The foundations of the british conservative party

Acknowledgements ixForeword The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KG GCMG CH MC PC DL x Section 1 The Conservative Ideal 1 The Principles of British Conservatism from 2 The Conservative Dialec

Conservative Party

Conservative Party

Essays on Conservatism from

Lord Salisbury to David Cameron

Edited by Bradley W Hart and Richard Carr

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© Bradley W Hart, Richard Carr and Contributors, 2013

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The foundations of the British Conservative party: essays on Conservatism from Lord Salisbury to David Cameron/edited by Bradley W Hart and Richard Carr.

pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4411-0614-8 (hardcover: alk paper) 1 Conservative Party (Great Britain)–History 2 Conservatism–Great Britain 3 Great Britain– Politics and government I Hart, Bradley W II Carr, Richard, 1985–

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Acknowledgements ix

Foreword The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KG GCMG CH MC PC DL x

Section 1 The Conservative Ideal

1 The Principles of British Conservatism from

2 The Conservative Dialectic of Margaret Thatcher’s

Section 2 The Conservatives and the Union

3 Tory Rebels and Tory Democracy: The Ulster Crisis,

4 The Conservative Party and the Irish Question,

Section 3 Looking Beyond Westminster

5 Machinations of the Centre-Right and British

Engagement with the Pan-European Ideal, 1929–48

6 The Conservatives and Local Government: Reform, Localism

and the Big Society since 1888 Steven Howell 133

Section 4 Conservatism and Party Politics

7 Coalition Blues: The Conservatives, the Liberals and

Conservative-Liberal Coalitions in Britain since 1895 Chris Wrigley 153

8 How to Put ‘the People First’: Conservative Conceptions of

Reform Before and After the Second World War Richard Carr 175

Section 5 The Future of Conservatism

9 The Limits of Power: Conservative Experience and

Opportunity The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH ACIB 197

10 Neo-Orthodoxy: Conservative Economic Policy in the

Conclusion – Where Next? Bradley W Hart and Richard Carr 230

The editors would like to thank all those who contributed to the conference

from which this volume has emerged Conservatism: Today and Yesterday was

held on 26 November 2010 at Churchill College, Cambridge, and the work of college staff both before and on the day itself helped make for a stimulating and successful event As two former students of the college, we should of course thank Churchill’s Master Sir David Wallace for his role in making the conference such a success

The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust, Churchill College, and the George Trevelyan History Faculty Conference Grants at the University of Cambridge have all provided funding at various stages of either the initial conference or research and editing process for the book itself, and we are grateful for the support these organizations have provided

Our editors at Continuum and Bloomsbury have been extremely helpful throughout the process of the production, and we would like to thank Marie Claire-Antoine, Kaitlin Fontana, and Ally Jane Grossan in particular for helping see this volume through to fruition

Equally, our contributors have produced a variety of chapters on several topics – and in some cases have written two papers, one for the initial conference, and another for this volume Our many thanks to all of them

We are grateful to Sir John Major and Dr Irwin Stelzer for permission to reproduce their conference papers in full Lord Carrington very helpfully turned round his generous foreword in extremely quick time

Lastly, as the dedication at the front of this book makes clear, Allen Packwood and his team at the Churchill Archives Centre have assisted in numerous ways in the production of this work – through the initial conference event, the archiving and sourcing some of the documents referenced throughout this volume, and various forms of kindness shown to both editors over several years Our grateful thanks go to them

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KG GCMG CH MC PC DL

The subject of this work is of importance to all interested in British politics – whether supportive of the Conservatives or not The Conservative Party has held office for more than any other in the modern era, and has included within its midst many of the major political actors of our times In terms of ideology,

a party which has been led in the last century by Stanley Baldwin, Harold Macmillan and David Cameron on the one hand, and Margaret Thatcher and Winston Churchill on the other, is certainly ripe for stimulating discussion

In many ways the term ‘Conservative’ does not always accurately capture the contribution the party has made in our public life The party has been adaptive

in opposition and reforming in office It has played a dynamic role in the waging

of two world wars, and it has sought to take on vested interests in the overall national interest

Naturally, a party which has been in office for such long periods will attract its fair share of criticism on occasion This volume highlights areas where Conservative politicians and the party itself have not performed as some argue they might Some will agree with the charges here, others will not In any case, turning the mirror on oneself has always been a Conservative trait Reform comes through learning the lessons of the past

I welcome, then, this volume which unites historians, political scientists and former Conservative politicians Conservatism has shown a willingness to bend when circumstance dictates, and move with the times This book, in helping stimulate discussion about where the party has been, enriches our understanding

of where the party may go next I commend it to broad attention

Professor Stuart Ball is Professor in Modern British History at the University of

Leicester He has published extensively on the history of the Conservative Party

in the twentieth century, including Baldwin and the Conservative Party (Yale University Press, 1988), The Conservative Party and British Politics 1902–1951 (Longman, 1995), Winston Churchill (British Library, 2003), and Dole Queues and

Demons: British Election Posters from the Conservative Party Archive (Bodleian

Library, 2011) He has edited the political diaries of Sir Cuthbert Headlam (two

volumes, 1992 and 1999), and, with Anthony Seldon, Conservative Century: The

Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford University Press, 1994) and Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867 (Palgrave Macmillan,

2005) His most recent book is Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in

Britain 1918–1945 (Oxford University Press, 2013).

Dr Richard Carr is a Research Fellow at Anglia Ruskin University, and has

lectured at the University of East Anglia and served as a By-Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge He has published widely on twentieth-century British

politics, including the monograph Veteran MPs and Conservative Politics in the

Aftermath of the Great War (Farnham, 2013), and journal articles on the Tories

and appeasement (Twentieth Century British History, 2011), electioneering in the 1920s (Historical Research, 2012) and eugenic interpretations throughout the interwar period (First World War Studies, 2012) He is currently researching

a biography of the Wilson era Labour Minister Alice Bacon with Rachel Reeves MP

Dr Bradley Hart is a lecturer at California State University, Fresno In 2011,

he completed his PhD in history at Churchill College, Cambridge and has published extensively on the international eugenics movement, the history of anthropology and the relationship between science and public policy in the early twentieth century He is currently working on a book derived from his doctoral thesis examining the relationship between the British, German and American eugenics movements in the interwar years

Steven Howell is a Research Fellow at the localism and local government think

tank Localis, where he writes on a variety of local government policy areas His recent work includes reports focusing on the commissioning relationship between local government and external partners ‘Catalyst Councils’, and regeneration ‘Grow Your Own Way’, while also contributing research to publications on the mismatch between skills and employment prospects, and different forms of local public sector leadership Prior to this, he worked as a researcher in local government and read History at King’s College London His contribution is written in a personal capacity

Dr Alan Macleod is a Research Fellow at the University of Leeds His research

interests are in British political, diplomatic and security history In 2012, he completed his PhD at the University of Glasgow on the international dimension

of the Troubles in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s He is currently working on a study of the British intelligence services in the mid-twentieth century

Sir John Major KG CH PC ACIB served as Conservative Party leader and Prime

Minister of the United Kingdom from 1990 to 1997 Prior to this, he held the posts of Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer under Margaret Thatcher He was elected to Lambeth Council in 1968 and, in 1979, as MP for Huntingdon He retired from the House of Commons in 2001 His victory in the

1992 General Election not only saw the largest number of votes for any British political party before or since, but also remains the last time – as of 2013 – that the Conservative Party achieved an outright majority in the House of Commons

He has recently published the historical work My Old Man: A Personal History of

the Music Hall (London, 2012) to widely positive reviews.

