Wundt and the philosophical foundations of psychology

45 2.5 The Relationship between Psychology and Philosophy in Wundt’s Early Work .... Araujo, Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-26636-7_1 In

Wundt and the Philosophical

Foundations of Psychology

A Reappraisal

of Psychology

Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology

A Reappraisal

With Foreword by Annette Mülberger

ISBN 978-3-319-26634-3 ISBN 978-3-319-26636-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-26636-7

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Departamento de Psicologia

Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora

Juiz de Fora , Minas Gerais , Brazil

Quanto mais em mim mesma me aprofundo Menos interiormente me conheça?!

(Augusto dos Anjos, Natureza Íntima)

Why another book on Wundt? If we look at the twentieth-century literature in the

fi eld of the history of psychology, we can soon see the prominent role that has been attributed to this historical fi gure, often referred to as the “founding father of scien- tifi c psychology.” When and why did he ascend to these heights in psychology’s history? It had already happened during his lifetime, when his laboratory became a

“mecca” for scholars interested in what was called a “new” and “scientifi c” chology A number of external factors certainly helped, such as the attractiveness of German university studies for North-American students and the prestige of Leipzig University at the time, but Wundt also clearly managed to “sell” his research as a monumental and innovative project, while converting his laboratory into an extremely productive scientifi c institution

The fact that many of the psychologists who would afterwards obtain infl uential and prominent positions in foreign universities (such as S Hall, E B Titchener, and

J M Cattell) had been trained in Leipzig undoubtedly contributed to Wundt’s tige inside and outside the country It was also in the interest of his students to praise the quality of their training, paying homage to their mentor Thus, the historical role

pres-of Leipzig as the “cradle pres-of the new science” was being constantly re-affi rmed and celebrated Apart from a particular reverence for the master, what these visitors often grasped and took with them was only a very vague and distorted idea about his thinking, together with a fascination about psychology as a science based on precise measurement and experimentation

Even in his own lifetime, then, Wundt was an author who often was neither fully read nor fully understood by those invoking his name He was a typical German

Universitätsgelehrter or Mandarin , who spent his life absorbed by his ambitious intellectual endeavor of constructing a coherent Weltanschauung (worldview) The

outcome is an impressive, voluminous, and complex opus of more than 50,000 pages A complete understanding requires an enormous amount of patience, a thor- ough expertise in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psychology and philosophy, and a good knowledge of the German language Many students and visitors lacked this and had only a very limited knowledge of Wundt’s project through reviews or a

superfi cial reading of his famous Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie

As a result, Wundt became one of the most cited authors while at the same time

an essential part of his thinking was ignored, misunderstood, and sometimes even rejected Immediately, simpler (in the sense of less philosophical, ambitious, and complex) and more positivist approaches to psychology were adopted, such as those found in the textbooks of Ebbinghaus, Külpe, and Titchener Histories written before Boring’s, such as the biographies of the six “founding fathers” of “modern psychol- ogy” written by G Stanley Hall (1912), dedicated twice as much space to Wundt than to any of the other founding fathers Boring’s book on the history of experimen- tal psychology would soon became a landmark in the fi eld, offering a richness of biographical data clothed in a comprehensive narrative, elaborating on the interplay

between the “great men” and the Zeitgeist of their time In his account, Helmholtz

and Fechner played the role of immediate forerunners, while the work developed in Wundt’s laboratory, founded in 1879, was described as the starting point of psychol- ogy as an institutionally autonomous and truly experimental science

The historical research on Wundt initiated by Blumenthal and Danziger at the centennial celebration of the foundation of his laboratory pointed out the shortcom- ings, distortions, and even “mystifi cations” in Boring’s work and tried to offer alter-

native accounts Aspects of his work such as his epistemology, Völkerpsychologie , his journal ( Philosophische Studien ), and the activities in his institute were thus re-

examined In this process of demystifi cation, Wundt’s approach was redefi ned as old-fashioned, conservative, and idealistic He was presented as an elitist scholar who defended a conceptual framework that was rarely accepted or followed by oth- ers In addition, his political engagement in the First World War against the allies and the cultural arrogance of his Elements of Völkerpsychologie were studied

Moreover, his life-long dedication to philosophy was noted, casting into doubt the role he had been given in ending the philosophical era of the history of psychology, and his rejection of what would become the dominant trend, namely applied psychology, made him appear incomprehensible for most psychologists of the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries Thus, it comes as no surprise that, after an enthusiastic reappraisal of Wundt at the centennial celebration, the interest in this historical fi gure soon declined Apart from his rather negative reputation, the value

of his psychology was questioned in similar terms to Titchener’s structuralism What can such a psychology, based on an analysis of the content of consciousness

of an abstract human mind, offer that could be of interest?

The present book clearly shows that this attitude is unjustifi ed Wundt’s ogy stands out as one of the most sophisticated philosophical conceptions of psy- chological knowledge, offering insights into essential methodological and conceptual problems of research on thinking, feeling, and perception His unjustly neglected work can still serve as an example and inspiration for the development of current studies on the human mind

Of course, under the impact of still-growing social concerns and the presence of Foulcauldian historiography, it is not fashionable to write about Wundt, especially about Wundt as a philosopher of psychology Nevertheless, a renewed interest in this fi gure has arisen in Brazil In 2005, Saulo de Freitas Araujo arrived from the University of Juiz de Fora (in the Region of Minas Gerais) as a doctoral student

at Leipzig He was determined to dedicate himself to reaching an understanding of Wundt’s huge intellectual endeavor It would take him years of hard work The out- come of this effort is the present volume Already honored by the American

Psychological Association (Division 26), which awarded Araujo the 2013 Early Career Award , it is clearly not just “another book” or one more celebration of the

Wundtian myth On the contrary, it constitutes a piece of serious scholarly work, offering a well-constructed analysis The book thereby serves excellently as an introduction to Wundt’s psychology and thinking His argumentation is easy to fol- low, voicing accurately the point of view of the Leipzig scholar

At the same time, it offers a new historical interpretation Focusing on the close link established by Wundt between his psychological work and his philosophical thinking, Araujo offers an insightful view of his intellectual development and the quest for conceptual coherence How is his experimental psychology linked to his

Völkerpsychologie ? Why did Wundt at a certain point reject the unconscious? Can

he be classifi ed as a Neo-Kantian? How are his principles (psychological laws) nected to his experimental fi ndings and philosophical thinking? Araujo’s compre- hensive study offers clearly understandable and novel answers to these questions This book is a piece of intellectual history, exemplifying one way to connect the history and philosophy of science It stands in clear contrast to previous sociological analyses The author starts with a thorough work on the primary sources and thus avoids the consequences of imposing a previously assumed scheme Without attempting to offer a fi nal and complete picture of Wundt’s thinking, Araujo’s research clearly leads to a major advancement in Wundt scholarship

CEHIC, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Annette Mülberger Barcelona, Spain

This book has a long history, which dates back to 2001, when I entered the PhD program in philosophy at the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) in Brazil After interrupting my studies for almost 2 years due to health problems, I resumed them in 2004 I then spent the years 2005 and 2006 in Leipzig, Germany, where I

had access to the Wundt Estate ( Wundt Nachlass ) at the University Archives, as well

as the different editions of his works in the Wundt-Zimmer at the Psychological

Institute In 2007, I fi nally defended my PhD dissertation, which was published in Portuguese with minor modifi cations in 2010

This English edition is not a translation of the Portuguese edition It is a tively revised, enlarged, and updated text It is, in fact, another book Although the general thesis remains the same, there is much new material, including primary and secondary sources, especially with regard to the literature after 2007 I have also added a new introduction to the book, new sections in each chapter, and new clari-

substan-fi cations regarding the intellectual context of the nineteenth century in Germany, in order to make my arguments clearer and stronger By the end, I hope to have better explained some diffi cult passages of the previous edition, thus rendering the book more suitable not only to specialists but also to anyone interested in the history and philosophy of psychology Thinking of a broader audience, I have added footnotes, concerning the general context of some passages, which would not be necessary if the book had been written only for specialists

Portions of the second chapter originally appeared in Araujo, S F (2012) Why did Wundt abandon his early theory of the unconscious? Towards a new

interpretation of Wundt’s psychological project History of Psychology, 15 (1),

33–49 Copyright © 2012 by the American Psychological Association Adapted with permission

Citations and Translations

Throughout the book, I use APA style, according to the sixth edition of its Publication Manual There are some exceptions, though Since there is no offi cial edition of

Wundt’s works, I created abbreviations for each of his published books, articles, and book chapters that I use here (see list of abbreviations) Accordingly, the references are given by the corresponding abbreviation, followed by the corresponding volume number (when applicable) in Roman numerals and page numbers in Arabic Regarding Kant, I followed the standard practice among Kant scholars, adopting the

Academy Edition ( Akademie-Ausgabe ) of his writings ( Kants gesammelte Schriften

in 29 volumes), edited by de Gruyter Thus, the references take the abbreviation AA, followed by the corresponding volume number in Roman numerals and page num-

bers in Arabic The only exception, as usual, is the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR),

which is referenced in accordance with the fi rst (A) or second (B) original edition, followed by the corresponding page numbers As for the archival funds, I followed the original abbreviations of each fund, adding the necessary specifi cations in each reference (e.g., letter and page number) Finally, in the specifi c cases of Wolff, Herbart, and Schopenhauer, I gave the corresponding paragraph numbers instead of page numbers, as is usual among their interpreters

