Responsibility AccountingTypes of Responsibility Centers – Cost center: only responsible for costs – Revenue center: only responsible for revenues – Profit center: responsible for both r
Trang 1COST MANAGEMENT
Accounting & Control
Hansen▪Mowen▪Guan
Chapter 10 Decentralization:
Responsibility Accounting, Performance Evaluation, and Transfer Pricing
Trang 2Study Objectives
1 Define responsibility accounting, and describe the four
types of responsibility centers
2 Explain why firms choose to decentralize
3 Compute and explain return on investment (ROI),
residual income (RI), and economic value added (EVA)
4 Discuss methods of evaluating and rewarding
managerial performance
5 Explain the role of transfer pricing in a decentralized
firm
Trang 3Responsibility Accounting
Responsibility accounting
– measures the results of each responsibility center
– compares those results with some measure of
expected or budgeted outcome
Trang 4Responsibility Accounting
Types of Responsibility Centers
– Cost center: only responsible for costs
– Revenue center: only responsible for revenues
– Profit center: responsible for both revenues and costs– Investment center: responsible for revenues, costs, and investments
Trang 5Reasons for Decentralization
– Better access to local information
– More timely response
– Focusing of central management
– Training and evaluation of segment managers
– Motivation of segment managers
– Enhanced competition
Trang 6Return on investment (ROI)
the most common measure of performance for
an investment center
ROI = Operating income ÷ Average operating assets
= (Operating income ÷ Sales) × (Sales ÷ Average operating assets)
= Operating income margin × Operating asset turnover
Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
available for interest, taxes
assets are being used to
generate sales
Sales Average operating assets
Trang 7Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Trang 8Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Trang 9Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Advantages of the ROI measure
– Helps managers focus on the relationship between
sales, expenses and investment
– Encourages cost efficiency
– Discourages excessive investment in operating assets
Disadvantages of the ROI measure
– Discourages managers from investing in projects
decreasing divisional ROI but increasing profitability of the company overall
– Encourages managers to focus on the short-term at the expense of the long-term
Trang 10Residual income
the difference between operating income and the
minimum dollar return required on a company’s
operating assets
Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Residual = Operating - Minimum rate of return
Income Income × Operating assets
Trang 11Advantages of Residual Income
Measuring the Performance of
Trang 12b Residual income divided by operating assets.
Disadvantages of Residual Income
Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
ROI is an absolute measure of return; it
does not discourage myopic behavior
Trang 13Economic value added (EVA)
after-tax operating profit minus the total annual cost of capital.
Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Total capital employed = capital assets
plus other expenditures meant to have
a long-term payoff
Trang 14EVA Example
Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Trang 15EVA Example (continued)
Furman’s EVA is:
Less: Weighted average cost of capital (1,470,000)
The positive EVA means that Furman, Inc., earned operating
profit over and above the cost of the capital used.
Measuring the Performance of
Investment Centers
Trang 16Behavioral Aspects of EVA
Trang 17 Tends to focus on long-run
Discourages myopic behavior
Behavioral Aspects of EVA
Positive EVA = wealth is being created
Negative EVA = capital is being destroyed
Trang 18Measuring and Rewarding the
Performance of Mangers
• Measuring performance in the MNC
– Evaluate the division
– Evaluate the manger
• Base on factors where control exists
• Do not evaluate on factors over which there is no
control (currency fluctuations, income taxes, etc.)
Trang 19Measuring and Rewarding the
Performance of Mangers
• MNC divisional ROIs impacted by
– International vs domestic environmental conditions
(economic, legal, political, social, etc.)
• Multiple measures of performance for
MNC divisions
– Consider market potential and market share
– Residual income and ROI should not be the sole
measures for MNC divisions
Trang 20Measuring and Rewarding the
Performance of Mangers
• Managerial rewards
– Separation of ownership and management creates the possibility that managers may not operate the
business in the best interest of the shareholders
• Managers do not exert the most productive effort for the company
• Managers may spend company resources on perquisites
– A well-structured incentive compensation system
encourages goal congruence
Trang 21Measuring and Rewarding the
Performance of Mangers
• Cash compensation
– Reward good management performance by granting periodic raises
• Become a permanent part of the compensation package
– Bonuses provide more flexibility
• Income-based compensation may encourage dysfunctional behavior.
– A combination of salary and bonus keeps salaries
fairly level and allows bonuses to fluctuate with
reported income
Trang 22Measuring and Rewarding the
Performance of Mangers
• Stock-based compensation
– A stock option is the right to buy a certain number of shares of the company’s stock, at a particular price and after a set length of time
– Stock options are offered to managers
• They become owners (shareholders) of the company
• Ownership encourages goal congruence
– The price of the stock is usually set to approximate market price at the time of issue
• If the stock price rises in the future, the manager may exercise the option.
Trang 23Measuring and Rewarding the
Performance of Mangers
• Issues to consider
– Single-measure outcomes encourage gaming
behavior
– The Big Bath
– Cash bonuses and stock options encourage
short-term orientation by management
• Noncash compensation
– Autonomy
– Perquisites
Trang 24Transfer Pricing
Transfer prices are the prices charged for
goods produced by one division and
transferred to another.
The price charged affects the revenues of
the transferring division and the costs of the receiving division.
Trang 26Transfer Pricing
Opportunity cost approach identifies
– The minimum price that a selling division would be
will to accept
Floor: leaves the selling division no worse off for
having sold to an internal division– The maximum price that the buying division would be willing to pay
Ceiling: leaves the buying division no worse off for
having purchased from an internal division
Trang 27Transfer Pricing
Trang 28Setting Transfer Prices
A good should be transferred internally
whenever the opportunity cost (minimum price)
of the selling division
is less than the opportunity cost (maximum price)
of the buying division.
Trang 29Setting Transfer Prices
• Commonly used policies
• Variable cost
• Full (absorption cost)
Trang 30Negotiated transfer prices
Example 1: Avoidable Distribution Costs
Setting Transfer Prices
Trang 31Negotiated transfer prices
Example 1: Avoidable Distribution Costs
Setting Transfer Prices
Trang 32Negotiated transfer prices
Example 1: Avoidable Distribution Costs
Setting Transfer Prices
Trang 33Negotiated transfer prices
Example 2: Excess Capacity
Setting Transfer Prices
Trang 34Negotiated transfer prices
Example 2: Excess Capacity
Setting Transfer Prices
Trang 35Setting Transfer Prices
• Negotiated Transfer Prices
– Disadvantages
• Time consuming– Advantages
• Negotiation helps ensure goal congruence
• Comparable negotiating skills support motivation and accurate performance measures
Trang 36Setting Transfer Prices
• Cost-Based Transfer Prices
– Forms
• Full-cost transfer pricing
• Full cost plus markup
• Variable cost plus fixed fee– Propriety of use
• Impact on divisional profit is negligible
• Ease of cost measurement is beneficial
• Result of negotiations
Trang 37Setting Transfer Prices
• Transfer Pricing and the MNC
– Performance evaluation
– Optimal determination of income taxes
• Shift costs to high-tax countries
• Shift revenues to low-tax countries
Trang 38Setting Transfer Prices
Trang 39Setting Transfer Prices
• IRS Code §482
– Requires arms’-length transactions
– Allowable pricing methods
• Comparable uncontrolled price method
• Resale price method
• Cost-plus method
• Negotiated between the company and the IRS
• Income taxes are universal
– Market-based transfer prices
Trang 40COST MANAGEMENT
Accounting & Control
Hansen▪Mowen▪Guan
End Chapter 10