CoRRuptIon, Global SECuRIty phần 10 docx

The keyquestion here is whether the requirements for good governance identify themost appropriate conditions and reform priorities to accelerate and sustaineconomic development.The quali

47 percent in Bangladesh, compared with 23 percent in Pakistan A site for going to secondary school, of course, is completing primary school.The net enrollment rate of girls in primary school was 89 percent inBangladesh, compared with 49 percent in Pakistan in 2003 By any measure,this program has been successful in getting girls enrolled.

prerequi-If we look only at the World Bank financing for the stipend program from

1994 through 1999, it provided $68 million to support stipends and tuition for1.6 million girls That comes to about $14 a year per girl This is an amountpaid above and beyond the normal subsidies for children in schools For thismarginal payment, the school system, parents, and the girls have respondedvigorously If some of the cash losses caused today by teacher absenteeismcould be redirected to programs with similar impacts, the change in produc-tivity would go from negative to wildly positive

The stipend program has had problems, though Administrative costs havebeen about 18 percent.22Graduation rates for the girls have been disappoint-ing (due to low school leaving exam results), the design of the program gaveschools an incentive to enroll as many girls as possible even if there was notroom for them, and there was obvious cheating by some schools and girls

On the positive side, all of these problems came to light because of theinformation system that is required to make payments to girls and schools.Unlike the case of the India DIR, the money can be traced to its final desti-nation because the whole system depends on payments against reports (e.g.,enrollment, attendance, exam scores) Prices cannot be inflated to financecash kickbacks, as the values of the stipend and tuition are fixed; only quan-tities can vary The nature of the intervention creates the digital trail neededfor enforcement, and it is possible to cross-check results.23For the same rea-son, conditional cash transfer programs have been successful in many envi-ronments, with low leakage rates and large impacts The cash goes to the finalbeneficiary, who of course may at times be criminally zealous about gettingthe money However, only a small amount is at risk with each individual orhousehold, and data analysis can reveal problems and risks.24

Options in Health

In health, solving the principal-agent problem is much more problematic.Compare, for example, a primary care clinic and a primary school or a sec-ondary school and a hospital In education, there is a long-term relationship

of eight or nine months between the principal and the agent, with a preciouscommodity involved (the child) Parents can acquire substantial informationabout performance and act on it If they have more than one child or just talk

to other parents, they can gain even more information about schools, ers, and results If empowered, as in EDUCO, parents have shown that theycan become effective supervisors of schools Parental capabilities to oversee arerobust and can extend to secondary schools, as shown in New Zealand.

teach-In health, contacts are more episodic, and there is a wider gulf in edge between the provider and the client There are greater limitations oncommunity oversight The result has been the shifting of more health sectorrelationships into the realm of competitive markets For example, while manycountries of the former Soviet Union have had limited or easily reversed expe-riences with democratic reforms, most have shifted with gusto from monop-olized, low-accountability, high-provider-discretion health care to systemswhere there is a separation between financing and provision, more consumerchoice, more (but uneven) accountability, less provider discretion, and moreinformation for everyone These evolving health markets are far from perfect,but there has been a consistent attempt to shift from systems where publicfunding follows doctors and hospitals to systems where public funding followsthe patient and where the suppliers compete This change has to be accom-panied by regulation and robust accreditation, neither of which develops well

knowl-in government-owned and -managed health care delivery systems (knowl-in whichcase the regulator also delivers the service)

Increasingly, low- and middle-income countries are moving in this samedirection China, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Rwanda, Turkey,and Vietnam, among others, have in just the past few years started to movetoward funding health services through subsidized insurance that follows thepatient As this intervention develops, ownership and control of facilities must

be addressed so that hospitals and clinics are forced into more business-likebehaviors Incentives for absenteeism disappear as, with the secondary schools

in Bangladesh, clients become more attractive because they are the sources ofrevenue Excess delivery of services becomes the public policy problem Asfacilities become independent—whether owned by the government or not—their abilities to tap private sources of investment finance increase Over-building and over-equipping becomes the problem, not incomplete worksand unsuitable equipment that does not function

Conclusion

This chapter has been no more than an exploration from an operational point of how to combat corruption in government health and education Cor-ruption can come in all three types of inputs in both sectors—labor, capital

stand-investment, and supplies A fairly convincing story can be developed that thesource of most losses in both sectors lies in shirking by civil servants It hasbeen measured by absenteeism surveys, although of course there are otherdimensions (such as poor performance when they show up for work) There

is, undoubtedly, corruption in capital investments, maintenance, logistics,and the purchase and supply of consumables, but these corrupt acts aredwarfed by shirking because labor consumes so much of public budgets, typ-ically crowding out these other inputs It is also difficult to tease out the losses

in these other areas that are due to poor performance (rather than to ruption) of civil servants

cor-Corruption and poor performance can be reduced through better policing,better fiduciary systems, and better leadership However, it is a long, slowprocess to change institutions that have developed certain patterns of behav-ior over many decades A simple rule change does not solve the underlyingproblem, and the PFM performance reviews in Africa and Latin America donot instill confidence that fiduciary systems can be improved quickly.Therefore it is important to focus on other means—paradigm shifts pos-sibly—by which government programs are designed so that they take advan-tage of the self interest of the parties that are involved and put the principals

in control of the agents These changes can take place relatively quickly, evenduring a civil war, once the principals are given the power and information toact They have an interest in doing so Moreover, changing program designsare probably more reliable ways under any circumstance to improve the per-formance of the agents relative to what could be accomplished through cen-tral control systems Motivation, supervision, and incentives are the issue,and they can be provided by the principals I hope that I have demonstratedthat this change can be relatively straightforward in education Market-basedsolutions can also be tried in education, but much can be accomplished byreorganizing authority in the public system

In health, it seems inescapable that greater use of markets is necessary Inthat case, it is a matter of putting purchasing power in the hands of the prin-cipal—in this case, the patient—and flipping current power relationships inthe public sector on their heads As this is done, the system will quickly shiftfrom under-delivering services to over-delivering them

