Pregnant women represent a unique population that differs from the populace at large both in terms of susceptibility to certain agents and in the management of any exposures.. This chapt
Trang 1Critical Care Obstetrics, 5th edition Edited by M Belfort, G Saade,
M Foley, J Phelan and G Dildy © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Attacks in Pregnancy
Shawn P Stallings & C David Adair
Division of Maternal - Fetal Medicine, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of Tennessee College of Medicine, Chattanooga, TN, USA
Introduction
It is an unfortunate reality that in many parts of the world there
is an ongoing threat of terrorism against target groups that
fre-quently include pregnant women In addition to the concerns
about injuries due to conventional weapons and explosions, there
is now the potential for attacks using chemical and/or biological
agents, as exemplifi ed by the the release of Sarin gas in a Tokyo
subway system in 1995, and the anthrax - contaminated letters
mailed in 2001
Pregnant women represent a unique population that differs
from the populace at large both in terms of susceptibility to
certain agents and in the management of any exposures Transport
and triage of the patient, and her long - term management in the
face of continued pregnancy must be anticipated and planned for
in advance to optimize outcomes This chapter aims to address
some of the special concerns of mass casualty management for
pregnant women and to review some of the potential biological,
chemical, or radioactive agents that might be involved in an
intentional event
Clinical v ignette
“ A 22 year - old primigravida at 30 weeks of gestation presented to
her local hospital for evaluation due to fever, chills, cough, and
malaise The initial work - up revealed a temperature of 39.6 ° C, but
at the time she had stable respiratory status Her chest radiograph
revealed a prominent pattern of diffuse infi ltration without
evi-dence of consolidation After evaluation by the patient ’ s midwife
and obstetrician, she was placed on antibiotics for suspected
com-munity - acquired pneumonia or viral pneumonia and admitted to
the antepartum - postpartum fl oor Fetal testing was reassuring
On the second day following admission she complained of severe headache and backache, and she developed frequent emesis The following day her condition worsened, ultimately requiring oxygen supplementation to maintain her arterial oxygen saturation (S p O 2 ) above 93% At this time a maculopapular rash was noticed over most of her body and this was thought to be pregnancy related Due to her headache and change in status, laboratory blood tests were repeated and showed an elevation in her liver enzymes, along with a falling platelet count Despite meticulous intravenous hydration in response to the emesis, her urine output began to decline The patient began to report uterine contractions, and was found to be 3 cm dilated with signifi cant effacement The fetal status, via electronic monitoring showed a change at this point, with a decrease in heart rate variability and intermittent decelerations
Because of the fetal heart rate tracing, the patient was deemed too unstable for immediate transport to a tertiary center and prepara-tions were made for cesarean delivery with a tentative diagnosis of severe pre - eclampsia At the time of the surgical skin preparation, the patient ’ s maculopapular rash was noted to have progressed to
a vesicular form The infant was delivered, failed to respond ade-quately to resuscitation and was pronounced dead in the delivery room By this time, the medical team suspected a contagious infec-tion, possibly varicella, and isolation measures were instituted The patient was later transferred to a tertiary care facility for intensive care support ”
In the above anecdote, a young, previously unvaccinated patient presented with an unknown exposure to what was later proven to be smallpox At most community hospitals and birth-ing centers, the initial care providers are generally not emergency medicine or infectious disease personnel and recognition of con-tagious conditions may be delayed The admission of such a patient to the antepartum/postpartum wing may inadvertently expose a large number of susceptible patients and staff Under most circumstances, the personnel are not to be faulted The presentation of a biological threat may be subtle and unexpected,
Trang 2patients who are en route [1] For example, knowledge of the approximate gestational age of any pregnant women involved will allow the providers to transport women with viable fetuses to hospitals where fetal monitoring is available and to triage those
fi rst and early second trimester patients to hospitals or facilities where there may not be fetal monitoring equipment
In a major bioterrorism event, it is important to have protocols that help in the rapid identifi cation of victims who have been exposed and who are showing symptoms, versus those who are exposed but as yet asymptomatic Asymptomatic patients may require different interventions, such as prophylaxis, and quaran-tine, rather than active therapy Pregnant women represent a unique population because of their predisposition to go into labor in times of stress For this reason the treatment of preterm labor and a plan to deal with large numbers of potentially infected
