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In its most common form, a credit-linked noteCLN is a synthetic bond with an embedded default swap as illustrated to the face value of the reference asset.. He receives the face value of

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Note that as T → ∞ the values of µ and η2 converge to fixed values,and the distribution of xT converges to a steady-state stationary distri-bution With this framework we can find the price of a European callCSO Let C(x, r, T ) denote the value of the option The payoff func-tion for this option is simply H(x) = max(ex− K, 0) The closed-formsolution for the call CSO is given by

op-A credit spread collar combines a credit spread put and a creditspread call An investor that wishes to insure against rising creditspreads by buying a credit spread call can reduce the cost by selling

a credit spread put In a credit spread forward (CSF), counterparty

A pays at time T a pre-agreed fixed payment and receives the creditspread of the reference asset at time T Conversely, counterparty Breceives the fee and pays the credit spread The fixed payment is chosen

at time t < T to set the initial value of the credit spread forward tozero The credit spread forward can also be structured around therelative credit spread between two different defaultable bonds Credit

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FIGURE 7.7

Credit spread swap

spread forwards can be combined to a credit spread swap (Figure 7.7)

in which one counterparty pays periodically the relative credit spread,(S1(t) − S2(t)), to the other

7.5 Credit-linked Notes

Credit-linked notes exist in various forms in the credit derivativesmarket; see [23,98,68,26] In its most common form, a credit-linked note(CLN) is a synthetic bond with an embedded default swap as illustrated

to the face value of the reference asset He receives the face value ofthe reference asset as cash proceeds at the beginning of the transactionand in turn pays interest, including some premium for the default risk,

to the investor In case the reference asset experiences a credit event,the issuer pays to the investor the recovery proceeds of the referenceasset The spread between the face value and the recovery value ofthe reference asset is the investor’s exposure at risk In case no credit

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Default Risk-Linked

Cash Collateral or Purchase of Collateral Securities

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event occurred during the lifetime of the reference note, the issuer paysthe full principal back to the investor So in this example one couldsummarize a CLN as a synthetic bond with an embedded default swap.

In our second example, an investor, who has no access to the creditderivatives market or is not allowed to do off-balance sheet transactions,wants to invest in a credit default swap, selling protection to the owner

of some reference asset This can be achieved by investing in a CLN

in the same way as described in our first example Note that fromthe investor’s point of view the CLN deal differs from a default swapagreement by the cash payment made upfront In a default swap, noprincipal payments are exchanged at the beginning

Another common way to set-up a CLN is protection buying Assumethat a bank is exposed to the default risk of some reference asset Thiscould be the case by means of an asset on the balance sheet of the bank

or by means of a situation where the bank is the protection seller in acredit default swap In both cases the bank has to carry the referenceasset’s default risk; see Figure 7.8 The bank can now issue a CLN

to some investor who pays the exposure of the reference asset upfront

in cash to the bank and receives interest, including some premiumreflecting the riskiness of the reference asset, during the lifetime of thenote If the reference asset defaults, the bank suffers a loss for itsbalance sheet asset (funded case) or has to make a contingent paymentfor the default swap (unfunded case) The CLN then compensates thebank for the loss, such that the CLN functions as an insurance

In this example, the difference between a CLN and just anotherdefault swap arises from the cash proceeds the bank receives upfrontfrom the CLN investor As a consequence, the bank is not exposed tothe counterparty risk of the protection selling investor Therefore, thecredit quality of the investor is of no relevance2 The proceeds fromthe CLN can be kept as a cash collateral or be invested in high-qualitycollateral securities, so that losses on the reference asset will be coveredwith certainty

Our last example refers to Chapter 8, where CLNs will be discussed

as notes issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in order to set-up

a synthetic CDO In this case, CLNs are used for the exploitation ofregulatory arbitrage opportunities and for synthetic risk transfer

2 Of course, for a short time at the start of the CLN their could be a settlement risk.

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Besides the already mentioned reasons, there are certainly more vantages of CLNs worthwhile to be mentioned For example, CLNs donot require an ISDA master agreement, but rather can contractuallyrely on the term sheet of the notes Another advantage of CLNs is thatnot only the investor’s credit quality but also his correlation with thereference asset is of no relevance to the CLN, because the money for theprotection payment is delivered upfront This concludes our discussion

ad-of credit derivatives

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Chapter 8

Collateralized Debt Obligations

Collateralized debt obligations constitute an important class of called asset backed securities (ABS), which are securities backed by

so-a pool of so-assets Depending on the underlying so-asset clso-ass, ABS clude various subclasses, for example residential or commercial mort-gage backed securities (RMBS, CMBS), trade receivables ABS, creditcard ABS (often in the form of so-called CC Master Trusts), consumerloan ABS, and so on Not long ago, it started that ABS were alsostructured based on pools of derivative instruments, like credit defaultswaps, resulting in a new ABS class, so-called collateralized swap obli-gations (CSO) In general, one could say that ABS can be based onany pool of assets generating a cash flow suitable for being structured

in-in order to meet in-investor’s risk preferences

As an important disclaimer at the beginning of this chapter, we mustsay that a deeper treatment of ABS would easily justify the beginning

of a new book, due to the many different structures and asset classes volved in the ABS market Moreover, it is almost impossible to capturethe “full” range of products in the ABS market, because in most cases

in-a new trin-ansin-action will in-also cin-arry new innovin-ative cin-ash flow elements orspecial features Therefore, ABS transactions have to be considered on

a careful case-by-case analysis

This chapter presents an introduction to CDO modeling in a ryline” style Some references for further reading are given in the lastsection of this chapter

