Business Environment Outlook Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings Table: Vietnam’s Commercial Banking Business Environment Rating Growth in total assets; Risks to realisatio
Trang 2Business Monitor International
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COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q1 2012
INCLUDING 5-YEAR INDUSTRY FORECASTS TO 2016
Part of BMI’s Industry Report & Forecasts Series
Published by: Business Monitor International
Copy deadline: December 2011
Trang 4CONTENTS
Executive Summary 5
Table: Levels (VNDbn) 5
Table: Levels (US$bn) 5
Table: Levels At March 2011 5
Table: Annual Growth Rate Projections 2011-2015 (%) 6
Table: Ranking Out Of 59 Countries Reviewed In 2011 6
Table: Projected Levels (VNDbn) 6
Table: Projected Levels (US$bn) 6
SWOT Analysis 7
Vietnam Commercial Banking SWOT 7
Vietnam Political SWOT 7
Vietnam Economic SWOT 8
Vietnam Business Environment SWOT 9
Business Environment Outlook 10
Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings 10
Table: Vietnam’s Commercial Banking Business Environment Rating 10
Commercial Banking Business Environment Rating Methodology 11
Table: Asia Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings 12
Global Commercial Banking Outlook 13
Asia Banking Sector Outlook 22
Table: Banks’ Bond Portfolios 28
Table: Asia Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings 29
Table: Comparison Of Loan/Deposit, Loan/Asset And Loan/GDP Ratios 30
Table: Anticipated Developments In 2012 31
Table: Comparison Of Total Assets, Client Loans And Client Deposits (US$bn) 32
Table: Comparison Of Per Capita Deposits, 2011f (US$) 33
Table: Interbank Rates And Bond Yields 34
Vietnam Banking Sector Outlook 35
Economic Outlook 39
Table: Vietnam Economic Activity, 2011-2016 41
Company Profiles 42
Vietcombank 42
Table: Key Statistics For Vietcombank, 2004-2008 (VNDmn) 43
BIDV 44
Table: Key Statistics For BIDV, 2004-2006 (VNDmn) 45
VietinBank 46
Table: Key Statistics For VietinBank, 2005-2008 (VNDmn) 47
Agribank 48
Table: Balance Sheet, 2004-2008 (VNDmn) 49
Table: Balance Sheet, 2004-2008 (US$mn) 49
Trang 5MHB Bank 50
Table: Key Statistics For MHB Bank, 2006-2008 (VNDmn) 51
Eximbank 52
Table: Balance Sheet (VNDmn, unless stated), 2005-2008 53
Table: Balance Sheet (US$mn, unless stated), 2005-2008 53
Table: Key Ratios (%),2005-2008 53
Sacombank 54
Table: Stock Market Indicators, 2005-2009 55
Table: Balance Sheet (VNDmn, unless stated), 2005-2009 55
Table: Balance Sheet (US$mn, unless stated), 2005-2009 56
Table: Key Ratios (%),2005-2009 56
Saigonbank 57
Table: Stock Market Indicators 57
Table: Balance Sheet (VNDmn, unless stated) 58
Table: Balance Sheet (US$mn, unless stated) 58
Table: Key Ratios (%) 58
SeABank 59
Table: Balance Sheet (VNDmn, unless stated) 60
Table: Balance Sheet (US$mn, unless stated) 60
Table: Key Ratios (%) 60
BMI Banking Sector Methodology 61
Commercial Bank Business Environment Ratings 62
Table: Commercial Banking Business Environment Indicators And Rationale 63
Table: Weighting Of Indicators 64
Trang 6Executive Summary
Table: Levels (VNDbn)
Date
Total assets
Client loans
Bond portfolio Other
Liabilities and capital Capital
Client deposits Other
March
2010 2,342,752.9 1,935,790.0 159,117.9 247,845.0 2,342,752.9 336,053.0 1,771,242.5 235,457.4March
2011 3,092,978.4 2,584,860.0 225,505.0 282,613.4 3,092,978.4 479,064.0 2,220,589.1 393,325.3Change,
Source: BMI; Central banks; Regulators
Table: Levels (US$bn)
Date
Total assets
Client loans
Bond portfolio Other
Liabilities and capital Capital
Client deposits Other
Table: Levels At March 2011
Loan/deposit ratio Loan/asset ratio Loan/GDP ratio
GDP Per Capita,
US$
Deposits per capita, US$
Source: BMI; Central banks; Regulators
Trang 7Table: Annual Growth Rate Projections 2011-2015 (%)
Source: BMI; Central banks; Regulator
Table: Ranking Out Of 59 Countries Reviewed In 2011
Local currency asset growth Local currency loan growth Local currency deposit growth
Source: BMI; Central banks; Regulators
Table: Projected Levels (VNDbn)
2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f
Total assets 1,747,335 2,286,351 2,953,153 3,720,973 4,614,007 5,536,808 6,644,170 7,973,004 9,567,605 Client loans 1,339,260 1,869,260 2,475,540 3,119,180 3,867,784 4,641,340 5,569,608 6,683,530 8,020,236 Client deposits 1,341,143 1,680,717 2,209,896 2,651,875 3,076,175 3,506,840 3,997,798 4,557,489 5,195,538
f = BMI forecast Source: BMI; Central banks; Regulators
Table: Projected Levels (US$bn)
2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f
Trang 8SWOT Analysis
Vietnam Commercial Banking SWOT
Untapped potential
Weaknesses Domestic banks lack capital and technology to sustain high credit growth
The financial accounts of many banks are still opaque
Opportunities Population still under-banked
Income levels likely to rise strongly over the medium term
Threats Macroeconomic instabilities threaten the credibility of the government and could
potentially drive economic policy away from further liberalisation
Vietnam Political SWOT
reforms and we do not expect major shifts in policy direction over the next five years The one-party system is generally conducive to short-term political stability
