GIS for SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT - PART 3C docx

Typically this can involve the analysis of police crime anddisorder data, to identify hotspots areas exhibiting disproportionately high levels of crime and disorder.. 22.3 THE HASCADE AP

Learning from Practice: GIS as a Tool in Planning Sustainable Development

Society and Environment

Approach to Community Safety: A U.K Perspective

Jonathan Corcoran and

Bernadette Bowen Thomson

CONTENTS

22.1 Introduction 385

22.2 The Importance of Geography 387

22.2.1 What is Community Safety? 387

22.2.2 Current Approaches to Community Safety 388

22.3 The HASCADE Approach to Community Safety 388

22.3.1 Data Requirements and Issues 389

22.3.1.1 Technical Issues 389

22.3.1.2 Security Issues 389

22.3.1.3 Data issues 390

22.4 The HASCADE Model 390

22.4.1 Spatial Methods 391

22.4.2 Statistical Analysis 392

22.4.3 Results from HASCADE 393

22.5 Discussion 395

22.6 Future Developments 399

22.6.1 An Integrated Deployable Solution 399

22.6.2 Increased Data Sets 399

References 400

22.1 INTRODUCTION

Crime and disorder are inevitable realities of society, affecting all of the populace either directly or indirectly Their formal control has traditionally been the respon-sibility of the police Increasingly, recent years have seen the control of crime and disorder, in England and Wales, charged to a range of both nationally and locally governed agencies The requirement to minimize community problems through tackling crime and disorder issues was formalized in the Crime and Disorder Act [1] The Act formally introduces the creation of multiagency Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) within each local authority area A legal obligation

was placed on these CDRPs, particularly the local authority and police, to work intandem to develop, publish, and implement three-year strategies to tackle crime anddisorder The production of an informed crime and disorder strategy relies heavilyupon an in-depth local community safety audit, which provides a snapshot of crimeand disorder-related issues, a further stipulation of the Act Each audit, consisting

of multiagency data and community consultation, attempts to encapsulate the munity dynamics within a given area In addition, the Act stipulates the necessity

com-to work with other key agencies, including the health authority (Sections 5–7, Crimeand Disorder Act 1998 [1]), while Guidance recommends the expansion of thepartnership to business and voluntary sectors

Section 17 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act extends the scope of responsibilityfor controlling crime and disorder It places a statutory obligation on local authoritiesand the police to consider crime and disorder implications in all its functions [1] Part

of this legislation (Section 115) enables partners to share previously internalized datafor crime and disorder reduction purposes If these agencies are to embrace the principleswithin the Act, then the production of a holistic strategy is essential Such a strategywould enable a variety of agencies to use their expertise for crime and disorder reductionand prevention purposes and for the benefit of the community, thus realizing increasedcommunity safety Key to achieving their missions is the ability to assimilate an under-standing of criminal dynamics, which are inherently complex Geographical tools havethe potential to provide invaluable insight into these dynamics

It has been shown that crime and disorder recorded by the police constitute only

a partial descriptor of community issues [2] Therefore, to understand the dynamicsand requirements of a region, there is the need to consult additional data, sourcedfrom a range of organizations at the local level [3] On this basis, local partnershipshave been promoted to guide and facilitate the data collation, aggregation, andanalysis process Hough and Tilley [4] outline six guiding principles that supportthe requirement for local partnerships:

• The police alone cannot control crime and disorder

• No single agency can control crime and disorder

• Agencies with a contribution to reducing crime and disorder need to work

Hough and Tilley [4, p.1] With permission.

In the remainder of this chapter, the importance of geography for crime and disorderanalysis and nature of community safety is discussed This is followed by a discus-sion of the design, development, and implementation of Holistic approach to strategiccrime and disorder evaluation (HASCADE), a geographical approach to strategiccrime and disorder analysis

22.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHY

The mapping of crime has a long history as a tool for understanding crime’s spatialdistributions It can be traced back as far as the nineteenth century in France [5,6],where mapping was first utilized to visualize and analyze crime information Crimedata and the computational tools that are used for their collection and analysis have,over recent years, grown in importance Academics and practitioners have seen value

in their potential to analyze crime and disorder issues

A central theme in the geo-analysis of crime and disorder data is the quest tobetter understand their dynamics, which in turn can be applied to formulate targetedresponses The U.K Home Office advocates a geographically orientated approach

to crime analysis This is reflected by the marked growth of computerized mapping

by U.K police forces [7], the trend set to continue However, a report of the auditingprocess [8] revealed that less than half (42%) made use of a GIS

