing the teachers union and providing social safety nets Foreign investment started to flow into the Korean economy again, and the country was seemingly over the financial crisis within 6 months of its outbreak (Im, Chap 5) Although the state successfully dragged the economy out of the crisis, it came at a cost The neo-liberal policies that were seen as the recipe for doing so actually precipitated fissures within society Regular workers who had secured permanent job contracts with big firms were safe in their positions and had high incomes and a welfare system,

whereas irregular workers with short-term contracts had low wages and

a less-certain welfare provision This polarization existed not only within large firms, but also between large firms and small and medium-sized companies

To tackle this issue the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–2008) launched a ‘Social Pact for Job Creation’ in early 2004; however the social dialogue between the government, management and the union came quickly to a stalemate The unions suffered from a weak and frag-mented leadership and were unable to represent all the workers since the regular workers were unwilling to negotiate benefits for irregular work-ers Neo-liberal economic policies, already de facto embraced by the Kim and Roh administrations gained even further traction during the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013), himself a former CEO of Hyundai The Lee administration became infamous for its pro-Chae-bol business-friendly policies In order to boost a shrinking economy,

it implemented neo-liberal business-friendly policies, which resulted in stronger Chaebols The alleged benefits were not felt by ordinary peo-ple who believed their lives had not improved In actuality, it was quite the contrary; the size of the middle class shrunk and Korea’s social struc-ture now looks like an ‘hourglass’ instead of being diamond-shaped (Im,

‘super-capitalism’ Some labour unions became accomplices in the perpetuation

of the system Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) was elected on a platform of tackling the social impact of such policies During the presidential cam-paign on economic democratization, the camp of the ruling party candi-date, Park Geun-hye, promised banning unfair contracts and regulating work relations in order to reduce differences between large and small companies, while Moon Jae-In, the opposition candidate, advocated fur-ther Chaebol reforms in order to give some breathing space to small and medium-sized companies While the two competitive parties both used the buzzword ‘economic democratization’ in their campaign, the way the term was understood, let alone the way this might have been achieved, was clearly very different and contested The conservative Saenuri Party saw the Chaebols as playing a major role in boosting the nation’s econ-omy by expanding business and thus creating jobs In contrast, the pro-gressive parties such as the Democratic United Party (DUP) and the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) considered the Chaebols to be a major source of problems in a hugely polarized society They believed that this situation could only be addressed if the Chaebols and their influence

were reined in In the end, however, the labour policies adopted by the Park administration still treated a flexible labour market as an unquestion-able dogma The regular workers employed in large heavy and chemical industries found themselves at the top social strata having secured income and benefits, while the majority of workers are irregular, including young part-timers who are exploited by the so-called ‘labour aristocrats’ in the same company Part-timers receive less than half of regular workers’ salary with fixed term contracts This is not just about job security and income gaps, of course Inequality and polarization, as this volume demonstrates, influence the workers’ social-cultural aspects, as irregular workers cannot afford private education for their children (a ‘must’ in Korean society) after regular public school tuition This in turn undermines any prospect

of upward social mobility

Inequality and social polarization are issues that Koreans care about deeply As Suh notes in his chapter in this volume (Chap 3), a recent survey showed that 35.7% of Koreans consider economic equality to be most essential for democracy Suh contends that Koreans see communi-tarian and egalitarian welfare as more important than political freedom or individual liberty According to the World Values Survey in 2005–2008, Koreans see egalitarianism as more important than individualism (51%), a higher value than in other neighbouring countries in Asia Koreans also consider income differences as too wide (75%) Inequality feeds polari-zation which produces a segmentation of society Might Korea be mov-ing to a class-based system? Evidence to that end, based on the available survey data, is inconclusive, as Youngmi Kim and Sunhee Park show

in Chap 4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that class is re-emerging as an important social category, and a category of analysis in understanding Korea’s socio-political dynamics, but more work is needed in that regard