Relations with the US have witnessed a marked improvement, and Washington sees Hanoi as a potential geopolitical ally in South East Asia
Weaknesses Corruption among government officials poses a major threat to the
legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party
There is increasing (albeit still limited) public dissatisfaction with the leadership’s tight control over political dissent
Opportunities The government recognises the threat corruption poses to its legitimacy, and
has acted to clamp down on graft among party officials
Vietnam has allowed legislators to become more vocal in criticising government policies This is opening up opportunities for more checks and balances within the one-party system
Threats Macroeconomic instabilities in 2010 and 2011 are likely to weigh on public
acceptance of the one-party system, and street demonstrations to protest economic conditions could develop into a full-on challenge of undemocratic rule
Although strong domestic control will ensure little change to Vietnam’s political scene in the next few years, over the longer term, the one-party-state will probably be unsustainable
Relations with China have deteriorated over recent years due to Beijing’s more assertive stance over disputed islands in the South China Sea and domestic criticism of a large Chinese investment into a bauxite mining project in the central highlands, which could potentially cause wide-scale
Trang 9Vietnam Economic SWOT
Strengths Vietnam has been one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia in recent
years, with GDP growth averaging 7.2% annually between 2000 and 2010
The economic boom has lifted many Vietnamese out of poverty, with the official poverty rate in the country falling from 58% in 1993 to 12.0% in 2009
Weaknesses Vietnam still suffers from substantial trade, current account and fiscal
deficits, leaving the economy vulnerable to global economic uncertainties in
2011 The fiscal deficit is dominated by substantial spending on social subsidies that could be difficult to withdraw
The heavily-managed and weak dong currency reduces incentives to improve quality of exports, and also keeps import costs high, contributing to inflationary pressures
Opportunities WTO membership has given Vietnam access to both foreign markets and
capital, while making Vietnamese enterprises stronger through increased competition
The government will in spite of the current macroeconomic woes, continue to move forward with market reforms, including privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and liberalising the banking sector
Urbanisation will continue to be a long-term growth driver The UN forecasts the urban population rising from 29% of the population to more than 50% by the early 2040s
Threats Inflation and deficit concerns have caused some investors to re-assess their
hitherto upbeat view of Vietnam If the government focuses too much on stimulating growth and fails to root out inflationary pressure, it risks prolonging macroeconomic instability, which could lead to a potential crisis
Prolonged macroeconomic instability could prompt the authorities to put reforms on hold as they struggle to stabilise the economy
Trang 10Vietnam Business Environment SWOT
Strengths Vietnam has a large, skilled and low-cost workforce, that has made the
country attractive to foreign investors
Vietnam’s location - its proximity to China and South East Asia, and its good sea links - makes it a good base for foreign companies to export to the rest
of Asia, and beyond
Weaknesses Vietnam’s infrastructure is still weak Roads, railways and ports are
inadequate to cope with the country’s economic growth and links with the outside world
Vietnam remains one of the world’s most corrupt countries Its score in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index was 2.7, placing it in 22nd in the Asia-Pacific region
Opportunities Vietnam is increasingly attracting investment from key Asian economies,
such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan This offers the possibility of the transfer of high-tech skills and know-how
Vietnam is pressing ahead with the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the liberalisation of the banking sector This should offer foreign investors new entry points
Threats Ongoing trade disputes with the US, and the general threat of American
protectionism, which will remain a concern
Labour unrest remains a lingering threat A failure by the authorities to boost skills levels could leave Vietnam a second-rate economy for an indefinite period
Trang 11Business Environment Outlook
Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings
Table: Vietnam’s Commercial Banking Business Environment Rating
Growth in total assets;
Risks to realisation of returns
Regulatory framework and
Regulatory framework and
Moody’s rating for local
Source: BMI
Trang 12Commercial Banking Business Environment Rating Methodology
Since Q108, we have described numerically the banking business environment for each of the countries