In both education and health, the post-reform shift of some power fromthe provider (the agent) to the consumer (the principal) reduces the need forold-style fiduciary controls on procurement Presumably more procurementwould be done at the point of service, where parents can observe closely howthe money is spent, or in the market where the owner has an incentive to get

value for money As a result, much less large-scale central or state ment procurement would be needed.

govern-On the financial management side, the demands would be great to be able

to follow the money and account for it by the end recipient The recipientsthemselves—whether school committees, parents, or patients—will demand

to get the funding or services to which they are entitled This change gives ernments the opportunity to develop systems that deliver and account forthe funds As with the Bangladesh stipend program, such systems also create

gov-a control environment in which money cgov-an be mgov-atched gov-aggov-ainst receipts gov-andperformance contracts

A new approach to reducing corruption would in the first instance focus

on reducing absenteeism and shirking It would also shift risks of formance nearer to the point of service delivery, where they can be observed

non-per-by interested parties and acted on It would require that parents and patients

be given more authority over their agents in the classroom or the clinic ruption would not be eliminated, but the fiduciary systems supporting such

Cor-a shift would be fCor-ar more Cor-able to “follow the money,” which is essentiCor-al to keep

a system as honest as possible

A reasonable case may be made that the incentive-focused changes gested here would be as long term and difficult to make as improvements inthe fiduciary, or control, environment The latter must be strengthened underany circumstance, but making a few important changes to how educationand health programs operate can simplify and strengthen the impact of fidu-ciary reforms that are carried out, and it can allow them to be more focused.Recruiting those who have an interest in the products of the education andhealth systems to watch more carefully and take more responsibility for howrobustly they operate is an intervention of a fundamentally different charac-ter from one aimed at changing the behavior of a procurement officer.People worry about the time that is required to make fundamental reformssuch as putting schools under control of parent-led boards Virtually all thetime cost of making that change is in the political decision-making process.Once that is done, service providers’ expected behavior changes should takeplace quickly as the newly empowered parties start to make decisions, chang-ing both incentives and the nature of supervision In contrast, for fiduciaryreform, not only do we face the time cost of political decision-making because

sug-of entrenched interests in the status quo, but the behavioral response is farfrom guaranteed Changing the behavior of bureaucrats, service delivery per-sonnel, and suppliers can take decades when the change is expected to comefrom within

Empowering those who depend on health and education services todemand greater accountability is the key missing ingredient in efforts to reduceopportunities for corruption in the social sectors This statement is an asser-tion based on the logic, suggestive guesses for India, and other evidence pre-sented in this chapter However, efforts to solve the problem through stricterenforcement, policing, forensic reviews, and rules have no stronger empirical

or theoretical basis Evaluation of alternative approaches is obviously in order

It is clear that poor children are getting a raw deal from their education andhealth systems, as are tax payers and donors Treating corruption in educationand health as a principal-agent problem broadens the set of tools that can beused to address corruption and has the potential to unleash a powerful posi-tive output response in systems that are woefully underperforming

Notes

1 In health, there are a number of excellent surveys with extensive phies Two good starting points are Maureen Lewis, “Governance and Corruption in

bibliogra-Public Health Care Systems,” Working Paper No 78 (Washington, D.C., 2006) and

Taryn Vian, “Review of Corruption in the Health Sector: Theory, Methods, and

Inter-ventions,” Health Policy and Planning, XXIII (2008), 83–94.

2 In education, the literature is more sparse and is focused on country cases and

teacher absenteeism See Jacques Hallak and Muriel Poisson, Corrupt Schools, Corrupt Universities: What Can be Done? (Paris, 2007), available at http://unpan1.un.org/

intradoc/groups/public/documents/unesco/unpan025403.pdf (accessed 11 March 2009); Harry Anthony Patrinos and Ruth Kagia, “Maximizing the Performance of Education Systems: The Case of Teacher Absenteeism,” in J Edgardo Campos and

Sanjay Pradhan (eds.), The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level (Washington, D.C., 2007).

3 The calculations combine information from Table 17-1 and Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009 (Paris, 2008) It was published jointly by the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

4 Indo-Dutch Project Management Society, Following the Public Health Delivery Trail: A Worm’s Eye-View of the Health Spend (Bangalore, 2008).

5 Sangeeta Raja and Donald A Hicks, “Designing a Strategic Public Sector Healthcare Supply Chain for Kenya: Driving Service Improvements through Supply Chain Excellence Using Advanced Modeling Software,” AIDS Campaign Team for Africa Learning Series presentation at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 18 Febru- ary 2009.

6 World Bank, Department of Institutional Integrity, Report of Investigation into Reproductive and Child Health 1 Project Credit N0180 India (Washington, D.C., 2005) This report is labeled “strictly confidential” but was obtained by the Wall

Street Journal and can be found at http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/090407

in award of contract, bid document drafted narrowly to favor specific bidder, ingly fraudulent documents, procurement officials’ inconsistent reliance on product literature.” Ibid., 72.

seem-9 The discussion of the Government of India’s response is drawn from World

Bank, World Bank Response to Detailed Implementation Review India Health Sector 2006–2007 (Washington, D.C., 2008) This report is labeled “strictly confidential” but was obtained by the Wall Street Journal and can be found at http://online.wsj.com/

12 OECD, Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems, Version 4

(Paris, 2006), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/36/37390076.pdf (accessed 12 March 2009).

13 Omowunmi Ladipo, Alfonso Sanchez, and Jamil Sopher, “Effective and parent Governance of Public Expenditures in Latin America and the Caribbean: Revi- talizing Reforms in Financial Management and Procurement” (Washington, D.C.,

Trans-2009, forthcoming in the World Bank’s Directions in Development book series).

14 Alfonso Sanchez, “Procurement Systems in Sub-Saharan African Countries: Hindering or Helping Improve Public Spending?” Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C., 2009).

15 See Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Program,“Public Financial Management Performance Measurement Framework” (Washington, D.C., 2005), avail- able at www.pefa.org/pfm_performance_frameworkmn.php (accessed 19 April 2009).

16 Håkon Mundal, Public Financial Management Performance Report–Norway— Based on PEFA Methodology (Oslo, 2008) The Ministry of Finance’s reactions to low

scores were: (a) weaknesses in procurement practices and follow-up to external audit findings would be addressed; (b) multi-year program/sector budgeting, limited extent

of internal audit, no consolidated overview of risks from autonomous agencies, and public corporations are not high priorities; (c) local health and education services are municipal responsibilities, central government will not get involved.