or affected preterm babies should be kept in mind when design-ing any master plan for population dense areas
Local hospitals, along with regional tertiary care centers, will need to have a plan in place for the triage of victims near the site of contact with the harmful substance, or for containment
of persons who may have been contaminated and are at risk of spreading the agent to others In the case of pregnant women, those requiring intensive care and those with preterm fetuses will likely need to be transferred to a tertiary care center The master plan should always include a back - up plan to deal with the possibility of failed communication lines or transportation modes
Labor and delivery unit managers should be prepared to provide fetal monitoring to multiple patients in isolated or inten-sive care unit settings Such monitoring, of course, must be accompanied by preparation of equipment and personnel to take care of any emergent deliveries that may become necessary While some patients may require only evaluation, others will require a longer stay, which may strain both the physical resources at the hospital and the personnel involved in their care Back - up plans for relief personnel may involve rotating duty for regular staff, part - time staff, or even volunteer personnel with known labor and delivery experience Identifying such individuals in advance facilitates the rapid response to an acute event Finally, it should always be borne in mind that attacks frequently do not occur in isolation, and coordinated second or third attacks might occur in rapid succession, generating new waves of victims
Review of s elected a gents
The following review deals with a selcted group of agents which could be encountered in the setting of an intentional attack This list is, of course, not exhaustive Injuries from conventional weapons that involve blast injury or penetrating trauma from bullets or shrapnel are managed as described in the chapter on trauma in pregnancy, and are not covered here The agents for intentional attack may be separated into three basic categories: biological, chemical, and radiological
and thus the necessary isolation precautions and treatment may
be delayed It is clear that, as in so many other situations, a high
index of suspicion, adequate training, and general preparedness
are the only protection against uncommon occurrences
General p reparation
The specifi c needs of the pregnant patient are often lost among
the basic humanitarian concerns of such disasters as the Indian
Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the fl ooding of the Gulf Coast after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 While it is clearly
impracti-cal to focus on a specifi c subgroup of people in a disaster it is
worthwhile having the issues faced by pregnant survivors in mind
when preparing for dealing with evacuation and treatment on a
massive scale Some of these specifi c needs will be discussed
below
One of the major differences between a chemical and/or
bio-logical intentional attack and a natural disaster is that in the
former, there is a pressing need to contain the spread of potent
contaminants and highly contagious and lethal organisms A
second major difference relates to the temporal relationship
between the injury and the time of the event With a natural
disaster, traumatic and other immediate injury is generally
limited to the time around the event, whereas with chemical and
biological agents, some of the worst effects may only become
apparent days to weeks after the inciting event
A major legislative step was taken by the United States
gov-ernment in 1996 with the “ Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act ” [1] The bill highlighted the contemporary
lack of preparedness of emergency medical systems for large
scale intentional destructive events, and included a mandate for
funding and training fi rst - responders to serve the general
popu-lation in such events While most patients will likely be
encoun-tered fi rst by emergency services personnel and physicians,
obstetric providers should be ready to participate or advise in
the care of pregnant patients In cases of natural disaster or
industrial accident, management of resources will be run by a
state or local law enforcement head, fi re chief, or the person in
charge of emergency services Within the USA, in the the event
of a terrorist attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
will take control of the disaster site from a security and
investi-gation standpoint and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) will be charged with the mobilization of federal
resources to deal with the aftermath [2] Most other countries
have similar federal or national structures in place to cope with
such events
Problems that may be anticipated include diffi culties in
com-munication, differences in command structure and coordination,
and the logistics of allocation of both personnel and physical
resources [1] Coordination between emergency fi rst responders
and hospital - based medical personnel is important, and back - up
communication systems are vital Reliable information from the
scene of the event is critical for planning for the disposition of