surveyed by BMI We do this through our Commercial Banking Business Environment Rating (CBBER),
a measure that ensures we capture the latest quantitative information available It also ensures consistency across all countries and between the inputs to the CBBER and the Insurance Business Environment Rating, which is likewise now a feature of our insurance reports Like the Business Environment Ratings
calculated by BMI for all the other industries on which it reports, the CBBER takes into account the
limits of potential returns and the risks to the realisation of those returns It is weighted 70% to the former and 30% to the latter
The evaluation of the ‘Limits of potential returns’ includes market elements that are specific to the banking industry of the country in question and elements that relate to that country in general Within the 70% of the CBBER that takes into account the ‘Limits of potential returns’, the market elements have a 60% weighting and the country elements have a 40% weighting The evaluation of the ‘Risks to
realisation of returns’ also includes banking elements and country elements (specifically, BMI’s
assessment of long-term country risk) However, within the 30% of the CBBER that take into account the risks, these elements are weighted 40% and 60%, respectively
Further details on how we calculate the CBBER are provided at the end of this report In general, though, three aspects need to be borne in mind in interpreting the CBBERs The first is that the market elements
of the ‘Limits of potential returns’ are by far the most heavily weighted of the four elements They
account for 60% of 70% (or 42%) of the overall CBBER Second, if the market elements are significantly higher than the country elements of the ‘Limits of potential returns’, it usually implies that the banking sector is (very) large and/or developed relative to the general wealth, stability and financial infrastructure
in the country Conversely, if the market elements are significantly lower than the country elements, it usually means that the banking sector is small and/or underdeveloped relative to the general wealth, stability and financial infrastructure in the country Third, within the ‘Risks to the realisation of returns’ category, the market elements (ie: how regulations affect the development of the sector, how regulations
affect competition within it, and Moody’s Investor Services’ ratings for local currency deposits) can be markedly different from BMI’s long-term risk rating
Trang 13
Table: Asia Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings
Limits of Potential Returns
Risks to Potential
Market Structure Structure Country Market Risks Country Risks Rating Ranking
Trang 14Global Commercial Banking Outlook
Europe On The Brink
The biggest risk to the global commercial banking sector remains the European crisis, with the worst-case scenario of a euro bloc breakup looming large in the background, and the health of the global banking sector hanging in the balance Our core global economic view is that the world is not about to enter a double-dip recession, but that weak ongoing growth leaves the global economy fragile, and thus
susceptible to a major shock A disorderly eurozone breakup would have devastating consequences for core eurozone banks, given their exposure to peripheral eurozone debt Furthermore, with sovereign bond spreads soaring, commercial banks exposed to European debt are seeing their balance sheets erode, with the effect compounded by a weak economy hurting lending conditions The market is discounting a negative outcome for bank asset value, with European and US bank shares trading well below book value
We stress that our core scenario for the eurozone is one of ‘muddle through’ rather than ‘meltdown’ Furthermore, the exact path of events in the eurozone is difficult to predict, with potential outcomes including a full breakup of the monetary union, to austerity-induced recession, to European Central Bank support for the banking sector However, it is worth looking at the potential contagion risks from a European financial crisis Looking at the commercial banking universe covered by BMI, direct exposure
to the weakest links in the eurozone is fairly limited, and is (unsurprisingly) most prevalent in European states We are also acutely aware of the potential for contagion from a European financial crisis into emerging markets However, looking at the data, emerging market exposure is mainly concentrated in Emerging Europe, as one would expect given the significant degree of banking sector integration across the continent over the past two decades Furthermore, emerging markets tend to be exposed to the
European banking sector on the liabilities side, far more than on the assets side (in other words, they are
in danger of having European banks pulling lending from their economies) The following chart shows European banks’ lending as a percentage of the destination country’s GDP Unsurprisingly, major
financial centres figure prominently (eg Hong Kong, Singapore and the UK), as do emerging European economies
Trang 15If European Banks Pull Out, How Bad Would It Be?