17 Matthew Andrews, “PFM in Africa: Where are We, How Did We Get Here, Where Should We Go?” Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C., 2009).

18 Darlyn Meza, José L Guzmán, and Lorena De Varela, “EDUCO: A Managed Education Program in Rural Areas of El Salvador,” paper presented at

Community-“Reducing Poverty, Sustaining Growth—What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why: A Global Exchange for Scaling Up Success, Scaling Up Poverty Reduction,” Shanghai, 25–27 May 2004.

19 Emmanuel Jimenez and Yasuyuki Sawada, “Do Community-Managed Schools

Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador’s EDUCO Program,” The World Bank Economic Review, XIII (1999), 415–441.

20 This paragraph was adapted from www.minedu.govt.nz/educationSectors/ Schools.aspx A brief exploration of this website will give the reader a feeling for how well this reform has become institutionalized and the resources that are available to sup- port the boards of trustees For a good, up-to-date narrative on some aspects of the sys-

tem, see Norman LaRocque, “School Choice: Lessons from New Zealand,” Education Forum Briefing Papers No 12 (Washington, D.C., 2005), available at www.education

forum.org.nz/documents/policy/briefing_no_12.pdf (accessed 13 March 2009).

21 Robert E Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, 1991).

22 Shahidur R Khandker, Mark M Pitt, and Nobuhiko Fuwa, Subsidy to Promote Girls’ Secondary Education: The Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh (Washington,

D.C., 2003).

23 World Bank, “Project Performance Assessment Report, Bangladesh Female ondary School Assistance Project (Credit 2469),” Report No 26226 (Washington, D.C., 2003); Janet Raynor and Kate Wesson, “The Girls’ Stipend Program in

Sec-Bangladesh,” Journal of Education for International Development, II (2006), available

at www.equip123.net/JEID/articles/3/Bangladesh.pdf (accessed 13 March 2009); nifer Hove, “Barriers to Girls’ Secondary School Participation in Rural Bangladesh,”

Jen-CPR Commentary No 5 (Dhaka, 2007).

24 Ariel Fiszbein and Norbert Schady, Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing sent and Future Poverty (Washington, D.C., 2009).

Corruption adversely affects development in many different ways,especially by diverting resources that may be invested productively and bycausing uncertainty for investors Efficient markets are defined as those withlow transaction costs, particularly the costs of negotiating and enforcing con-tracts If these costs are high, markets are inefficient, and transactions, includ-ing investments, become less likely

The economic argument for the good governance agenda can be rized as follows Poor economic development performance is blamed on inef-ficient, high-transaction-cost markets Inefficient markets are blamed on wel-fare-reducing government interventions, especially those that cause insecureproperty rights with uncertain, potentially high-cost implications Unstableproperty rights and welfare-reducing interventions are then explained bywhat rent seekers pay to secure economic advantage Such payments limit theaverage person’s ability to establish a connection between government policyand democratic accountability, allowing the abuses to persist

summa-Good governance indicators become necessary conditions for low action costs in market economies, and thus, they become preconditions fordevelopment Consequently, good governance proponents advocate ambi-tious policies to break out of this trap Unlike the traditional economic reformthat focuses on economic liberalization, these approaches require many insti-tutional reforms

trans-However, there is, at best, a weak and moot relationship between therequirements of the good governance agenda and improved economic per-formance Other conditions needed to accelerate and sustain economic

18

Good Governance, Anti-Corruption, and Economic Development

jomo kwame sundaram

I am greatly indebted to Mushtaq Khan, but do not implicate him in any way.

growth are not usually identified by the good governance approach The keyquestion here is whether the requirements for good governance identify themost appropriate conditions and reform priorities to accelerate and sustaineconomic development.

The quality of governance cannot be directly measured; so instead, proxyindicators, often based on subjective judgments and opinions, are utilized.Although many governance indicators are methodologically subjective innature, they are widely perceived by their users as objective and utilized todraw policy conclusions and recommendations that are rarely justified.Advanced countries score better on all governance indicators compared toboth converging and diverging developing countries, suggesting that higherper capita incomes generally improve governance indicators The data showthat richer countries generally have better governance, lower corruption and

so on, but the causality is unclear.1For corruption and other governance cators to become developmental policy priorities, good governance shouldclearly enhance economic growth This presumed relationship between gov-ernance indicators and growth rates is weak, and often disappears with theinclusion of other variables such as investment rates.2Even when corruptionand other governance variables improve, Khan shows that overall economicperformance can remain weak

indi-Significant differences in economic performance between converging anddiverging developing countries are not explained only by good governanceindicators Data for all countries for the 1980s show a weak positive relation-ship between governance quality and economic growth Governance indica-tors were only marginally better for converging compared with divergingdeveloping countries, while both groups were significantly worse than theadvanced countries The large differences in growth rates between convergingand diverging developing countries were not associated with significant dif-ferences in governance quality in the 1980s or 1990s Meanwhile, the “medianconverging developing country” had a marginally poorer governance indexcompared with the “median diverging developing country.”3

The median corruption indices for both converging and diverging oping countries were similar in the 1980s and 1990s, but both groups scoredsignificantly worse than the advanced countries.4Meanwhile, although thereundoubtedly are significant governance differences between converging anddiverging developing countries, the differences in their governance charac-teristics are not identified by the good governance indicators

devel-Khan shows that converging and diverging developing countries do notcontrast significantly in terms of their average governance characteristics, but

differ significantly in terms of economic growth performance.5While goodgovernance advocates claim that diverging countries will develop and thusbecome advanced countries by implementing good governance reforms, Khannotes that no country has ever first improved its governance characteristicsand then increased its growth rate to achieve advanced country status Oncegrowth has accelerated, the implementation of good governance reforms may