“sto-8.1 Introduction to Collateralized Debt ObligationsFigure 8.1 shows a segmentation of the CDO market There arebasically two types of debt on which CDOs are based, namely bondsand loans, constituting

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• Collateralized bond obligations (CBO):

In this case, the collateral pool contains credit risky bonds Many

of the CBOs we currently find in the market are motivated byarbitrage spread opportunities, seeSection 8.2.1

• Collateralized loan obligations (CLO):

Here the collateral pool consists of loans Regulatory capitalrelief, cheaper funding, and, more general, regulatory arbitragecombined with economic risk transfer are the major reasons forthe origination of CLOs by banks all over the world, seeSection8.2.1

Besides these two, CSOs (see the introductory remarks) are of ing importance Their advantage is the reduction of funding costs,because instead of funded instruments like loans or bonds, the cashflows from credit derivatives are structured in order to generate anattractive arbitrage spread A second advantage of CSOs is the factthat credit derivatives are actively traded instruments, such that, based

increas-on the fair market spread of the collateral instruments, a fair price ofthe issued securities can be determined, for example, by means of arisk-neutral valuation approach

Another class of CDOs gaining much attention are multisector CDOs

In this case, the collateral pool is a mixture of different ABS bonds,high-yield bonds or loans, CDO pieces, mortgage-backed securities,and other assets Multisector CDOs are more difficult to analyze,mainly due to cross-collateralization effects, essentially meaning thatbonds issued by a distressed company could be contained in more thanone instrument in the collateral pool For example, “fallen angels”(like Enron not too long ago) typically cause performance difficultiessimultaneously to all CDOs containing this particular risk Cross-collateralization can only be treated by looking at the union of allcollateral pools of all instruments in the multisector pool simultane-ously in order to get an idea about the aggregated risk of the combinedportfolios Then, based on every aggregated scenario in a Monte Carlosimulation, the cash flows of the different instruments have to be col-lected and combined in order to investigate the structured cash flows

of the multisector CDO

The credit risk modeling techniques explained in this book can beused for modeling (multisector) CDOs Of course, a sound factormodel, like the one explained inSection 1.2.3, is a necessary prerequi-site for modeling CDOs by taking industry and country diversification

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FIGURE 8.1

Classification of CDOs

motivated balance sheet-

arbitrage-motivated

cash flow

structure

synthetic structure

cash flow structure

synthetic structure

market value structure

Assets

high-yield bonds/loans derivatives multisector

Assets

credit risky

instruments

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effects into account Moreover, in many cases one additionally has toincorporate an interest rate term structure model in order to captureinterest rate risk in case of floating rate notes.

In general, Market value CDOs are more difficult to treat from amodeling point of view These structures are more comparable to hedgefunds than to traditional ABS structures In a market value CDO, theportfolio manager has the right to freely trade the collateral As a con-sequence, a market value CDO portfolio today sometimes has very few

in common with the portfolio of the structure a few months later Theperformance of market value CDOs completely relies on the portfoliomanager’s expertise to trade the collateral in a way meeting the prin-cipal and interest obligations of the structure Therefore, investors willmainly focus on the manager’s deal track record and experience whendeciding about an investment in the structure The difficulties on themodeling side arise from the unknown trading strategy of the portfoliomanager and the need of the manager to react to a volatile economicenvironment Such subjective aspects are difficult if not impossible tomodel and will not be treated here

8.1.1 Typical Cash Flow CDO Structure

In this section, we explain a typical cash flow CDO transaction; seeFigure 8.2 For this purpose we focus on some of the main aspectswithout going too much into details

• At the beginning there will always be some pool of credit riskyassets Admittedly, it will not always be the case that the poolintended to be securitized was existent at the originating bank’sbalance sheet for a long time; instead, there are many caseswhere banks purchased parts of the pool just a few months beforelaunching the transaction Such purchases are typically done in

a so-called ramp-up period

• In a next step, the assets are transferred to an SPV, which is

a company set-up especially for the purpose of the transaction.This explains the notion special purpose vehicle An importantcondition hereby is the bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV, essen-tially meaning that the SPV’s own bankruptcy risk is minimizedand that the SPV will not default on its obligations because ofbankruptcy or insolvency of the originator This is achieved by a

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©2003 CRC Press LLC

FIGURE 8.2Example of a cash flow CDO transaction

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strict legal separation between the SPV and the originator, ing a legal and economic independence Additionally, an SPV’sobligations typically involve various structural features support-ing the bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV.

imply-In case of cash flow structures, a “true-sale” of the assets fromthe originator to the SPV completely removes the securitized as-sets from the originator’s balance sheet However, most often theadministration of the asset pool remains the originator’s respon-sibility The originator receives the principal balance of the pool

as cash proceeds, such that from the originator’s point of viewthe funding of the asset pool is completed