European Cross-Border Bank Lending To Country As % of Country’s GDP
(Excluding Eurozone)
Source: BMI, Bank for International Settlements
The accompanying chart draws upon Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data, and shows border bank lending to the ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) as a percentage of
cross-commercial banking sectors’ total foreign lending exposure Here, core eurozone banking sectors
including Germany and France’s, and major developed markets such as the UK, are heavily exposed
Trang 16Emerging Markets Fairly Well-Insulated From Direct Exposure
Lending To PIIGS As % of Total Foreign Lending Exposure
Source: BMI, Bank for International Settlements
Looking solely at our commercial banking universe, lending exposure to the PIIGS as a percentage of national commercial banking systems’ assets shows that Austria, Germany and France are the most heavily exposed to a peripheral eurozone crisis These exposures are relatively small, as they do not include sovereign bond holdings, but they show fairly clearly that a) the core eurozone states are the most exposed, and b) emerging markets are not heavily exposed, at least not directly As the Lehman Brothers crisis taught us, however, the collapse of a major financial institution can have wide-reaching and
unpredictable effects
Trang 17Core Eurozone Most Exposed To Periphery
Exposure To PIIGS As % of Banking Sector Assets
Source: BMI, Bank for International Settlements
EM: Regional Outlooks
On a region-by-region basis, the risks to emerging commercial banking sectors come largely from abroad, with economic growth in Europe, the US and China all set to slow, and the eurozone crisis rumbling on
Emerging Asia: The regional outlook for Asian banks has deteriorated significantly in recent months, as
the yet unresolved European fiscal debt crisis as well as sluggish US growth threatens economic growth within Asia Moreover, there is also the significant threat of a reduction of European lending to Asian banks, both in terms of trade financing and longer-term business loans – that may threaten to destabilise the balance sheets of lenders within the Asian region In addition, we believe Asian banks will also have
to contend with an abrupt slowdown in Chinese economic growth, led by a steep contraction in domestic money supply growth that should constrain lending activity and hence, overall activity within China
Trang 18Some Biting Off More Than They Can Chew
Asia – Loan-To-Deposit Ratio, %
Source: BMI
Latin America: Massive capital inflows since late 2009, particularly into the more dynamic South
American economies, has increased the risk of tighter liquidity exposing weaknesses in banks’ balance sheets, concerns which were reinforced following the wealth of headlines about dubious lending practices
in Brazil and Chile, the region’s two most developed banking sectors Yet despite the selloff in equities,
to date no country has suffered a major threat to its banking sector from external headwinds, and in our view, any systemic risks that do emerge will be home grown, prompted by excessively loose monetary conditions and/or too much state intervention in local credit markets The countries’ we believe are most exposed to this risk are Argentina and Venezuela, with the others set to suffer no more than a cyclical slowdown in credit growth and subdued profitability as regulators enforce stricter provisions for bad credit The one possible exception is Brazil, where the authorities’ desire to maintain strong economic growth may yet harm financial stability, although our core scenario remains for a period of consolidation followed by a more sustainable growth trajectory
Trang 19Few Have Grown As Aggressively As Brazil
Source: BMI, central banks, banking supervisory bodies
Emerging Europe: We maintain our broadly constructive view on Central and Eastern European banking
sectors due to lower levels of leverage as compared to Western European banks and more sound
macroeconomic backdrops that will help promote growth and we expect the broad-based recovery to continue at a relatively slow pace in most markets However, we caution that risks to this outlook are mounting in light of the ongoing eurozone debt crisis and signs that the global slowdown may be more sustained than we had previously expected Indeed, we expect this continued moderation of economic expansion combined with more cautious lending practices to weigh on banks’ profitability going forward