22.2.1 WHAT IS COMMUNITY SAFETY?

Community safety is a recent concept, the definition of which has amassed muchdebate Since the Morgan Report [9], the term community safety has witnessedincreasing popularity in Britain The Morgan Report (para 3.7), considers commu-nity safety “as being concerned with people, communities and organizations includ-ing families, victims and at risk groups, as well as attempting to reduce particulartypes of crime and the fear of crime Community safety should be seen as thelegitimate concern of all in the local community” (cited [10, p.6]) Community safety

is recognized as comprising situational and social characteristics The situationalcharacteristics of community safety include crime prevention Crime prevention, inits simplest form, indicates a situation whereby crimes would have occurred if theyhad not been prevented [11] In general, crime prevention techniques can be applied

to a variety of approaches that aim to reduce the likelihood of an individual or groupencountering crime events Social characteristics refer to the socioeconomic andcultural aspects of people’s lives; thus individuals and groups should be able “topursue, and obtain fullest benefits from, their social and economic lives without fearcommunity safety because it recognizes that community safety is not the soleresponsibility of the police The change in policy focus toward partnership working

at the community level in the United Kingdom implies that an advantage will beachieved if broader multiagency and multifaceted approaches are applied Walklateidentifies that “a genuine desire for policy to work for change needs above all to becognizant of the importance of the local context in which that policy is set Thisdesire needs to work with rather than against the historical and socioeconomiccircumstances which structure that local context” [13, p.62] As such, diligence inensuring that inclusive approaches are implemented and that these approaches areappropriate to the community should have primacy

HASCADE attempts to inform short, medium, and long-term strategy throughthe examination of data at the community level This information endeavors toprovide insight into the crime, disorder, and potential vulnerabilities that include

or hindrance from crime and disorder” [12] Partnership working is fundamental to

socioeconomic factors present within such geographical areas It seems, then, thatthe term community safety renders itself more easily toward applying holisticapproaches, thus potentially increasing engagement from partners, community, andagency In relation to this chapter, the term community safety will be used, recog-nizing that such a term includes crime prevention and that its definition can extendbeyond the realms of crime and disorder.

22.2.2 CURRENT APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY SAFETY

Current approaches to achieving community safety in England and Wales oftenreflect traditional crime prevention concepts, commonly involving applied situationalcrime prevention (SCP) techniques [14] The application of such techniques haspositively impacted upon crime and disorder reduction in communities, often achiev-ing a rapid effect Felson and Clarke [15] note numerous examples where theapplication of targeted “opportunity-reducing measures” has produced effective out-comes Such measures include reductions in check frauds occurring in Sweden,through the introduction of new identification measures, and the establishment ofCCTV cameras in Surrey University car parks that resulted in reductions in crime.The HASCADE model is receptive to the important contribution of crime pre-vention, but it also endeavors to inform strategy development centered upon con-sideration of wider, holistic, community safety issues, particularly those basedaround social exclusion Crime and disorder strategies informed solely by analyzingthe spatial distribution of crime and disorder events, provide only a partial view ofcommunity issues Typically this can involve the analysis of police crime anddisorder data, to identify hotspots (areas exhibiting disproportionately high levels

of crime and disorder) The results from this exercise are then used to design strategy

to combat crime and disorder within the identified locales However, such use ofcrime and disorder data is likely to increase the risk of only responding to communitysafety through the application of primarily situational methods (for example, the use

of locks to deter burglaries within identified burglary hotspots) In addition, theseare likely to result in imbalanced strategy that may not identify key facets of acommunity’s needs Such imbalanced approaches increase the risk of exclusion,while potentially reducing trust within communities (for a more detailed discussionHASCADE introduces a joined-up strategic framework Its holistic natureencourages multifaceted methods for improving community safety, as opposed toapplying a singular methodology The use of geographically referenced multiagencydata is key to informing this holistic approach

