With theirdecision to support the gasoline path the majority of the industry sup-ported gasoline.27 prefer-As for the rest of the industry, not all companies were that pronouncedabout th
Trang 1DaimlerChrysler made some agitated remarks concerning competitors’allegations of health and safety problems of methanol At a conference
in Nagoya 2000 a Daimler executive exclaimed: ‘Yes, methanol is nous if you drink it, but so is gasoline.’25
poiso-With DaimlerChrysler (and Ford via partnership) on methanol, and
GM (and Toyota) on gasoline, the industry was mixed in its fuel ence, and the race to win the dominant design intensified The gasolineoption received a relatively surprising push when the third largest FC con-sortium in the field (Nissan, Renault and PSA) decided to pursue gasolineFCVs, thereby following GM–Toyota’s lead in July 2001.26Both Renaultand PSA had relatively modest FCV activities, but increased their effortsaround 1998–1999, like most of the automotive industry In July 2000 theydecided to join forces, as individual efforts were bound to be marginalgiven their respective budgets With this collaboration they formed acounterweight to Daimler–Ford–Ballard and GM–Toyota With theirdecision to support the gasoline path the majority of the industry sup-ported gasoline.27
prefer-As for the rest of the industry, not all companies were that pronouncedabout their fuel preference The fourth major player in FC technology wasHonda, which had not given any comments on the methanol–gasolinedebate, other than that it would continue its direct hydrogen option Allother players are relatively small Companies like Mitsubishi, Mazda,Hyundai, Daewoo, Fiat, BMW each had their respective FC program, butquite modest These players either did not have the resources to develop allthe necessary components for FCVs, or were partly owned by a parentcompany; usually the fuel strategy of the parent company is followed(Mazda with Ford, Mitsubishi with Daimler, Opel, Suzuki, Isuzu with GM,etc.) The determining factor seems to be the high cost of developing a gas-oline or methanol reformer; therefore its development is limited to thosecompanies with a strong financial arm In the past Nissan had mentionedthat this was a main reason not to choose methanol or gasoline With itsRenault–PSA partnership Nissan seems more confident in pursuing thesealternative fuel options.28
At a conference in Stuttgart in October 2002, DaimlerChrysler’s head of
FC activities, Dr Panik, announced that DaimlerChrysler was continuingits efforts in methanol, although they recognized that gasoline FCVs werebecoming an increasingly supported option by the industry.29 Industryexperts commented that DaimlerChrysler was now more or less alone in itsmethanol preference, and that most companies were either supportingthe gasoline path, or remaining with direct hydrogen Only firms related to
or owned by Daimler, mainly Chrysler and Mitsubishi were still active inmethanol
Trang 23.3.4 Concluding 1990–2002
Table 6.2 shows the individual firms’ fuel use in demonstration vehicles, as
an indication of fuel preference First it shows that all firms active in
FC technology have experimented with both hydrogen and methanol This
reflects the widespread activities in methanol, and indicates the industry
consensus on this fuel Second, it shows the hydrogen models are still
in the majority; this reflects the fact that although alternative fuels are
explored, hydrogen-based FCVs are technically still seen as the best
solu-tion Third, there are still only two gasoline FCV demonstration models,
due to the complexity of the gasoline reformer in comparison to the
methanol reformer In this case press statements are essential in
assess-ing fuel preference The variable ‘number of demonstration vehicles’ thus
has some limitations; company statements serve as a necessary addition
In the future patent research could further enhance the assessment of fuel
preference
Figure 6.3 shows the accumulated number of demonstration vehicles
using either hydrogen, methanol or gasoline over time, quarterly It shows
how hydrogen FCV dominated until the beginning of 1997 Methanol FCVs
increased from then until the end of 2000, when this number stabilized From
that point on hydrogen FCV surged
Table 6.2 Fuel preference in demonstration vehicles per firm 1993–January
2002
Trang 3Figure 6.4 schematizes the fuel preference of the different car companiesover the decade Methanol dominated in 1997–1999 A shift to gasoline can
be discerned from then on In the patterned area underneath in Figure 6.4the companies are mentioned which have not made specific announcements
on preference; however industry experts expect most of these companies tohave discarded methanol (Volkswagen, Honda, Ford) and to be activelyevaluating gasoline (Ford, Mazda)
Based on the above description of the industry reaction to fuel preferencethe process of technological decisionmaking and determinants of techno-logical change will be discussed
4.1 Technology Choices at Industry Level