We also believe that given the less supportive external environment, banking sectors with a more
domestic focused funding structure are better placed to weather the slowdown (we view the Czech
Republic and Poland most positively)
Trang 20Generally Slow Recovery In Europe With Few Outliers
Central and Eastern Europe – Loan Growth, % chg y-o-y
Source: central banks
Sub-Saharan Africa: The outlook is mixed for the three major Sub-Saharan African markets covered by
BMI – the South African, Nigerian and Kenyan banking sectors We see Nigeria as having the strongest growth potential over the short term, while South Africa should see slow but stable expansion, and Kenya will likely struggle amid various macroeconomic challenges
Trang 21A Mixed Bag
Kenya, Nigeria & South Africa – Banking Sector Asset Growth, % y-o-y
Source: Central banks, BMI
Middle East & North Africa: The outlook for banking sectors across the region continues to diverge,
with elevated exposure to Europe and lingering political risks likely to see the performance of financial institutions in North African oil importers lag far behind their hydrocarbon-rich peers in the Gulf Given ample liquidity across the region, the main obstacle to a more pronounced ramp up in lending activity points to elevated risk aversion on the part of many financial institutions This would seem to suggest that once fears surrounding the strength of the global economy begin to subside, many banks will be in a solid position to aggressively ramp up lending, reversing the multi-year trend of single-digit credit expansion that has prevailed since the burst credit bubble of 2009
Trang 22Qatar Leading The Way
GCC – Loan Growth, % yoy
Source: BMI/central banks
Trang 23Asia Banking Sector Outlook
Uneven Banking Risk Exposure Across Region
BMI View: Amid the recent slump in global consumer and investor confidence due to economic
instability in the EU and the US, the banking sectors of certain Asian countries are relatively more
exposed than others With the recent creep-up in the share of mortgage loans as a percentage of total
loans amid a weakening housing sector, we regard Australian banks as the single most vulnerable group
within the region By contrast, economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong should remain financially
more stable despite facing similar price instability in their respective real estate markets
The regional outlook for Asian banks have deteriorated significantly in recent months, as the yet
unresolved European fiscal debt crisis as well as sluggish US growth threatens economic growth within
Asia Moreover, there is also the significant threat of a reduction of European lending to Asian banks,
because such debt makes up about 25% of total foreign lending - both in terms of trade financing and
longer-term business loans - that may threaten to destabilise the balance sheets of lenders within the
Asian region
In addition, we believe Asian banks will also have to contend with an abrupt slowdown in Chinese
economic growth, led by a steep contraction in domestic money supply growth that should constrain
lending activity and hence, overall activity within China With the tightening of liquidity, anecdotal
reports of small-to-medium sized enterprises - which have had to resort to raising funds from the shadow
banking system that charges exorbitant interest rates - going bankrupt in cities such as Wenzhou are
beginning to surface
From a macroeconomic perspective, the slide in real GDP growth in Q311 to 9.1% year-on-year from
9.5% in the preceding quarter, provides support to our view that the country is in its nascent stages of a
prolonged slowdown (see our online service, October 17 2011, ‘No Cure For The Credit Hangover’)
This does not bode well for key trading partners, which are already facing the prospect of lower external
demand from key EU and US buyers With these factors in mind, we believe banking sectors across the
region will face heightened risks to asset and loan growth, forcing overall industry expansion to slow or
even turn negative
Trang 24Overreliance On Mortgage Loans
Asia – Mortgage Loans By Country, % of total loans
Sources: RBA, RBNZ, HKMA
Prospect Of Property Slowdown Compounds Fears