22.3 THE HASCADE APPROACH TO COMMUNITY SAFETY

The relevance of incorporating multiagency data within the crime and disorder auditsreinforces the underlying principles of partnership working that is promoted throughoutthe Crime and Disorder Act In addition, all guidance relating to the crime and disorderaudits has advocated the use of multiagency data sets [4], but little information existsyet on how these multiple data sets should be incorporated and analyzed

of trust and exclusion see [16,17])

22.3.1 DATA REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES

The importance of a geographically orientated approach has already been stated.However, modeling the geography of crime in a way applicable to CDRP objectivesrequires an alternative approach to that demanded by police operations Modelingtechniques to direct, monitor, and evaluate community initiatives demands the adop-tion of a holistic approach, in which a range of local information is analyzed in anappropriate manner

The ability to visualize the precise locations of events has been welcomed andpromoted by the government [18] As such, microlevel analysis has become ofparticular interest for those implementing SCP programs Microlevel analysis canprove successful in such programs, because the objective is to uncover the specifics

of a locale Furthermore, it offers an explanation of a locale’s propensity towardobserved events (for example, a series of houses within a neighborhood particularlysubject to burglary) SCP techniques should not constitute the entire audit analysis,because an imbalanced strategy, with a tendency to short-term gains, would result.Such a strategy would discount the social, cultural, and community characteristics

of an area A primarily SCP focus impedes the development of a strategy that strives

to address community safety in the short, medium, and long term Moreover, in thecontext of the audit, the use of such techniques places large demands upon eachpartner to provide full address information from which the data can be geocoded tothe fine scale typically demanded by SCP programs In addition, the role of the audit

is to provide an overview of a whole local authority area; thus fine resolution analysis

is arguably not the primary objective Therefore, the audit should put in place aseries of analyses that are capable of identifying the broad issues At this stage amicro level analysis could take place to isolate the specific issues (for example,vulnerable houses and common modus operandi) to ensure a correct application ofpreventative measures (such as a lock-fitting scheme and security advice), whilesimultaneously directing attention on the broader social issues that impact upon thecommunity

During the development of HASCADE, several constraining political, technical,and administrative issues were identified These issues are discussed below in turn

22.3.1.1 Technical Issues

A fundamental issue at the commencement of auditing was the identification of keytechnical personnel within each partner agency, possessing the necessary technicalskills and knowledge pertaining to their data systems This formed a vital stage,following which questions regarding data (for example, descriptions of coding pro-tocols) could be posed and replied to efficiently

22.3.1.2 Security Issues

Despite the caveat (Section 115) in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act facilitatingthe sharing of previously internalized data, many concerns for partners still remained.This was partially resolved through the implementation of data security measures inaddition to the specification of what could be disseminated Clearly stated dissemination

protocols were enforced, whereby no information was to be published (cartographic

or text based) beyond the confines of the CDRP without formal approval by allpartners On a technical level, it was agreed that a single machine would be utilizedfor all data analysis and presentation, the access to which was strictly controlled

22.3.1.3 Data issues

Many partners had concerns regarding the sharing of data The concern was inperceived contravention of the 1998 Data Protection Act, despite the clear caveatstipulated within Section 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act facilitating their use

To appease such concerns, a data wish list proforma was designed to adhere to thegeneral, while providing the necessary information from which targeted mappingand statistical output could be generated Using the identified technical contacts, allpartners completed this, and a final standard was agreed, with each agency providing

as a minimum the contents summarized in Table 22.1

In addition, the confirmation of any problems, inconsistencies, and known errorswere established prior to the analysis, which in the main involved changes incounting rules and coding protocols This established known, but not necessarilypublished, information concerning data reliability The result of this process was toeither omit or amend their use within the audit This could then be attached to theaudit, not necessarily as a formal appendix, but as a reference from which decisions

to include or omit certain facets of data could be supported

One of the most problematic issues was achieving a common temporal coverageacross all contributing agencies Typical obstacles to accomplishing this were mod-ifications to software systems that rendered data prior to particular dates difficult toaccess In addition, the requested data spanned alterations in collection protocolsand, thus, introduced potentially immeasurable inconsistencies

22.4 THE HASCADE MODEL

provide an insight into the dynamics of crime, disorder, and vulnerability across thepartnership region

The result of the data collection process (following the resolution of the tioned issues), achieved the collection of eight partners’ data spanning a twelve-month

aforemen-TABLE 22.1

Minimum Data Provision Proforma

Temporal Reference Date (dd/mm/yyyy)

Spatial Reference Full postcode

Incident or Event description Numeric code or standardized text

File formats MS Excel, MS Access, Delimited text

The HASCADE model (Figure 22.1) uses both spatial and statistical techniques to

period Each data set was then attributed a meaning, classified as either a crime anddisorder data set or a vulnerability data set (Table 22.2).