At the same time, many Koreans see that ‘exiting’ the (political) system is

no longer an option for getting their interests represented or for ing their grievances What are the consequences for Korean democracy then? The civil revolution that was sparked by the outrage over the Choi Soon-sil scandal in the fall of 2016—examined in greater detail in Chap 7 and the concluding chapter of this volume—gives some hope Outrage-fuelled demonstrations of over a million citizens in the streets of Seoul and other cities and eventually, in the face of popular pressure the legislature, including many MPs of Park Geun-hye’s own party, passed a motion to impeach the (former) president (technically suspending her), herself reluctant to either explain her own view or to resign In March

address-2017 the Constitutional Court upheld the motion with a ruling that malized the impeachment, removing her from office and paving the way for the presidential elections In the face of privilege, entitlement and abuse of power, ordinary Korean citizens rebelled, bringing about politi-cal change.

for-Aims And contRibution

This edited collection, which grows out of two conferences on this topic held at Central European University, Budapest (Hungary) in 2013 and

2014, aims to investigate the sources of polarization in contemporary Korea, the political contention this fuels and the way this is reshaping society To do so, it adopts a dual focus The first is on the agency and the specific policies of successive administrations While structural con-straints, including international ones, certainly do account for Korea’s embrace of neo-liberal economic and social policies, the story the vol-ume’s contributors tell is one that emphasizes agency over structure Policies do not just happen They are made The contributors focus on various administrations, some (Im and Suh) through a more historical overview, others zooming in on specific presidencies (Kim) The second focus is on different social groups, their experiences, voices and impact

on government and society at large Again, these are not conceived of

as passive recipients of government policies Rather they are a complex and internally fragmented ensemble, with internal agendas, preferences and divisions Moreover, the contributors show that while some groups, from immigrants to militant unions, have sought to counter government policies and in some cases even change them, others (regular workers and the unions protecting their interests) have joined efforts with the government in the preservation of privilege and a ‘labour aristocracy’, as Hyung-a Kim notes in Chap 6 Government and society (labour, immi-grants) are not worlds apart though, and the book examines a conten-tious government-society relationship through a series of in-depth case studies (tripartite commissions; legislative changes allowing voting rights

to immigrants in local elections) What emerges is a picture of a complex, increasingly segmented society, but one that is still contentious, where the groups on the losing side do not give up and have scored some victo-ries against all odds

The volume’s contributions, coming from scholars with various ciplinary backgrounds (from history and sociology to international

dis-relations, from political science to economics) fundamentally deal with and seek to bring two strands of scholarship into a conversation The first one is the work on the political economy of development, and specifically

of Korea’s economic and democratic development, which has devoted more attention to macro-economic processes (Sun 2002; H Kim 2004; Lew 2013; Kim and Shin 2004; Yap 2013; Gray 2014; Mathews 1998; Lim and Chang 2007) The second is scholarship on social contention and its impact on (the quality of) Korea’s democracy (S Kim 2000,

2002; Koo 1993; Cho 1998, 2006; Lee 2014, 2015; Yap 2013) In their chapters, the contributors draw on the growing scholarship on the active social and political role of labour and the contentious nature of the rela-tionship between government and unions (Lee 2011; Gray 2007a, 2014:

H Kim 2004; Kim and Sorensen 2015), including that on issue-based activities of grassroots digitally-enable movements (Kim 2008; Shin 2005; Min 2003, Hauben 2005; Chang and Lee 2006) Thus, the vol-ume seeks to intervene to the debate on the effects of growing inequali-ties on Korean society and the rise of a poorer, alienated and aggrieved

