HANDBOOK FOR Envi ronmental RESK Decision Making - SECTION 5 (end) pdf

a Risk assessment is an appropriate and useful aid in environmental b Risk assessment should be relied on more heavily in decision making 3.. a Public values should be taken into account

SECTION V

ETHICS AND VALUES

IN ENVIRONMENTAL RISK

Bayard L Catron

This summary highlights three central themes of the chapters presented in this volume The preceeding chapters traverse a very wide range of issues, making a true synthesis quite impossible The chapter concludes with four modest suggestions

This summary is organized around three pairs of propositions Each pair contains a “weak” version, which most people attending the symposium (though not necessarily in the broader risk community) would endorse, and a “strong” version which will be much more controversial, I think The three sets are

1 (a) Risk assessment is value laden

(b) The whole enterprise of risk assessment is socially constructed-

2 (a) Risk assessment is an appropriate and useful aid in environmental (b) Risk assessment should be relied on more heavily in decision making

3 (a) Public values should be taken into account in decision making and in (b) Where there is persistent disagreement, public (“political”) values should

meaning that it has no independent validity or objectivity

decision making, despite its deficiencies

(as has been proposed in recent bills before Congress)

setting risk reduction priorities

trump expert (“scientific”) values

PROPOSITION 1(A) RISK ASSESSMENT IS VALUE LADEN

Everyone who expressed a view on this point at the symposium agreed that values are present in risk assessment For example, Schnare’s model of risk analysis shows how values, often those of the assessor, were fundamental to the method used in the analysis Nash argued not only that the notion of a

scientifically pure analysis of risk is an illusion, but also suggests that the pretense of value neutrality itself poses a major danger to scientific integrity There is also a practical challenge here, and Burt Hakkenen presented several examples of industry efforts to incorporate values into risk decision making There might not be such unanimity in the home disciplines represented at the symposium, andor the professional communities and/or scientific organi- zations represented, but this proposition is rather widely accepted by this time

For example, as Nash notes, the EPA Science Advisory Board in Reducing

Risk’ speaks of “inevitable value judgments” When risks are borne differently

by different groups of people, or cross generations are discussed by Catron et al., questions of fairness or justice arise

Scott Baker pointed out that 1983 NAS risk assessmenurisk management paradigm attempted to limit values to the risk management side, preserving risk assessment as value free However, he says each step involves “best profes- sional judgment” which is subjective as well as objective, as he argues in some detail He suggests that subjective values are acceptable “as long as they do not introduce bias” (However, it might be argued that this is exactly what is at issue.)

Some, but not all, types of values create difficulties in the “scientific” status of particular claims It is important to sort out the several kinds, such as moral, aesthetic, economic, and scientific values In an unusual treatment,

James Nash identified as moral values the following scientific values - hon- esty in selecting data, rationality, tolerance of diversity, freedom of inquiry, corrective dissent, cooperation, and open communications Nash claims that moral values are present in all phases of risk assessment - motives, purposes, definitions, methods, and assumptions However, granting that risk assessment

is not value free, is it necessarily a moral enterprise in all these ways? Doug MacLean’s chapter on intrinsic vs instrumental values illustrated the kind of careful analysis of particular values that is needed regardless of the method used to assess risks Virginia Sharpe adopted a different strategy with respect to values Beginning with a normative commitment to a particular value - sustainability - she explores the relation to ethical theory

PROPOSITION 1(B) THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE OF RISK

THAT IT HAS NO INDEPENDENT VALIDITY OR OBJECTIVITY

The idea of social construction of reality was introduced by Bill Freudenberg According to this epistemology or theory of knowledge, facts are not meaningful without human interpretation There is no such thing as “brute facts” independent of a context, which is provided by the language and catego- ries we use to understand anything at all Facts do not “speak for themselves”

So, for example, as William Cooper pointed out, in answering the question

“How safe is a risk?’, we might conclude that it provides a generous level

of protection or a license to kill, depending on the interpretation Not only the concept of risk itself, but other basic concepts like fact, value, and objectivity, are socially constructed according to this theoretical framework This orienta- tion would not be accepted by many of those at the symposium For example,

it would undermine the distinction between subjective and objective that Scott Baker builds his paper around- what he calls objective is no less socially constructed, from this point of view, than what is acknowledged as subjective However, contrary to the fears of many positive scientists, the orientation does not undermine the scientific enterprise - at least in some accounts of what that enterprise is essentially According to philosophers and historians of science following in the tradition of Thomas Kuhn (The Structure ofScientifk Revo-

Zutions)*, superhuman objectivity has never been a requirement of scientific method The values of the scientific community include those Nash listed (cited earlier) and, as Kristin Shrader-Frechette notes, testability and reliabil- ity (This does not deny the usefulness of understanding the personal attributes

of risk assessors, which Crawford-Brown and Arnold address in their chapter.)