How do technology choices at industry level come about? The case showshow within the three periods one fuel dominates as the preferred fuel withinthe automotive industry to fuel FCVs Given that the hydrogen preference
in the early 1990s is due to the experimental nature of FC research, theintentional choices for methanol and gasoline as the preferred fuel in thecommercial FCV are most interesting to study The following mechanismscan be discerned for methanol as well as gasoline
First, a ‘credible actor’ in the automotive industry proposes an
alterna-tive to the current dominant technological solution; the credible actor plays
fuel preference in demonstration vehicles
Trang 4the role of opinion leader within the industry by deviating from the current
‘routine’ or ‘technological solution’ In the case of methanol the opinionleader was DaimlerBenz shifting from hydrogen; with gasoline GeneralMotors took the lead by deviating from the widely supported methanol.DaimlerBenz owed its credibility to its leading position in FC technology,its partnership with FC leader Ballard, and its strong name in the industry
as an automotive innovator General Motors owed its credibility to itsmarket leadership and financial arm, combined with its partnership withToyota (globally third automotive manufacturer) and Exxon (market leader
in the oil industry) Credibility is an important determinant of whether ornot the industry will support the suggested new routine For several yearsBMW has unsuccessfully promoted hydrogen-based ICEs, and FC tech-nology used a battery replacement Also Chrysler’s attempts to get gasoline
Hydrogen-fuelled FCV Methanol-fuelled FCV Gasoline-fuelled FCV
PSA Renault
Mazda
Volkswagen
Ford Hyundai
Nissan
Renault PSA
Honda Volkswagen
DaimlerBenz/
Chrysler Mitsubishi
Benz
Mazda
Ford
Fiat Nissan
Figure 6.4 Shifting FCV strategy of the main car manufacturers between
1990 and 2002
Trang 5FCV accepted in the 1996–1998 period failed Although BMW is seen as aninnovator in the industry, it is a relatively small player with limited financialmuscle The same accounts for Chrysler, which also has a relatively modestR&D department in comparison to DaimlerBenz, and its US rivals Bothlacked the credibility, and were unsuccessful in creating industry support.Within the organizational field firms thus attempt to win relevant actors
in favour of their own technology, thereby changing the institutional rulesfor the rest of the industry; this supports the notion of the so-called insti-tutional entrepreneur (Hoffman, 2000), the actor who is able to change therules of the game, and institutionalize their preferred technological solu-tions The ability to affect the institutional environment is a major asset forfirms, as they are in the driver’s seat to change the rules of the game (Oliver,1992)
Second, after a credible player has successfully gained support for theirtechnological solution, individual firms tend to direct R&D funds to thistechnological solution It is striking that most automotive companies active
in FC technology invested in methanol reforming technology, developingmethanol FCV demonstration vehicles, and testing methanol reformingsystems, once DaimlerBenz had proposed this fuel This suggests mimick-ing behaviour: the tendency of firms to follow a credible player of bestpractice in order to reduce uncertainty and risks related to making thewrong choice
Third, due to this mimicking behaviour there is a relatively strong ance of one fuel over the alternatives, rather than a continuous competi-tion between different technological alternatives Whereas methanol hadthe support of most of the automotive industry around 1999, onlyDaimlerChrysler was currently continuing this effort at the time of writing.The majority of firms in the industry has shifted to gasoline Mimicking ofcredible actors is not the only mechanism by which individual firms choose
domin-to conform domin-to a certain technological solution The nature of the industry,changed through mergers and acquisitions, has an important influence
as well
More or less dependent automotive companies (subsidiaries or partly
owned companies) are more likely to follow the technical choice of the parentcompany In order to strengthen the alliance with respect to its technicalchoice parent companies convince/coerce subsidiaries and partly ownedcompanies to their preferred position The best example of this phenomenoncomes from Chrysler’s shift to methanol when it merged with Daimler,despite Chrysler’s efforts to develop gasoline reformers Alliance pressurewas thus dominant over internal beliefs that gasoline made more sense
Independent automotive companies in an FC alliance (technology-related
alliance) are likely to support the technological decisions of the dominant
Trang 6alliance player Examples include Ford’s support to Daimler’s methanolpath, and Toyota’s support to GM’s gasoline shift This is however not aform of coercion or mimicking This seems largely motivated by strategicmotives of strengthening the alliance and its technical choices.