ARgument

The story the books tells is one of a society acutely divided by the liberal policies that accompanied the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the intervening years Rescuing the Chaebols at all costs was seen as the only feasible way to salvage first and boost the economy later A set of neo-liberal social and economic policies reshaped the labour market around the dogma of flexibility and had wide-ranging social, economic and politi-cal consequences As part of this bigger picture, the various contributions develop three distinct arguments The first one is about the long-term continuities of successive governments which, even before the 1997 cri-sis, had embraced the ideology of labour market flexibility along with the social and economic costs that came with it, excluding possible alterna-tives built around cooperation and concertation (Im in Chaps 2 and 5)

neo-or looking back into the communitarian roots of Kneo-orean agricultural society (Park in Chap 8) The second is about the contentious nature

of Korean society, which emerges strongly in all contributions In their appraisal of civil society, Fiori and S Kim (Chap 7) argue that this has

changed considerably since democratization, and not for the better, as civil society organizations replicate the problems plaguing political par-ties They are torn by ideological strife, are increasingly decoupled by ordinary citizens and their relationship with the government has also deteriorated Their role and impact is being questioned H Kim’s analysis

in Chap 6 unpacks organized labour, showing intra-labour divisions and the formation of a faction-prone elitist union in Korea, keen on coop-erating with large firms and the government The role of government and intelligence services in manipulating the official union was crucial to ensuring a split among the likely sources of opposition to authoritarian rule This split led to the creation of a labour aristocracy, as Kim calls it, whereby a small circle of union-affiliated regular workers employed by big firms came to enjoy the security and the benefits reserved for few Youngmi Kim and Sunhee Park’s chapter use data from Korea’s elections

to reflect on the emergence of new social and political cleavages and the possible—and widely expected—emergence of class as a key concept to understand contemporary Korean society The third is that of a changing face of Korean society brought about by growing immigration (Pedroza and Mosler, Chap 9) and international marriages (Kim, Chap 10) Though still small in scale, collective action has brought about some unexpected changes in voting rights for immigrants, as Pedroza and Mosler nicely show in their contribution Taken together, this volume’s contributions suggest that dealing with inequalities and polarization are challenges that Korean policy-makers can no longer postpone The solu-tion, however, cannot be, once again, one that is imposed from the top down, but instead needs to arise from a broad conversation that includes all segments of Korean society, not just the privileged ones Korea is indeed at a crossroads

book oveRview

In Chap 2 Hyug-Baeg Im contextualizes his discussion of the effects

of neo-liberalism in the debate over the three-corner relationship with globalization and democracy While proponents of neo-liberal policies believed that globalization would promote democracy and democracy, in turn, would enhance globalization, critics countered that globalization can also undermine democracy, while others suggested that democracy could also obstruct the globalization of national economies The ques-tion Im engages with in his contribution is the following: under what

circumstances does globalization deepen social polarization, ultimately weakening democracy? The contribution focuses on the case study of the Lee Myung-bak administration as this, more than its predecessors, has been when neo-liberal policies favoured the large industrial conglom-erates and rendered social polarization more acute The net result was the emergence of new polarized classes, different income groups and a polarized education environment, and a stark divide between regular and irregular workers In his pursuit for a way out of the status quo, Im calls for policy innovation ‘for a fair society’ aimed at expanding the size of the middle class, extending and bettering the welfare system to include irregular workers while also supporting development and growth Im draws on Hirschman’s work on ‘possibilism’ (Hirschman 1971; Adelman 2013) and reform mongering (Hirschman 1963) as he proposes any alternative solutions for growth and welfare society In his chapter Im argues that it is not necessarily globalization that induces social polariza-tion, but rather that agency lies with those political actors adopting spe-cific policies The Lee Myung-bak administration, whose starting point was that pro-business policies would generate growth and create jobs, is thus a case in point of a government that would not provide policies for fair society but relied on neo-liberal policies focusing on the supply side only However, an expanded Chaebols-centred economy did not guar-antee more jobs for ordinary people nor did it set in place a fair business environment As neo-liberal policies pushed for state downsize and with-drawal, the reduction of social services, deregularization and privatiza-tion, Im argues this led to a more technocratic government which lacks deliberations with the National Assembly The consequences extend way beyond the Korean case, with the legitimacy of representative institutions being eroded and called into question (Wuger 1998).