Except when otherwise indicated, all the translations of the original German, French, and Latin passages are mine For Kant’s works, I used whenever possible

the translations of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant , indicating

the exact reference of each translation As for Wundt, I tried to preserve as much as possible his original style His writing is very elegant but extremely complex, fol- lowing the typical nineteenth-century style of German philosophy, with long para- graphs composed of many subordinate clauses Sometimes, it was not easy to fi nd

an adequate translation in English, but I tried to be as accurate as possible Whenever

I had to choose between accuracy and beauty, I opted for the former Not being a native speaker of either German or English has made things more diffi cult In any case, I hope to have been faithful to Wundt’s thought The extent to which I have succeeded I leave for every reader to judge for him/herself

Juiz de Fora, Brazil Saulo de Freitas Araujo

During all these years, I have been in the unpayable debt of many people First, to

my PhD supervisor in Brazil, Prof Dr Luiz Roberto Monzani, with whom I have learned to respect and admire the history of philosophy I am equally grateful to

Prof Dr Ortrun Riha and all the members of the Karl-Sudhoff-Institut für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften at Leipzig University, where I found an

excellent environment to develop my research Dr Anneros Meischner-Metge,

responsible for the Wundt-Zimmer , gave me invaluable help and information

regard-ing Wundt’s work and the history of psychology in Leipzig Dr Jens Blecher, Sandy Muhl, and Michael Natho at the University Archives in Leipzig made my archival research much easier Dr Werner Moritz at the University Archives in Heidelberg saved me much time during my visit there

Regarding this English edition, it was mostly prepared during my sabbatical leave at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain), where I spent the period 2013/2014 as guest scholar in the Philosophy Department, whose members I thank for their generous reception I am especially grateful to Thomas Sturm and Annette Mülberger for reading and commenting on the manuscript and for the inspiring intellectual exchanges we have had in recent years Their rigorous and critical read- ing and our lively debates have been invaluable to me I am also grateful to the members of CEHIC (Centre for the History of Science), who invited me to present the plan and the main ideas of the book, followed by a general discussion: Augustí Nieto Galan, Fernando Vidal, Massimiliano Badino, Lino Camprubí, Oliver Hochadel, and Xavier Roqué

Since the publication of the Portuguese edition, I have had the opportunity to present and discuss ideas with many scholars in North America and Europe I would like to thank Wade Pickren and Alexandra Rutherford for their generosity and keen interest in making a North-American audience aware of my scholarship I also thank the members of the Cheiron Society and the Society for the History of Psychology (APA’s Division 26) for their comments and suggestions: William Woodward, David Robinson, Rand Evans, Christopher Green, Andrew Winston, Thomas Teo,

and Hank Stam, among others I am especially grateful to the Society for the History

of Psychology for selecting me for the 2013 Early Career Award , which gave me

extra motivation for this English edition

I also thank the members of the European Society for the History of Human Sciences (ESHHS), as well as the following scholars, for discussing with me some

of the ideas presented in this book: Theodore Arabatzis, Sara Dellantonio, Georg Eckardt, Jochen Fahrenberg, Horst Gundlach, Gary Hatfi eld, Barbara Held, Gerd Jüttemann, Marco Innamorati, Margret Kaiser-El-Safti, Ingrid Kästner, Klaus

Christian Köhnke ( in memoriam ), Joel Michell, Serge Nicolas, Wolfgang Nitsche,

Lisa Osbeck, Luigi Pastore, Sonu Shamdasani, Roger Smith, Andreas Sommer, Lothar and Helga Sprung, Holger Steinberg, and Thomas Wendt

I am equally grateful to Judy Jones at Springer for her support

I am greatly indebted to my Brazilian colleagues in the Psychology Department and the Graduate Program in Psychology at the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF) for assuming my activities during my sabbatical leave José Antônio Damásio Abib, Alexander Moreira- Almeida, Luis Henrique Dreher, and Andrea Faggion have made comments and suggestions that I have incorporated into this English edition

Last but not least, I am grateful to DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), CNPq (National Council for Scientifi c and Technological Development), CAPES (Brazilian Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education), and PROPG (Pro-rectorate for Graduate Studies) at the UFJF for fi nancial support

1 Introduction 1

1.1 German Psychology Before Wundt: An Overview 1

1.2 A Brief History of Wundt Scholarship and Its Problems 6

1.3 General Methodological Remarks 12

1.4 Thesis and Structure of the Book 19

2 The Logical Mind: Wundt’s Early Psychological Project 21

2.1 The Need for Reform 22

2.2 A Program for a Scientifi c Psychology 26

2.3 The Logical Theory of the Mind and Unconscious Inferences 36

2.4 The Vorlesungen as Realization of Wundt’s Early Psychological Project 45

2.5 The Relationship between Psychology and Philosophy in Wundt’s Early Work 58

2.6 Intellectual Roots of the Young Wundt 64

3 The Grundzüge and the Abandonment of the Unconscious 81

3.1 Abandoning Mental Panlogism (Thesis 1) 83

3.2 The Grundzüge and the Rejection of the Unconscious (Thesis 2) 87

3.3 The “Axioms of Physics” and Wundt’s Philosophical Development 92

3.4 A New Theory of Consciousness 98

3.5 Kant’s Infl uence 103

3.6 Wundt and the Beginnings of Neo-Kantianism 118

4 Wundt’s Idea of a Scientific Philosophy 125

4.1 Toward a Scientifi c Philosophy 126

4.2 Logic and Theory of Knowledge 134

4.3 The Logical Evolution of Knowledge and the Concept of Experience 137

4.4 Categories of Scientifi c Knowledge 144

4.5 Beyond Kant, Neo-Kantianism and Positivism: A New Idealism? 154

5 Wundt’s Mature Project of a Scientific Psychology 167

5.1 Between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften 168

5.2 Branches of Psychological Investigation 173

5.3 The Theoretical Principles of Psychology 191

5.4 Wundt’s Voluntarism 202

6 Concluding Remarks 209

Sources 215

References 219

Index 247

Saulo de Freitas Araujo , Ph.D is Professor for the History and Philosophy of

Psychology at the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (Brazil), Department of Psychology He is also director of the Wilhelm Wundt Center for the History and Philosophy of Psychology at the same institution His research is primarily con- cerned with the history and philosophy of scientifi c psychology He has published, among others, “Psychology and Neuroscience: An Evaluation of Contemporary Materialism” (2011), “History and Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Perspectives” (2012), “Echoes of the Past: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Psychology” (2013), “Philosophical Foundations of Contemporary Psychology” (2014), and “Current Topics in the History and Philosophy of Psychology” (2015) His work on Wundt has been awarded the 2013 Early Career Award from the American Psychological Association (Division 26)

Archival Funds

UAH, H-III-111 Universitätsarchiv Heidelberg, Akten der medizinischen

Fakultät

UAH, PA Universitätsarchiv Heidelberg, Personalakte

UAL, NW Universitätsarchiv Leipzig, Nachlass Wundt

Kant’s Works

AA Akademie-Ausgabe Kants gesammelte Schriften (29 Vols.), 1900ff

CPR Critique of Pure Reaon, First Edition (A) and Second Edition (B)

Wundt’s Works (in alphabetical order) 1

AEP Die Aufgaben der experimentellen Psychologie (1882)

BBA Berichtigende Bemerkung zu dem Aufsatze des Herrn B Erdmann

(1880)

BTS Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung (1862)

CIC Central innervation and consciousness (1876)

DTP Die Thierpsychologie (1885)

DGG Die Geschwindigkeit des Gedankens (1862)

EB Eine Berichtigung (1915)

EDW 1 Die Entwicklung des Willens (1885)

EDW 2 Die Entwicklung des Willens (1906)

1 The chronological order of these works is presented as part of the sources at the end of the book

EE Erlebtes und Erkanntes (1920)

EMP Über empirische und metaphysische Psychologie (1904)

EPhi Einleitung in die Philosophie (1918)

EPsy Einführung in die Psychologie (1911)

Eth Ethik (1886)

EVP Elemente der Völkerpsychologie (1912)

GDP Grundriss der Psychologie (1896)

GPP 1 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie (1874)

GPP 2 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie 2nd ed 2 vols (1880) GPP 3 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie 3rd ed 2 vols (1887) GPP 4 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie 4th ed 2 vols (1893) GPP 5 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie 5th ed 3 vols (1902–1903) GPP 6 Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie 6th ed 3 vols (1908–1911) GUS Gehirn und Seele (1880)

GWL Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1913)

HMP Handbuch der medicinischen Physik (1867)

IEP Das Institut für experimentelle Psychologie (1909)

KNA Kritische Nachlese zur Ausfragemethode (1908)

L 1 Logik, 2 vols (1880–1883)

L 2 Logik 2nd ed Vol II.2 (1895)

L 3 Logik 3rd ed Vol I (1906)

L 4 Logik 4th ed Vol III (1921)

LEI Leibniz Zu seinem 200 jährigen Todestag (1917)

LHA Lectures on human and animal psychology (1912)

LMB Die Lehre von der Muskelbewegung (1858)

LPM 1 Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1865)

LPM 2 Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen 2nd ed (1868)

LPM 3 Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen 3rd ed (1873)

LPM 4 Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen 4th ed (1878)

LUP Logik und Psychologie (1910)

MVG Die Metaphysik in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (1902)

NKR 1 Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus Erster Artikel (1896)

NKR 2 Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus Zweiter Artikel (1898)