4.2 Opinion Leaders and Technological Deviations
If opinion leaders are indeed so important in technological choices, as issuggested in the above, then which factors determine their specific choices?More specifically: do these factors originate from the institutional environ-ment, or more from firm-internal motives? Are these choices technology-specific, or are political aspects more dominant?
4.2.1 DaimlerBenz/Chrysler and methanol
In 1996 DaimlerBenz could broadly choose between methanol and gasoline(ethanol and natural gas have never been actively discussed and developed
by the industry), and preferred the first At this point in time there were norules or standards to conform to; FC technology was a new technology, thedominant design was not yet set (no normative rules), and to the extentthat design decisions were already set, they were set by DaimlerBenz itself.The technology was unfolding, in its possibilities as well as its bottlenecks.Within this context, DaimlerBenz had the freedom to choose, and with itscompetitive advantage over its competitors it had the opportunity to shapethe dominant design in line with its interests
As said functional aspects played an important role in the decision to
move to methanol, and not gasoline Methanol formed ‘the best option’ forthe job (easy reforming, relatively efficient, and a sustainable solution):DaimlerBenz considered these arguments strong enough to convince the oil
industry to develop a methanol infrastructure Related is the environmental image of FC technology The FC program within DaimlerBenz had been
set up with the specific environmental problems associated with the ICE.Shifting to gasoline would undermine the very reason for FC activities
Apart from functional aspects, strategic motives played an important
role Choosing gasoline would have set the deadline back for the tion by a number of years In that period Daimler might lose its competi-tive position; the window of opportunity was there for Daimler to use
introduc-Lastly, the methanol choice also reflects di fferences in institutional context between Europe and the USA The issues of the ‘greenhouse effect’and ‘renewable energy’ are higher on the agenda in Europe (and Japan)than in the USA Both in Europe and Japan methanol was preferred due
to the opportunity it offered to reduce greenhouse gases and form a tainable energy source (when produced from biomass) In contrast, all US
Trang 7sus-companies had a past in gasoline reforming: GM with Exxon, Ford withMobil, and Chrysler before it merged with Daimler The combination ofstrong influence of the oil industry, as well as the lower priority of green-house issues seems to explain differences in fuel choices between GM andDaimlerBenz DaimlerBenz gave higher priority to functional characteris-tics and the intrinsic advantages of methanol over gasoline, rather than tothe explicit rejection of methanol by the automotive industry.
4.2.2 General Motors and gasoline
When fuel preference became an issue around 1997–1998 GM followedDaimler’s preference for methanol, due to Daimler’s lead over GM in FCtechnology Furthermore, GM’s FC research was carried out in Mainz,Germany at its Opel subsidiary In the past Opel made more positive state-ments about methanol than GM itself GM’s methanol preference mightthus also reflect Opel’s preference
GM gave functional arguments for gasoline over methanol given the
problems associated with developing a methanol infrastructure, as well astechnical advantages Gasoline is widely available; it has a relatively highenergy density in comparison to methanol (resulting in more range); andthere are no health and safety problems associated with gasoline (methanol
is transparent) However, Daimler also used functional arguments thatmethanol made more sense: apparently the priorities in these arguments
differed between Daimler and GM
The oil industry seemed to have played a dominant role in GM’s shift.