Chapter 3 provides a historical tour d’horizon of economic and cratic development in Korea, starting from the economic miracle under the Park Chung-hee administration, to democratization and democratic consolidation, the financial crisis and its aftermath Doowon Suh argues that electoral democracy did not lead to economic and cultural democ-racy Because of the severe income inequality and disappointment with the government’s failure to tackle this issue, Korea is further divided by region, ideology, generation and now by an emerging class division Suh warns that democracy is backsliding as the 2012 presidential election shows nostalgia for the authoritarian government and its efficacy The export-oriented industrialization in general can, of course, result in high

demo-inequality; however, the Park administration’s careful mixed effective ernance encouraged a vocational welfare system that narrowed social and income inequality Unlike in the well-known U-shaped theory, the rela-tionship between economic growth and inequality in Korea showed the reverse outcome: higher economic growth and less inequality Suh con-cludes that the neo-liberal reform during the financial crisis created a more harmful environment for democracy Furthermore, Suh argues that a capi-talist market needs institutionalized market regulation to correct inequali-ties and the increased poverty resulting from free competition and the monopolization of the market Drawing on the Korea Barometer Survey (KBS) data in Chap 4, Youngmi Kim and Sunhee Park examine the determinants of party support over a period of two decades (until 2010, when the latest data were available) Analysis confirms the persistence of old cleavages (region, ideology, age), whereas evidence concerning the possible rise of new ones (class, most notably) is at present inconclusive.The next two chapters shift the attention from government policies to labour, labour unions, and the deepening gulf between government and labour on the one hand and between regular and irregular workers on the other In Chap 5 Im provides a historical trajectory of labour union movements from the authoritarian period through democratization up

gov-to the present day What emerges is a bleak picture of polarized labour unions against labour aristocrats, who enjoy welfare protection and a reg-ular and high income but are outnumbered by irregular workers who are

on short-term contracts and have no social welfare support Im argues that the labour unions such as Korea Trade Commission (KTC) should engage in a social dialogue on the issue of the insecure work environ-ment of irregular workers, though this is not happening due to the mon-olithic, centralized and internally non-democratic structure of the unions

In Chap 6 Hyung-a Kim discusses detailed cases of labour tion between what she terms the labour aristocracy and irregular workers

polariza-in post-developmental Korea Kim appraises the origpolariza-ins, evolution and splits within Korea’s labour unions, and the problematically close rela-tionship some of these have enjoyed with the authoritarian government and even the intelligence services Borrowing the concept of Reich’s

‘supercapitalism’, which states that ‘democracy may not be essential to capitalism (Reich 2007: 9)’, Kim argues that a focus on state-led devel-opment and an ‘economy first’ mentality continued in the post-Asian financial crisis period, with a flexible labour market rendering workers, most notably the irregular ones, especially vulnerable Kim concludes

three main features on the polarization of the labour aristocrats and the non-regular workers First the labour flexibility that accompanied neo-liberal globalization and the financial crisis led Korea into the Chaebol-centred economy with supercapitalism As a result, the Chaebol economy

is competitive in the global market but this is only due to the sacrifice of the majority of irregular workers The cooperation between management and the past militant labour union is achieved on the basis of exploita-tion of irregular workers within each company-based union Second, supercapitalism allowed the Chaebol companies to be highly influential

in politics, policies, and society, and now they are beyond the control of the state Chaebol firms have relatively good relations with the militant union within their own company, but they do allow the system where regular workers exploit irregular workers at the same firm for their own interest, and thus the irregular workers’ conditions become the buffer between the management and the militant union Finally, Kim argues that while the labour aristocracy seems to enjoy their secure job, high income and benefits of social welfare, they comprise only 10% of the total labour force; the militant labour union is also ageing