• After the true sale, the assets are property of the SPV Therefore,the SPV is the owner of all of the cash flows arising from the assetpool This can be used to establish a funding source for the SPV’spurchase of assets from the originator Note that as a specialpurpose company, the SPV itself has no money for paying theprincipal balance of the asset pool to the originating institution

A way out is the issuance of securities or structured notes backed1

by the cash flow of the asset pool In other words, the SPV nowissues notes to investors, such that the total notional of notesreflects the principal balance of the pool Interest and principalfor the notes are paid from interest and principal proceeds fromthe asset pool This mechanism changes the meaning of the assetpool towards a collateral pool From the issuance of notes, theSPV receives cash proceeds from the investors, refinancing theoriginal purchase of assets from the originating institution.Because investor’s proceeds (principal and interest) are paid fromcash flows generated by the collateral pool, investors are taking theperformance risk of the collateral pool Because different investorshave different risk appetite, the notes issued by an SPV are typicallytranched into different risk classes The first loss piece (FLP), oftenalso called the equity piece2 is the most subordinated tranche, receivinginterest and principal payments only if all other notes investors receivedtheir contractually promised payments

1 This perfectly explains the name asset backed securities.

2 The equity tranche is sometimes kept by the originating institution, therefore constituting equity.

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after reinvest period

investment

in additional collateral securities, according to eligibility criter.

sequential down amortiz.

top-until tests are passed, taking priority rules into account

O/C and I/C tests passed O/C or I/C tests failed

O/C and I/C tests passed

class A repayment

class B repayment

class C repayment

equity repayment

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TABLE 8.1: CDO example (illustrative only).

The FLP is followed by junior, mezzanine, and senior tranches, ceiving interest and principal proceeds in the order of their seniority:Most senior note holders receive their payments first, more junior noteinvestors receive payments only if more prioritized payments are in linewith the documentation of the structure Therefore, the most seniortranche always is the safest investment, carrying the lowest coupon.The more junior a tranche is, the higher the promised coupon, com-pensating investors for the taken risk

re-An exception is the equity tranche, which typically carries no promisedcoupon Instead, equity investors receive the excess spread of the struc-ture in every payment period, where the excess spread is the left-overcash after paying all fees of the structure and all payments to notesinvestors senior to the equity piece

From the discussion above it follows, that subordination is kind of astructural credit enhancement For example, in a structure with onlyone equity, mezzanine, and senior tranche, the senior note holders areprotected by a cushion consisting of the equity and mezzanine capital,and the mezzanine tranche is protected by the equity tranche

Figure 8.3describes the interest and principal proceeds “waterfalls”

in a typical cash flow CDO The figure also indicates the deleveragingmechanism inherent in CDO structures, realized by overcollateraliza-tion (O/C) and interest coverage (I/C) tests, which brings us to ourlast topic in this section

But before continuing we should mention that there are additionalparties involved in a CDO transaction, including

• rating agencies, which assign ratings to the issued notes,

• a trustee, which takes care that the legal documentation is ored and receives monthly trustee reports regarding the current

hon-Class Notional Tranche Moody's Spread ov minimum minimum

in USD Size Rating LIBOR (bps) O/C ratio I/C ratio

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-performance of the structure,

• some swap counterparties in case interest or currency risk has to

be hedged, and

• lawyers, structuring experts, and underwriters at the beginning

of the transaction, where the latter mentioned are hired fromanother investment bank or from inhouse business units

Now, in order to explain the O/C and I/C mechanisms in a cash flowCDO, let us consider a simple illustrative example Let us assume weare given a structure like the one outlined in Table3 8.1 Further weassume that

• the collateral pool contains 100 corporate bonds with an averagedefault probability

DP = 3% ,and a weighted4 average coupon (WAC) of

WAC = 10.4% ,reflecting the risk inherent in the collateral securities;

• spreads and default probabilities are annualized values The lowing discussion is independent of the maturity of the structure.Now we are ready for explaining the O/C respectively I/C mechanisms.Basically these coverage tests are intended as an early warning (auto-matically redirecting cash flows) that interest or principal proceeds arerunning short for covering the notes coupons and/or repayments Incase of a broken coverage test, principal and interest proceeds are usedfor paying back the outstandings on notes sequentially (senior tranchesfirst, mezzanine and junior tranches later) until all tests are passedagain This deleveraging mechanism of the structure reduces the expo-sure at risk for tranches in order of their seniority So one can think

fol-of coverage tests as some kind fol-of credit enhancement for protectingnotes investors (according to prioritization rules) from suffering a loss(a missed coupon5 or a repayment below par)

3 In the table, LIBOR refers to the 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate, which is a widely used benchmark or reference rate for short term interest rates.

4 For reasons of simplicity assuming that the bonds trade at par, the weighting is done w.r.t the principal values of the bonds.

5 For mezzanine investors often a deferred interest is possible: If the cash flow from the collateral securities is not sufficient for passing the coverage tests, mezzanine investor’s

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