Trang 3rare, but has been raised as a concern for bioterrorism because of its high mortality rate and ease of dissemination [6]
The spores of B anthracis are stable for many years, are
resis-tant to sunlight, heat and disinfecresis-tants, and can be dispersed as a dry or moist aerosol cloud It is reported that weaponized spores may be disseminated throughout an entire building even after delivery within a sealed envelope [4] As an example of the deadly nature of the spores, it was reported from the former Soviet Union that an outbreak near one of their weapons facilities in
1979 resulted in 77 cases of inhalational anthrax with 66 deaths (85% mortality) [4] In the fall of 2001, 22 cases of anthrax infec-tion occurred following delivery of spores through the United States Postal Service Eleven of the cases were inhalational, with
fi ve deaths occurring in that group, while the rest of the cases
were cutaneous [4,6] The knowledge that strains of B anthracis
have been modifi ed and may potentially be released creates a whole new outlook in public health policies It is estimated that more than 30 000 potentially exposed persons were placed on postexposure prophylaxis during the US outbreak of 2001 [4] The direct and indirect costs of handling even as limited a con-tamination as the 2001 mailed attacks are undoubtedly high The spores germinate in an environment rich in amino acids, nucleic acids and glucose, such as in mammalian tissues or blood The bacteria then multiply rapidly and will only form spores again when the nutrients are depleted, such as when contami-nated body fl uids are discharged and encounter ambient air The vegetative bacteria do not survive long in ambient conditions, but the spores may remain stable for many years
Inhalational anthrax begins when inhaled spore particles 1 – 5 microns in size enter alveolar spaces and are ingested by macro-phages Spores that survive and are not lysed may travel to the mediastinal lymphatic tissue where they germinate and multiply The incubation period varies Most often incubation occurs during 1 – 7 days, but can be delayed as many as 43 days [4 – 6]
The replicating B anthracis produces toxins that will continue to
cause cell damage even after living bacteria are eradicated with antibiotics [6] This ongoing damage results in hemorrhagic lymphadenitis, hemorrhagic mediastinitis, necrosis, and pleural effusions The patient may present initially with fever, cough, dyspnea, and malaise An initial chest radiograph may be abnor-mal with widened mediastinum, infi ltrates, and effusion The more fulminant cases progress rapidly with a continued rise in fever, worsening dyspnea, chest pain, and respiratory failure Blood culture will usually show the characteristic colony forma-tion, but communication with the laboratory is important when
B anthracis is suspected since colonies may be mistaken for
con-taminant normal fl ora [5,6] Hemorrhagic meningitis is also a frequent occurrence in such patients and the organism may be identifi ed readily in the cerebrospinal fl uid
Cutaneous anthrax occurs following deposition of the spores
in cuts or abrasion of the skin Following germination in the skin, toxin production will cause local edema and necrosis A vesicle typically forms which then dries to form a black eschar Antibiotic therapy will not alter the course of skin destruction and eschar
Biological a gents
Biological agents have received the most attention from the news
media as potential weapons of terrorism In describing some of
the concerning agents, Dr Gregory Moran has noted: “ The ideal
agent for biological terrorism (BT) would be capable of
produc-ing illness in a large percentage of those exposed, would be
dis-seminated easily to expose many people (e.g by way of aerosol),
would remain stable and infectious despite environmental
exposure, and would be available to terrorists for production in
adequate amounts Fortunately, few agents have all of these
characteristics ” [3] The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) have designated three different categories for
agents that are potential threats for bioterrorism
Category A agents include those that are easily disseminated and
which have high morbidity and mortality rates or,
alterna-tively, have great potential to cause widespread panic or
dis-ruption These agents include anthrax, smallpox, plague,
botulism, and viral hemorrhagic fevers [4,5]
Category B agents include those considered easy to disseminate
but which do not cause such widespread injury These agents
include ricin, threats to food safety such as E coli O157:H7,
typhus and Q fever
Category C agents include pathogens that have not historically
been used for acts of terrorism or mass destruction, but whose
high morbidity and mortality rate make them potential targets
for deliberate engineering to allow widespread dissemination
Such agents could include various tick - borne hemorrhagic
viruses and tick - borne encephalitides (see Table 52.1 ) [3 – 5]
Anthrax
Anthrax arises from infection with the Gram positive, spore
forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis Humans acquire naturally
occurring disease from contact with infected animals or
contami-nated animal products The disease more commonly infects
her-bivores which ingest the spores from the soil Animal vaccination