The following sections detail the spatial and statistical techniques that wereemployed to generate the final output

22.4.1 SPATIAL METHODS

Using the spatial reference provided by all partners, data was geocoded utilizing OSCode-Point® [19] to assign x,y coordinates at a postcode unit level Once geo-referenced, all data were inspected at point level and overlain with street andboundary information to provide context In many cases the volume of mapped incidentscreated visualization problems at the point level, where multiple incident localitiesappeared as a single occurrence (each point was simply positioned one above anotherand, thus, appeared incorrectly as a single incident) Therefore aggregate and density

FIGURE 22.1 The HASCADE model.

TABLE 22.2

Meanings Attributed to Data

Crime and Disorder Police Incident Figures, Benefit Fraud, Arson Vulnerability

indicators

Economic poverty Council tax benefit claimants

Peer and family criminality Police reprimand, final warning, sentence — youth

offending team (YOT); supervised and unsupervised data — probation

Lack of educational

attachment and future risk of

low educational attainment

Statistical

Underlying correlations

Identifications

of PGAs Determination

of areas in

FACTORS A,B,C,D

mapping were used to provide a better indication of event intensity across the CDRPregion.

In order to provide a greater context to the underlying population geography towhich the various events were related, it was necessary to generate a series ofaggregate maps Using a boundary set based upon the 1991 Census enumerationdistricts (containing 1999 population estimates) each partner’s data were aggregated

to the new framework A GIS script was created to automate the calculation ofnumber of incidents contained within each region and derivation of rate based uponpopulation The script consisted of a “point in polygon” test for the partner’s data

to calculate the total number of incidents occurring in each region The total countwas then used against the population for that region to derive the incident rate per

1000 population

A key part of the spatial analysis was to derive a boundary network to providethe closest representation of each partner’s data This boundary network then formedthe foundation from which statistical analysis could be conducted Creating andvalidating the boundary network first involved examining the event distributions(using hotspot mapping — as this best describes event distribution) from eachagency’s data Where there was an identified lack of coterminosity, the boundarynetwork could be modified to provide a closer fit to the agency data Typically, amodification included aggregating two or more regions together In certain circum-stances, however, the imposed boundaries could either under- or overfit areas of highevent volume Because a perfect match could not be achieved, it was deemed acceptableOne limitation of this process was the input boundary network constraining theminimum size of areas for which population data was available Thus, if agencydata underfitted a region, this could not be redefined to a subdivision, becauseincident rates could not be calculated A second limitation was the decision criteriaused to assess whether areas were representative or required modification For thisstage visual inspection rather than any quantitative techniques were employedbecause it was recognized that high-level precision could not be achieved due to thenature of the agency’s data A visual comparison was therefore considered sufficient

At this stage it was possible to commence a primary identification of prioritygeographical areas (PGAs) on the strength of point, hotspot, and aggregate mappingacross all data sets Aggregate outputs offered an indication of vulnerability at abroad neighborhood scale, while point and hotspot maps identify more specificsubneighborhood localities internal to these regions

22.4.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Spatial analysis using GIS techniques offered a tool by which visualization andaggregation was conducted In many audits, outputs from this stage are taken nofurther Therefore one was able to overlay and visualize, but unable to quantifyinteractions between various layers of information

Statistical analysis targeted the correlation between the various data sets to reinforcerelationships identified through the spatial analyses Establishing significant statisticallinkages, together with identification of PGAs, provided the foundation from whichwhere the boundaries were generally representative of all data, (Figure 22.2)

partnership strategy was developed through building a fundamental comprehension

of community safety processes

Pearson correlation coefficients [20] were used as the basis from which icant relationships were established Using the rates for each data set, for each smallarea, significant correlations were flagged and used as the basis to establish keydependencies between the various data areas (the term small area refers to a singleareal unit of the validated boundary network) Thus, for a neighborhood area iden-tified as a vulnerable locale for events such as school exclusions and youth offending,spatial inspection can be further queried through statistical linkages, in addition tosuggestions of further potential associations that may exist The result of this hypo-thetical scenario would be to identify a target set of agencies required to jointlydirect interventions in the specified area In addition, such output and evidenceproduced through the implementation of this framework reinforces the necessity ofthe partnership, supporting the current drive toward joined-up government workingpractices

signif-22.4.3 RESULTS FROM HASCADE

The final part of the analysis was to produce a final output in which areas from thevalidated boundary were classified to reflect each of the partners’ data To achievethis categorization, a count system was designed Using a natural break method,each partner’s data was first mapped using five classes For each data set, those areas