NKR 3 Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus Dritter Artikel (1898)

NLG Neuere Leistungen auf dem Gebiete der physiologischen Psychologie (1867) NWP 1 Naturwissenschaft und Psychologie (1903)

NWP 2 Naturwissenschaft und Psychologie 2nd ed (1911)

PAC Die Physikalischen Axiome und Ihre Beziehung zum Causalprincip (1866) PIG Philosophy in Germany (1877)

PKD Die Psychologie im Kampf ums Dasein (1913)

PMN Die Prinzipien der mechanischen Naturlehre (1910)

PUL Psychologismus und Logizismus (1910)

RCor Rezension von Cornelius’ Grundzüge einer Molecularphysik (1866) RGer Rezension von Gerbers Die Sprache und das Erkennen (1886)

RHae Rezension von Haeckels Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (1867) RHar Rezension von Harms’ Philosopische Einleitung in die Encyclopädie der

RSpe 1 Rezension von Spencers Grundlagen der Philosophie (1875)

RSpe 2 Rezension von Spencers Einleitung in das Studium der Sociologie (1876) RSpe 3 Rezension von Spencers System der synthetischen Philosophie, II:

Die Principien der Biologie, Band 1 (1877)

RSpe 4 Rezension von Spencers System der synthetischen Philosophie, II:

Die Principien der Biologie, Band 2 (1878)

SDS Das Sittliche in der Sprache (1886)

SGS Sprachgeschichte und Sprachpsychologie (1901)

SIW Selbstbeobachtung und innere Wahrnehmung (1888)

SP 1 System der Philosophie (1889)

SP 2 System der Philosophie 2nd ed (1897)

SP 4 System der Philosophie 4th ed (1919)

SUD Die Sprache und das Denken (1885)

SÜW Sinnliche und Übersinnliche Welt (1914)

UAE Über Ausfrageexperimente und über die Methoden zur Psychologie des

Denkens (1907)

UAP Ueber die Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Gegenwart (1874)

UBG Ueber den Begriff des Gesetzes, mit Rücksicht auf die Frage der

Ausnahmslosigkeit der Lautgesetze (1886)

UDP Über die Defi nition der Psychologie (1896)

UEG Über die Entstehung räumlicher Gesichtswahrnehmungen (1869)

UEP Über den Einfl uss der Philosophie auf die Erfahrungswissenschaften (1876) UEW Ueber die Eintheilung der Wissenschaften (1889)

UHK Ueber Dr Hering’s Kritik meiner Theorie des binocularen Sehens (1863) UPA Über die physikalischen Axiome (1886)

UPC Ueber psychische Causalität und das Princip des psychophysischen

Parallelismus (1894)

UPK Über psychische Kausalität (1911)

UPM Über psychologische Methoden (1883)

UVE Über das Verhältnis des Einzelnen zur Gemeinschaft (1891/1913) UZW Ueber Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie (1888)

VEP Völkerpsychologie und Entwicklungspsychologie (1916)

VMT 1 Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele (1863)

VMT 2 Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele 2nd ed (1892)

VPK Völkerpsychologie Kultur und Geschichte (1920)

VPS Völkerpsychologie Die Sprache (1900)

WSK Was soll uns Kant nicht sein? (1892)

ZFL Zur Frage der Localisation der Grosshirnfunctionen (1891)

ZKS Zur Kritik des Seelenbegriffs (1885)

ZLG Zur Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen (1891)

ZLW Zur Lehre vom Willen (1883)

ZWV Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie (1911)

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

S.d.F Araujo, Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-26636-7_1

Introduction

This book is intended to be a philosophical history of psychology , that is, a history

of psychology guided by specifi c philosophical questions, the most important of which is the general relationship between psychology and philosophy At the same time, the book’s subject matter can be considered a case study in the History and Philosophy of Science By placing Wundt’s psychological project in its historical context, I want to demonstrate how his project is intertwined with his philosophical assumptions and interests Thus, the book offers an example of the relationship between psychology and philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Furthermore, by focusing my analysis on Wundt’s intellectual development and by showing the formation of his philosophical program, I offer a new interpretation of his conception of scientifi c psychology that tries to be faithful to the systematic character of his thought, in contrast to much of the traditional historiography of psychology, which presents a rather fragmented, sometimes unilateral treatment of his ideas It is, so to speak, ‘a view from above’; that is, I see Wundt’s psychology

as part of his highest epistemic ideals, which are philosophical in their essence From the beginning, it must be clear that throughout the book, the term ‘psychol- ogy’ will be understood as a science, the aim of which is to obtain theoretical knowledge For Wundt, psychology was never intended to solve individual, social,

or cultural problems The justifi cation for all these claims is given in the following sections, which serve as a general introduction to the book

1.1 German Psychology Before Wundt: An Overview

Before beginning the presentation and discussion of Wundt’s psychological project,

I would like to offer a very brief description of the historical background that favored its emergence and development More specifi cally, I want to focus this brief contex- tualization on the emergence of different conceptions of scientifi c psychology

within the German tradition up to the fi rst half of the nineteenth century 1 Other, more specifi c aspects will be discussed throughout the book, according to their per- tinence to specifi c questions raised in each chapter

Horst Gundlach ( 2004a , 2004b , 2006 ) has introduced an important conceptual distinction to the historiography of psychology According to him, the term ‘ psy-

chology’ can refer to both a fi eld of knowledge or science ( Gebiet , Wissenschaft ) and to a discipline in the strict sense ( Fach , Disziplin ), that is, an institutionalized

subject, the teaching of which is mandatory for a specifi c professional training 2 Accordingly, in its fi rst meaning, psychology is much older than in its second, although both meanings intersect in the nineteenth century 3 Thus, I want to make it clear that I am using the term ‘psychology’ in the primary way that Wundt under- stood it: as a science, a fi eld of knowledge with a proper subject matter (the mind),

a specifi c vocabulary, and specifi c methods of investigation, the central aim of which is to obtain theoretical knowledge

It is no novelty that there was a long German psychological tradition before Wundt, as the literature shows (e.g., Bell, 2005 ; Carus, 1808 ; Dessoir, 1902 ; Laehr,

1900 ; Meischner-Metge, 2009 ; Sachs-Hombach, 1993 ; Sommer, 1892 ) The term

‘psychology’ appeared in German culture for the fi rst time in the sixteenth century,

mostly in relation to discussions about Aristotle’s De Anima or the immortality of

the soul (Brozek, 1999 ; Lapointe, 1970 , 1972 ; Luccio, 2013 ; Park & Kessler, 1988 ; Scheerer, 1989 ; Vidal, 2011 ) However, it is not enough to follow the history of the term, because it was not univocal; it was often intercalated with other terms, such as

‘pneumatology’ and ‘anthropology’ (Sturm, 2009 ; Vidal, 2011 ); and most tant of all, it did not designate an independent or new fi eld of knowledge 4

It seems that, as an autonomous science ( Wissenschaft ) of the mind—an

orga-nized and systematic fi eld of knowledge with a proper subject matter (the mind), a specifi c vocabulary, and new methods of investigation—psychology fi rst appeared in the eighteenth century, as recent literature suggests (e.g., Brauns, 2002 ; Fox, 1987 ;

1 This does not mean that British and French intellectual traditions are not relevant to Wundt’s project As I will show in the following chapters, Wundt was well acquainted with British and French ideas (e.g., positivism) However, his motivation for establishing a new psychology grew out of his dissatisfaction with the German psychological tradition preceding him

2 For an alternative and broader understanding of the term ‘discipline,’ as well as its implications for the history of psychology, see Vidal ( 2011 , pp 3–8)

3 This happened fi rst in Germany, as a result of its signifi cant educational reforms in the fi rst decades of the nineteenth century For a broader context of such reforms, see Nipperdey ( 1998 ) and Wehler ( 2008a , 2008b )

4 According to Park and Kessler, “philosophers and scientists of the Renaissance did not treat chology, the philosophical study of the soul, as an independent discipline Following the medieval tradition, they placed it within the broader context of natural philosophy, and they approached it,

psy-like the other sub-divisions of natural philosophy, through the works of Aristotle, notably De

anima and the Parva naturalia ” (Park & Kessler, 1988 , p 455, emphasis in original) Vidal comes

to the same conclusion: “The term psychologia may well have named certain discourses linked to new ways of thinking about the scientia de anima in sixteenth-century Protestant Germany, but it

certainly was not conceptualized in terms of a radical break or presented as a new fi eld of empirical knowledge” (Vidal, 2011 , pp 29–30, emphasis in original)

Gundlach, 2006 ; Hatfi eld, 1995 ; Sturm, 2006 , 2009 ; Vidal, 2011 ) 5 In this context, Christian Wolff (1679–1754) played a prominent role, giving psychology a new con- ceptual direction 6

For Wolff, psychology has a proper subject matter: the soul or mind ( Die Seele )

In order to approach this subject, one must adopt a twofold strategy One must start from the most basic experience, from what one knows immediately (e.g., that I am conscious of myself) However, in order to fi nd the ultimate justifi cation for what is given in experience, it is necessary to go beyond experience and capture through reasoning the nature or essence of the mind This diffi cult enterprise led Wolff to propose a division of labor for psychology, according to which the investigation of the mind should occur in two distinct and separate moments, one empirical and one metaphysical This program was fi rst carried out in his German writings (e.g., Wolff, 1751/ 2003 , §§ 191–539 and §§ 727–927), but it was only in his Latin works that Wolff gave each part of psychology its proper name—empirical psychology and rational psychology, respectively (Wolff, 1740/ 1983 , §§ 111–112)—and then its full elaboration and development (Wolff, 1738/ 1968 , 1740/ 1972 ) For Wolff, as part

of a broader and universal system of knowledge, empirical psychology and rational psychology should complement and never contradict each other With his project, Wolff inaugurated a way to conceive of psychology that would serve as a reference for debates in the fi eld for more than a century, at least in Germany 7