is a common practice and has decreased animal mortality from
the disease [6] There are three manifestations of the illnesses in
humans depending on the route of contact: cutaneous,
inhala-tional, and gastrointestinal The cutaneous form is the most
common naturally occurring disease, although outbreaks of
gas-trointestinal anthrax are occasionally reported due to
consump-tion of undercooked, contaminated meat Inhalaconsump-tional anthrax is
Table 52.1 Examples of CDC category A , B , and C biological agents [3 – 5]
Inhalational anthrax Coxiella burnetti (Q fever) Hantavirus
fever Pneumonic plague Salmonella species Tickborne encephalitis
viruses Viral hemorrhagic fevers E coli O157:H7 Yellow fever
Trang 4during pregnancy, but the potential benefi ts may outweigh the risk associated with systemic disease in the event of a large - scale exposure Experience from the military vaccination program sug-gests no adverse effect on pregnancy outcomes for women vac-cinated prior to becoming pregnant [9]
Smallpox
Younger generations know very little of the devastation of small-pox infection, as a result of widespread vaccination and aggressive disease control measures Ironically, this extraordinary medical accomplishment has left the vast majority of the world ’ s popula-tion susceptible to the potential reintroducpopula-tion of this disease Initial dissemination may be diffi cult, but the number of second-ary contacts and ease of transmission to secondsecond-ary victims make this agent attractive to groups seeking to induce massive societal disruption
Smallpox is caused by the DNA virus variola It is easily trans-mitted from person to person by respiratory droplets In addition, the virus may remain stable on fomites for up to 1 week [4] The virus replicates in respiratory epithelium and then migrates to regional lymph nodes An initial viremia, accompanied by mild fever and malaise, will lead to introduction of the virions into a variety of tissues, resulting in localized infection of the kidneys, lungs, intestines, skin, and lymphoid tissues After an incubation period of 7 – 17 days, a second viremia occurs with high fever, headache, backache, rigors, and vomiting A rash is usually appar-ent within 48 hours of this new phase The rash is initially maculopapular, but changes soon to a vesicular eruption The characteristic smallpox appearance is reached when the vesicles become pustules Viral shedding may occur from the time of the rash until the lesions have crusted and separated Death may occur
in this phase due to overwhelming viremia and organ failure [4] From historical series of pregnant women affected by smallpox
it is known that there may be very high rates of prematurity and fetal loss [10] In addition, pregnant women appear more suscep-tible to the disease, with historical case - fatality rates as high as 61% among unvaccinated individuals, and mortality rates of 27% even among vaccinated pregnant women This compares with com-monly reported mortality rates in non - pregnant adults of 3% when vaccinated and 30% among unvaccinated patients [5,10] Pregnant women more commonly develop the hemorrhagic form of the disease in comparison with non - pregnant women and men [7,10] The hemorrhagic form of smallpox is characterized by fever, back-ache, abdominal pain, and a diffuse red rash Historically, sponta-neous epistaxis, ecchymoses, and bleeding into various organs led
to rapid death in such patients The case - fatality rate among women with hemorrhagic smallpox was 100% in one series Congenital smallpox among liveborn infants has been described in
as many as 9 – 60%, with a very high mortality rate [7,10]
An infected patient should be isolated in a negative - pressure room In the setting of large numbers of infected individuals, quarantine and separate physical facilities may be needed Airborne and contact precautions must be used All discarded laundry or waste should be placed in biohazard bags and
auto-resolution Systemic spread may be possible, and if untreated the
mortality is reported to be as high as 20% [4,6] Gastrointestinal
anthrax may be contracted from ingestion of contaminated meat
Spores may germinate in either the upper or lower intestinal tract
Ulcer formation in the mouth or esophagus may lead to regional
lymphadenitis In the lower tract, infection of the terminal ileum
or cecum may lead to nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and
bloody diarrhea In both cases, death may occur due to systemic
illness, and mortality as high as 25 – 60% has been reported [4 – 6]
There is little specifi c information available on anthrax infection
during pregnancy [7]
It is important to remember that casual contact or respiratory
droplets from coughing or sneezing do not spread anthrax While
person - to - person respiratory transmission does not occur, care
should be exercised when caring for patients with non - intact skin
from cutaneous anthrax [5] Treatment of anthrax is by
combina-tion therapy that usually includes ciprofl oxacin and doxycycline,
and may also include clindamycin, rifampin, vancomycin, or
chloramphenicol [6] The recommendations for appropriate
antibiotic therapy are the same for pregnant women or children
as for non - pregnant adults One should check with an infectious