In Chap 7 Antonio Fiori and Sunhyuk Kim assess the relationship between the state and civil society since democratization Looking at six governments after democratization the authors examine how the role of civil society has changed and how it has interacted with different gov-ernments Social movements during the authoritarian regimes primarily sought to achieve democratization After democratization, civil move-

ments have moved away from being ‘people’s movements’ (Minjung undong) and towards ‘citizens’ movements’ (Simin undong), which are

more moderate and diversified movements Citizens’ movements played their role as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Fiori and Kim 2011; Kim 2013) rais-ing issues on environment and gender equality, among others Fiori and Kim argue that the previous two progressive governments had main-tained close relations with civil society; however, since the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, the relationship has deteriorated sharply Furthermore, civil society has become ideologically polarized since the Roh Moo-hyun administration took over North Korea, especially in relation to their policies towards the Chaebols This chapter illustrates some of the recent failures in the evolution of Korean civil society, its being mired in ideological battles, its gradual detachment from ordinary citizens and its reliance on financial support from the state In Chap 8 Albert Park argues that even an economic democracy-centred critique

of the current development path does not actually propose any tive to the status quo Rather, he maintains, a possible option requires looking at Korea’s experience with agricultural cooperatives This has the advantage of shifting the focus away from the attainment of individual benefits to the pursuit of the common good and the idea of commu-nity Park uses the case of modern Korea’s experience of grassroots-level cooperation within an agricultural society to advance an idea of a com-munity-centred society (as opposed to individuals and consumers) Looking at the cooperative movements of the YMCA, Presbyterian and Cheondogyo (indigenous religion) in 1920s and 1930s, Park examines how agricultural societies were built around notions of community ethics and cooperation Next, he turns to the contemporary cooperative move-ment in which the Korean Peasants League (KPL) and Korean Woman’s Peasant Association (KWPA) organized agricultural cooperatives such as iCOOP Korea, Hansalim and Dure as concrete ways of actualizing the idea of economic democracy.

Korean society is changing: immigration, and its demographic impact

on a society that has long been almost mono-ethnic and is now ing increasingly plural In Chap 9 Luicy Pedroza and Hannes Mosler focus on one aspect of this diversity by bringing attention to the issue

becom-of migrants’ voting rights in the local elections Though a noteworthy achievement, the impact is still small as only a fraction of the population received the benefits from this legislative change Among the migrants, only the F-5 visa holders were afforded voting rights, which is less than 10% of the total migrants The enfranchisement of migrants is the result

of a diplomatic strategy to influence Japan’s reform of its own tion to ensure voting rights to local Koreans Specifically, the authors

legisla-argue that Mindan, the ethnic Koreans’ civil society organization in

Japan, was most active and influential in bringing about the migrant

enfranchisement reform in South Korea Mindan was active in

push-ing for votpush-ing rights lobbypush-ing legislators in Japan as well as the Korean

government Minbyon, the ‘lawyers for a democratic society’, based in

Korea also played crucial role in bridging Korean and Japanese ties over enfranchisement and migrants’ human rights with voting rights for immigrants in Korea An important point made by Pedroza and Mosler in their chapter is that while NGOs have been actively pushing for reforming the law to grant voting rights, this did not alter the ethno-centric view of South Korea’s, nor did the new law engender a higher

activi-participation rate among immigrants, though this is perhaps too early a stage to gauge long-term changes The change in legislation also encour-aged ethnic Chinese settled in Korea to acquire similar rights; a discus-sion aimed at extending voting rights for local elections to Koreans living abroad also followed.

In Chap 10 Kyung-mi Kim examines the case of international riages and the way in which Korea’s immigration policies have changed

mar-to respond mar-to this phenomenon, increasingly widespread in the country Revisiting the issue historically, Kim notes the negative connotation that accompanied the situation where Korean women married foreigners after the Korean War; the reverse (Korean men marrying foreign women) was not the case The chapter discusses the role of civil society organi-zations advocating for immigrant women’s rights, and assessing govern-ment policies in the areas of integration and social inclusion Kim argues however, that such policies focus on integration of the foreigners’ side but do not require much effort of accepting divergent cultures from the locals Also, Korean women who married foreigners are left with less attention in addition to foreign male workers who are married to foreign women Thus, such integration and multicultural policies have been par-tial to the groups who benefit, while ignoring various minority groups The chapter elaborates how the issue of otherness within the ethnic-cen-tred, homogeneous Korean society, helped to realize the rapid changes with cross-border marriages and the policies that were enacted to solve such emerging issues The author points out that while the discourse