Dr Kieron O’Hara is a Senior Research Fellow in Electronics and Computer

Science, where he writes on the philosophy and politics of technology, particularly trust, privacy and transparency He is also a commentator on conservatism and the British Conservative Party, a Research Fellow for the Centre for Policy Studies, and the author of ‘After Blair: Conservatism Beyond Thatcher’ (2005), ‘The Referendum Roundabout’ (2006), ‘Joseph Conrad Today’ (2007), ‘Democratising Conservative Leadership Selection: From Grey Suits to Grass Roots’ (2008, with Andrew Denham) and ‘Conservatism’ (2011) He is the author of a report on transparency and privacy, ‘Transparent Government, Not Transparent Citizens’, for the Cabinet Office (2011), and chairs the Transparency

Sector Panel on Crime and Criminal Justice at the Home Office and the Ministry

of Justice His latest book is an introduction to the work of Aldous Huxley

Dr Robert Saunders is a lecturer in History and Politics at the University of

Oxford He is the author of Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848–67:

The Making of the Second Reform Act (Farnham, 2011) and co-editor with Ben

Jackson of Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012) He has published articles

on Chartism, the relationship between Britain and America and the history of democratic thought, as well as writing political commentary in a variety of blogs and journals He is currently researching the intellectual history of Thatcherism and the impact of the Cold War on British politics and society

Dr Irwin Stelzer is a Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson Institute’s economic

policy studies group Prior to joining Hudson Institute in 1998, Stelzer was Resident Scholar and Director of regulatory policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute He is an US economic columnist who often contributes to

The Guardian, Daily Telegraph, the New Statesman, among others His academic

career includes teaching appointments at Cornell University, the University

of Connecticut and New York University He is a Visiting Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford He has advised several Prime Ministers in both Conservative and Labour administrations

Professor Chris Wrigley is Emeritus Professor of Modern British History,

Nottingham University He previously taught at Queen’s University of Belfast

and Loughborough University His books include David Lloyd George and the

British Labour Movement (1976), Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour

(1990), Arthur Henderson (1990), Lloyd George (1992), British Trade Unions

Since 1933 (2002), Winston Churchill (2006) and AJP Taylor: Radical Historian of Europe (2006) Among the books he has edited are A History of British Industrial Relations, 3 volumes (1982–96), William Barnes: the Dorset Poet (1984), Challenges of Labour: Central and Western Europe, 1917–20 (1993), British Trade Unionism 1945–95 (1997), The First World War and the International Economy (2000), Churchill: A Biographical Dictionary (2002), A Companion to Early Twentieth Century British History (2003) and (jointly) The Second Labour Government, 1929–31 (2011) He was president of the Historical Association,

from 1996 to 1999 He was awarded an honourary doctorate by the University

of East Anglia in 1998

Bradley W Hart

On 11 May 2010, Conservative Party leader David Cameron moved into 10 Downing Street, officially ending more than a decade of Labour government This victory had not come easily for Cameron or his party: despite spending nearly 5 years attempting to change the Party’s image and improve its poll numbers after Cameron became leader, and with Labour leader Gordon Brown viewed – rightly or wrongly – as unlikeable, the Conservatives failed to achieve

an outright victory Winning some 306 seats at the polls, the Conservatives were short of the minimum (326) number of seats required to form a stable government on their own These they quickly gained by concluding a coalition agreement with the Liberal Democrats that included the appointment of leader Nick Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister, with Vince Cable, Chris Huhne and others taking their seats at the Cabinet table With his majority thus secured, Cameron became the head of Britain’s first full-blown coalition government since World War II and the youngest Prime Minister since Lord Liverpool nearly two centuries before.1 In one sense then, he fulfilled his own claim to be the ‘heir

to Blair’ by breaking the Labour Prime Minister’s own record of a youthful rise

to the top job in 1997

Throughout the 2010 General Election campaign, Cameron and Conservative strategists went to great lengths to challenge the electorate’s perceptions of the Party and its manifesto The pro-privatization and free market rhetoric of the Margaret Thatcher era was played down (if consistently still highlighted by their Labour opponents) and in its place was the assertion that the Conservatives were ‘the party of the NHS [National Health Service]’ and advocates of the

‘Big Society’.2 This latter notion, which was largely influenced by the writings

1 A Hough, ‘David Cameron becomes youngest Prime Minister in almost 200 years’, The Telegraph,

11 May 2010 becomes-youngest-Prime-Minister-in-almost-200-years.html).

(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/7712545/David-Cameron-2 R Winnett, ‘David Cameron: Tories are the party of the NHS’, 4 January 2010 (http://www.telegraph co.uk/news/election-2010/6932043/David-Cameron-Tories-are-the-party-of-the-NHS.html).

of Conservative ‘philosopher king’ Phillip Blond, called on Westminster to empower local government and, ultimately, individuals (their manifesto was entitled, rather like some formal RSVP, ‘an invitation to join the government of Britain’) in a wide variety of areas This broad localization programme included giving councils greater borrowing powers (such as Tax Increment Financing, long used in the United States) and greater retention of their business rates, setting up so-called ‘free schools’ along the Swedish model which would be free from local authority control, and a number of other policies which, in theory, were predicated on subsidiarity By returning power to the local level, Cameron argued, individuals would be empowered to assert control over their own communities through volunteerism and becoming closer to the complex, and sometimes difficult, decision-making process As a result, much of the legislation passed by Cameron’s government, including the somewhat aborted and largely unpopular attempts to reform aspects of the NHS, was at least initially couched in the language of localism and ‘cutting the red tape’ for innovators and for those seeking to help their communities.3 Cynics and political foes argued that this rhetoric merely provided a pre-text for extensive public-sector cuts by encouraging charities and other groups to take on responsibilities previously managed by government, but Cameron denied having an agenda beyond ‘the biggest, most dramatic redistribution of power from elites in Whitehall to the man and woman on the street’.4

This volume hopes to cut through such short-term debates and place them

in their historical context The Conservative Party, after all, is the oldest and most successful of Britain’s political parties, and has faced off against numerous rival parties over the centuries that have sometimes ceased to exist entirely,

as in the case of the Whigs Since the early years of the twentieth century, the party has provided an alternative to both Liberal and Labour visions of how the nation should develop, and how power should be concentrated As Stuart Ball notes in his chapter, much of this role has revolved around providing a

‘pragmatic’ alternative to the far-reaching ‘ideological’ plans of its rivals, and indeed much of the 2010 General Election campaign focused on both the alleged incompetence of Gordon Brown’s Labour government, and discrediting

3 For an example, see K Ahmed, ‘David Cameron’s radical plan to reform jobs red tape’, The Telegraph,

19 May 2012 to-reform-jobs-red-tape.html).

(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9277508/David-Camerons-radical-plan-4 N Watt, ‘Cameron promises power for the man and woman on the street’, The Guardian, 19 July

2010 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jul/19/david-cameron-big-society-cuts).