Eighteenth-century psychology was not restricted to Wolff’s program, however Besides this more ‘armchair’ style, psychology also developed in close relationship with natural science There is now ample evidence of experiments on and attempts

to measure mental phenomena, such as attention and visual perception, as one can see, for example, in the works of Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715–1759), Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–1779), and Johann Nicolas Tetens (1736–1807) Even if the

phrase ‘ experimental psychology ’ ( experimentelle Psychologie ) still did not appear

in a very clear way (Hatfi eld, 1995 ; Ramul, 1960 ; Sturm, 2006 , 2009 ; Zelle, 2001 ), there cannot be any doubt that the experimental method was being applied to psy- chological phenomena in the eighteenth century 8

5 Richards ( 1992 ) offers an alternative account For him, “with the isolated exception of Tetens, experimental empirical Psychology was unknown in Enlightenment Germany” (Richards, 1992 ,

p 204)

6 In recent years, the pioneering work of Jean École and collaborators on a new edition of Wolff’s

collected works ( Christian Wolff ’s Gesammelte Werke ) has stimulated a reevaluation of his

intel-lectual legacy, including his psychological project (Araujo, 2012a ; Araujo & Pereira, 2014 ; Bell,

2005 ; École, 1985 ; Gerlach, 2001 ; Marcolungo, 2007 ; Mei, 2011 ; Rudolph & Goubet, 2004 ; Schneiders, 1983 ; Sturm, 2009 ; Vidal, 2011 )

7 As I will show in Sect 2.1 , Wundt refers explicitly to Wolff’s division of psychology in order to justify his new psychological program

8 Krüger ( 1756 ) called his investigation an “ experimental theory of the mind ” ( Experimental

Seelenlehre ) and Sulzer ( 1759 ), after claiming that psychology should proceed according to

phys-ics, defi ned it as “the experimental physics of the mind” (Sulzer, 1759 , p 157) In the same way,

Tetens (1760/ 2005 , p 13) refers to the Experimental-Seelenlehre as a necessary basis for

meta-physics It might be objected, however, that such phrases do not imply that people were doing truly psychological experiments, only that they were referring to what Wolff called empirical psychol-

Immanuel Kant ’s (1724–1804) classic critique of psychology should be stood within this context Initially close to Wolff’s program through one of his dis- ciples, Alexander Baumgarten (1714–1762), Kant came to reject the very idea of a rational psychology, claiming that there is no such thing as a substantial soul or mind that could be an object of knowledge (CPR, A381–382) With regard to empir- ical psychology, he accepted the idea of an empirical investigation of the mind, but with certain restrictions First, psychology could never become a proper science like physics was, because mathematics could not be applied to the phenomena of inner sense Second, Kant criticized free introspection or self-observation—the psycho-

under-logical method par excellence for Wolff and his school—claiming that the act of

observation changes the observed object (inner phenomena) Regarding the mental tradition, Kant refused the possibility of the direct manipulation (arbitrary selection and separation) of psychological phenomena because they could not be objectively isolated, only in thought 9 On the basis of such arguments, Kant con- cluded that empirical psychology should be understood as a descriptive doctrine of the mind and never as a proper natural science (AA IV, 471) 10 Not by accident, he ended up integrating empirical psychology into his pragmatic anthropology (AA VII, 127–282) 11

Kant’s critique of psychology became a reference point for German gists in the nineteenth century Many psychological projects were thought of as a sort of reply to Kant Not by accident, there was an explosion of new projects for a

psycholo-scientifi c psychology ( Psychologie als Wissenschaft ) trying to prove Kant wrong

For them, psychology as a science was indeed possible However, the term

Wissenschaft should not be taken at face value, because underlying these programs

were different conceptions of what a scientifi c psychology should be

To form a general idea of this complex background in the fi rst half of the teenth century, I will briefl y mention only a few psychological projects that appeared

nine-in German culture before 1860 12 First, and most infl uential, was Johann Friedrich Herbart’s (1776–1841) mechanical and metaphysical psychology (Herbart, 1850a – 1850c ), further

ogy Now, it is true that the adjectives ‘experimental’ and ‘empirical’ were used interchangeably during that period, but in many cases specifi c experiments were also being conducted, over and above the ambiguous terminology Among others, Krüger’s case leaves no doubt, as Hatfi eld ( 1995 ), Sturm ( 2006 ) and Zelle ( 2001 ) have convincingly shown Similarly, Tetens described many experiments he had done to test his ideas (e.g., Tetens, 1777 , pp 123–124, 197–198) This evidence refutes Richards’s general thesis about the absence of a scientifi c psychology in the eigh-teenth century (Richards, 1992 )

9 Kant’s discussion of the limits of the experimental method when applied to psychological matters

is further evidence in favor of the existence of experimental psychology in the eighteenth century

If there had been no such experiments, how would he have been able to discuss the idea of an experimental doctrine of the mind?

10 There are many recent studies on the meaning of Kant’s critique of psychology (e.g., Araujo, 2013a ; Hatfi eld, 1992 ; Sturm, 2001 , 2006 )

11 For recent accounts of the relationship between psychology and anthropology in Kant, see Leite and Araujo ( 2014 ), Frierson ( 2014 ), Sturm ( 2009 ), and Wilson ( 2006 )

12 Wundt launched his fi rst program for a scientifi c psychology in 1862 (see Chap 2 )

developed by his disciples, despite important divergences among them, especially in relation to the acceptance of mathematical psychology (Bastian, 1860 ; Drobisch,

1842 , 1850 ; Volkmann, 1856 ; Waitz, 1846 , 1849 ) 13 In direct opposition to Herbart, Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798–1854) established another direction for psychol- ogy His main idea was to make empirical psychology the fundamental science upon which we should base all our knowledge, thereby rejecting any vestige of a transcendent metaphysics (Beneke, 1820 , 1832 , 1845 ) 14 A third was the so-called romantic psychology , of which the programs of Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869) and Carl August von Eschenmayer (1768–1852) are good examples Under the infl u- ence of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von

Schelling (1775–1854), and Naturphilosophie , the romantic psychologists rebelled

against a mechanical conception of life and tried to establish a teleological model of the mind from the perspective of an ideal totality, in which there was no opposition between nature and mind (Carus, 1831 , 1846 ; Eschenmayer, 1817 ) 15 Still within the idealist tradition, one can detect a fourth current, the Hegelian school of psy- chology, mainly represented by Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz (1805–1879), Carl Ludwig Michelet (1801–1893), and Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892) Understanding science in the Hegelian sense of a philosophical apprehension of the whole of reality, they called psychology “the science or philosophy of the subjective spirit” (Erdmann, 1842 ; Michelet, 1840 ; Rosenkranz, 1837 , 1850 ) 16 A fi fth direc- tion emerged from the new physiology, fi nding one of its expressions in Rudolf Hermann Lotze’s (1817–1881) program for a medical or physiological psychology (Lotze, 1852 ) 17 Finally, there was Gustav Theodor Fechner’s (1801–1887) psycho- physics and his search for functional relationships between the physical and the mental (e.g., between stimulus and sensation), which appeared only 2 years before, and was explicitly referenced in, Wundt’s fi rst programmatic essay (Fechner, 1860/ 1964 ) 18

13 As will become clear in the chapters that follow, Herbart remained a reference for Wundt throughout his career Despite being a critic of Herbart’s psychological program, Wundt borrowed

some of his concepts and ideas (e.g., the concept of Verschmelzung )

14 Although it is certain that Wundt knew Beneke’s work, it is not clear how much of it he ated for his own purposes As I will show in Chap 2 , there are certain similarities However, a careful study of this topic remains to be carried out

appropri-15 Wundt shared with the romantic psychologists the genetic approach to mental life (see Chap 2 )

16 It is not clear how much Wundt knew about such Hegelian psychological programs This is another topic worthy of investigation

17 In connection with the new German physiology, one must add the names of Johannes Müller (1801–1858), Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), and Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1894), among others Given its relevance for Wundt’s psychological project, I will discuss different aspects of this physiological tradition in a more detailed way in Chap 2 , showing Wundt’s debts

to it

18 To my knowledge, there is no work covering all these conceptions of psychology, although some

of them have been addressed (e.g., Bell, 2005 ; Brandt, 1895 ; Dunkel, 1970 ; Exner, 1842 –1844; Gundlach, 1993 ; Heidelberger, 2004 ; Heinrich, 1895 ; Sachs-Hombach, 1993 )

This brief contextualization is enough to suggest that in approaching Wundt’s psychological project, one has to take into account a complex background However, because one can do this in different ways, it seems necessary to justify

my methodological choices in relation to other alternatives This is the main goal

of the next two sections

1.2 A Brief History of Wundt Scholarship and Its Problems

In order to justify my methodological approach, I will begin by reviewing some trends in Wundt scholarship in recent decades From the beginning, it must be clear that I do not intend to present in this section a complete picture of Wundt’s

Rezeptionsgeschichte 19 —which would demand an entire book—but only to trate some general aspects of its recent development, which, I think, must be revised or complemented