Exxon mandated gasoline, and dismissed methanol Furthermore, methanolwould require alterations in the current infrastructure, as the establishedtanks (at tank stations) would contaminate the methanol GM acknowledgedthat without the oil industry infrastructure would be lacking for methanolFCVs, and thus discarded this option Less emphasized is that apart frommethanol, the projected gasoline for FCVs would also require new storagetanks to counter contamination of the clean fuel: the costs of developing aninfrastructure for clean gasoline or methanol are similar
Another point suggesting why GM was more inclined to shift than
Daimler relates to strategic factors Daimler had a clear lead in methanol
reforming technology In a period in which methanol became more ized (2000) choosing gasoline would undermine Daimler’s competitiveposition in methanol further The support of Toyota and Exxon was crucial
scrutin-to give this shift sufficient push and credibility, as well as its own strongposition in FC technology which it had acquired in recent years
Another strategic factor is that choosing gasoline would permit
auto-motive firms more time for the development of FCVs; it would delay thecommercialization of FCVs by several years Although GM has announced
Trang 8that it strives to be the first car maker to sell one million FCVs, it has torically been sceptical about the potential and expectation of FC technol-ogy, being complex and expensive The FCV program plays an importantlegitimizing role for automotive firms towards regulators and Californianregulators in particular, demonstrating the good will to address environ-mental issues Postponing fits with a decade-long strategy of litigation andconfrontation with regulators with regard to new emission and energy
his-efficiency standards
Lastly, as said earlier the institutional context favours gasoline over
methanol in the USA, due to different priorities assigned to renewableresources and greenhouse gas effect
Concluding, one can say that the case of fuel preference and Daimler’sand GM’s respective choices of methanol and gasoline are determined by
a combination of institutional differences, technological (functional) acteristics, and firm-specific interests
char-The case also shows that neither methanol nor gasoline can be called ‘thebest option’: both have their specific merits and bottlenecks; firm-internalbeliefs and convictions seem important to prioritize among the specificqualities of each fuel Daimler pursued an environmental technology,based on its environmental image and sense of urgency felt with the green-house gas issue; GM stressed transition advantages of gasoline, therebyfollowing its own conviction that gasoline was not the problem
Lastly strategic motives have played a role in two ways: firstly, choosing
a certain technology undermines the position of competitors, and secondlythe timeline of innovation was influenced
In this chapter a specific technological choice process is described withregard to the preferred fuel for the future fuel cell vehicle (FCV) The caseprovides insights into the process by which technological decisions are madewithin an industry concerning new technologies, and how certain techno-logical trajectories are terminated In this case the choice of methanolaround 1997, and the shift from methanol to gasoline around 2000 providerelevant insights into this process
First, the case suggests that periods in which technological options inate succeed each other Methanol was the preferred fuel of most of theautomotive companies in the late nineties, until a shift to gasoline tookplace, which is now the dominant option for fuelling FCVs
dom-Second, it is useful to make a distinction between opinion leaders and the
‘followers’ of the industry The case shows how two or three opinion leaders
Trang 9in the automotive industry have the credibility to shape the discussion onthe fuel, and deviate from the established route Credibility is based on astrong resource position, a strong network or a historically built name as
an innovator Credible players or coalitions are able to gain support fortheir option from industry players, leading to mimicking behaviour, which
in turn leads to an institutionalization of the proposed solution direction.This takes the form of rules and norms (normative pressure), but can intime lead to regulatory standards Credibility is an important asset enablingfirms to change the rules of the game, or change the institutional context.The case thus provides some evidence of the institutional entrepreneur.Third, as for the ‘followers’ in the industry, mimicking behaviour can bediscerned on an organizational level with the majority of firms: in times ofuncertainty over future technological directions, best practice is followed inorder to reduce uncertainty, risk and search costs Apart from mimickingbehaviour, coercive pressure can be observed when parent companiesmandate their preferred fuel on their subsidiaries or their weaker alliancepartners
Fourth, with respect to how technological decisions are made, opinionleaders are influenced by a number of factors with no clear dominance
A combination of institutional differences, strategic motives, and internalmotives (defining technological priorities) are important determinants inthe choice process
NOTES
1 DaimlerBenz and Chrysler merged in 1998 to form DaimlerChrysler.
2 Platform strategy refers to the specific focus on developing a limited set of platforms, on which a multitude of models can be built Since Volkswagen introduced this strategy in the 1980s it has become widespread in the industry.
3 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews.htm (see January 1997).
4 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews.htm (see April 1997).
5 FC investments are estimated based on press releases of car companies during 1995–2002, combined with company reviews selected from the Business and Industry database, investment and data quoted for 2002, www.gm.com, www.toyota.com, www.ford.com, www.daimlerchrysler.com.
6 Data for 2002.
7 Based on interviews with DaimlerChrysler.
8 Based on interviews with DaimlerChrysler; press release DaimlerBenz, May 1997.
9 Based on interviews with DaimlerBenz.
10 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews.htm (see February 2000).
11 Daimler did not have to invest in BEV technology as it was not a ffected by the ZEV requirements being a small scale manufacturer in California, and it could allocate all resources to the fast moving FC technology.
12 See www.fuelcells.org, monthly newsletter in this period.
13 See press releases by Toyota (December 1997), General Motors (April 1998), Nissan (September 1998), Honda (November 1999), and Ford (December 1999).
Trang 1014 www.ford.com, downloaded April 2002.