(ironically given developments in the week that followed the election) the rigourously costed proposals in the Liberal Democrat manifesto Cameron’s claims to be eliminating bureaucracy and paving the way for a more empowered citizenry, thus, fit into a longer historical tradition of Conservatives presenting their party’s ideas as a remedy to the grandiose and complex schemes of its more progressive opponents, whether the Liberals prior to the early 1920s, or Labour thereafter By examining these historical precursors, therefore, we can learn a great deal about the way these ideas might well be viewed by the electorate and, indeed, whether they are likely to be successful politically or otherwise The chapters included in this volume, thus, hope to shed important new light on where British conservatism has been and where it may be going over the next few years.

Origins of modern conservatism

British conservatism has understandably been the subject of much past arship Many, if not most, scholars have placed the intellectual roots of modern

schol-conservative politics in the writings of Edmund Burke, whose Reflections

on the Revolution in France (1790) appeared to present a succinct outline of

conservative arguments against radical and revolutionary change Despite being a Whig rather than a Tory himself, Burke argued against the French Revolution’s radicalism in strongly reactionary terms As general policy, Burke argued, existing traditions and ‘establishments’ ought not to be abandoned or significantly changed without a significant and pressing justification ‘The errors and defects of old establishments are visible and palpable It calls for little ability

to point them out; and where absolute power is given, it requires but a word wholly to abolish the vice and the establishment together,’ Burke wrote.5 With existing establishments thus destroyed, ‘to make every thing the reverse of what they [politicians] have seen is quite as easy as to destroy No difficulties occur in what has never been tried.’6 Instead, Burke argued, a more rational path would be to ‘at once to preserve and to reform’ the ‘useful parts of an old establishment’ through careful consideration, despite the relatively slow rate of progress this method might entail Indeed, for Burke, this slow pace of progress

5 E Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution, Ed L G Mitchell (1993), 168.

6 Ibid., 169.

was desirable in itself ‘If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom, when we work only upon inanimate matter, surely they become part of duty too, when the subject of our demolition is not brick and timber, but sentient beings,

by the sudden alteration of whose state, condition, and habits, multitudes may

be rendered miserable.’7 Thus, for Burke, progress should be slow and proceed with appropriate reverence for existing institutions and the ideas that underpin them Government should not seek to reinvent the wheel, if the existing wheel empirically seems to work rather well

The influence of Burke’s view of politics, particularly regarding the ship between the past and the present, is still visible today Indeed, throughout the modern period, British conservatism has essentially presented itself to

relation-a lesser or grerelation-ater extent relation-as relation-a bulwrelation-ark relation-agrelation-ainst rrelation-adicrelation-alism In relation-a remrelation-arkrelation-able

1954 article, American political scientist Leon D Epstein concluded that Conservatism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries largely focused on

a combination of Burkean anti-radicalism and more vaguely defined capitalist economic interests, leading its proponents to successively oppose the Whigs, Liberals and, most significantly after the events of 1922, which Chris Wrigley’s chapter in this volume touches on, Labour.8 At the heart of these views, Epstein found the relationship between history and the present day to

pre-be vital to the conservative mindset ‘Essentially it appears that the intellectual ground being defended is the British tradition of balance and moderation which the Party considers its own faith Conservatives not only believe that there is much in the past worth preserving, but that they, because of their attachments

to the past, can best decide what ought to be saved,’ Epstein wrote.9 Political success for the Conservative Party, Epstein concluded, would, thus, come from

an expansion of a middle class that could be convinced to vote Tory because

of its own aspirations towards property ownership and individual economic improvement.10

Indeed, this view of Conservatism as essentially a counterpoint or alternative

to the statist policies of the Labour Party has perhaps been the party’s most defining characteristic since World War I Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin attempted to position his party

as a predictable, Burkean alternative to the ‘radical’ platform advocated by Labour.11 As Philip Williamson has observed, as Baldwin’s career veered through the tumultuous terrain of early twentieth-century politics, he helped build the framework that subsequent Tory leaders would use to confront Labour in later years.12 Despite taking serious damage to his reputation during World War II and after, Baldwin’s influence on twentieth-century politics and Conservatism

is undergoing significant reconsideration That Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan – both in many ways the political heirs to Baldwin – would go on to lead the Conservative Party after 1945 meant there was a degree of continuation

in Conservative thought that is often somewhat downplayed The nature of the post-war consensus is probed in this volume with a chapter by Richard Carr

It is Winston Churchill, of course, who is perhaps most closely associated

in the public mind with pre-Thatcher conservatism Taking over from Neville Chamberlain during one of Britain’s darkest hours in May 1940, Churchill’s leadership undoubtedly helped make Britain’s survival and eventual victory in World War II possible Churchill’s coalition government included all the major parties in an effort to ensure national unity, and an electoral truce during the war prevented partisan campaigning when seats became open, though independent candidates often ran against the major parties and, on some occasions, were victorious in by-elections.13 Despite predictions of a Conservative victory in a repeat of the ‘Khaki Elections’ of 1900 and 1918, Churchill was swept out of power in 1945 by Attlee’s Labour Party promising a New Jerusalem of state ownership, a National Health Service, and no repetition of the mass, lengthy unemployment seen in the interwar years As John Charmley has argued, the inclusion of Labour figures in the coalition government for much of the war may well have lessened the appeal of Baldwin-esque arguments about the radical dangers posed by socialist policies and politicians.14 Churchill’s ill-conceived remark in an election speech that Labour would need to establish a ‘Gestapo’ to insure the success of its political programme likely did not help either, though such themes regarding freedom from governmental control would return to Tory discourse in the 1950s and, most famously, in the Thatcher era from 1975 onwards.15

11 See P Williamson, Stanley Baldwin (1999).

12 Ibid., 8–11.

13 J Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics, 1900–1996 (116–17).

14 Ibid., 119–20.

15 Ibid., 119.

Foundations of the modern Conservative Party

This volume integrates these ideas and historical circumstances with a consideration of more recent events to paint a metaphorical picture of the Conservative Party’s foundations and present trajectory Of course, by more

or less ending in 1945 the previous narrative has excluded perhaps the most influential Conservative of the twentieth century: Margaret Thatcher As already noted, with her rhetoric of individualism and emphasis on liberal markets and privatization, Thatcher arguably interjected a wide-ranging ideology into Conservative thought for the first time: a development not entirely welcomed

by the Party faithful at the time ‘As the Conservative Century came to an end, it seemed that even if the Conservative party has survived, Conservatism had not,’ historian Ewen Green wrote in 2002.16

Thus, much of this work focuses on the relationship between Conservative ideas before the Thatcher era and the path the party has taken since It is important to note that this volume has been arranged thematically rather than chronologically in an attempt to draw out significant themes and comparisons without becoming mired in individual narratives The first section considers Conservative ideas and ideals themselves in an attempt to draw out the intellectual ‘core’ of conservatism Stuart Ball first examines the principles

of British Conservatism in the pre-Thatcher era and illustrates the ideas that underpinned ‘One Nation’ Conservatism in this important period, which as previously mentioned was largely dominated by Baldwin and his political heirs

In the following chapter, Kieron O’Hara discusses the fate of this thread in conservative thought under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership As O’Hara argues, Thatcher’s approach to conservative politics was not universally accepted, and her first term was in many ways circumscribed by internal battles for the future direction of the Conservative Party Together these chapters provide the intellectual backdrop for later sections

The second section explores the Conservative Party’s approach to the Union, specifically the ‘Irish Question’ that so often dominated British politics throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Indeed, as Robert Saunders argues, political disputes over Ireland pushed some Unionists towards even advocating violence in the years before World War I While the prospect of civil war in the United Kingdom was averted, the crisis left an indelible impression