Most of Wundt’s works were reviewed by his contemporaries, and some of his students wrote historical accounts of his infl uence upon psychology (e.g., Eisler,

1902 ; Hall, 1912 ; Klemm, 1911 ; König, 1909 ; Petersen, 1925 ; Titchener, 1921 ) However, despite offering useful overviews of Wundt’s intellectual career, most of these studies refl ect the personal relations their authors had with Wundt Besides, by trying to highlight Wundt’s gigantic intellectual enterprise, they are too ceremonial and celebratory My primary concern here, by contrast, relates to how Wundt has been treated in the historiography of psychology in recent decades

The story begins after the Second World War, more precisely in December 1947, when Wundt’s heirs—Eleonore Wundt (1876–1957) and Max Wundt (1879– 1963)—donated to Leipzig University the Wundt archive, that is, his entire estate

( Nachlass ), composed of manuscripts, institutional documents, correspondence and

published works in all their editions 20 However, internal and external obstacles led

to handling and cataloging problems 21 Besides, with the political and ideological

19 Fahrenberg ( 2011 ) has done an important service in this respect To my knowledge, it is the fi rst attempt to offer an extensive list concerning the reception of Wundt’s work

20 Wundt’s personal library does not belong to this collection After his death, because of fi nancial diffi culties arising from the post-World War I context, the family sold the greater part of it to Japanese professor Tenerari Chiba (1884–1972) Today, it belongs to the Main Library of Tohoku University in Japan (Takasuna, 2001 , 2008 ) For a list of these books, visit the Wilhelm Wundt Library at http://vlp.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/library/libraries.html A smaller part of Wundt’s library was kept by his son, Max, a philosophy professor

21 Until recently, there were only three papers about the origins and situation of the Wundt Estate

in Leipzig (Bringmann & Ungerer, 1980a ; Gröteke, 1976 ; Meischner, 1985 ) However, because changes in maintenance and organization of this material have been introduced since the 1980s, such accounts are incomplete and outdated, albeit still useful for introductory purposes After my return from Germany at the end of 2006, I wrote a brief report about the status of the collection and some internal problems with it (Araujo, 2009a ) The report itself is now also out of date In 2012,

Leipzig University Library initiated a new project, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft,

to catalogue, index, digitalize, and open up the documents of the Wundt Estate (Meyer, 2015 )

division of Germany that lasted until 1990, it was diffi cult for foreign researchers to access the Wundt collection in Leipzig Consequently, for many years, the possibil- ity of archival research was restricted, in any practical sense, to East German citi- zens, as the few publications based on the Leipzig archives up to the end of the 1970s reveal (e.g., Meischner & Eschler, 1979 ; Schlotte, 1956 ) Furthermore, it seems that, with a few exceptions (e.g., Blumenthal, 1970 ; Eschler, 1959 , 1962 ; Kossakowski, 1966 ; Mischel, 1970 ), Wundt did not attract much attention from contemporary psychologists until the fi rst half of the 1970s

This situation began to change in the second half of that decade, owing primarily not to an intrinsic interest in Wundt’s intellectual legacy but to an external factor, namely, the proximity of the centennial of his laboratory (1879–1979)—the “cen- tennial fever,” as Robinson ( 1982 , p 128) calls it—which led to the realization, in

1980, of the XXII International Congress of Psychology in Leipzig 22 Suddenly, a wave of Wundt studies emerged, both in North America and in Germany, followed

by other countries (e.g., Spain) 23

With regard to the North American literature, the pioneering work of Arthur Blumenthal ( 1975 , 1976 , 1979 , 1980a , 1980b ), Kurt Danziger ( 1979 , 1980a , 1980b , 1983 ), and Wolfgang Bringmann (1933–2009) 24 —supplemented by anthologies on Wundt’s psychological project (Bringmann & Scheerer, 1980 ; Bringmann & Tweney, 1980 ; Rieber, 1980a )—had as its main goal to rescue Wundt’s psychology from oblivion Besides offering new biographical informa- tion from archival research, they intended to criticize and to correct the carica- tured and mythological portraits of Wundt in traditional textbooks within the North American tradition, appealing to a revaluation of his thought According to them, one of the main origins of the problem lay in Edwin Boring’s infl uential

About 5700 documents have been scanned and cataloged according to the German Kalliope System ( http://kalliope.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ ) It seems that they will be available online very soon, with full open access ( http://histbest.ub.uni-leipzig.de/content/estate_wundt.xed ) I thank Jochen Fahrenberg for this update

22 According to O’Neil ( 1984 ), “[T]here is little reason for doubting that Wundt established the fi rst effective psychological research laboratory in Leipzig, but we must question that the date of estab-lishment was 1879; it emerged between 1877 and 1882” (p 285) O’Neil argues that this is one of the myths created by Eduard Titchener (1867–1927) and Edwin Boring (1886–1968), but he fails

to offer any piece of evidence for his claim In fact, he ignores important primary sources regarding the history of the Institute, including Wundt’s own report about its origins and development up to

1909 It was Wundt himself, not Titchener or Boring, who fi xed the date of 1879 for the beginning

of the psychological experiments in Leipzig (IEP, pp 118–119) For independent evidence cerning the founding of the Institute, see Bringmann, Bringmann, and Ungerer ( 1980 ), Klemm ( 1922 ), and Kraepelin ( 1896 )

con-23 The foundation, in 1980, of the Revista de Historia de la Psicología —the fi rst journal in Spain

dedicated to the history of psychology—was of paramount importance for the appearance of these Spanish studies on Wundt (e.g., Caparros & Kirchner, 1982 ; Carpintero, 1981 ; Diaz-Guerrero,

1983 ; Marin, 1981 ; Miralles, 1986 ; Pinillos, 1981 )

24 From 1975 on, Bringmann and his collaborators gave impetus to Wundt scholarship in general,

by publishing a series of biographical papers (e.g., Bringmann, 1975 ; Bringmann & Balance,

1975 ; Bringmann, Balance, & Evans, 1975 ; Bringmann, Bringmann, & Cottrell, 1976 ; Bringmann, Bringmann, & Balance, 1980 ; Bringmann & Ungerer, 1980b )

book A History of Experimental Psychology (Boring, 1950 ) Boring relied too

much on the interpretation of his intellectual master, Edward Titchener, a former student of Wundt and one of his fi rst North American interpreters 25 Boring’s book served as a source for an entire generation of North American psychologists and inspired many historians of psychology, who repeated his portrait of Wundt as

“the founding father of psychology” without ever returning to the primary sources,

as his critics claimed (e.g., Blumenthal, 1976 , 1980b ; Danziger, 1980a ; Farr,

1983 ; O’Neil, 1984 ; Rieber, 1980b ; Tweney & Yachanin, 1980 ) 26

The appearance of this new scholarly work on Wundt is praiseworthy On the one hand, the authors helped to bring to light the importance and impact of Wundt’s project of a scientifi c psychology 27 Moreover, they contributed to the historiogra- phy of psychology in general by correcting some distortions in the history text- books On the other hand, one cannot help but note important fl aws even here—such

as a selective appropriation of Wundt’s ideas, an exaggerated emphasis on his

experimental psychology, and a lack of in-depth analyses of his Völkerpsychologie —

which in their turn ended up generating new distortions of Wundt’s ideas 28 As Koch correctly noted, “[S]ome of the recent writing on Wundt seems not much less super-

fi cial than the sources it seeks to correct—sometimes betraying this circumstance

by an imprecise reading of those very sources […]” (Koch, 1992 , p 11) 29

Within the context of the centennial of Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig, there also emerged in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) during the 1970s a joint project between the Psychological Society of the GDR and the Universities of Leipzig, Berlin, and Jena to foster the creation of interdisciplinary groups for the study of the history of psychology, with a special emphasis on Wundt’s work and

legacy (Eckardt & Fensch, 1977 ) As a consequence, the Arbeitskreis Wundt Forschung —a working group under the coordination of Wolfram Meischner (1932–1997)—was created in Leipzig, which promoted the publication of a series

-of special issues on Wundt’s thought 30 In the same period, some publications also

25 As testimony to such criticisms, Ernest Hilgard (1904–2001) reported, “The most telling

criti-cisms are directed against Boring’s A History of Experimental Psychology , the historical source for

generations of psychology students” (Hilgard, 1980a , p 2) More recently, Benetka ( 2002 ,

pp 61–62) has reaffi rmed Boring’s negative infl uence on Wundt’s reception in the twentieth century

26 Adrian Brock summarizes the situation regarding the traditional literature on Wundt, by claiming that “the problem is not that Wundt was ‘misread’ but simply that he was not read at all” (Brock,

1993 , p 238)

27 Brozek ( 1980 ), for example, has shown that experimental psychology had a great impact in the

United States, whereas Völkerpsychologie was poorly received

28 Ash ( 1983 ), for example, correctly noted one of these problems: “Blumenthal’s approach is

vul-nerable to a tu quoque rebuttal He, too, has appropriated his own founding father, selecting the

aspects of Wundt’s system that make him seem more attractive to current science in a manner little different from that of Boring” (Ash, 1983 , p 170, emphasis in original)

29 The main fl aws of such studies will be discussed throughout the book, according to both its eral plan and the specifi c subject matter under analysis

gen-30 Up to the realization of the XXII International Congress of Psychology, the following issues

appeared: Beiträge zur Wundt-Forschung (1975), Beiträge zur Wundt-Forschung II (1977),

appeared in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), usually associated with a group of scholars in Heidelberg, where Wundt had studied and worked at the beginning of his career (e.g., Graumann, 1980 , 1983 ; Gundlach, 1983 ; Ungerer,