on multicultural society advanced various institutions to support border, married, foreign women and their children, such institutions still ignore or exclude various marginalized minority groups who could also

cross-be accommodated by such institutions and welfare systems Multicultural policies should look beyond cross-border marriage for Korean males

In Chap 11 Virginie Grzelczyk reminds us all that Korea’s domestic actors and social groups do not operate in a vacuum There are broader constraints that Korea and Koreans are subject to and need to take into consideration The chapter is a stark reminder of the tough international environment in which Korea finds itself, and that it is a rapidly evolving one too Grzelczyk’s application of Ikenberry’s work on world orders in transition to a discussion of Korea’s aspiration to being a middle power brings together the discussions on the global politics of neo-liberalism and the domestic dynamics of government policies and social contention Overall, she notes that Korea’s own internal predicament and

troubles have not, so far, had negative externalities in terms of the try’s foreign policy and its international image and perception Lastly, in

locate the South Korean experience comparatively in relation to those

of other advanced industrial economies In this regard, Korea’s case is hardly unique and in line with a global trend in polarization The nega-tive effects of inequality and polarization on societal fabric are evident, with evident risks on the quality of Korea’s democracy There are none-theless some distinctive traits in Korea’s own trajectory, namely the con-tentious and yet fractured nature of labour, the evident limits of civil society and the intertwined relationship between politics and (large) business, which has defined Korea’s rise in the past and now risks under-mining the considerable progress this still relatively young democracy has made The ‘civil revolution’ that brought down Park’s presidency holds

a tremendous promise for Korea democracy, but the road ahead remains tortuous

notes

1 The daughter of the founder of Korean Air subjected a cabin staff to iation on an airplane bound for Incheon Airport over the way macadamia nuts were served in the first class cabin in 2013 (see also in Chap 12 )

humil-2 A board member of the ‘POSCO Energy’ company hit a flight attendant over the alleged poor quality of the ramen (noodle) served on board He was arrested by FBI upon landing at Los Angeles Airport in April 2013

(Korea Times April 27, 2013 ).

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In this chapter, I will first analyse four perspectives on the relationship between globalization and democracy: (1) the neoliberal argument that globalization promotes democracy; (2) the democratic globalization argu-ment that democracy facilitates globalization; (3) the anti-globalization argument that globalization hinders the development of democracy; and (4) the incompatibility of democracy and globalization argument that democracy impedes the globalization of national economies (Im 1996).

Secondly, I will discuss under what conditions globalization ates social polarization and thus weakens the material bases of emerging democracy.

gener-Thirdly, I will explain how and why social polarizations have deepened under the neoliberal Lee Myung-bak government I will discuss polariza-tion between classes and income groups, in education, between regular and irregular workers, and in other areas

Finally, I will explore the possibility of resolving social polarization under a globalized economy I will imagine policy innovations for a ‘fair society’, such as nurturing a middle class, more welfare for irregular workers, and the parallel development of growth and welfare

The main aim of this chapter is the search for feasible alternative tions for sustainable growth and welfare democracy in South Korea In searching for feasible alternatives, I rely on Albert O Hirschman’s ‘pos-sibilism’ In mongering development economics for Latin American countries and other underdeveloped countries, Hirschman looked for possibility rather than probability, possibilism rather than necessity, cau-sality rather than correlation, indeterminacy and uncertainties rather than structural determinism, and actors rather than structure (Hirschman 1971; Adelman 2013: 450–454) My premise is that globalization does not necessarily bring about social polarization The relationship between globalization and social polarization has not been given determin-istically The relationship is not the problem of probability or a ready-made correlation, but that of possibility and policy choice (Hirschman 1971) This relationship varies with the choices of leaders of concerned countries Elected leaders can escape fatalistic social polarization if they choose feasible alternatives that enable the compatibility of globalization and socioeconomic equity Thus, avoiding globalization-induced social polarization depends on whether or not relevant political actors make the

solu-‘right policy choices’ that enable the compatibility of democracy and a neoliberal market economy