16 E H H Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (2002), 234.

on the Conservative Party and the development of the British constitution more generally Alan Macleod’s chapter examines the wider response of the Conservative Party to events in Ireland from the nineteenth century to the end of Gordon Brown’s government in 2010 With the first section providing

an analysis of the Party’s intellectual underpinnings, this section explores the practical implications of these principles where one of the county’s most delicate and complicated issues has been concerned

Likewise, the third section focuses on the Conservative Party’s policies beyond the corridors of Westminster The first chapter examines the Conservative Party’s changing views of Europe over the course of the mid-twentieth century Europe has always posed a unique challenge for conservatives both politically and ideologically By exploring the role of pro-European Conservatives in the years immediately surrounding World War II, this chapter hopes to demonstrate the depth of these differences, many of which are still easily detectable in the Conservative Party of the early twenty-first century It also outlines why Tories have occasionally looked more positively on the European project than contemporary debates may suggest, and what this says about the party and its relationship with private sector interest The following chapter, by Steven Howell, changes scope significantly, examining the development of the Conservative Party’s policies towards local government since 1888 As mentioned previously, localism has been placed near the top of the political agenda by David Cameron’s government, and it is instructive to examine the historical background of these contemporary developments in an effort to understand both their origins and likely outcomes While these chapters might ostensibly seem rather dissimilar, they are here united under the same heading to illustrate the striking similarities

in how Conservative policies and politicians have interacted with both supranational bodies, in the case of Europe, and local councils alike Both have long presented frustrating challenges to Conservatives, and it is instructive to examine how Westminster-based politicians have responded

The fourth section returns the focus to Westminster and examines the relationship between conservatism and party politics Chris Wrigley’s chapter focuses on the relationship between the Conservative Party and the Liberals (later, after the drift of the politicians on the Labour right to form the Social Democratic Party, and the SDP’s merger with the Liberals, known as the Liberal Democrats) As Wrigley observes, before 1945, the Conservative Party was in power with a Liberal coalition partner for more years than not, while after World War II coalitions became almost non-existent for any party Wrigley explores

the reasons for these trends, focusing on the political necessities that often seemed to demand a coalition to confront before 1945 With David Cameron’s government itself containing a significant Liberal Democrat presence in one

of the country’s rare modern era coalitions, Wrigley’s observations about the nature and frequent outcomes of these alliances are particularly resonant In the following chapter, Richard Carr discusses the Conservative Party’s internal debates over interventionism in the middle years of the twentieth century As mentioned previously, strict Burkean interpretations of conservatism have long been sceptical of efforts to systematically intervene in society or the economy In the midst of the 1930s, however, failing to intervene in the face of mass hardship became a matter of political debate both within and outside the Conservative Party Carr’s chapter traces these discussions into the present day, as conservatives once again debate the merits of intervention To do so, Carr synthesises and extends his recent output on the 1930s/40s, especially vis-à-vis Quintin Hogg.The penultimate section of this volume then examines the state of the Conservative Party in the early twenty-first century, particularly following David Cameron’s 2010 victory The first chapter in this section is written by Sir John Major, who served as Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997.17 Sir John’s Churchill lecture came at a key juncture in British politics – some 6 months into the 2010 coalition government, after the swingeing cuts of the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review had been announced but not fully implemented, and a matter

of weeks before a controversial parliamentary vote was held to treble university tuition fees, an issue that would test the strength of the coalition Though Liberal Democrats did indeed rebel from backing that government bill (though only just, 28 backing the bill with 29 voting against or abstaining), key figures within that party such as Nick Clegg, Vince Cable and Danny Alexander voted in favour

of the measure, and thus indicated that they were prepared to ditch previous flagship Lib Dem policies in favour of remaining in government In calling for a more permanent pact between the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties but a couple of weeks earlier, Sir John’s lecture formed a key historical moment and one worth recording as we look to the future of both these parties Along similar lines, the second chapter in this section examines the possible future direction of centre-right economic thought on both sides of the Atlantic The author, Irwin Stelzer, has served as a significant adviser to leaders in both

17 Sir John Major’s essay is derived from a speech delivered at Churchill College, Cambridge on

26 November 2010 The editors are grateful for Sir John’s permission to include it in the present volume.

the United States and Great Britain, and consequently his insight into how conservative economic philosophy should approach the challenges of the twenty-first century is particularly salient Together these chapters serve as an important complement to the historically oriented sections that precede them Conservatism in the twenty-first century cannot afford to be without either an understanding of its past or a plan for its future, and as a result, this volume includes a present-day focus in an effort to further the discourse on what role conservative ideas should and will play in the future.

This volume, thus, covers key aspects of British conservatism It does not – and indeed could not – address any and every issue of potential interest, however Gender and the appeal to the female voter, particularly since the enfranchising legislation of 1918 and 1928, is not directly addressed here Important work has been done in this area by Helen McCarthy, David Jarvis and others in recent years, and readers may wish to consult their work in combination with some of the themes this volume explores.18 The conclusion

to this volume makes some preliminary comments on this issue Similarly, some may argue that this volume could include a more direct engagement with the Disraelian legacy, but we argue there is more to be gained – given his place in a democratic political culture – by a broader consideration of Stanley Baldwin, in many ways his political descendant The intention here is

to shed light on British conservatism, but also not merely to repeat the work

of others

The distinct contributions this volume makes are threefold First, it marries chapters from historians, political scientists, contemporary thinkers and former practitioners to offer a range of perspectives on the Conservative ideal Secondly,

it unites both younger researchers and leading academics to bring forward a wave

of new research regarding Britain’s oldest party Thirdly, and most importantly,

it adopts a longue durée thematic approach with an up-to-date thrust It has

been over 15 years since Stuart Ball (one of this volume’s contributors) and Anthony Seldon published their work on the Conservative Party since 1900.19Though both would go on to edit a volume on the Tories in opposition in 2005, the implications of the 2010 election have created new space for a collection

18 See D Jarvis, ‘Mrs Maggs and Betty: The Conservative Appeal to Women Voters in the 1920s’,

Twentieth Century British History, 5/2 (1994), 129–52, and H McCarthy, ‘Service Clubs, Citizenship

and Equality: gender relations and middle-class associations in Britain between the wars’, Historical

Research, 81/213 (2008), 531–52.

19 A Seldon and S Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford,

1994).

considering the party’s history.20 The Liberals/Liberal Democrats are given much coverage in this volume, and the circumstances of 2010 may indeed prove to be particular, but there is more homogeneity of thought between the Tories and the Liberals than often – particularly during their first decade of the twenty-first-century movement to the left – suggested If the Liberals are a party of Lloyd George and Charles Kennedy, the reforms of the 1906 government and modern calls for a mansion tax, they are also capable of absorbing Nick Clegg and David Laws, and ditching the very left leaning policies that have garnered them sometime popularity Their relationship with the Tories certainly makes for interesting debate.