Apart from external concerns, we also highlight that certain Asian lenders will be heavily exposed to a domestic slump in property prices, where economies such as Australia, and Hong Kong having among the highest exposures, with mortgage loans making up 58.8% and 50.3% of total loans respectively (China is similarly exposed to a real estate slump as well, although indirectly, through soaring construction loans) Ominously, growth in property prices in both places have fallen significantly over the past few quarters, suggesting substantial downward pressure on loan growth for these economies in 2012, turning negative
in countries including Australia and Hong Kong
Trang 25Smaller Proportion
Asia – Mortgage Loans By Country, % of total loans
Sources: BNM, MAS, BOK
Other key countries with rapidly cooling property prices include Taiwan and Singapore as their respective administrations have put in place measures to stem a runaway bubble from forming In Taiwan, the Kuomintang-led government introduced a property tax on non-self-use properties in June, with the levy ranging between 10% and 15% depending on the assets’ holding period In Singapore, National
Development Minister Khaw Boon Wan has accelerated the release of residential land supply, as well as the number of built-to-order public housing units, in order to meet rising demand These interim
measures, while detrimental to the banks’ loan books in the short term, should help prevent a sharp downward shock to the financial industry over the longer term due to a more orderly unwinding of the property bubble
Trang 26Some Biting Off More Than They Can Chew
Asia – Loan-To-Deposit Ratio, %
Source: BMI
Keeping A Close Eye On Leverage
Overall, we believe countries with a higher degree of leverage will be more vulnerable in the face of the current global slowdown We believe risks will be the highest in the heavily leveraged economies,
particularly Australia, South Korea, and Vietnam, with the loan-to-deposit ratios averaging 115.7% By contrast, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan remain far less exposed than their regional counterparts, with the ratio coming in at a mean of only 71.7% As a result, we see far limited downside for the latter group of banks compared with the former
Trang 27Going Down Under
Asia – Growth Rate Of Housing Price Index, % chg y-o-y
Sources: RP Data Rismark, RADD
In particular, we single out Australia as the single most vulnerable financial sector within the Asian
region The country is exposed both externally to China (see ‘If China Sneezes, Australia Catches
Pneumonia’, September 19 2011) due to its mining sector’s reliance on Chinese buyers as well as
internally on a property slump (see ‘Banks’ Profitability Going Down’, August 8 2011) We believe the
negative impact of a sell-down in Australian home prices will have an outsized impact on firms such as
the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Westpac Banking Corporation, as personal and
commercial loan growth remain in the red
Trang 28Looking For A Bounce
MSCI Singapore Financials Index (RHS) v ASX200 Financials Index (LHS)
Source: BMI
Singapore Over Australia: Seeing Value In Relative Stability
With this in mind, we see relative fundamental value in a ‘bullish Singapore, bearish Australian banks’ view Singapore banking stocks suffered a major beating over the past two months amid the rise in global uncertainty relative to their Australian counterparts This forced the ratio of MSCI Singapore Financials index to the ASX200 Financials index to break below support in September Given Singaporean banks’ relative advantage, a strong bounce could potentially push the ratio back to the previous upward trendline resistance at around 0.0575
Trang 29Table: Banks’ Bond Portfolios
Bond Portfolio, US$bn Bond as % total assets Year-on-year growth %
Trang 30Table: Asia Commercial Banking Business Environment Ratings
Limits of Potential Returns
Risks to Potential
Market Structure Structure Country Market Risks Country Risks Rating Ranking
Trang 31Table: Comparison Of Loan/Deposit, Loan/Asset And Loan/GDP Ratios
Loan/Deposit ratio % Rank Trend
Loan/Asset ratio % Rank Trend
Loan/GDP ratio % Rank Trend
South
United
Source: Central banks, regulators, BMI
Trang 32Table: Anticipated Developments In 2012
Loan/Deposit
Loan Growth, US$bn
Deposit Growth, US$bn
Residual, US$bn
Incorporates estimated economic data and projected banking data Source: Central banks, regulators, BMI
Trang 33Table: Comparison Of Total Assets, Client Loans And Client Deposits (US$bn)
Total Assets
Client Loans
Client Deposits
Total Assets
Client Loans
Client Deposits