With Hirschman’s possibilism, it can be seen that the possibility of resolving social polarization under a globalized economy has not been predetermined by structure (e.g the globalized economy) but has been decided by the choices and strategies of relevant actors I would like to

be an optimist as well as a possibilist I do not believe in TINA (There Is

No Alternative) I would like to search for a feasible alternative to make reform possible under exceptionally difficult conditions with Hirschman’s

enables the theory of possibilism more feasible and reliable I would like

to encourage ‘mongering’ reform rather than waiting for structural

pre-conditions to mature I focus more on agency’s virtu rather than the unpredictable events of fortuna (Machiavelli 1977).

globAlizAtion And democRAcy: fouR PeRsPectives

The Neoliberal Argument: Globalization Promotes Democracy

Neoliberals argue that globalization will extend the scope of zation and deepen its content For them, the main barrier to the devel-opment of democracy has been statism Globalization expelled statism, which has been the source of economic inefficiency, protection rent, privileges and political repression

democrati-According to neoliberals, the state has been the source of injustice and inefficiency The very capacity of the state to intervene in the economy ironically activates strong interest groups to invade and colonize the state (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 69) The state thus becomes the instru-ment whereby strong interest groups realize their particular interests Once the state itself has become the main source of power and affluence, politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and labour unions vehemently fight for the rents controlled by it, with elections becoming warfare and flour-ishing corruption (Diamond 1994: 9) Globalization, neoliberals argue, stamps out this kind of rent-seeking society, and in its place, restores competitive democracy

The neoliberal argument is that the ideal democracy can be ized under a market-led government For them, the market is a perma-nent democracy because in the market everybody casts a vote on every occasion that they buy or sell In an organizing social order, strength-ening the market principle enables the optimal allocation of economic goods and political power As competitive capitalism allocates resources efficiently, decentralized and free exchanges of citizens under democ-racy produce optimal allocation of power for social welfare maximum Capitalism is a “marketplace of goods” and democracy is a “marketplace

real-of ideas” (Weitzman 1993: 314)

One of America’s founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, argued that free trade consolidated American democracy Schumpeter (1942), Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960) similarly all shared the neoliberal thesis that free trade and free flow of capital enhances the optimal allocation of

resources, increases income, stimulates the economy and thus promotes democracy Free trade, neoliberals contend, strengthens democratic insti-tutions, and electoral institutions in particular Li and Reuveny (2009) find specifically that foreign direct investment promotes democracy.

A market economy, so the neoliberals would have it, promotes democracy by bringing economic affluence Democracy can prosper on the soil of political culture created by an abundance economy, leading

to a democratic political culture that favours tolerance, reconciliation and compromise Modernization theorists also argue that globalization would complete the universal causality that capitalist economic growth promotes democracy According to Huntington, “economically, a mar-ket economy appears more likely to give rise to the economic wealth and more equitable distribution of income that provide the infrastructure of democracy” (Huntington 1984: 205)

The Democratic Globalization Argument: Democracy Facilitates

Globalization

The democratic globalization argument contends that mature racy guarantees free trade and free flow of capital, thus facilitating glo-balization Frieden and Rogowski (1996: 43) found that “on average, democratic regimes will liberalize more readily than nondemocratic ones” Quinn (2001) argues that democracy can remove the barriers

democ-to free flow of capital better than authoritarianism can Democracy has been more positive towards financial liberalization if the democratic gov-ernment is under the control of ‘capital-friendly’ conservative parties Democratic globalization arguments mention the policy effects of demo-cratic governments in terms of globalization