15 Based on interviews.
16 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews.htm (see January 1999).
17 Nissan interviews.
18 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews (see May 1997).
19 Interview JARA, Japan Automobile Research Center, November 2000.
20 Exxon and Mobil merged in 2000.
21 www.evworld.com, August 2000.
22 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews (see April 2001).
23 GM press release, March 2001.
24 The partnership with BP did not involve methanol infrastructure development, but focused on hydrogen.
25 DaimlerChrysler, November 2000.
26 www.fuelcells.org/fcnews (see July 2001).
27 GM, Toyota, Renault–Nissan–PSA have relatively large FC programs in comparison to the rest of the industry Only DaimlerChrysler, Ford and Honda have similar budgets: The gasoline supporting alliances thus represent the majority of the industry in terms of
FC budgets.
28 Renault and Nissan took over when Renault bought 37 per cent of the stock of Nissan
in 1998.
29 F-cell conference, Stuttgart, 27–28 October 2002.
Table A6.1 Firms interviewed
Firm/country Number of Period of Department /position
interviews interviews
director Chemical and Environmental Science Laboratory/Director, Senior Researcher, Principal Research Scientist, Manager Fuel Chemistry and Systems DaimlerChrysler, 3 October 2000 FC division / Assistant
Communications R&D department / Senior Researcher
Research / Head Electric Systems
Energy and Environment / Researcher Energy and Environment / Public Relations
Trang 11Brint, S and J Karabel (1991), ‘Institutional origins and transformations: the case
of American community colleges’, in W W Powell and P J Dimaggio (eds), New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, pp 337–60.
DiMaggio, P J and W W Powell (1983), ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional
iso-morphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, American
Sociological Review, 48 (April), 147–60.
Dosi, G (1982), ‘Technological paradigms and technological trajectories’, Research
Policy, 11 (3), 147–62.
Giddens, A (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structure,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Greenwood, R and C R Hinings (1996), ‘Understanding radical organizational
change: bringing together the old and the new institutionalism’, Academy of
Management Review, 21 (4), 1022–54.
Hart, D and A Bauen (1998), Further Assessment of the Environmental Characteristics of Fuel Cells and Competing Technologies, London: Energy
Technology Support Unit, Department of Trade and Industry.
Haveman, H A (1993), ‘Follow the leader: mimetic isomorphism and entry into
new markets’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 593–627.
Hoffman, A J (2000), From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of Corporate Environmentalism, Boston, MA: Stanford Business Books.
Höhlein, B (1998), ‘Vergleichende Analyse von Pkw-Antrieben der Zukunft mit verbrennungsmotoren oder Brennstoffzellen-Systemen’, VDI Berichte, Munich.
Table A6.1 (continued)
Firm/country Number of Period of Department/position
interviews interviews
Environmental and Safety Engineering Department / Senior Managerial Specialist
Engineer, General Manager Corporate
Communications Department / Manager Renault, France 2 February 2002 R&D department / Group
Head, Researcher
Trang 12Kalhammer, F R., P R Prokopius, V P Roan and G E Voecks (1998), Status and Prospects of Fuel Cells as Automobile Engines: a Report of the Fuel Cell Technical Advisory Panel, Sacramento, CA: State of California Air Resources Board.
Levy, D L and S Rothenberg (2002), ‘Heterogeneity and change in environmental strategy: technological and political responses to climate change in the automo- tive industry’, in A J Hoffman and M J Ventresca (eds), Organizations, Policy and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives, Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
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Goteborg: Göteborgs Universitet.
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San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books.
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13 (4), 563–88.
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resource-based views’, Strategic Management Journal, 18 (9), 697–713.
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Harper & Row.