disease consultant or the CDC website for the latest
recom-mended drug combination Supportive therapy is also usually
required for severe cases
Prophylactic antimicrobial therapy is not needed unless law
enforcement and public health offi cials document an actual
expo-sure It is recommended that the primary care women ’ s health
providers do not initiate therapy unless directed to do so by the
appropriate public health offi cials [8] Screening may be
per-formed by way of nasal swab, but due to potential error,
postex-posure prophylaxis is recommended only after a confi rmed
exposure or high - risk encounter [8]
Adult exposure prophylaxis is typically given with ciprofl
oxa-cin 500 mg orally every 12 hours for 60 days or doxycycline
100 mg orally every 12 hours for 60 days [4 – 6,8] The
recom-mendation is the same for pregnant and lactating women The
potential morbidity and mortality from anthrax are felt to
out-weigh the historical concerns regarding these medications [8] If
the anthrax isolate in a current case is found to be sensitive to
penicillin, the pregnant or lactating patient should be switched to
amoxicillin 500 mg orally three times a day for the remainder of
the prophylaxis period [8]
Vaccination against anthrax is available The vaccine, called
anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA), is a cell - free product given in a
6 - dose series over 18 months [6] While there has been signifi cant
media coverage of concerns over side effects of the vaccine
fol-lowing the US military ’ s mandated vaccination of active - duty and
reserve - duty personnel, AVA is thought to be acceptably safe [6]
Due to the potential for spores to remain dormant in tissues for
prolonged periods despite antibiotic prophylaxis, there has been
interest in the use of AVA for postexposure prophylaxis in
con-junction with antibiotics [6,7] The vaccine should theoretically
be safe for use during pregnancy due to a lack of active organism
No published experience is available on the use of the vaccine
Trang 5organism can also be ingested from a contaminated food source The gastrointestinal form of the disease also follows a rapid course, with the buboes developing in mesenteric drainage sites Persons infected by the inhalational route may not develop the typical buboes but may progress rapidly to septicemia
The diagnosis is made by a sputum Gram stain showing Gram -negative coccobacilli with bipolar “ safety pin ” staining Chest
X - ray may show consolidating lobar pneumonia Further tests include an IgM enzyme immunoassay, antigen detection, and PCR [5] These tests are available typically through state health departments and CDC This approach requires a high index of suspicion and the ordering of the requisite tests early enough to involve state organizations in containment Patients with sus-pected bubonic plague should be separated from other patients, preferably under negative - pressure conditions, and body fl uid precautions should be followed until at least 3 days of appropriate antibiotics have been completed [4] Patients who are suspected
of being septic, or having respiratory symptoms, or are diagnosed with pneumonic plague should be maintained under respiratory droplet precautions including negative pressure isolation until the completion of 4 days of antibiotic therapy [4]
Standard therapy is 10 days of intravenous antibiotic, which may be switched to oral therapy when there are positive signs of improved condition For non - pregnant adults the recommended treatment is streptomycin 1 mg intramuscularly twice a day or gentamicin 5 mg/kg IM or IV every 24 hours Other choices include chloramphenicol or fl uoroquinolones For patients with suspected meningitis, chloramphenicol (50 – 75 mg/kg per day) is considered mandatory because of its superior penetration of the CNS [4,5]
It is thought that the major determinant of the outcome of mother and child is the timing of antibiotic administration [6] Historically, plague acquired during pregnancy led to nearly uni-versal fetal loss and could be especially severe in pregnant women [7] Gentamicin should be substituted for streptomycin in the case of pregnancy Chloramphenicol should be used with caution
in pregnant women due to potential adverse effects on fetus and newborn Doxycycline and ciprofl oxacin have also been consid-ered as alternative regimens and use in this situation should rep-resent the choice between the benefi t of treating the infection versus any potential risks of the medication to the fetus [7] Empiric treatment of the newborn following delivery of an infected mother should also be considered In the event of a bioterrorist attack, it is thought that postexposure prophylaxis is necessary to prevent rapid spread of the disease A decision regarding whether or not to place pregnant patients on the rec-ommended prophylaxis of doxycycline 100 mg twice a day would need to be made based on the risk of exposure and the anticipated spread of the disease [7] Timely treatment with the appropriate antibiotics is very important in affecting the outcome in preg-nancy Untreated, the mortality from plague is estimated to be close to 100% Even in treated cases, pneumonic plague is highly lethal with up to 50 – 60% mortality despite appropriate antibiotic therapy Given the small risk to the fetus of doxycycline use in