1978 , 1979 , 1980 ; Woodward, 1982a )

With regard to the studies being produced in the GDR, the understanding of Wundt’s thought was considerably impaired by the works’ submission to political and ideological interests, to the extent that their primary goal was to impose the principles of Marxism-Leninism on the interpretation of Wundt’s work (e.g., Eschler, 1975 ; Fritsche, 1980 ; Hiebsch, 1977 ; Meischner, 1975 , 1977a , 1977b ; Meischner & Metge, 1980 ) Accordingly, the motto was “to read Wundt materialis- tically” (Meischner, 1977a , p 19) Infl uenced by Vladimir Lenin’s (1870–1924)

Materialism and Empiriocriticism —a sort of offi cial ‘bible’ of the GDR’s

intelli-gentsia—they understood every intellectual production as belonging primarily to one of two mutually exclusive parties: on the one hand, the representatives of mate- rialism (progressives), and on the other, the idealists (reactionaries) In this way, Wundt’s work was seen as a series of contradictory elements, classifi ed as either

progressive (experimental psychology) or reactionary ( Völkerpsychologie ),

accord-ing to his alleged materialist or idealist tendencies, respectively In their eyes, Wundt oscillated between materialism and idealism, but his strong idealist assumptions never allowed him to overcome the contradictions of his two psychologies For this reason, it was necessary to save the progressive (materialist) Wundt and to eschew the reactionary (idealist) Wundt (e.g., Eschler, 1975 ; Fritsche, 1980 ; Hiebsch, 1980 ; Meischner, 1975 , 1977a ; Sprung, 1979 ) 31

This Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Wundt is highly problematic, to say the least First, it is a fl agrant case of ideological misuse of Wundt’s ideas, to the extent that the scholarly work was too strongly directed by, and compromised with, the GDR’s offi cial political ideology 32 Second, the application of this superfi cial schema of interpretation—based on what Reinhart Kosellek called “ asymmetric counterconcepts ” or “ asymmetrically opposed concepts ” (Kosellek, 1979/ 2004 ) 33 — however effi cient or useful it may be from a political point of view, does not provide

Probleme und Ergebnisse der Forschung (1979), Probleme und Ergebnisse der Forschung II (1980), Wilhelm Wundt : Progressives Erbe, Wissenschaftsentwicklung und Gegenwart

Wundt-(1980)

31 For Meischner, for example, Wundt’s psychologism had a “ reactionary function ” (Meischner,

1975 , p 14) According to him, “we are called to assimilate the progressive heritage in a critical way, to develop it creatively on the basis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and to defend it against distortions” (Meischner, 1975 , p 16)

32 In the following passage, the political use of Wundt to promote the GDR’s materialistic ogy becomes clear: “Without losing sight of the period-dependent and idealistic limitations, nota-bly the paradigmatic in Wundt’s psychological work has proven to be the historically progressive, which receives in the German Democratic Republic its proper appreciation and continuation” (Meischner, 1980 , p 128)

psychol-33 According to Kosellek, “In such cases, a given group makes an exclusive claim to generality, applying a linguistically universal concept to itself alone and rejecting all comparison This kind

of self-defi nition provokes counterconcepts which discriminate against those who have been defi ned as the ‘other.’ The non-Catholic becomes heathen or traitor; to leave the Communist party

reliable historical knowledge 34 In the specifi c case of Wundt, it led to marked tortions in the understanding of his psychological project, such as the celebration of

dis-his experimental work to the detriment of dis-his Völkerpsychologie and the fabrication

of a two-headed, contradictory fi gure: a materialist Wundt and an idealist Wundt One can speak here of a kind of ideological Panglossianism: just as Doctor Pangloss had eyes only for the Good, the Marxist-Leninists saw signs of reactionary bour- geois idealism everywhere, in which context the term ‘idealism’ had a merely rhe- torical function, namely, to create, identify, and disparage alleged class enemies

In recent years, in the aftermath of the wave of Wundt studies in the 1970s and 1980s, there has been no shortage of work on his psychology On the contrary, stud- ies focusing on specifi c aspects of his career are plentiful: his biography (e.g., Bringmann, Ungerer, & Bringmann, 1995 ; Gundlach, 1999 ; Lamberti, 1995 ; Nicolas, 2003a ), his impact on psychology in different countries (e.g., Carpintero, García, Parajón, Herrero, & Lafuente, 1995 ; Carroy & Schmidgen, 2004 ; Klappenbach,

1994 ; Mülberger, 2008 ; Nicolas, 2003b ; Nicolas, Gyselink, Murray, & Bandomir,

2002 ; Taiana, 2005 ), his experimental psychology (e.g., Carpenter, 2005 ; Schmidgen,

2003a , 2003b ; Wontorra, 2009 ), his Völkerpsychologie (e.g., Brock, 1992 ; Diriwächter, 2004 ; Greenwood, 2003 ; Jüttemann, 2006 ; Wong, 2009 ), his general theory of science (e.g., Fahrenberg, 2008 , 2012 , 2013a ), and his relation to some of his contemporaries (e.g., Brock, 1991 ; Haupt, 2001 ; Mülberger, 2012 ; Wassmann,

2009 ) In general, they have the merit of exploring or shedding new light on neglected elements of Wundt’s life and work 35 In spite of their positive contributions, though, many gaps persist in Wundt scholarship For example, an intellectual biography is still to be written Moreover, many aspects of his Völkerpsychologie remain

untouched or poorly understood, such as its relationship with the philosophy of tory and metaphysics There also remains a third blind spot—which I think is the most urgent issue to be addressed—namely, the relationship between philosophy and psychology in Wundt’s thought, precisely the focus of this book 36 Indeed, given that

his-does not mean to change party allegiance, but is rather ‘like leaving life, leaving mankind’ (J Kuczynski)” (Kosellek, 1979/ 2004 , p 156)

34 Kosellek again: “One can certainly assume that rigorous dualisms —above all, those which divide all of humanity into two groups with opposing modalities—were politically effi cacious and will always be so On the other hand, the historical record does show that all these global dualisms formerly in use were overtaken by historical experience and to this extent refuted […] Past antith-eses have tended to be too crude to serve as categories of historical knowledge Above all, no historical movement can be adequately evaluated in terms of the self-same counterconcepts used

by the participants of such a movement as a means of experiencing or comprehending it” (Kosellek, 1979/ 2004 , p 158)

35 For instance, Wontorra’s book ( 2009 ) represents a new accomplishment in Wundt scholarship It

is the fi rst attempt to provide a complete picture of Wundt’s experimental psychology in his Leipzig years Wontorra presents and explains Wundt’s experiments in a level of detail rare to encounter in the secondary literature

36 It is interesting to note that, in his review of Wundt’s System of Philosophy , Charles Judd (1873–

1946), one of Wundt’s North-American students, had already warned that “for a clear sion of these psychological doctrines, some knowledge of Wundt’s philosophical position is essential” (Judd, 1897 , p 370) Unfortunately, little or no attention was paid to him

comprehen-Wundt was a philosophy professor and lived at a time when psychology and phy were rarely separated, institutionally or intellectually, how could a historical interpretation of his psychological work set aside or downplay the importance of his philosophical project, which runs parallel to it?

This is not to say that his philosophical system has been completely ignored During his lifetime, his philosophy books were always reviewed and discussed by his peers, inside and outside Germany (e.g., Adickes, 1898 ; Hartman, 1891 ; Seeberger, 1915 ; Sidgwick, 1880 ; Venn, 1884 ; Volkelt, 1891 ; Whittaker, 1887 ,

1890 ), and some of his contemporaries considered him one of the most important philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a true German mandarin (Ringer, 1969 ) 37 Furthermore, studies on his philosophical system appeared in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century (Eisler, 1902 ; Heußner, 1920 ; König, 1909 ; Nef, 1923 ) However, none of them succeeded in presenting a satis- factory analysis of its relationship with the development of his psychological proj- ect, because little or no connection between the two was established Since the second half of the twentieth century, only one book has been dedicated to Wundt’s philosophy (Arnold, 1980 ), whose author, however, because of his ideological com- mitment to Marxism-Leninism , fails to understand Wundt’s thought on its own terms, to say the least Nonetheless, contemporary investigations trying to expose the theoretical foundations of Wundt’s psychological project have raised important questions and suggested contact points between his philosophy and psychology, but unfortunately only in a generic or fragmentary manner (e.g., Danziger, 1979 , 1980b ; Hatfi eld, 1997 ; Hoorn & Verhave, 1980 ; Leahey, 1981 ; Leary, 1979 , 1980 ; Mischel,

1970 ; Richards, 1980 ; Robinson, 1982 ; Woodward, 1982b ) 38 In spite of their merit

in raising relevant questions, they have failed to establish a systematic and detailed connection between Wundt’s philosophical system and his psychological project

We need far more than philosophical labels—such as ‘idealism,’ ‘empiricism,’

‘rationalism,’ and so forth—and general points of contact between Wundt and other philosophers in order to understand the deep structure of his thought Moreover, there is an overwhelming tendency to look at Wundt’s mature psychology on its own, without considering its relationship to his fi rst psychological project In other words, what is missing is a more systematic and detailed connection between phi-

losophy and the development of Wundt ’ s psychological project

What seems to have escaped the attention of many scholars is that it was not psychology but philosophy that occupied the highest place in Wundt’s intellectual project Although having no formal training in philosophy, Wundt was above all a philosopher, to the extent that his ultimate objective was to develop a universal