be desirable, and such reforms may even be necessary to sustain growth.However, there is no evidence that the full good governance agenda—allthe indicators that are identified as significant for development and thosethat are promoted by the World Bank or the Millennium Challenge Corpo-ration—can be fully implemented in poor countries or that such reforms arepreconditions for growth in poorly performing countries Undoubtedly, poorgovernance may be the stumbling block to development, but in suchinstances, “good enough,” pragmatic, or necessary developmental reforms—rather than the entire good governance agenda—have proved sufficient toremove the bottlenecks that prevent development The governance reformsthat are undertaken by developing country governments, which have beenconducive to development, clearly support the case for pragmatism, ratherthan dogmatism, in governance reforms that are needed for development.Such governance reforms are undoubtedly context-specific, and shouldtherefore be conceived after careful consideration of the stumbling blocks todevelopment, their origins or causes, as well as the factors that sustain them.Consequently, the identification and imposition of ostensibly universal bestpractices—irrespective of the specific governance bottlenecks to develop-ment—have probably contributed to the failure of the good governanceagenda approach to reform The universal good governance agenda is there-fore problematic, not only because it demands more than is needed, and thusincreases the likelihood of failure, but also, more important, because itrequires inappropriate, if not anti-developmental, reforms

Available evidence does not point to any single set of institutions thathave accelerated growth in all advanced or converging countries The WorldBank recognized the critical role that the government played in East Asiandevelopment, but warned that such governance capacities were absent inother developing countries, therefore these other countries should not adoptEast Asian–type strategies.6The bank was thus effectively asking countrieswith poor governance capacities to achieve new good governance capacitiesthat no poor country had historically achieved, claiming that such gover-nance capacities would ensure faster growth, despite the absence of evidence

to that effect.7

The Causes of Corruption in Developing Countries

Many commentators have offered their opinions on the ostensible causes ofcorruption in developing countries First, the most influential view is thatcorruption is principally due to the greed of public officials who abuse theirdiscretionary powers for their own self-interest (self-seeking bureaucrats orpoliticians) The weakness of central government, in turn, encourages preda-tion, a scourge in many developing countries Anti-corruption strategies musttherefore strengthen appropriate governmental enforcement capacities.Second, weaknesses in enforcing legal rights, including property and con-tractual rights, produce higher costs for negotiating, enforcing, and protect-ing contracts Weakly protected property rights or poorly enforced contrac-tual rights and their associated corruption seem widespread in developingcountries However, with sustained high growth, as well as greater social andpolitical stability, economic expectations become more stable, helping to sus-tain investment and growth In other words, corruption tends to decline withsustained economic development

Third, clientelism—or patron-client relations or “political corruption”—

is often associated with efforts by politicians or others to retain or gain power.Developing countries’ governments and politicians may resort to such meas-ures to maintain political stability, often because the underlying problems(the factors that are conducive to or encourage clientelism) cannot beaddressed by more conventional programs, owing to fiscal constraints Clien-telism must be regulated to limit its most damaging effects, while the ability

of governments to budget and spend according to their own priorities, ratherthan according to those that are imposed through aid or debt conditionalties,should be enhanced to achieve social and political stability through trans-parent fiscal transfers to the deserving

Fourth, corruption and rent-seeking that are associated with needed ernment interventions cannot be addressed simply by privatization or liber-alization The conventional critique of rent-seeking presumes that rents thatare created by governmental interventions will be completely dissipated byrent-seeking behavior; thus, rent-seeking can only be wasteful However, there

gov-is no theoretical or empirical support for thgov-is presumption, fatally mining such a critique of rents due to government interventions As Schum-peter acknowledged, rents constitute important incentives for innovativebehavior, which are essential for economic progress The major policy chal-lenge then is to limit wasteful and unnecessary rent-seeking to maximize thegains from such behavior State capacities should be strengthened to better

under-motivate innovative and entrepreneurial behavior, while enforcing improvedregulations to reduce associated rent-seeking.

While all corruption is damaging and undesirable, some types of tion are much more damaging than others Claiming to fight corruption indeveloping countries generally (by implementing a laundry list of desiredgovernance reforms) sounds impressive and deserving of support, but suchefforts ignore more feasible and targeted policies that can improve economicperformance As it is virtually impossible to address all types of corruptionsimultaneously, good policy should limit its focus to the types of corruptionthat are most damaging to development, such as corruption that results in thedissipating of investment resources Reform priorities should respond toactual circumstances Otherwise, anti-corruption and other governancereform efforts can adversely impact developing countries by setting unat-tainable targets, inadvertently causing disillusionment and reform fatigue

corrup-Officials’ Greed and Discretion

Predatory corruption occurs as a result of a central government’s inability orunwillingness to prevent government officials from enriching themselves,even when such action threatens government revenue, stability, and survival.8Ironically, instead of strengthening state cohesion, capacity, and efficacy, someostensible anti-corruption initiatives—such as decentralization and devolu-tion—have instead exacerbated the problem, albeit inadvertently, by creatingnew opportunities for rent-seeking (for example, in the case of the Filipinoand Indonesian provincial elections after Suharto)

Predation is widely considered the most important corruption challenge

in developing countries; it involves government officials who use their cretionary powers to extort Successful developing countries have been able

dis-to limit predation and exdis-tortion by limiting the ability of lower officials—orprivate looters in association with local officials—to abuse their discretionarypowers Where and when governments are threatened by public officials’predatory behavior, state enforcement capacities need to be strengthenedand consolidated instead of having them simply eliminate developmentalinterventions

The World Bank’s corruption analysts and many anti-corruption cates argue that corruption is largely due to the greed of bureaucrats or politi-cians who use their discretionary powers to confer personal benefits selectively

advo-or cause societal damage.9 If the risk of detection and punishment is low,these officials are more likely to engage in this type of corruption Althoughthere are many varieties in such analyses of corruption contributions, Khan

focuses on their similarities to describe collectively this approach as the “greedplus discretion” theory of corruption.10

If corruption in developing countries has been due to factors that are tified by the greed plus discretion approach, the adoption of anti-corruptionmeasures that are associated with this approach should have significantlyreduced corruption in many developing countries However, conventionalanti-corruption strategies and policies that are proposed by the greed plus dis-cretion perspective have failed to reduce significantly corruption and some-times, unwittingly, exacerbated the problem Privatization should have elim-inated public sector corruption; instead it created opportunities for a newtype of corruption

iden-The main measures to address corruption that are associated with thisanalysis, as well as the actual outcomes from the implementation of such poli-cies, have been summarized by Khan as follows:11