Finally, as with any publication, this volume would not have been possible without a great deal of invaluable support As previously mentioned, many of the chapters contained here have been derived from papers delivered in the course of a conference at Churchill College, Cambridge, on 26 November 2010 The editors, who also served as the conference conveners, extend their sincere thanks to all who took part and contributed in the proceedings The editors owe

a specific debt of gratitude to Sir John Major for his conference contribution and

to his staff for facilitating a wide variety of requests both before and after the event itself The editors also wish to thank Irwin Stelzer for delivering a keynote address on a topic related to his chapter during the conference

In addition, neither the conference nor this book would have come to fruition without the exceptionally generous support of Allen Packwood, Andrew Riley and all the staff of the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge This volume is appropriately dedicated to the Archives Centre as a gesture of gratitude for this support The editors also wish to thank the Master of Churchill College, Sir David Wallace, and the fellows of Churchill College for their support for the conference and general kindness over the years This conference looks beyond Winston Churchill – both chronologically, and in analysing political forces outside his two main alignments, the Conservative and Liberal Parties But the institution which bears his name has formed an intellectual hub for both editors over several years, and has logistically been of much help in the preparation of this work This book owes much to it

20 A Seldon and S Ball (eds), The Conservatives in Opposition Since 1867 (Basingstoke, 2005).

The Conservative Ideal

The Principles of British Conservatism from Balfour to Heath, c.1910–75

Stuart Ball

This chapter is an analysis of the basic principles enunciated by British Conservatives in the period from the Edwardian constitutional crisis of 1910–11 to the advent of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative leader in 1975 Its concern is not the constantly changing proposals of the Conservative Party’s programme and policies, but the essential foundation of ideology and outlook upon which these depended for their coherence and validity Throughout this period, Conservative principles were a topic of frequent discussion, to an extent which may be surprising for a party often depicted as being driven by pragmatism and a simple appetite for power, and unconcerned with – even abhorrent of – any intellectual endeavour or theoretical analysis The reality

is that the Conservatives were not disinterested in defining the principles and concepts through which they interpreted human society, and which formed the

‘guides to movement and to action’ upon which they based their expectations and strategies.1 Their specific rejection, precisely on grounds of principle, was

of what they termed ‘ideology’, by which they meant something inflexible, inhumane and imposed upon society regardless of its practicality, often by coercive methods – something doctrinaire and dangerous Statements by Conservatives repudiating any notion of being ideological (which, of course, was

in itself an ideological form of inward interpretation and outward presentation) have been taken too readily at face value; indeed, to mean much more than they did and to constitute a rejection of ideas and principles in all their forms It has

to be said that such a depiction suited not only the Conservatives’ opponents,

in both propaganda and the reinforcement of their sense of superior merit, but

1 P Dean, J Douglas and T E Utley, Conservative Points of View (1964), 5.

also for much of the period it suited the Conservatives themselves, as it was a clear demarcation from their main rivals which they believed gave them more resonance and appeal with the public at large and the uncommitted voter in particular Conservatives preferred to use terms such as ‘spirit’ and ‘faith’, even

‘gospel’ and ‘creed’, to describe the nature of their political philosophy and to mark that its wellsprings were fundamentally different from those of the left In fact, Conservatism was ‘grounded in a system of thought’, which was composed

of elements which meshed together and reinforced each other.2 This accounts for two of the striking features of the Conservative Party over the last 150 years: its resilience and its continuing relevance to the needs of its supporters As Bernard Braine, later a long-serving post-war MP, wrote in 1946, Conservatism was ‘a distinct way of thinking’ which was ‘at once a philosophy of life, an outlook upon the world, and a temperament’.3 In the same year, a discussion pamphlet for use

at the constituency grass-roots defined what drew people to the Conservative Party as ‘a belief in certain political ideals and in a certain standard of human relationships’.4

During the period considered here, there was a regular and extensive discourse which was specifically about Conservative principles and quite separate from proposals and debates about the policies to be presented in the election manifesto

or implemented in government Naturally enough, the immediate programme was usually the focus of speeches by leading figures and the propaganda leaflets produced by the party organization Even so, the underlying principles were often acknowledged in the presentation of policy, and on certain occasions – often in specific forums – they were the main concern of a keynote speech For the most part, however, the discussion of Conservative principles took place on the printed page, in the form of books and pamphlets written by contemporary Conservatives Many of these authors were practising politicians, including some leading front-bench figures, while others were academics and journalists, some

of whom also became MPs This chapter draws primarily upon this extensive literature, with the aim of exploring the central themes which were common

to most definitions of Conservatism Conservative ideas before the advent of Thatcherism have been investigated only to a limited extent by historians and political scientists, with the focus mostly on the period since 1945.5 They are

2 Lord Coleraine, For Conservatives Only (1970), 20–2.

3 B Braine, Conservatism Today (1946), 5; A Bryant, The Spirit of Conservatism (1929), viii; J Carpenter, The Conservative Case (1950), 7.

Boyd-4 C J M Alport, About Conservative Principles (1946), 3.

examined here through a thematic approach, which considers the Conservative view of human nature, the fallacies of the rational approach, the organic nature

of society, the inevitability of inequality, the importance of property, the strategy of adaptation to change, the value of the past, the nature of freedom, the function

of authority and the role of the state

For most individuals, the principles which they acknowledged in public were

to some extent a rationalization of opinions, prejudices and needs which were already held at a deeper level In the case of those with wealth or a social position

to defend, there was an element of self-interest which at the least encouraged their political outlook towards Conservatism Nevertheless, as with the party’s supposed pragmatism, this was far from the whole story and was but one determinant among many The Conservatives differed from the parties to their left in acknowledging and welcoming the way in which irrationalized ‘instinct’ could form a valid basis for political belief.6 This was related to the influence

of ‘small c’ conservatism – a matter of temperament which, to varying degrees, was present in all people, regardless of whether they favoured the Conservative

Party or not In his influential volume, Conservatism, published in 1912, Lord

Hugh Cecil took this ‘natural conservatism’ as his starting point, defining it

as ‘a disposition averse from change’ which was founded upon two elements:

‘distrust of the unknown’ and ‘liking for the familiar’ From this perspective, what was known ‘has proved to be at least safe and endurable’, while change entailed ‘perplexity, effort, confusion of mind, weariness’.7 However, not all of the elements in temperamental conservatism were negative, for it also ‘springs

5 H Glickman, ‘The Toryness of English Conservatism’, Journal of British Studies, 1 (1961), 111–43; W

L Burn, ‘The Conservative tradition and its reformulations’, in H Winkler (ed.), Twentieth-Century

Britain: National Power and Social Welfare (New York, 1976), 82–99; R Bennett, ‘The Conservative

tradition of thought’, in N Nugent and R King (eds), The British Right: Conservative and Right Wing

Politics in Britain (Farnborough, 1977), 11–25; W Harbour, The Foundations of Conservative Thought:

An Anglo-American Tradition in Perspective (Notre Dame, 1982); J D Fair and J A Hutcheson,

‘British Conservatism in the twentieth century: an emerging ideological tradition’, Albion, 19 (1987), 549–78; J A Thompson and A Mejia (eds), Edwardian Conservatism: Five Studies in Adaptation (1988); J Barnes, ‘Ideology and factions’, in A Seldon and S Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The

Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford, 1994), 315–45; M Bentley, ‘Liberal Toryism in the twentieth

century’, Royal Historical Society, Transactions, 6th series, 4 (1994), 177–201; E H H Green, Ideologies

of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 2002); K Hickson

(ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945 (Basingstoke, 2005); M Garnett and

K Hickson, Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributions to the Political Thought of the Modern