FIGURE 22.2 Method of validating the boundary network Identification of areas with

sim-ilar event intensities was achieved using the GIS to overlay each agency’s data (for example, see dotted line between layers) The degree to which hotspots matched the boundary network could be assessed and modifications made if the majority of layers lacked coterminosity.

(From Corcoran, J and Bowen Thomson, B., Br J Commun Justice, 2 (1), 45, 2003 With

permission.)

that were classified in the top two categories were tabulated (Figure 22.3)

GIS f

FIGURE 22.3 The HASCADE count system (using artificially generated data).

© 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

The tabulation of all cartographic outputs (representing each partner’s data) wasthen used to distinguish areas of disproportionately high crime, disorder, and vul-nerability from those exhibiting lesser levels Analyzing the results of the tabulationindicated several different area types, from which four categories were defined (Table22.3).

Each of the four distinct categories (termed Factors A, B, C, and D) reflects ablend of community issues within identified areas where a different combination ofThe result of the factorization process resulted in the production of a singlefinal output was designed to minimize the use of numerous representations (forexample, graphs, tables, and multiple maps for each partner agency), providing aconcise indication of crime, disorder and vulnerabilities across the CDRP region,from which strategy could be derived

22.5 DISCUSSION

HASCADE provides partners from a variety of agencies with a method of describingcommunity dynamics within an area, based on the prevalence of crime, disorder, orcommunity vulnerabilities The factorization of an area enables practitioners toconsider how their expertise could be distributed across the larger region Guidancefor CDRPs notes the importance of referring to multiagency information to informstrategy The partnership Auditing Toolkit [21] advocates the use of GIS and itsincorporation into crime and disorder audits, but its emphasis is upon the use ofsuch systems for microlevel analysis of crime and disorder incidents, thus risking

TABLE 22.3

Classification of Small Areas into Factors

Crime & Disorder

community safety responses is required (Table 22.4)

cartographic output (Figure 22.4) that is supported by the statistical analysis This

imbalanced strategy development, primarily concerned with SCP approaches It hasbeen suggested that the application of such approaches may result in reductions ininterpersonal trust or trusting individuals being considered irresponsible “Instead,much of what remains of our trust will reside in locks and alarms, CCTV, environmental

design, and regulation, rather than in some conception of others as trustworthy” [22,

TABLE 22.4

Description of Geographical Areas and Type of Response

Several categories

of crimes or disorder BUT

NO community vulnerabilities

No crime and disorder, BUT SEVERAL types

of community vulnerabilities Type of

Recourse to criminal justice system plus situational crime prevention methods

Promotion of community safety and prevention of future criminality

FIGURE 22.4 Factor map showing PGAs (From Corcoran, J and Bowen Thomson, B., Br.

J Commun Justice, 2 (1), 47, 2003 With permission.)

0 3 6 Kilometers

Factor A Factor B Factor C Factor D All other Areas

N

p.41] The inclusive approach of HASCADE does not, however, rely upon suchmicrolevel analysis Such analysis is likely to deter partner involvement, as not allpartners are able to produce information in the detail required (for example, high-resolution full-address information), nor would their service be motivated to respond

by purely situational means HASCADE attempts to reduce the risk of such animbalanced approach to community safety strategy by informing decisions basedupon various vulnerabilities, for example, school exclusion data, alongside crimeand disorder, which can then be combined to inform the development of a moreholistic strategy Additionally, the holistic nature of HASCADE aims to providepartners with an insight into the community dynamics of an area, thus informingmultifaceted approaches to community safety based upon each agency’s expertise.The extension of HASCADE beyond the mapping of crime and disorder incidentsfacilitates the development of holistic processes Subsequently, such processes arenot restricted to criminality-based service provision Thus, multiple agencies arebetter able to identify how they can support community safety, while adhering tothe principle objectives of their own service delivery