—reducing the discretionary powers of government officials throughderegulation, privatization, and greater transparency as well as accountabil-ity In fact, deregulation and privatization have often been accompanied byincreased corruption.12

—improving government officials’ authorized remuneration, thus raisingthe opportunity cost of corruption as officials risk losing these positionsand incomes if found to be corrupt Higher remuneration for state officialsalone is unlikely to deter corruption unless the likelihood of punishment isalso greater

—improving the rule of law to ensure that corrupt bureaucrats and cians will be prosecuted and punished While the rule of law has improved inmany developing countries, actual experience raises grave doubts as to whetherthis progress has either reduced corruption or enhanced development

politi-—encouraging greater transparency and civil society scrutiny of ment and public affairs to enhance accountability While setting up new insti-tutions to enhance checks and balances, with improved transparency andaccountability, attracts foreign support, these institutions have had little effectwhere governance is poor.13

govern-—promoting democratization, devolution, and decentralization However,there is no evidence that corruption is lower in democracies or stronglyrelated to decentralization in developing countries.14

The failure of policies that have been inspired by this greed plus discretionexplanation of corruption has encouraged greater attention to other typesof—and explanations for—corruption in developing countries Three other

types of corruption in developing countries point to alternate causes that arenot usually adequately addressed by conventional anti-corruption policies.

Government Interventions

The conventional wisdom presumes that all discretionary government ventions are undesirable, ostensibly because such interventions generateopportunities for public officials to participate in corruption If governmentinterventions benefit some more than others, or even benefit some at theexpense of others, the inevitable rent-seeking that will occur needs to be man-aged to maximize these interventions’ socially desirable outcomes.15Invest-ment incentives are a good example of selective governmental interventions

inter-to accelerate economic development The “losers” may need inter-to be sated to reduce resentment about incentives and other “privileges” that areoffered to potential investors

compen-Governments in advanced countries play important roles in managingtheir economies, inevitably creating opportunities and incentives for extensiverent-seeking, much of which is not deemed illicit, as the interventions andrents are legal.16In advanced economies, rent-seeking is legally regulated (e.g.,business lobbying within prescribed limits), whereas rent-seeking in devel-oping countries is often unregulated, and thus, more likely to be deemed cor-rupt Ironically, the blanket moralistic condemnation of rent-seeking hasunwittingly served to cloud understanding of rent-seeking’s nuances and how

it can be appropriately regulated Governmental interventions to help ing big businesses in developing countries are typically not transparent; theyare informal and lack wide political legitimacy

emerg-If rent-seeking does not undermine the intended outcomes of an vention, the resources used for rent-seeking constitute a social cost, but the neteffect of the intervention can still be positive for development.17Developingcountries can significantly reduce corruption by identifying needed govern-mental interventions and properly regulating such interventions, as well asrelated rent-seeking.18

inter-For instance, industrial policy—or investment and technology policy—interventions are generally recognized as necessary for development To min-imize abuses during implementation, some governments have introduced

“performance standards” to ensure that incentives are withdrawn from thosewho fail to meet these criteria.19The World Bank has acknowledged the crit-ical contribution of “directed credit” or “financial restraint” in proactivelyfinancing industrial expansion in Northeast Asia.20Similarly, in Northeast

Asia, trade policy during its “catching up phase”—effective protection that wasconditional on export promotion—disciplined industries, with firms enjoy-ing trade protection, while being required to export increasing amounts oftheir output, and thus, more quickly becoming cost- and quality-competitive

in international markets

The possibility of corruption or abuse should not block such needed opmental government interventions, even if they are likely to involve someunavoidable rent-seeking After all, rent-seeking remains the most significantincentive for “profit-maximizing” investor behavior (Keynes’s “animal spir-its”), as recognized by Schumpeter, as well as Porter’s notion of “competitiveadvantage,” which encourages firms to try to develop exclusive (monopolis-tic) access to rents

devel-Protecting Rights

In many developing countries, property claims, contractual rights, and otherentitlements generally are weakly protected and often contested because of thelimited governmental resources that are available for properly defining andprotecting such rights Conventional governance analysis assumes that theprotection of these rights can be improved through governance reforms andreducing corruption But establishing and maintaining property rights isexpensive, and rich countries often only stabilize property rights after theyachieve high levels of productivity.21

The protection of property rights has been estimated to account for half ofall economic activity in some advanced economies Transaction costs mayvary with efficiency, but are far from negligible.22Developing countries aregenerally characterized by modest fiscal means, limiting their ability to pro-tect property rights and reduce transaction costs Not surprisingly, then, devel-oping countries generally have much weaker and more contested propertyrights, compared to advanced countries Consequently, non-market transfersare widespread and far more significant in developing countries compared todeveloped economies.23But again, these differences cannot only be attrib-uted to the greed and discretion of public officials Such non-market transfersinclude not only those involving bribery and corruption, but also other redis-tributive government interventions that are prone to abuse and corruption.Although property rights seem to be insecure and the enforcement of con-tract laws leave much to be desired in many developing countries, the impli-cations for economic performance can vary greatly In most poorly perform-ing developing countries, potential investors often face great uncertainty, andconsequently investments tend to remain low.24But addressing this problem

requires more than just curbing the greed and discretion of public officials.While insecure property rights and associated corruption affect most devel-oping countries, fast-growing developing countries have often developednovel institutional capacities to provide credible commitments, ensuring reli-able expectations in areas that are considered critical to potential investors.Such capacities include giving long-term supply contracts that encourage thecontractor to invest so as to better supply his service.