Conservative Party (Manchester, 2009); P Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (2011); S Ball, Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918–1945 (Oxford,

from contentment; it tends to tranquillity and to a desire to be left alone’.8These unconscious impulses were regarded as setting in motion an individual’s evolution of more comprehensive and conscious Conservative views, a process which it was understood would take time to mature, as it drew nourishment from the wellsprings of experience of life and increasing responsibilities In consequence, a ‘great strength’ of the Conservative Party was that it had ‘a firm psychological and emotional base’.9 From this was derived not a political theory, but the more elastic – but also more enduring – understanding that there was ‘a Conservative style of politics’.10

Human nature and the fallacy of reason

The Conservative view of the universe was fundamentally derived from a Christian religious perspective and thus ‘rooted in the facts of nature or in Divine revelation’.11 Some of those who wrote or spoke influentially about Conservative principles had a strong personal faith, such as Lord Hugh Cecil, Stanley Baldwin and Quintin Hogg (later Lord Hailsham) While scientific discovery had undermined belief in the literal truth of the Book of Genesis, acceptance of the general Christian view of humanity was widespread The latter provided a pervasive cultural background which was imbibed during their formative years

by the middle and upper classes, from whom the Conservative Party’s leaders, MPs and key local supporters were drawn A cardinal feature of this outlook was the acceptance of something greater than humanity as the creator, and thus

it did not place man at the centre of his environment as the controlling power Humanity was instead subordinate and had to respond to the circumstances in which it existed, rather than to seek with dangerous pride to be the master and attain a god-like omniscience Conservatives rejected the gnosticism prevalent

in radical and reformist purposes, that it was possible for humanity by its own initiatives to realize a heaven upon earth

Equally important was the Conservative recognition of human imperfection, based upon the biblical depiction of original sin: man was a fallen being who was constantly drawn by temptation towards the venal sins, and who would

8 F J C Hearnshaw, Conservatism in England (1933), 8.

9 T Raison, Why Conservative? (1964), 28.

10 Sir I Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (1977), 115.

11 K Feiling, Toryism: A Political Dialogue (1913), 19.

always take the path of the least effort and the greatest sensual gratification.12

A key element in this view was that evil resided within human hearts, rather than resulting from external forces, such as poverty, ignorance and lack of opportunity Therefore, such environmental factors neither explained nor excused evil actions; the latter were always ultimately a matter of choice, for which the individual and not ‘society’ was responsible While removing these factors might be a worthwhile endeavour, it would not result in any remodelling

of humanity; human nature might be redeemable on an individual basis through the path of Christian salvation, but human nature in the mass was not mutable.13Its weaknesses were intrinsic, and therefore to fail to take them into account was blind folly of the most irresponsible kind This was the basis of the Conservative emphasis upon the limitations of what politics could achieve:

The things that are most wrong in our world and always have been, the things that make people most unhappy, and always have done, are things that can scarcely be touched by political action This is the case, because they are not defects in laws or defects in institutions, but defects in human nature; and it is in human nature that the remedies must be sought 14

Conservatives were not optimists in their appreciation of human nature, and considered that the record of history proved that in the mass, humanity’s flaws were always more evident than its strengths Acceptance of this truth was considered to give the Conservative viewpoint the strength and flexibility of realism, so that the party developed policies which went with the grain of human nature rather than working against it.15 In this sense, Conservatism was ‘as old as the human race’.16 The sentiment that ‘the facts of life invariably do turn out to be

Tory’ had a resonance far beyond Conservative Party members, or even voters.17For the most part, at least in public statements, this outlook did not develop into pessimism or cynicism, and their consequences of drift and despair; rather,

it led to the conclusion that clearly defined authority, strong legal structures and firmness in government were necessary to counter and contain the base

12 A Jones, Right and Left (1944), 6; Q Hogg, The Case for Conservatism (1947), 12–13; K Feiling,

‘Principles of Conservatism’, Political Quarterly, 24 (1953), 135–6 This did not require personal religious belief, as ‘original sin’ was ‘an obvious truth’ of human nature: Gilmour, Inside Right, 113.

13 Cecil, Conservatism, 91.

14 P Goldman, Some Principles of Conservatism (1956), 12.

15 Ludovici, Defence of Conservatism, 60; Braine, Conservatism Today, 4–5; Dorey, British Conservatism,

6–11.

16 Feiling, Toryism, 50.

17 Conservative Central Office, The Right Approach: A Statement of Conservative Aims (1976), 19, emphasis in the original; Alport, About Conservative Principles, 6.

impulses of humanity This was also leavened by the elements of endeavour and

of striving for redemption which were central to the Protestant Christian ethic, and thus, ‘it is ultimately on his respect for the dignity of the human soul that the Conservative bases his political faith’.18 This also had an aspirational aspect:

‘Conservatism sees man as a personality capable of infinite development’, and society must make this possible: ‘the Conservative is therefore concerned not only with material progress but with spiritual progress’.19

There was a further aspect of the religious influence upon the Conservative conception of human nature, which was that man could not exist in a healthy state without ideals and aspirations, and without acknowledgement of something greater and more lasting than the existence of the self Materialism was not enough: it might provide for the body, while the spirit withered; for this reason, the theories of the Marxist left and the Socialist elevation of an impersonal state were repugnant to Conservatives in their very nature, just as much as in the threat they posed to their social position or wealth Men and women were ‘not machines’, and ‘could not be boiled down into a mere formula’.20 The importance

of an appeal to idealism was acknowledged by Conservatives; it was an article

of faith that faith was necessary, that the public must be offered something more than a dour defence of the ‘haves’ against the ‘have-nots’ and negative criticism of the proposals of opponents.21 Although, if unrestrained, humanity might descend

to the law of the jungle and the crude application of ‘might is right’, Conservatives believed that man could only survive in coherent social groups and that these needed a moral code – very probably religious in origin and purpose This morality derived from a fundamental need of the human condition and psyche,

so that individuals could establish relationships with others around them, first in their own families and then linking these together in the larger society.22 Anything else left mankind as atomized beings, promoting conflict and rejecting charity; this was the cause of the Conservative distrust of pure individualism (and hence the concern of the traditional ‘one nation’ strand of Conservatism at the Zionistic advocacy of the free market during the height of Thatcherism), despite their endorsement of the improving moral as well as economic benefits of increased opportunity, freedom and choice For many Conservatives, a secularized society

18 D Stelling, Why I Am A Conservative (1943), 25; Cecil, Conservatism, 164.

19 D Clarke, The Conservative Faith in the Modern Age (1947), 8.

20 Winchester Conservative Association, North Stoneham & Bassett Women’s Branch, 28 June 1923, Southampton Record Office, D/STC/1/1–2.