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Trang 137 Distant networking? The out-cluster strategies of new biotechnology
uni-to establish connections outside the regional environment, given the globalnature of their markets and the diversified and fast changing nature of thescience base needed to innovate (McKelvey et al., 2003) In this context, thesuccess of new biotechnology firms, which perform an intermediate func-tion between science and the market, depends on their ability to put together
a coherent set of relationships, both close by and distant, that enable access
to new scientific knowledge and to the establishment of effective channels
to technology or product markets
Against this background it is possible to ask the question: how do firmsoperating outside biotechnology clusters manage to survive and develop?The objective of this chapter is to address this question by identifying anddiscussing the main features of an ‘out-cluster’ strategy, based on casestudies of Portuguese new biotechnology firms
This chapter is arranged as follows Section 2 examines the network ture of the biotechnology industry, focusing on the role of the new biotech-nology firms and the importance of local versus distant relationships Afteridentifying the features that allow distant relationships (and thus peripherallocations) to be viable, six propositions regarding the relative importance
struc-152
Trang 14of and establishment of regional, national and international relationshipsare derived Section 3 outlines the methodology and describes the generalcharacteristics of firms interviewed for this study Section 4 examines thestructure and composition of firm relationships and analyses the under-lying firm strategies and motives The section focuses, particularly, on thestrategies of biotechnology firms operating outside established clusters.Section 5 characterizes ‘distant networking strategies’and discusses two pat-terns in the establishment of foreign technological relationships Section 6concludes.
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
2.1 The Network Structure of the Biotechnology Industry
and the Position of New Firms
According to some authors the abstract and codified nature of scientificknowledge introduces a certain linearity in the innovation process in bio-technology, permitting its separation into stages and thus favouring a div-ision of labour, where universities and other public sector organizationswould be concerned with the production of new scientific knowledge, newbiotechnology firms (NBFs) with the transformation of this scientific know-ledge into technological and commercial applications and large firms withthe production and marketing activities (Arora and Gambardella, 1994).However, this ‘division of labour’ is not static and has registered somechanges through time, driven by the interactions between actors and byalterations in the properties of the underlying technologies, which led tosome modifications in the patterns of specialization (Barbanti et al., 1999;Orsenigo et al., 2001; Queré and Saviotti, 2002) NBFs maintain a criticalrole, by conducting a transformation process that enables the mobiliza-tion and productive use of knowledge generated in research organizations(Fontes, 2001) Still, there have been some changes in their actual functions,from acting as translators between research organizations and large firmsstill building a knowledge base in the new field to acting as explorers of newand/or alternative paths, enabling the large firms to explore a wider range oftechnological approaches (Pyka and Saviotti, 2000)
The role played by NBFs is based on their ability to gain access to andidentify application opportunities for new knowledge originating fromresearch But, NBFs specific competences and organizational structurealso present some disadvantages both in terms of breadth of knowledge –they can be too specialized to operate independently from large firms – and
Trang 15regarding the downstream stages of the innovation process: compliancewith regulatory requirements, large scale production and commercializa-tion, where competences and assets often lie with large established firms(Arora et al., 2001; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001).
Therefore, the NBFs’ capacity to explore their particular type of tages depends on their ability to access both new scientific knowledge andmarkets channels We will subsequently address the conditions in whichfirms created outside major biotechnology agglomerations can compensatefor the limitations of their local environments in these areas
advan-2.2 Clustering and Reaching Out in Biotechnology
Research on the behaviour of high technology firms located in regionswhere knowledge accumulation is lower, although scarce, shows that suc-cessful firms will reach out for knowledge and resources they cannot findlocally and therefore will tend to rely more frequently on distant relation-ships (Cooke, 2001; Felsenstein, 2001; Rees, 2001; Saxenian and Hsu, 2001).Echeverri-Carroll and Brennan (1999) conclude that the importance ofproximity is relative, depending on the local accumulation of knowledgeand that when such accumulation is smaller, firms will look for knowledgeelsewhere, where it is available
Biotechnology is likely to be one field where this type of behaviour mayemerge because of some features of biotechnology, related to the nature ofknowledge production and the characteristics of markets, may facilitate thedevelopment of distant strategies We will now discuss this issue in detail
2.2.1 The relative importance of local vs distant relationships in
biotechnology
Evidence from the USA and Europe shows that biotechnology firms appear
to benefit from being located in strong regional clusters and simultaneouslyfrom being positioned in transregional networks that enable them to inter-act with a greater variety of organizations and to access a wider range ofcompetencies and resources (Allansdottir et al., 2002; Cooke, 2001; OwenSmith et al., 2002) In fact, biotechnology shows a strong tendency towardsclustering, which is associated with: the quality, variety and level of inte-gration of the science base; the industry’s absorptive capacity; and the pres-ence of supporting institutions, namely financial and labour markets But,there is also a parallel tendency of existing clusters to open up and establish
a variety of external connections, associated with the need to access leadingedge research (Allansdottir et al., 2002)
Additionally, it has been shown that the relative importance of the cluster
is not the same for all activities and partners For instance, co-location