For example, with the de-collectivization of agriculture in China from thelate 1970s, the “household responsibility” system, as well as land leasingarrangements, provided flexible but nonetheless predictable expectations.These expectations induced significant investments in and effort toward farm-ing, resulting in sustained increases in agricultural production for well over adecade Similarly, the collective “township and village enterprise” (TVE)became the basis for significant non-agricultural growth and economicexpansion, at least until the mid-1990s

Securing Political Support and Clientelism

Limited fiscal resources constrain government capacities, especially in oping countries, with their much lower incomes and typically lower taxshares But maintaining political stability requires sufficient fiscal resources forredistribution to secure political legitimacy and support Most rich countriestax between a third and one half of their national income, whereas the rate indeveloping countries is typically less than a quarter of much smaller averageincomes In most developing countries, after civil servants are paid (in gen-eral, poorly), there is not much left for other basic services, let alone neededinfrastructure Developmental spending is often largely financed by domes-tic and external lending

devel-Political stability is difficult to maintain because the limited redistributionthat is made possible through the budget cannot meet popular demands andexpectations Khan explains patron-client networks in developing countries asoff-budget transfers—through such networks—in response to group demandsfor redistribution.25Often through inherently corrupt processes, political powerand public resources are used to benefit particular clients to keep their politi-cal patrons in power Thus, clientelism provides, to certain privileged clientgroups, what is not provided to all deserving groups When these resources arenot available through the budget, off-budget resources are likely raised throughcorrupt processes or through tolerating corruption by those so favored.Khan emphasizes that while these processes are not desirable and devel-oping countries may want to be rid of them, such corruption is not wholly due

to the greed or discretion of public officials Clearly, the chances of reducingthis type of corruption are likely to remain limited until greater fiscalresources become available for redistribution While clientelism and associ-ated corruption are widespread in developing countries, the many varietieshave different origins, often playing different roles and functions, especially inthe co-optation and management of popular expectations.26

The tendency for reformist governments to succumb quickly to corruptionsuggests that transparency and accountability reforms, on their own, cannotresolve the problem The larger issues, as well as fiscal constraints, must beaddressed Clientelist politicians win elections, even if their corruption is well-known, because they deliver, even if the delivery is biased Appropriate gover-nance reforms are context-specific, and unlikely to be aided by ambitious anti-corruption strategies, which are hard to implement and rarely successful

—whether pursuing the good governance agenda distracts from moreurgent and achievable reforms that will enhance economic developmentprospects and will, in turn, contribute to achieving good governance.Anti-corruption efforts—inspired by the greed and discretion analysis ofcorruption—can only be effective if the analysis is relevant Hence, if a gov-ernmental intervention is only intended to create or enhance opportunities forpredation for government officials, whether politicians or bureaucrats, theconventional policy agenda—economic liberalization, improved remunera-tion of public officials, strengthening the rule of law, and enhancing trans-parency—should work Such measures are likely to be effective for checkingthe discretionary powers of public officials that are due to such undesirable orunnecessary government interventions However, if corruption is principallydue to other factors, such reforms are unlikely to be effective in reducing cor-ruption, even if they can be successfully implemented

The preceding analysis suggests that the conventional anti-corruptionagenda is unlikely to be successful in developing countries, as the imposition

of governance conditionalities on developing countries has no sound ical or empirical basis Most governance and corruption indicators that areused are subjective and somewhat arbitrary Progress on such measures hasnot enhanced the developmental prospects for developing countries.Instead, critical developmental governance capacities need to be enhancedpragmatically in developing countries to accelerate economic development.Distinguishing among different causes, sources, and types of corruption canhelp inform the choice of feasible reform and anti-corruption priorities Hav-ing a long laundry list of unachievable “feel good” governance goals as imme-diate reform priorities distracts from the more urgent task of carrying outcritical developmental reforms for developing countries.

analyt-Notes

1 See Robert I Rotberg and Rachel M Gisselquist, Strengthening African nance: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Results and Rankings, 2008 (Cambridge,

Gover-MA, 2008).

2 Mushtaq H Khan, “Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the

1960s,” in José Antonio Ocampo, Jomo K S., and Rob Vos (eds.), Growth Divergences: Explaining Differences in Economic Performance (London, 2007), 285–324.

3 Mushtaq H Khan, “Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Developing

Countries: Policies, Evidence, and the Way Forward,” G-24 Discussion Paper Series No.

42 (New York, 2006), 6, available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420064_ en.pdf (accessed 16 April 2009).

4 Ibid., 6–7.

5 Ibid., 7.

6 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle (Washington, D.C., 1993), 27–78.

7 Khan, “Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms,” 11–12.

8 Mushtaq H Khan, “The Efficiency Implications of Corruption,” Journal of International Development, VIII (1996), 683–696.

9 See, for example, World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economies and itics of Government Ownership (Washington, D.C., 1996).

Pol-10 Khan, “Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms,” 12–14.

11 Ibid., 13.

12 Barbara Harriss-White and Gordon White, “Corruption, Liberalization and

Democracy,” Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, XXVII (1996), 1–5.

13 Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, “Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A

Framework for Evaluation,” Operations Evaluation Department Policy Research ing Paper No 2501 (Washington, D.C., 2000), available at www-wds.worldbank.org/

Work-external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2001/01/06/000094946_001219060637 71/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed 16 April 2009).

14 Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study,” Journal

of Public Economics, LXXVI (2000), 399–457; Tugrul Gurgur and Anwar Shah,

“Local-ization and Corruption: Panacea or a Pandora’s Box,” International Monetary Fund Conference on Fiscal Decentralization, Washington, D.C., 21 November 2000 While this chapter states that there is no evidence that corruption is lower in democracies, others disagree However, the evidence for the case in Africa is equivocal and is not cor- roborated in other regions such as in Asia or Latin America.

15 Mushtaq H Khan, “Rents, Efficiency, and Growth,” in Mushtaq H Khan and

Jomo K.S (eds.), Rents, Rent-Seeking, and Economic Development—Theory and dence in Asia (New York, 2000), 21–69.

Evi-16 Khan, “Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms,” 14.

17 Khan, “Rents, Efficiency, and Growth,” 21–69.

18 Khan and Jomo K.S (eds.), Rents, Rent-Seeking, and Economic Development.

19 Hasan Hasli and Jomo K.S., “Rent-Seeking and Industrial Policy in Malaysia,”

in Jomo K.S (ed.), Malaysian Industrial Policy (Honolulu, 2007), 150–171.

20 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, 86–90; Chin Kok Fay and Jomo K.S.

“Financial Sector Rents in Malaysia,” in Khan and Jomo K.S (eds.), Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development, 304–326.