21 Salisbury to Baldwin, 26 January 1924, Cambridge University Library, Baldwin MSS, 159/258–61.

22 Hogg, Case for Conservatism, 16, 18.

lacked the essential component which would give it a moral structure, and hence the reaction at many levels – including the grass-roots – to the social changes of the 1960s and 1970s The moral code would need constant support if it was to succeed in restraining the powerful impulses of human nature, and it could not

be imposed upon people from without, whether by legislation or a state police It had to be fostered within people, and the surest way to do so was by encouraging aspirations and establishing standards of behaviour, by means of the examples set by the leading elements of society This was in tune with Conservative preferences for hierarchy and social order, and for leadership and responsibility

to flow through that structure; it was also the cause of hostility to those within the elite who turned against it or whose conduct undermined it

Following from this view of human nature, the second fundamental element in Conservatism was a rejection of the rational approach This was as flawed as the humans who had developed it; indeed, that must be so, for human thought could not transcend its own nature, which contained elements of irrationality Reason could, therefore, never be ‘pure’ or ‘abstract’, nor could it be divorced from the past or detached from present society On the contrary, reason was limited, and a weak force rather than a strong one – as with individual conscience, it often could not withstand the other impulses in human nature and the temptation to wrong-doing.23 The rational approach was a fallacy not only because it ignored the nature

of humanity, but also because it sought to set itself above it, and thus to ascertain truths of superior worth and universal application To Conservatives, such claims were deeply suspicious, and they favoured the insights and warnings provided by instinct rather than logic Where they spoke of the merits of ‘common sense’, what they meant was the store of experience and custom which had been laid down by many generations, and which should not be disregarded in favour of the theory

of one person or the ephemeral fashion of one generation, however convincing

or rewarding this might appear on the surface.24 From this flowed their critique

of Socialism, which might be admirable in its utopian objectives but would never attain them due to its naive optimism and its assumption of the power of reason;

it was based upon an imaginary world, which the facts exploded.25 A criticism

of ‘Radical and Socialist theoretical politicians’ published in 1912, which would have been even more strongly endorsed by Conservatives six decades later, was

‘that they try to make that part of humanity with which they have to deal fit

23 K Feiling, What Is Conservatism? (1930), 10.

24 Goldman, Some Principles of Conservatism, 7; Feiling, Toryism, 132–3.

25 A Duff Cooper, The Conservative Point of View, National Union leaflet 2616 (1926).

their theories and their measures rather than making their measures fit the men’, and ‘because they neglect these essential unclassified elements of human nature, their well-meant measures will work evil, not good’.26

The antithesis of the ‘abstracts and systems’ which attracted the left was ‘the Conservative belief that no general principle is universally applicable’.27 Any general theory was bound by its nature to ignore specific circumstances or to seek

to override them As Conservatives from Edmund Burke in the late eighteenth century onwards had argued, the situation in which people found themselves was of more importance than the theory, not less, for the latter could be changed more easily than the former Conservatives accepted that the complexity of society and politics was such that many variable, unpredictable, contingent and transient factors were in constant interaction, in a state of malleable flux which the rationalist approach failed to encompass For this reason, ‘the first duty of

a humane government is to accept the facts of human nature as they actually are’.28 The application of principles based upon a priori reasoning was, therefore,

inappropriate, whatever abstract conception it started from – whether this was the divine right of kings, the natural rights of man or the supreme will of a dictator The same factors led Conservatives to reject the ‘spurious intellectual pride’ and programmatic nature of Liberal and Socialist policies, and to dismiss the promises made for their results: at best, these were over-optimistic and exaggerated; at worst, many Conservatives suspected, they were knowingly and cynically unattainable.29

By contrast, Conservatism was ‘a practical attitude, rather than a reasoned creed’.30 While it was founded upon truths about the human condition, these could not be extrapolated into a programme for action Conservatives certainly did not welcome chaos, especially in society or in politics, but they accepted the vagaries of human endeavour, the intrusion of the unforeseeable into the best laid plans and therefore the unpredictability of outcomes: ‘this is not a world

in which anything can be taken for granted’.31 This enjoined caution, of taking small incremental steps rather than great leaps forward, and the importance of looking behind as much as ahead, to learn from the past rather than to reject

it Conservatism provided tools other than those of reason, with tradition,

26 P Loftus, The Conservative Party and the Future (1912), 12–13.

27 Gilmour, Inside Right, 113–14; Boyd-Carpenter, Conservative Case, 5.

28 D M Crichton (ed.), Tory Oxford: Essays in University Conservatism (1935), 39.

29 Alport, About Conservative Principles, 7.

30 A Boutwood, National Revival: A Restatement of Tory Principles (1913), 4.

31 Raison, Why Conservative?, 43.

prudence, empiricism and adaptability being among the most useful There was no single path and no master plan: Conservatism ‘does not claim to possess

the keys or the Kingdom There is no certainty about the route and no certainty

about the destination’, wrote Ian Gilmour at the end of this period.32 During the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, Conservatism was above all empirical in its approach and navigated by ‘rule of thumb about what is practical and tolerable’.33 Conservatives were quite willing to be labelled as ‘pragmatic’

or ‘realist’, as they regarded these terms not as the antithesis of principle, but

as its accompaniment; in this respect, both of these terms were regarded as being very different in nature from opportunism The latter had no guiding spirit with which to keep it safe, and thus alienated Conservative opinion, as was seen with the decline and fall of the most opportunistic government of this period, the peacetime Lloyd George Coalition of 1918–22 Conservatives held that there must be a balance between principle and practise, in which each informed the other The surest guide to the best course to follow would develop from this, based not upon abstract theory propounded by individuals, but upon the strengths of the broad-based and collective fusion of experience, custom, caution, moderation, toleration and practicality which Conservatives venerated as ‘common sense’ This was something innate rather than learned, and believed by Conservatives to be a particular national characteristic of the British people which explained the stability and success of their national development, and the superiority of their existing political institutions over alternatives derived from suspect foreign sources, whether of the Marxist left

or of the Fascist right

The nature of society

The next most important foundation of Conservative principles was the belief that society was an organic entity, which had grown naturally over time.34 As with any living organism, it could not be taken apart without serious – possibly fatal – consequences for its health It was not a machine which could be operated in a predictable way once clever men had discovered the control levers, nor could it

be redesigned according to their intellectual blueprints, however neat and logical

32 Gilmour, Inside Right, 120, emphasis in the original.

33 Pickthorn, Principles and Prejudices, 7.

34 Clarke, Conservative Faith in the Modern Age, 13, 38.

these might seem on paper.35 Society was composed of a myriad of shifting connections and fluid relationships, ‘an organic whole in which the several atoms react in all their movements upon one another’, and therefore was complex and subtle to an extent which placed it beyond the comprehension of individual mortals.36 To consider otherwise was to assume a god-like omnipotence; this would inevitably be exposed as hubris and delusion, but not without having inflicted suffering – perhaps fatal – on both individual innocents and society as a whole The human society which had evolved over centuries could not be reduced

to the automated predictability of a ‘system’ or captured in the reductionism of

a ‘model’ Conservatives were suspicious and sceptical of those who sought to establish general laws of human behaviour or to discern patterns of such universal regularity that they could be defined as formulae, and so made into tools with which to manipulate society They rejected as selective and simplistic the social theories of the left, from Marx in the nineteenth century to moderate British Socialists such as Laski in the mid-twentieth, and were unconvinced by the claims

of academics in the new disciplines of the social sciences – a term which most Conservatives regarded as an oxymoron.37 The concept of restructuring society

on a ‘scientific’ basis filled most Conservatives with horror; the elimination of uncertainty which this intended was not just impossible, but also undesirable: the result would be a society fossilized, regimented and devoid of humanity.38 This was a significant element in the Conservative critique of Socialism, which ‘makes the mistake of supposing that if only the machinery is skilfully constructed it will go of itself’.39 Another concept which Conservatives rejected as a rationalist abstract fallacy was that there was a capitalized entity of ‘Society’ which had a separate existence or moral authority superior to its members; this was the point later made in Mrs Thatcher’s famous but misunderstood statement that there was ‘no such thing as Society’.40

A core element of the Conservative outlook was that inequality was a natural and inevitable part of the human condition, and so also was the stratification

of society.41 These might, at first sight, seem to be dangerous tenets to hold in

35 Hogg, Case for Conservatism, 24–5; Coleraine, For Conservatives Only, 35.

36 D Clarke, The Conservative Faith in the Modern Age (1947), 13.

37 A Maude, The Common Problem (1969), 87–91.

38 G Rippon, Right Angle: A Philosophy for Conservatives (1969), 7.

39 H M Adam, The Fallacies of Socialism (1926), 11.

40 Clarke, Conservative Faith in the Modern Age, 20; Thatcher’s comment was made in an interview published in Woman’s Own, 31 October 1987.