37 For example, Rudolf Eisler (1873–1926) called him “the Leibniz of the nineteenth century” (Eisler, 1902 , pp 21–22), and Wilhelm Stern (1871–1938) considered him “one of the most uni-

versal living Gelehrten ” (Stern, 1900 , p 348) It is interesting to note how Wundt’s importance

during his lifetime contrasts with his status in the contemporary historiography of philosophy Recent books dealing with the history of German philosophy in the nineteenth century fail to address Wundt’s place in the philosophical scenario of his time (e.g., Beiser, 2014a , 2014b ; Fellmann, 1996 ; Hogrebe, 1987 )

38 For a more extensive development of this point, see Araujo ( 2012b )

metaphysical system—understood as a worldview ( Weltanschauung )—based on the

empirical results of all the particular sciences (see Chap 4 ) 39 In this sense, his chology is part of this larger project and can only be properly understood within it

psy-In other words, Wundt’s philosophical project embraces psychology because losophy lies in both its beginning—as logic and theory of knowledge—and its end,

phi-as metaphysics By treating psychology separately from philosophy, one will never understand the ultimate meaning of Wundt’s psychological work, only its partial signifi cance In this sense, it is necessary to rescue and make more visible the inti- mate relationship between psychology and philosophy in Wundt’s thought

1.3 General Methodological Remarks

There is no consensus about how to approach the history of psychology Instead, the methodological choice seems to be guided by the subject matter and the questions raised by the historian 40 In this sense, the problems and gaps in Wundt scholarship that I mentioned above led me to conclude that a new approach to Wundt’s psycho- logical project was necessary Let me explain

In recent decades, the historiography of psychology has undergone a dramatic change, leading to a general tendency that is called “critical historiography of psy- chology ” (Woodward, 1980 , 1987 ), the “social turn” in the historiography of psy- chology (Ash, 1987 , pp 1–3), or simply “the new history of psychology” (Furomoto, 1989 ) 41 Starting from a critique of the traditional or ‘old’ historiogra- phy of psychology, allegedly based on great men, psychological ideas, and schools, Kurt Danziger ( 1990 , 1997 ), Nikolas Rose ( 1985 , 1998 ), Roger Smith ( 1992 ), Mitchell Ash ( 1998 ), and Martin Kusch ( 1999 ), among others, have published pio- neer works on the impact of cultural, social, and political factors on psychological theory and practice 42 This has gradually transformed the way textbooks have been

39 Robinson is right, when he claims that “the infl uence of German metaphysics is apparent and sometimes even dominant in nearly all of Wundt’s major publications” (Robinson, 1982 , p 131) Unfortunately, he did not explore this relationship

40 The recent debate between Daniel Robinson and Danziger is a lively example of the different ways of conceiving how the history of psychology should be approached (Danziger, 2013 ; Robinson, 2013a , 2013b ) The key issue in this debate is continuity vs discontinuity in psycholo-gy’s subject matter On the one hand, Robinson argues that the history of psychology begins with the Greeks, especially Aristotle, who raises a series of recurrent topics concerning human nature Danziger, on the other hand, claims that it should deal only with psychology in the modern sense

For him, Aristotle’s De Anima “forms part of the historiography of psychology only by way of

written in the fi eld; they began to depart from the traditional structure (e.g., Jansz

& Drunen, 2004 ; Jones & Elcock, 2001 ; Pickren & Rutherford, 2010 ; Smith, 2013 ; Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014 )

These new approaches to the history of psychology have brought to light tant aspects of psychological theory and practice, such as the infl uence of psycho- logical discourse on society and the political and ideological uses of mental testing Despite all their merits, however, many of these studies leave much to be desired in methodological terms For example, Lovett ( 2006 ) has shown that the dichotomies created by the new historians (e.g., nạve vs critical, amateur vs professional, use

impor-of primary vs secondary sources, etc.) are exaggerated, if not invalid Moreover, he identifi es in the new history an uncritical acceptance of theoretical assumptions (e.g., Kuhn’s philosophy of science) and similar errors attributed to the old history (e.g., new forms of Whiggism) He concludes that “the new history is not so differ- ent from the old as its practitioners would argue” (Lovett, 2006 , p 26), and that sometimes “it is diffi cult to distinguish careful judgment from careful prejudgment” (Lovett, 2006 , p 33) 43

Some problems of the new history can be seen more easily when we consider the specifi c case of Wundt’s psychology Among the new historians, Danziger is the main representative, having spent more than a decade reevaluating Wundt’s psycho-

logical project For example, in his infl uential Constructing the Subject (1990), he

claims that in the historiography of psychology “what is missing is the recognition

of the socially constructed nature of psychological knowledge” (Danziger, 1990 ,

p 2) In his attempt to fi ll this gap, Danziger proposes the concept of investigative practice as a substitute for methodology in order to capture the social dimension of psychological research, including Wundt’s laboratory 44 However, when it comes to Wundt’s central methodological concept—introspection and its relation to the

1978 ; Jaeger, Staeuble, Sprung, & Brauns, 1995 ) For example, even when they claim they are doing a sociological analysis of psychology, they are not necessarily talking about the same thing (e.g., Benetka, 2002 ; Buss, 1979b ; Kusch, 1999 ) For a detailed analysis of the beginnings of such diversifi cation in the historiography of psychology in the United States, see Ash ( 1983 )

43 There is an interesting parallel between Lovett’s critique of the new history of psychology and Porter and Micale’s ( 1994 ) critical remarks on social revisionism in the recent historiography of psychiatry For them, although social historians of psychiatry are conscious of their ideological orientation, “they are far less conscious of the myriad ways in which their political agendas served

to select their subject matters to shape their methodologies, to texture their interpretations, and to predetermine their conclusions.” As a consequence, they say, “the literature of social revisionism […] has centered its narratives on subjects that lend themselves to social, political and economic (rather than scientifi c or clinical) analyses In addition, its demystifi cations of Whig idealizations have often only generated ‘heroic’ neo-Marxist and Foucauldian remystifi cations The historical picture it provides as a whole has not been free of ideology so much as counterideological Lastly, the work done in this tradition has been no less self-promoting professionally than what preceded it” (Porter & Micale, 1994 , p 11)

44 According to him, “investigative practice is very much a social practice, in the sense that the individual investigator acts within a framework determined by the potential consumers of the products of his or her research and by the traditions of acceptable practice prevailing in the fi eld Moreover, the goals and knowledge interests that guide this practice depend on the social context within which investigators work” (Danziger, 1990 , p 4)

experimental method—Danziger does not follow the precepts of his social structivist approach and changes the focus of his analysis to a selective conceptual history of introspection, which is as problematic as some of the old conceptual his- tories of the subject 45 Even when he introduces what he calls “a third element in Wundt’s investigative practice” (Danziger, 1990 , p 18)—the social organization of his psychological experiments—Danziger fails to show the social determination of Wundt’s goals and knowledge interests, thus frustrating the highest goal of his social constructivist approach In other words, that Wundt’s laboratory had a social structure does not explain either his experimental psychology as a whole or his psychological theory in relation to experimental data At most, it can illustrate some aspects of his experimental practice, such as the interchangeability of experimenter and experimental subject In sum, Danziger’s interpretation, besides being incoher- ent according to its own principles at crucial points, lacks a careful analysis of the philosophical foundations of Wundt’s psychology 46

con-In his Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy , Martin

Kusch ( 1999 ) offers an interpretation of the controversy over thought psychology in Germany based on the sociology of scientifi c knowledge (SSK) According to the general thesis of the book, “bodies of psychological knowledge are social institu- tions” (Kusch, 1999 , p 1) As a consequence of Kusch’s sociologism , 47 one should then expect Wundt’s psychological theory to be shown to be a social institution as well 48 However, Kusch’s analyses are far from convincing Not only are his catego- ries of analysis problematic when applied to the Würzburg School itself, which is the focus of the book, 49 but they also seem inadequate to deal with Wundt’s psycho- logical project Although he is right in claiming that Wundt’s argument for the

methodological separation of experimental psychology and Völkerpsychologie was

accepted by many of his students in Leipzig (Kusch, 1999 , pp 176–177), he fails to show how Wundt’s psychological theory as a whole, not to mention its underlying philosophical program, could be a social institution Kusch ignores the fact that the theory was not collectively accepted or, to use his own criterion, that no collective had a self-referential belief about it Moreover, even if this was granted, the social character of Wundt’s psychological theory (or parts thereof) cannot explain crucial aspects of the latter, such as the rejection of the unconscious or the principles of

45 To mention but one problem, Danziger restricts the analysis of introspection before Wundt to Locke and Kant, leaving aside essential aspects of eighteenth-century debates on the subject For more details on this topic, see Hatfi eld ( 2005 ) and Sturm ( 2006 , 2009 )

46 Throughout the text, I will discuss other aspects and details of Danziger’s interpretation of Wundt

47 In Kusch’s words, “[S]ociologism is the claim that so-called ‘rational’ factors, that is theories, arguments, and reasons, are in fact social factors” (Kusch, 1999 , p 177)

48 For Kusch, “for something to be a social institution, it is suffi cient that some collective has a

self-referential belief about it” (Kusch, 1999 , p 172, emphasis in original)