21 Mushtaq H Khan, “Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World Bank Strategies and their Limitations,” in Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters (eds.),

Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca, 2002), 164–184; Mushtaq H Khan, “State Failure

in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform,” in Bertil Tungodden,

Nicholas Stern, and Ivar Kolstad (eds.), Toward Pro-Poor Policies: Aid Institutions and Globalization: Proceedings of 2003 Annual World Bank Conference on Development Eco- nomics Europe (Washington, D.C., 2004), 165–195, available at www-wds.world

22 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

(Cambridge, MA, 1990); Douglass C North and John J Wallis, “Measuring the tion Sector in the American Economy 1870–1970,” in Stanley L Engerman and Robert E.

Transac-Gallman (eds.), Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth (Chicago, 1992), 95–161.

23 Khan, “Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms,” 18.

24 Khan, “State Failure.”

25 Mushtaq H Khan, “Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks

and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries,” Democratization, XII (2005),

705–725; Khan, “Determinants of Corruption,” 216–244.

26 Mushtaq H Khan, “Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of

Cor-ruption in Asia,” European Journal of Development Research, X (1998), 15–39; Khan,

“Rents, Efficiency, and Growth,” 21–69; Khan,“Determinants of Corruption,” 216–244.

Matthew Bunn is an Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F.

Kennedy School of Government His research interests include nuclear theftand terrorism; nuclear proliferation and measures to control it; and the future

of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle Before coming to Harvard, Bunn served

as an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as

a study director at the National Academy of Sciences, and as editor of Arms Control Today He is the author or co-author of more than a dozen books or

major technical reports, and over a hundred articles in publications ranging

from Science to the Washington Post He is an elected Fellow of the American

Association for the Advancement of Science; a recipient of the AmericanPhysical Society’s Joseph A Burton Forum Award for “outstanding contribu-tions in helping to formulate policies to decrease the risks of theft of nuclearweapons and nuclear materials”; and the recipient of the Hans A Bethe Awardfrom the Federation of American Scientists for “science in service to a moresecure world.”

Erica Chenoweth is Assistant Professor of Government and Director of the

Program on Terrorism and Insurgency Research at Wesleyan University She

is also an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

at Harvard University and a visiting fellow at the Institute of InternationalStudies at the University of California at Berkeley Chenoweth’s main researchinterests are political violence, nonviolent and violent protest, the conse-quences of democratization, and repression She is co-lead investigator (withLaura Dugan) for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism andResponses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Center

of Excellence at the University of Maryland Her project for START, entitled

“Dealing with the Devil: When Bargaining with Terrorists Works,” assesses the

Contributors

efficacy of different counterterrorism policies in the Middle East since 1980.Before coming to Wesleyan, Chenoweth taught at the University of Coloradoand Harvard University.

Sarah Dix is Research Adviser to the Government of Papua New Guinea

(PNG), in the Political and Legal Studies Division of the National ResearchInstitute She was previously Lecturer on Social Studies at Harvard University,and has worked in Latin America and Africa as a consultant and senior man-ager for the International Rescue Committee, the United Nations Develop-ment Programme, and the Organization of American States She has pub-lished articles on corruption, refugee issues, and peace-building In 2009, inPNG she is advising on the development of a national anti-corruption policy,

a national survey on governance, and research on the costs of corruption

Peter Eigen has worked on economic development for twenty-five years,

mainly as a World Bank manager of programs in Africa and Latin America.From 1988 to 1991, he was the Director of the Regional Mission for EasternAfrica of the World Bank Under Ford Foundation sponsorship, he providedlegal and technical assistance to the governments of Botswana and Namibia

In 1993, Eigen founded Transparency International (TI), a tal organization promoting transparency and accountability in internationaldevelopment In 2005, Eigen chaired the International Advisory Group of theExtractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and became Chair of EITI

non-governmen-in 2006 Eigen has lectured at the universities of Georgetown and Frankfurtand from 1999 to 2001 was a faculty member of Harvard’s John F KennedySchool of Government In 2001, Eigen joined the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace as a Visiting Scholar while teaching at Johns HopkinsUniversity’s School of Advanced International Studies He became a member

of the board of the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) andsince 2002 has been teaching as an Honorary Professor of Political Science ofthe Freie Universität in Berlin In 2004, he received the Readers Digest Award

“European of the Year 2004.” Since 2007 Eigen has been a member of KofiAnnan’s Africa Progress Panel

Kelly M Greenhill is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts

Univer-sity and Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program onIntrastate Conflict She was previously Assistant Professor of Government atWesleyan University, a pre- and post-doctoral Fellow and Visiting AssistantProfessor at Stanford University’s Center for Security and Cooperation, and

pre-doctoral Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for gic Studies Her current projects examine nontraditional methods of coercion;counterinsurgency; international criminal networks; and the differentialeffects of visual versus verbal imagery on public opinion formation andchange Her first book manuscript, which focuses on the use of forced migra-tion as a military and political weapon, is forthcoming Her work has appeared

Strate-in a variety of venues, Strate-includStrate-ing International Security, Security Studies, Civil Wars, and International Migration.

Charles Griffin joined the World Bank in 1992 as a Senior Economist in

Human Development for Eastern Africa, where he worked for five years From

1997 to 2001, he managed first the Social Protection group, then the Healthgroup in the Latin America and Caribbean Region In 2002, he became Direc-tor for Human Development in the South Asia Region In 2004, he trans-ferred to the same position in the Europe and Central Asia Region Griffintook a leave of absence from the bank in 2006 to join the Brookings Institu-tion as a Senior Fellow Previously, Griffin was an Associate Professor of Eco-nomics at the University of Oregon, a Senior Research Associate at the UrbanInstitute, and Research Director for the USAID-supported Health Financingand Sustainability Project His operational and research experience has been

in public finance and service delivery related to health, education, pensions,social welfare, and water supply In 2009, Griffin returned to the World Bank

as a Senior Adviser

Ben W Heineman, Jr was General Electric’s Senior Vice President–General

Counsel from 1987 to 2003, and Senior Vice President for Law and PublicAffairs from 2004 until his retirement at the end of 2005 He is a Senior Fellow

at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s KennedySchool of Government, Distinguished Senior Fellow at Harvard Law School’sProgram on the Legal Profession, and Senior Counsel to the law firm of Wilmer