Two other chapters seem relevant here, although neither explicitly men-

tions the social construction of reality Don Brown argues that there is no neutral discourse - whether law, economics, or natural science He might or might not agree with the further inference that science does not or should not have a privileged position - for example, as being “more rational” than other types of discourse Rachelle Hollander focuses on the question: “How does knowledge get legitimated and socially appropriated?’ The risk domain is contested - withidbetween different scientific fields, between experts and the public, between industry and government, etc She says that the contest in- volves who legitimately (I would add “authoritatively”) speaks about risk, and

how (This issue is important in the third set of propositions below.)

AND USEFUL AID IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, DESPITE ITS DEFICIENCIES

All authors who discuss risk assessment here seem to take this for granted, even as many of them acknowledged limitations and deficiencies of various sorts No one in this group, at least, fundamentally challenged the utility of risk assessment

PROPOSITION 2(B) RISK ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE RELIED

ON MORE HEAVILY IN DECISION MAKING (AS HAS BEEN

To agree that risk assessment is useful, however, is not to commit oneself

to using it to drive decision making Of the authors in this volume, Don Brown would probably disagree most strongly with proposition 2(b) He would argue,

I think, that the deficiencies of risk assessment are intrinsic, like they are with cost-benefit analysis, and cannot be fixed Therefore, we should use the meth- odology as a heuristic, not as a decision-driving method

Bryan Norton would also disagree with this proposition He argued that risk assessment as a methodology “will never be adequate” to deal with all we ordinarily think of as risk (which is more than the probability of an event occurring and an estimate of the magnitude of its consequences) He empha- sized particularly our limitations in using ecological risk analysis (as William Cooper did as well), and our problem of understanding long-term and large- scale events

PROPOSITION 3(A) PUBLIC VALUES SHOULD BE TAKEN

INTO ACCOUNT IN DECISION MAKING AND SElTING RISK REDUCTION PRIORITIES

This is such a common litany these days that few people would contest

it - at least in public It is often used in advocacy, as when Tom Burke appealed to public values in arguing that we need to “rediscover public health” However, there is a question of how deeply and widely this proposition is held

Is it just a self-protective strategy, to coopt public opinion and avoid litigation?

Or is it a basic principle, and a normative commitment?

Bert Hakkenen stated that Procter and Gamble has elevated to a principle the idea of involving the public or considering its values through two-way communication Of course this is at least partly self-interested on the part of the company - every company wants its products to be “safe and perceived to be safe” How important is the “public values” principle in relation to other principles used in decision making (in the case of P&G efficiency and risk- based priority setting)?

DISAGREEMENT, PUBLIC (“POLITICAL”) VALUES

SHOULD TRUMP EXPERT (“SCIENTIFIC”) VALUES

This is perhaps the real acid test Scientists and technical experts of all sorts who value reason and evidence highly are not often comfortable seeing themselves as stakeholders in public debates, and certainly not as having vested interests However, the public will inevitably see risk experts as wedded to their methodology and not as the final authority on what social risks should be accepted This is not necessarily “irrational,” as many experts would have it;

as Freudenberg suggests, opponents of particular technologies are often as well informed as advocates

At least some of the symposium presenters were not willing to put scien- tists in a privileged position with respect to value determinations Scientists are

“as competent” as others, according to Freudenberg, which suggests that their

value judgments should not be given preference automatically Nash has a more skeptical view: scientists are no more competent - and perhaps less

so - than the public as a whole to make these value determinations There are many examples of disparity between public and expert estimates

of the importance of particular risks One of the most striking is nuclear waste, which the public ranked first in importance and the experts ranked 20th out of

30 in a recent survey Freudenberg gives a useful example of differing values between scientists and the public He says that scientists and engineers as a whole value efficiency and cost-effectiveness more highly than long-term safety, compared to the population as a whole In that situation, should the scientists’ view prevail? If so, why?

Of course there is not always disagreement between experts and the public No one would prefer a lay opinion to an expert assessment of probabili- ties and consequences of a technical sort However, risk is more than that, as Norton pointed out, and the circumstances under which risk should be under- taken or one risk preferred to another is not a technical question Perhaps in addition to the categories of risk assessment, risk management, etc., we need

the concept of a risk judgment which emanates from a social process involving

all parties

Ideally, it seems that we need better decision mechanisms that will avoid such polarization How can public participation be made meaningful rather than cosmetic? Paterson and Andrews offered some excellent ideas in their chapter They use state and local comparative risk projects to illustrate ways of involving the public meaningfully in establishing criteria for risk assessments and setting priorities, including recommending strategies to public officials Technical advisory committees are used to bring science to bear, do first-phase assessment and ranking, and assist in generating and evaluating risk reduction strategies In their example of the state of Washington, the public advisory committee seems to be in the driver’s seat in at least some stages of the process Paterson and Andrews’ chapter provides a good basis for hoping that we will

do better in blending public and expert judgments in the future

Several recommendations can be made, partly derived from the sympo- sium, but ultimately the personal suggestions of the author:

1 Pay more attention to the problems of definition and analysis in this arena

of values and ethics in risk assessment It may be true, as Baker said, that

“God’s favorite color is gray”, but that does not excuse casual analysis and the loose, insensitive use of key terms