HASCADE identified a number of factors that aimed to describe areas wherethe prevalence of crime, disorder, or community vulnerability was disproportionatelyhigh These areas could thus be considered as PGAs Examination of an areaidentified as a Factor A, for example, would consist of a relatively high prevalence

of crimes and disorders coupled with a relatively high prevalence of communityvulnerabilities A multiagency partnership approach to community safety couldinvolve a cluster of techniques incorporating SCP approaches (for example, a lock-fitting scheme for burglary reduction) recourse to the criminal justice system (forexample, a prison sentence), and the prevention of future criminality (for example,youth diversionary schemes such as sport and vocational provisions) Examining thedata layers that contribute to its factorization would provide various agencies withinformation that could inform how service provision could be collectively targeted,thus indicating intralocale relations

In addition to intralocale relations, the factorization scheme has the potential toindicate interlocale relations Our analysis identifies possible relationships between

a variety of high crime and disorder types and vulnerabilities (Factor A) are locatednext to areas exhibiting disproportionately high levels of vulnerabilities and relativelylow levels of crime and disorder (Factor D) Areas exhibiting high levels of vulner-abilities may include disproportionately high levels of offenders, young people whohave been excluded from school, or benefit claimants Figure 22.5 is possiblyindicative of interrelations between Factor A and D areas

Overall, the division of areas into Factors A, B, C, and D, has the potential toinform strategic decisions regarding resource allocation from partner agencies acrossthe partnership area The positioning of factor areas and, where appropriate, theinterlocale relations between them require a variety of community safety approaches.Simply targeting the high crime and disorder areas may not prove the most effectiveway of achieving community safety Instead, agencies may wish to expand relevantschemes to the adjacent Factor D areas

different factor areas that are adjacent to one another (Figure 22.5) Areas exhibiting

Guidance on reducing crime within areas mostly focuses upon multiagency

intralocale relations [23,24] HASCADE identifies high crime areas and a number

of underlying vulnerabilities, but it also attempts to inform partners of potentialmultiagency interlocale relations Research shows that offenders do not travel largedistances to commit crimes; Wiles and Costello [25] found that the average distancetraveled to commit crimes, by offenders, was 1.93 miles from their home In relation

to crime and disorder partnership areas, 1.93 miles represents a relatively large area,possibly extending an administrative boundary or many other imposed boundaries.The significance of inter- and intralocale relations when developing communitysafety strategy is more pertinent, because it supports holistic community safetyapproaches, thus enabling partners to play an active role in community safety,increasing partner participation

To follow are two examples of how HASCADE was applied to inform strategicdecisions, as well as the application of operational measures to support communitysafety objectives At the time of writing, both case studies are ongoing

The application of HASCADE has informed the targeting of a number ofprojects One such project is the Safer Cardiff Bus Project; a mobile communityprovision One of the primary functions of this bus project is the provision ofactivities for young people, particularly young people “at risk,” within areas thatwere classified as Factor A, B, and D The final aspect of this project involved theidentification of specific locales and timings to ensure efficient and effective servicedelivery To achieve this, further analysis of relevant data relating to issues considered

to be pertinent to the target group were required For each data set hotspot mappingwas generated Using this microlevel analysis, coupled with local knowledge and per-ception, allowed informed operational decision-making regarding the most appropriate

FIGURE 22.5 Enlarged factor map.

Enlarged subset of the Cardiff CDRP

location of the bus over given times The outcome of this microlevel analysis revealedareas previously known to agencies working with the target group Most importantly,however, additional, previously unknown, areas were identified that potentially couldbenefit from the service.