Hale He was the editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal, and law clerk to

Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart Heineman was Assistant Secretary forPolicy at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and practiced con-stitutional law prior to his service at GE He is a Fellow of the American Acad-

emy of Arts and Sciences His most recent book, High Performance with High Integrity, appeared in 2008 In 2007, he served on the Independent Review

Panel on the World Bank Group’s Department of Institutional Integrity (theVolcker Panel) and is a member of a World Bank Group expert advisory panelappointed by the bank to assess its governance and anti-corruption strategies

Nathaniel Heller is Managing Director of Global Integrity In 1999, he joined

the Center for Public Integrity and began, along with Marianne Camerer andCharles Lewis, to develop the Integrity Indicators and conceptual model forwhat would become Global Integrity At the center, Heller reported on pub-lic service and government accountability His reporting on the human rightsimpact of post-9/11 U.S military training abroad won awards from bothInvestigative Reporters and Editors and the Society for Professional Journal-ists In 2002, he joined the State Department, focusing on European securityand transatlantic relations He later served as a foreign policy fellow to Sena-tor Edward Kennedy In 2005, Heller returned to Global Integrity

Jomo Kwame Sundaram (Jomo K.S.) has been Assistant Secretary General for

Economic Development in the United Nations Department of Economic andSocial Affairs (DESA) since 2005, adviser to the president of the 63rd UnitedNations General Assembly, and member of the [United Nations GeneralAssembly or Stiglitz] Commission of Experts on Reforms of the InternationalMonetary and Financial System He was Professor in the Applied EconomicsDepartment, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, until 2004 Jomo hasauthored over thirty-five monographs and edited over fifty books including

Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development (with Mushtaq Khan) (2000).

In 2007, he was awarded the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the tiers of Economic Thought

Fron-Lucy Koechlin is a Lecturer in Development Studies at the Institute of

Soci-ology and the Centre for African Studies, University of Basel, and was, untilrecently, responsible for Development Policy and Research at the Basel Insti-tute on Governance Her major research interests include political order, civilsociety, poverty, and governance and corruption, with a geographical focus onsub-Saharan Africa

Johann Graf Lambsdorff holds a chair position in economic theory at the

University of Passau, Germany, and is a research consultant to TransparencyInternational He created the Corruption Perceptions Index, which he hasbeen overseeing since 1995 He has published extensively on corruption and

anti-corruption in leading international journals such as Public Choice, nomics of Governance, Kyklos, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza- tion, and the Journal of International Economics.

Eco-Robert Legvold is the Marshall Shulman Professor Emeritus of Political Science

at Columbia University He is Project Director for “Rethinking U.S Policy

toward Russia” at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Legvold cializes in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet states Hisprimary interests include the international relations of the post-Soviet regionand their impact on the international politics of East Asia and WesternEurope From 1978 to 1984, he was Director of Soviet Studies at the Council

spe-on Foreign Relatispe-ons and from 1984 to 1993 the Associate Director, then theDirector, of the Harriman Institute He is a Fellow of the American Academy

of Arts and Sciences His most recent books are Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past (2007); with Bruno Coppieters, State- hood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution (2005); with Celeste Wal- lander, Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of National Security in Belarus and Ukraine (2004); and Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Nexus (2002).

Emmanuel Pok is Researcher in the Political and Legal Studies Division of the

National Research Institute (NRI), Papua New Guinea He has published cles in Papua New Guinea on electoral politics, provincial autonomy, andpublic policy He has served as a domestic electoral observer

arti-Susan Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law

and Political Science) and Co-director of the Yale Law School’s Center forLaw, Economics, and Public Policy She was a Visiting Research Fellow at theWorld Bank and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the BehavioralSciences She has written widely on corruption, administrative law, and law

and economics Her most recent books are Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (1999), which was translated into fifteen languages; From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland (2005); and Controlling Environmental Policy: The Lim- its of Public Law in Germany and the United States (1995).

Robert I Rotberg is Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict

Resolution, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the vard Kennedy School of Government, and President, World Peace Founda-tion He was Professor of Political Science and History at MIT; Academic VicePresident of Tufts University; and President of Lafayette College He is a Fel-low of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences He is the author and edi-tor of numerous books and articles on U.S foreign policy, Africa, Asia, and the

Har-Caribbean, most recently China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence (2008); Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations (2007); Build- ing a New Afghanistan (2006); A Leadership for Peace: How Edwin Ginn Tried

to Change the World (2006); Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (2005); When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (2004); State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (2003); Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy: The Tribulations of Southern Africa 1960–2000 (2002); and Truth v Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (2000).

Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona is the United Nations Independent Expert

on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty Sepulveda is aChilean lawyer and is currently working as Research Director at the Interna-tional Council on Human Rights Policy (Geneva) She lectures at several uni-versities in Latin America and has provided technical assistance and training

on human rights to NGOs, IGOs, and governments Sepulveda has worked as

a researcher at the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, as a staff attorney

at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and as the Co-Director of theDepartment of International Law and Human Rights of the United Nations–affiliated University for Peace in San Jose, Costa Rica She also served as aconsultant to the Department of International Protection of UNHCR and tothe Norwegian Refugee Council in Colombia

Daniel Jordan Smith is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Associate

Director of the Population Studies and Training Center at Brown University

He has worked in Nigeria since 1989 and published on a range of topics in

jour-nals such as Africa, American Anthropologist, American Ethnologist, American Journal of Public Health, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Cultural Anthro- pology, Politique Africaine, Population and Development Review, and World Development His recent book, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (2007), won the 2008 Margaret Mead Award.

Rotimi T Suberu teaches political science and international relations at

Ben-nington College Earlier he taught political science at the University of Ibadan.Suberu has served as a consultant to the Nigerian government, to the EU del-egation to Abuja, as well as to Washington, D.C.’s National Democratic Insti-tute and National Endowment for Democracy He has won fellowships andvisiting positions from University of Oxford, the Woodrow Wilson Interna-tional Center for Scholars, the University of Pennsylvania, Northwestern Uni-versity, New Delhi’s Center for the Study of Developing Societies, and from theU.S Institute of Peace

Jessica C Teets is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science department

at Middlebury College Her main research interests are governance in