41 R Rose, ‘Tensions in Conservative philosophy’, Political Quarterly, 32 (1961), 281; T E Utley, Essays

in Conservatism (1949), 46; B Patterson, The Character of Conservatism (1973), 22–5; Dorey, British Conservatism, 11–15.

the era of a democratic franchise after 1918 and the succeeding impulses to the egalitarianism of World War II and the 1960s Conservatives were certainly careful of their language, so as to avoid the appearance of hostility to democracy itself (especially in the interwar period) or of reactionary intentions (especially after 1945) However, the concept itself did not need concealment from public view, as it was based upon a recognition of reality which every adult would acknowledge Humanity was not cast from one mould: it was a self-evident fact that human beings were born with different degrees of physical strength and intelligence, and to a large extent the similarly vital attributes of health and mental factors such as adaptability and resolution were also random variables Attempts to ignore or eliminate inequality were, therefore, futile endeavours and indeed unnatural in conception as they sought to replace a natural state with an artificial order, conceived on the basis of an assumed omniscience of human rationality Such order could only be imposed from outside, and applied and maintained only by regulation and – given human nature – coercion and punishment, which might range from penalizing forms of taxation to confiscation of property by nationalization and ultimately to the concentration camp and mass murder Thus, in self-defeating paradox, absolute equality could only be achieved by the most unfair and extremely inegalitarian of methods,

by using the powers of the state to intervene against the abilities, aspirations and living standards of some groups and strata in society, despite their having done nothing in breach of the law Owing to the variation of innate human characteristics, Conservatives had no faith in the probability of raising everyone

up to the level of the highest attainment, and were well aware that levelling down

to the lowest common denominator was bound to end up being the reformers’ strategy, whatever pious hopes might be on their lips at the outset; this was one

of the reasons for growing Conservative hostility, especially at grass-roots level, towards the move to comprehensive schooling from the 1960s onwards

Conservatives were not opposed to the removal of ‘irrelevant or unfair inequalities’ which acted as restraints upon attainment, provided that this could

be afforded without undue financial costs and without placing strains upon the fabric of society.42 There was an increasing element of meritocracy in the Conservative outlook, which the cultural atmosphere of the post-1945 period encouraged.43 However, it was not only long before the era of Thatcherism, but also before World War II, that the Conservatives presented themselves as the

42 Rippon, Right Angle, 13.

43 Raison, Why Conservative?, 38, 139.

promoters of opportunity and the defenders of choice They contrasted their belief in an upwards ladder, where achievement was based upon effort and merit, with a Socialist plateau of dull and discouraging uniformity There was nothing new in the assertion made in the Conservative Party policy statement of 1976:

‘we believe in levelling up, in enhancing opportunities, not levelling down’.44 The Conservative approach to improving the health of society was concerned not with the manipulation of an inert mass of humanity, but with the dynamism and motivation of the individual, which could only come from within: ‘every man should endeavour to raise himself by his own efforts to the highest point to which his nature can attain’.45 This was a matter not just of material advance but

of spiritual progress; while people had unequal gifts, there should be ‘equality

in the possibility of developing these gifts and in the right to do so’.46 Human society could seek to create either an environment which fostered this or one which stifled it; the latter became an increasingly vocal Conservative criticism

of government regulation and the operation of parts of the Welfare State by the 1970s Conservatives held strongly that individuals should be rewarded for their efforts and achievements This was firstly because, given human nature, humans would not exert themselves or be venturesome if there was no incentive and if the results of laziness and selfishness were just as good Secondly, Conservatives considered that those who were hard-working, enterprising and successful had beneficial effects upon others as well as themselves This was not only through the obvious material improvements which resulted from their innovations or the goods which they produced, the employment which they created and their greater proportionate contribution through taxation to the benefit of others; there was also a moral dimension, that society was healthier as a result of such exemplars of the virtues of forethought, insight, application and organization

In the Conservative view, social order was founded upon the rights of property, which were not a matter of selfishness or greed.47 Of course, there were owners

of property who were motivated by material acquisition or were jealous and fearful of their position and acted narrowly on that basis; this inevitable aspect

of human character was not admirable, but attempts to thwart it were folly and futile For Conservatives, the importance of property was that it provided social stability and was a guarantor of independence and privacy, and thus also of

44 The Right Approach, 18.

45 Bryant, Spirit of Conservatism, 10.

46 Clarke, Conservative Faith in the Modern Age, 8.

47 Bryant, Spirit of Conservatism, 11–15; Feiling, ‘Principles of Conservatism’, 134.

freedom.48 The possession of property gave an individual or family a measure

of security and a stake in society; in order to retain their property, they needed

to avoid unwise risks (which included political leaps in the dark), to participate

in society and politics, and to be vigilant in defence not only of their own rights but also those of all property owners Property encouraged thrift and endeavour, and fostered a sense of responsibility, all of which were of value to society as a whole as well as to the individual The possession of property satisfied natural and commendable human instincts: to establish a secure home for the family, to make provision against illness and old age, to pass on an inheritance to children,

to rely on the efforts of self rather than on the charity of strangers and to be rewarded for hard work, improved skills or good judgement.49

Property also encouraged a sense of community, and its wide diffusion would draw social classes together; therefore, saving and investment – especially

in housing – on the part of the lower classes was to be encouraged In the pamphlet of 1924 which first proposed that a ‘property-owning democracy’ be the Conservative aim, the young MP Noel Skelton argued that the stability and longevity of a civilization was directly related to ‘the widest possible extension amongst its citizens of the private ownership of property’.50 It was not necessary for this that the quantities of property should be made equal: the examples of greater ownership encouraged emulation, while confiscation for the purposes

of equalization would be a disincentive and unjust, by rewarding the lazy and feckless at the expense of the hard-working and prudent On the contrary, economic inequality was unavoidable in a free society; due to the variation in human ability and character, even if all were somehow to start out equal, they would not end up so, while the freedom to strive for gain would not be real if it did not also include the possibility of loss However, property was not something

to be enjoyed in a selfish or careless way; there was an element of trust, present in moral tone rather than in legal obligation, that property should be used in ways that increased its security and value, both of which were of benefit to society as

a whole In this sense, Conservatives were agreed that property ‘has its duties as well as its rights’.51

48 Hogg, Case for Conservatism, 97–9; Dean et al., Conservative Points of View, 10–11; The Right

Approach, 17.

49 Cecil, Conservatism, 119–20; P Worsthorne, ‘The ideological setting’, in Conservatism Today: Four

Personal Points of View (1966), 29–30.

50 N Skelton, Constructive Conservatism (1924), 9, 23; H Sellon, Whither, England? The Letters of a

Conservative (1932), 171, 157; D Eccles, About Property-Owning Democracy (1948).

51 Sir R M Banks, The Conservative Outlook (1929), 15.