The Anti-globalization Argument: Globalization Hinders the

Development of Democracy

In contrast to a rosy picture drawn by neoliberals about the prospect of

a relationship between globalization and democracy, anti-globalists insist that the wave of globalization will reverse the present wave of democrati-zation According to them, globalization increases the inequality among classes and groups, thus destabilizing new democracies

Firstly, they argue, economic globalization challenges democratic control of the economy The growing power of global actors such as

transnational corporations, international stock brokers and international money dealers threatens the sovereignty of the state because their deci-sion to invest and produce is mostly made outside the control of the sov-ereign state and the people.

While global actors have increased their control over investment, production, distribution, employment and mass communications, the democratic government does not have feasible control mechanisms to force these global actors to be accountable and responsible to the people

and anywhere, national governments cannot make them accountable to the people and their government National governments cannot monitor and control the activities of global firms to conform to the macroeco-nomic policies of the government Philip Schmitter comments that “in principle, elected national leaders are sovereign, in practice however, they are quite limited in their ability to control the decisions of transnational firms, the movement of ideas and persons across their borders, and the impact of their neighbours’ policies The political leaders find themselves decreasing capacity of ensuring the welfare and security for their own cit-izens” (Schmitter 1994: 63)

Anti-globalists criticize that under a global capitalist society, there are

no checks or balances; neither institutions nor structures can make global actors accountable The weakening state autonomy over the global mar-ket and transnational firms makes the democracy based on active citizens more vulnerable Lindblom concluded that “the major institutional bar-rier to fuller democracy may therefore be the autonomy of the private corporations” (Lindblom 1977: 356) Now, with globalization, the autonomy of big corporations has expanded to a global scale and this will

be the main barrier to democratization

These critics also argue that globalization aggravates inequality among nations, regions and peoples to such an extent as to threaten democracy,

in that no democracy can survive serious socio-economic inequality The unevenness of the globalization process threatens the material base of new democracies

Advanced capitalist countries compel new democracies to construct market economies similar to the West These new democracies are forced

to accept neoliberal economic reform measures comprising short-term stabilization of the economy and long-term market-oriented economic restructuring Neoliberal economic reform measures, known as the Washington Consensus, advise new democracies to sell state property

or state-owned firms, downsize the state, eliminate or reduce social fare and open markets to foreign competitors While the neoliberal pre-scription is not proved, the political consequences of economic reforms may threaten new democracies because the outcome of those reforms would increase socio-economic inequality and deprive the poor masses of social safety networks.

wel-Critics of globalization warn that the spread of market-oriented reforms would not consolidate new democracies but regress politics

to a market authoritarianism in which people can vote but not choose The legislature is taught that it has no role to play in policy decisions Political parties and trade unions learn that their voices do not count Electoral democracy with weak public deliberation and participation coexists with free market expansion

Anti-globalist Democracy Argument: Democracy Impedes

Globalization

The fourth and last argument is that democracy impedes the zation of local economies According to this argument, democracy obstructs the globalization of local economies by holding protectionism firmly in place In Peru and Bolivia recently, populist antipathy against globalization brought populist political leaders back to power (Yu 2006) When the globalization of the local economy distorts income distribu-tion so as to disfavour the working poor, a democratic government’s policy for globalization cannot win the support of the working class and the peasants and thus may face an electoral defeat If globalization cre-ates a 20:80 society, produces a massive underclass and generates social polarization, a democratic government may choose anti-globalization policies to exploit popular antipathy against globalization for electoral purposes On the eve of the new millennium at the end of 1999, the so called ‘Millennium Round’ held at Seattle to expand the World Trade Organization was dispersed in the face of vehement anti-globalization protests by global and local NGOs

globali-globAlizAtion And sociAl PolARizAtion

From the discussion of these four perspectives on globalization and democracy, it becomes clear that globalization does not necessarily pro-mote democracy but may hinder it by generating and deepening social