49 Annette Mülberger ( 2001 ), for example, argues that Kusch’s analysis of the Würzburg School as

a social institution is highly problematic, to the extent that Kusch treats it as a unity, overlooking the huge heterogeneity among the Würzburgers themselves

mental causality In other words, the essential features of Wundt’s theoretical ration are not affected by Kusch’s sociological analysis

elabo-Another example is Gerhard Benetka’s Denkstile der Psychologie (Thought

styles in psychology), which contains large sections on Wundt and his critics From the beginning, Benetka makes clear that his methodological approach to the history

of psychology is based on Ludwik Fleck’s (1896–1861) sociological analysis of scientifi c knowledge, 50 especially with regard to his notions of Denkstil (thought style) and Denkkollektiv (thought collective) 51 However, in his concrete historical analyses, Benetka does not show exactly how Fleck’s approach would apply to—or lead to a sound understanding of—the history of German psychology in general or Wundt’s project in particular Instead, one fi nds general or vague claims, such as,

“[I]n the last fi fteen years of the nineteenth century, a new thought style began to establish itself against Wundt’s psychology” (Benetka, 2002 , p 149) There is no attempt to demonstrate how the categories of ‘thought style’ or ‘thought collective’ are able to explain Wundt’s psychological project or how they illuminate new aspects of his thought in comparison with the old histories of psychology Instead, for his presentation of Wundt’s psychological ideas, Benetka ends up relying on Danziger, 52 repeating his traditional attack on Boring’s interpretation as well as his vague indications about Wundt’s intellectual roots (Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, etc.) As a result, Benetka’s approach, like Danziger’s, reveals itself to be inade- quate to deal with the deep conceptual structure of Wundt’s psychology, which brings us back to the need for a careful philosophical analysis of Wundt’s project

In a certain sense, then, Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology:

A Reappraisal is also intended to be a new history of psychology However, it is not

a social history of psychology I will call it a philosophical history of psychology

There are a number of reasons for this First, there is much room left for cal and conceptual analyses of the historical development of psychology, especially

philosophi-in the case of German psychology, philosophi-includphilosophi-ing many important yet neglected projects that helped to shape that tradition Second, it seems that social histories of psychol- ogy cannot properly address some of the questions raised in this book, which demand a more careful philosophical analysis than is usually offered Third, I defend the view that philosophical/conceptual questions cannot be reduced to social ones, that is, their meaning cannot be exhausted by social constructivist or

50 Fleck was a Polish-Jewish microbiologist who used his experience as a scientist to propose a new way of understanding scientifi c knowledge, based not on physics but on biology and medicine Against the then-dominant position of the Vienna Circle, Fleck defended the primacy of the social dimension of scientifi c knowledge over the logical dimension (and of the collective over the indi-vidual) dimension of scientifi c knowledge (Fleck, 1935/ 1980 )

51 As Benetka explains, “A scientifi c thought collective is nothing but a community of scientists, who share fundamental views: a research group in a laboratory, a scientifi c school, or a community

of specialists, depending on what is the unity of analysis in question is Fleck calls thought style the assumptions that are common to a group and underlie its work” (Benetka, 2002 , p 22)

52 It is interesting to note that, except for Wundt’s biography, Danziger is the only interpreter tioned in Benekta’s analysis A proper discussion of the secondary literature is completely absent from his historical account of Wundt

sociological analyses Even if such analyses can open new ways of understanding the historical development of psychology, they leave many other questions unan- swered Moreover, categories such as ‘ social practices ,’ ‘ cultural practices ,’ ‘ discur- sive practices ,’ and the like, besides their vagueness and problematic usage, 53 cannot grasp in principle the deeper meaning of many psychological projects, such as Wundt’s, which is above all part of a broader philosophical system and is rooted in

a deep philosophical motivation I am not saying that the social, institutional, and political dimensions are not important in understanding the historical development

of psychology My point is rather that these dimensions alone cannot explain tial features of psychological theories and concepts This explains why the second- ary literature has ignored so many aspects of Wundt’s project and so many primary sources relevant for his intellectual development, especially with regard to the rela- tionship between his philosophy and his psychology As I intend to show through- out the book, in the absence of a careful philosophical analysis, Wundt’s project for

essen-a scientifi c psychology cessen-annot be understood in its own terms Therefore, if we wessen-ant

to avoid new mythical histories of psychology, the fi rst thing to do is to address Wundt’s deepest philosophical motivation and its relationship to psychology

A philosophical history of psychology , as I understand it, is related to the debates about the interaction between the history of science and the philosophy of science

In the last decades, many authors have defended the need to integrate the History of Science and the Philosophy of Science, culminating in the proposal for a new fi eld

of studies: The History and Philosophy of Science (hereafter HPS) One of the basic justifi cations for this integration originates from Norwood Hanson’s (1924–1967) verdict—later taken up by Imre Lakatos (1922–1974)—according to which the

“history of science without philosophy of science is blind, […] philosophy of ence without history of science is empty” (Hanson, 1962 , p 580) The central tenet

sci-is that some metascientifi c problems could only be solved through an intense laboration between the two areas Peter Galison , for example, presents a list of ten questions that would illustrate the necessity of such collaboration (Galison, 2008 ) Furthermore, some efforts have been made to foster the debate and to offer possi- bilities of approximation and integration (Arabatzis & Schickore, 2012 ; Domsky & Dickson, 2010a ; Mauskopf & Schmaltz, 2012a )

Nothing is that easy, however The intended integration is diffi cult, and today it

is still precarious, with mutual neglect and a lack of communication between rians and philosophers being at least as frequent as the desired approximation and collaboration (Arabatzis & Schickore, 2012 ; Burian, 2002 ; Laudan, 1996 ; Mauskopf

histo-& Schmaltz, 2012b ; Pinnick histo-& Gale, 2000 ; Steinle histo-& Burian, 2002 )

53 Stephen Turner ( 1994 ), an early enthusiast of contemporary social theory, has submitted the concept of practices to a rigorous critique For him, the concept is elusive and has mysterious properties In this way, he shows that practices are often understood as real objects with mysterious properties, such as causal power For example, he asks, “if a culture is a causal object, how does it work, and what kind of object is it?” (Turner, 1994 , p 6) Such problems led him “to conclude that the concept of practices is deeply fl awed” (Turner, 1994 , p 11) I thank Massimiliano Badino for calling my attention to Turner’s book

In brief, there are two opposed ways of considering the approximation or integration

of the history of science and the philosophy of science On the one hand, there is a skeptical stance, which was best expressed in Ronald Giere ’s famous dictum, “a mar- riage of convenience” (Giere, 1973 , p 283) On the other hand, it is possible to defend

a positive attitude, as captured in Lorenz Krüger’s (1932–1994) answer to Giere For him, it would be “a marriage for the sake of reason” (Krüger, 1982 , p 108) 54

The positive stance, which I endorse here, has been defended in different ways Hasok Chang ( 1999 ), for example, understands HPS as an integrated discipline, the function of which would be to complement the scientifi c knowledge produced by scientifi c experts According to him, “when HPS brings out older systems of knowl- edge from the history of science […] the results of these investigations complement and enrich current specialist science” (Chang, 1999 , p 415) More recently, he pro- poses that this should occur through analysis of concrete historical episodes, with- out incurring the fallacy of hasty generalization (Chang, 2012 ) Mary Domsky and Michael Dickson, praising Michael Friedman’s synthesis of the history of science and the philosophy of science, argue that, “his goal is to bring philosophy to bear on history and history to bear on philosophy in order that we might ‘see beyond’ what either can offer alone” (Domsky & Dickson, 2010b , p 11) Finally, Theodore Arabatzis has claimed that philosophy of science can enrich the historical investiga- tion of science by analyzing the philosophical foundations of the historiographical choices and categories at stake (Arabatzis, 2006a , 2006b ) For instance, by employ- ing the category ‘scientifi c discovery’ (X discovered Y), the historian would inevi- tably be raising philosophical questions relating to, for example, scientifi c realism Thus, the more conscious of the complexities of such questions he or she becomes, the greater the benefi ts for his or her historical narrative

In the recent history and philosophy of psychology , there is no shortage of ies addressing in one way or another the relationship between philosophy and psy- chology within a historical perspective (e.g., Ash & Sturm, 2007 ; Feest, 2005 ; Gundlach, 1993 ; Hatfi eld, 1990 , 2009 ; Heidelberger, 2004 ; Osbeck & Held, 2014 ; Smith, 1986 ; Sturm, 2009 ; Sturm & Mülberger, 2012 ) What is missing, however, is

stud-a series of systemstud-atic debstud-ates on the implicstud-ations of HPS for the history stud-and losophy of psychology

Assuming that such debates on HPS can be fruitful in this respect, two central but highly general questions could guide the fi eld: How can philosophical analyses of psychological projects enhance the accuracy and richness of historical knowledge

in psychology, and how can investigations of concrete historical episodes be vant for contemporary philosophical discussions in psychology?

In this book, my primary concern lies with the fi rst question, to the extent that I want to show how the analysis of Wundt’s philosophical program opens new possibilities for the historical understanding of his psychological project, in particular,

54 More recently, Domsky and Dickson ( 2010b ) published a ‘manifesto’ in defense of HPS in an attempt to address Giere’s skepticism In the same way, Arabatzis and Schickore argue that the new ways of doing HPS represent “more than a new marriage of convenience” (Arabatzis & Schickore,

2012 , p 404)