Similarly, HASCADE was used to identify geographical environments for theapplication of a Homesafe project (a lock-fitting service) The areas identified con-sisted of disproportionately higher levels of crime and disorder, particularly burglarydwelling and disproportionately higher levels of vulnerabilities than elsewherewithin the partnership region As the areas used within HASCADE are relativelysmall (i.e., approximately equivalent to the U.K Census enumeration districts),Homesafe was able to provide its free service to households, up to a 10% saturationpoint within the priority area (as recommended by the project director)

The aforementioned examples illustrate the flexibility of HASCADE, as it isable to inform strategic decision-making and operational implementation Addition-ally, HASCADE is organic in nature The model can be easily adapted to includeadditional data layers, which collectively aim to further the explanation of commu-nity dynamics

22.6 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

HASCADE represents the first stage in the development of a geographicallygrounded community safety methodology Future developments of HASCADE arenumerous and can be categorized under four broad categories, which are discussed

in turn in the remainder of this chapter

22.6.1 AN INTEGRATED DEPLOYABLE SOLUTION

Future work should develop HASCADE into a solution that is deployable to CDRPswhereby the scalability of the model can be more fully evaluated To date, HAS-CADE relies upon the use of multiple packages and a largely manual process forthe transfer of data between such applications The focus for future developmentshould be on the creation of a single application capable of carrying out the necessarymapping, aggregation, and statistical functions Of particular note is the method bywhich the validated boundary network is created The current process (based uponvisual inspection) should be updated by a quantification of the visual technique (forexample, calculating a measure of fit from which the best boundary configuration

is selected), to ensure a more robust and replicable procedure

Finally, embedded within this application should be the capability of providingexpert advice to the user (for example, on the appropriate use of agency datacombinations — the suitability of using benefit fraud data alongside data fromprobation and police incidents and what this combination is potentially illustrating)

22.6.2 INCREASED DATA SETS

In spite of legislation facilitating the exchange of previously internalized informationfor crime and disorder reduction purposes (Section 115, Crime and Disorder Act,

1998), some agencies may be reluctant to provide personalized information formultiagency use The HASCADE model attempts to alleviate such concerns using

a postcode as the minimum spatial reference required Furthermore, data outputsfrom HASCADE are aggregated based upon postcode centroids Consequently,confidence regarding the initial provision of information is increased for agenciesthat may be hesitant about sharing personalized information

Future developments for HASCADE would include expanding the crime, order, and vulnerability data layers currently incorporated in the model The mini-mum data requirements increase the potential for agencies, particularly smaller, ornot-for-profit agencies, to be included in the process and actively involved in theplanning and delivery of community safety

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Infrastructures Facilities Localization in Particularly Valuable Environmental Areas: The Eolian Islands Case Study

Giuseppe Cremona and Luisella Ciancarella

CONTENTS

23.1 Introduction 403

23.2 Planning in the Eolian Islands 405

23.3 Land Use and Vegetation in the Eolian Islands 407

23.4 The GIS Application 407

23.5 Conclusions 413

References 415

23.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes an original experience in GIS application to support an environmental prefeasibility study of Public Facilities as defined by the Italian Outline Law on Public Works (L 109/94 and later modifications and additions) The Law introduces the feasibility study as a key step in the decisional process on public investments, having to provide all the elements enabling the administration to make informed decisions before planning start-up The environmental prefeasibility is a component of the study that assumes specific relevance for their natural heritage in particularly valuable areas such as the Eolian Islands

The volcanic Eolian Archipelago is in fact the only Italian naturalistic site belonging to the UNESCO World Heritage List, as an “outstanding record of volcanic island-building and destruction, and ongoing volcanic phenomena.”

This volcanologic peculiarity joins important naturalistic and landscape tations and significant portions of the islands are included in the European Natura

conno-2000 Network as Community Importance Sites and Special Protection Zones thermore, Regional Natural Reserves have been established in all the islands aiming

Fur-at the conservFur-ation of the nFur-atural heritage

The Eolian Archipelago is composed of seven islands standing in the southeastTyrrhenian Sea about 40 km off the Sicilian coast Actually, there are ten volcanoesbuilding over the deep-sea plain, forming a ring of which only seven emerge fromwater In decreasing size order, the largest islands are Lipari, Salina, and Vulcano,followed, with their smaller extent, by Stromboli, Filicudi, Alicudi, and Panarea(Figure 23.1) Tourism is a vital part of the archipelago economy and, as in manyother small Mediterranean islands, the planning and management of limited envi-ronmental resources is a special challenge [1] In this context the total lack of naturalwater sources and a water supply system based largely on tankers has become anever-more-pressing issue, together with the need to treat wastewater in a sustainablemanner A sustainable management of water resources is, on the other hand, “animportant determinant in the location of a tourism enterprise or ensuring the viability

of existing operations” [2], and a specific “competitiveness factor,” too [3], especially

in small islands where the deterioration of fragile ecosystems is the principal cause

of destination’s decline

The Italian Ministry of Environment, in the frame of the “Sustainable ment of Italian Minor Islands” objective of a more comprehensive Program Agree-ment, entrusted to ENEA (Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy

Develop-and Environment) a feasibility study to find out the infrastructures required for

sustain-able and integrated management of Eolian Islands water resources, to be realizedthrough project financing The goal was, therefore, to remove the inefficiencies of the

FIGURE 23.1 Eolian Archipelago.

present supply system, to increase the qualitative standard of the water facilities,and to identify new and up-to-date infrastructures that can locally produce drinkingwater and provide the collection and treatment of waste water, providing all theelements to enable the administration to find a promoter.

These integrated infrastructures certainly contribute to the environmental tainability of the Eolian Islands, but a careful assessment of their environmentalcompatibility is essential, in order not to compromise further this particularly fragileterritory

sus-For this reason the environmental prefeasibility, beyond a preliminary tion of the state of the environment, assumed the macro-localization aspects as themain point of view through which to analyze the environmental implications of theproposed solutions

descrip-In the frame of works to be performed for the integrated management of EolianIslands water resources, the final goal was to achieve a geographic data managementand analysis able to effectively support management options and location alterna-tives, considering both planning regulations and constraints and potential impacts

on biodiversity and environmental matrixes’ quality Therefore a spatial analysisapplication has been developed using GIS, which has made it possible to map themacro-localization potentiality of water infrastructures for each Eolian Islandbelonging to Lipari Municipality

This application, which the promoter could further update, has laid the tion for the assessment of works consistency to the land planning framework andalso of the potential impacts and compensation measures to be foreseen

founda-23.2 PLANNING IN THE EOLIAN ISLANDS

The normative rules established in the Eolian Islands to preserve natural and culturalheritage have not been supported by proactive management able to exploit thesustainable use of the environment, both protecting the basic resources of the Eolianeconomy, and identifying innovative opportunities for excessive seasonal tourism.The lack of accurate and well-balanced land and urban planning is indeed one

of the reasons for the unsuccessful control and minimization of the negative impactscaused by the increasing mass tourism which has raised the local community’s well-being but, in the long run, does not assure further improvements or natural resourcepreservation Vested interests, which delay development and approval of the urbanplans, and the lack of management tools for the natural reserves, when not suspended,have raised illegal building phenomena with little attention to natural resourceconservation and sustainable use

Against this background, the Territorial Landscape Plan of the Eolian Islands[4], approved in February 2001 according to the National ACT 431/85, meets withstrong opposition by local authorities, who filed an appeal to the Regional Admin-istrative Court (TAR) of Sicily, which involved the Constitutional Court (whichalready passed a sentence in favor of the Plan) While waiting for the TAR judgment,the Territorial Landscape Plan is fully in force

The Plan approach is centered on Eolian volcanism as the “decisive factor ofthe anthropic settlement in the Eolie and then of all cultural heritage related to the

human process.” The main Plan category, called “Landscape Forming Cultural itage,” is therefore represented by morphologic-volcanic-tectonic territorial systems,

Her-by wide patterns of the morphologic-volcanic-tectonic landscape, Her-by significantvolcanic elements, and by geomorphologic posteruptive territorial systems.The other important category, called “Landscape Featuring Cultural Heritage,”

is represented by vegetative, faunal, anthropic, and historical heritage and logical heritage systems (Figure 23.2)

archaeo-Starting from the identification, hierarchization, and localization of these gories as territorial context, normative rules are applied regulating the compatibleactivities, the compatible activities for recovery interventions only, and the incom-patible activities (i.e., not pertaining to the given territorial context)

cate-Specific rules concern “works significantly transforming the territory” (Law Art

39, 40–41, Title IV), including technological infrastructures such as desalinators,water conditioners, and reservoirs, requiring an environmental and landscape impactassessment inclusive of compositional and formal factors and infrastructure execu-tive details, with reference to historical and environmental features (geological,ecological, botanical, faunal) dealing with the territorial context involved

The localization of these infrastructures is allowed in the zones concerned withtransformation processes (normative rules: RIO, MO1, MO2, TR., etc.) but also

FIGURE 23.2 Territorial Landscape Plan of Stromboli Island.