2 Do not rely too heavily on risk assessment or claim more for it than it can deliver Given our blind spots and pervasive overconfidence (and, as Freudenberg said, especially the unknown unknowns) and the limitations of all our techniques, humility is important

3 Stop disguising value judgments as technical ones Freudenberg was par- ticularly forceful in emphasizing the seriousness of potential public mistrust

of science He says it is not just a public relations battle here; science is not immune to erosion of confidence

4 Stop playing the blame game Regarding failures in risk communication between experts and the public, as Victor Cohn suggests, there is enough blame to go around While he acknowledges some journalistic deficiencies,

he cites vested interests of some parties, the blind spots of experts, and the myopia of some players - let alone the wide areas of disagreement and uncertainty inherent in risk decision making The blame game is unhelpful and indeed counterproductive, whether Federal vs local, industry vs regu- lator, media bashing, government bashing, lawyer bashing After all, in some real sense we are all in this together

REFERENCES

1 U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities And Strategies For Environmental Protection, Science Advisory Board, September

1990, SAB-EC-90-021, Washington, D.C 20460

2 T.S Kuhn, The Structure of Scient$c Revolutions, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Richard N L Andrews is Professor of Environmental Policy in the Depart-

ment of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Formerly chairman of UNC’s Environmental Management and Policy Program and of the Natural Resource Policy and Management Program of the University of Michigan’s School of Natural Resources, he is the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters on U.S and comparative environmental policy, environmental impact and risk assessment, and the uses of science and economics in environmental policy making He has also served as budget examiner in the U.S Office of Environmental Studies and Toxicology, and as a member of the EPA’s Science Advisory Board Subcommittee on Risk Reduction Strategies

Jeffrey Arnold is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Environmental

Sciences and Engineering at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

He received his B.A and M.A in History with a focus on medieval history

Scott R Baker is the Director of the Health Sciences Group at EA Engineer-

ing, Science, and Technology, Inc He is a toxicologist with broad technical experience in human health and the environment, with 20 years of experience directing and participating in a wide variety of scientific evaluations involving toxicology, health risk assessment, and scientific interpretation of regulatory affairs and risk management issues In his prior position with the U.S EPA as Science Advisor to the Assistant Administrator for Research and Develop- ment, he earned several citations for his excellent service Prior to the EPA, he was a Senior Staff Officer at the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences His experience includes scientific evaluations of the effect of chemicals on human health and the environment; assessment of the impacts of legislative initiatives, regulations, and standards on the interests of clients; environmental toxicology investigations; risk assessments; and expert witness testimony He has related experience in emergency preparedness, indoor air research, pesticide health effects, air toxics, and water quality criteria He has also chaired and served on a number of committees and task forces related to risk assessment and environmental issues such as chemical safety and the human health effects of chemicals He received his Doctorate degree in toxicology from Iowa State University in 1978 He has published a number of papers and books and presented a number of papers on topics related

to human health and the environment

Lawrence G Boyer is a public administration graduate student at The George

Washington University He holds a master’s degree in Economics from Rutgers University and a bachelor’s degree in Physics from the University of Massa- chusetts Mr Boyer is also a member of the joint GWU-EPA Green University Task Force His research interests include: intergenerational decision making, risk management, climate change, and non-market valuation techniques

Donald A Brown is Director of the Bureau of Hazardous Sites and Superfund

Enforcement in the Office of Chief Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department

of Environmental Resources He is interested in, and has written and lectured extensively on, the interface between environmental science, law, economics, and environmental ethics Mr Brown represented Pennsylvania at the Earth Summit and was recently the director of a conference held at the United Nations as a follow up to the Earth Summit on the ethical dimensions of the United Nations program on environment and development He holds a B.S from Drexel Institute of Technology in Commerce and Engineering Science,

a M.A in Philosophy and Art from Seton Hall University School of Law, and

a J.D from Seton Hall University School of Law He has also done graduate work toward a Ph.D in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research He has worked as an engineer and taught both philosophy and environmental law

Thomas A Burke is an Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management

at Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health Trained as an epide- miologist, he formerly served as Deputy Commissioner of Health for the State

of New Jersey and Director of the Office of Science and Research of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection His experience has shaped his research interest in the interface of science and policy in environmental deci- sion making

Douglas Crawford-Brown is Professor of Environmental Physics in the De-

partment of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill His B.S and M.S degrees are in Theoretical Physics and his Ph.D degree is in Nuclear Science from the Georgia Institute

of Technology Dr Crawford-Brown teaches and conducts research in risk analysis, philosophy of science, and mathematical modeling of biophysical phenomena He is Director of Undergraduate Studies in Environmental Sci- ence and Policy and of the Institute for Environmental Studies

Bayard L Catron is Professor of Public Administration and Policy at George Washington University His primary research interests are in applied ethics -

especially environmental ethics and ethics in government He was Research Director of a recent study, “Deciding for the Future: Balancing Risks and Benefits Fairly Across Generations”, conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration and sponsored by the U.S Department of Energy Professor Catron earned his Ph.D in Social Policies Planning and also a Master