claved prior to disposal [4] A certain number of hospital
person-nel may need to be vaccinated in advance in order to provide care
in the event of a deliberate infection The United States
govern-ment made an attempt at vaccinating a core group of staff at
hospitals all over the country in 2002, but the program met with
limited success due to concerns about adverse reactions to the
vaccine Again, for obstetric units, planning to care for multiple
pregnant, infectious victims will be challenging Hospitals with
maternity services should anticipate the need to designate
obstet-ric and neonatal physicians and nurses for a team response
Although Cidofovir has been tried with success against other
pox viruses and has been reported to have in vitro activity against
variola, it cannot yet be recommended as treatment for smallpox
[5] The principles of managing an outbreak of smallpox will be
isolation and supportive care of infected patients and
postexpo-sure vaccination for contacts Vaccination against smallpox is by
inoculation of the related orthopoxvirus, vaccinia Vaccination is
moderately effective at aborting or attenuating the disease if given
within 4 days of an exposure [5] Complications from widespread
vaccination with vaccinia in the past included localized dermal
reactions, vaccinia gangrenosa (with local extensive skin necrosis
at the site of inoculation), eczema vaccinatum (a superinfection
of eczema with the vaccinia virus), progressive vaccinia, and
post-vaccinial encephalitis [10] While pregnant mothers may be
vac-cinated, there is a low risk of a potentially fatal fetal infection
from the vaccinia virus Therefore, routine vaccination of
preg-nant women in non - emergent settings is not recommended In
the event of an actual bioterrorism event, a pregnant woman at
risk for exposure must weigh the relatively small risk of an adverse
effect from the vaccine, against the devastating outcome
associ-ated with smallpox infection in pregnancy [10]
Plague
Plague has held a special place in world history with multiple
pandemics leading to the deaths of millions of people The
bacil-lus, Yersinia pestis , is generally transmitted to humans from a
rodent host by way of a fl ea vector However, direct host - to - host
transmission may occur by way of an infectious aerosol from
affected individuals This makes the disease extremely contagious
The disease is rapidly fatal in the absence of appropriate antibiotic
treatment [4] There have been attempts in the past to weaponize
plague; however, most such attempts have met with limited
success Still, it is thought that plague represents a bioterrorism
threat by way of an aerosol or inhalational route
Typical bubonic plague is acquired from the bite of a fl ea,
which regurgitates the Y pestis from its foregut The organisms
rapidly multiply and spread to regional lymph nodes within 1 – 8
days The infection of lymph nodes creates a characteristic bubo,
which is a large tender area of infl ammation within the regional
lymph node Once this occurs, the patient may become septic
within several days Some patients will develop pneumonia and
begin to shed the Yersinia organisms in their cough droplets
Victims will typically develop a productive cough with blood
tinged sputum within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms [4] The
Trang 6320 mg with sulfamethoxazole 1600 mg daily for the duration of the pregnancy Chronic infection is more common in women who develop the acute infection during pregnancy This is thought to be related to the relatively immunocompromized state
of pregnancy The use of the trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole during pregnancy reduces the frequency of abortion, and
decreases the number of women with identifi able Coxiella in the
placenta at birth [12] Such treated patients are still at risk for preterm delivery and low birth weight Prolonged therapy should
be instituted after delivery, and the recommended postpartum regimen is doxycycline 100 mg twice daily and hydroxychloro-quine 600 mg daily for 1 year following the pregnancy For women who are appropriately treated, future pregnancies seem
to be unaffected Similarly, women who acquire and resolve the acute infection prior to becoming pregnant do not show any adverse pregnancy effects [12] Breastfeeding is not recom-mended for women with acute Q fever
Ricin
Ricin is a potent toxin easily derived from the beans of the castor
plant ( Ricinus communis ) The history of ricin ’ s use as a lethal
agent goes back several years and crosses many political lines Recently, this toxin received extensive media attention as an agent
of terrorism following the arrest of six persons in Manchester, England, in December of 2002, who allegedly produced the toxin
in an apartment for use in a potential attack The discovery of powdered ricin in the mailroom serving US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist ’ s offi ce in February 2004 resulted in renewed fears regarding vulnerability to an attack with this toxin The potential for ricin to be a weapon of mass destruction rests in the ease with which it can be produced, its stability, and its relatively easy route of dissemination with low risk of detection The amount of ricin necessary to produce effects is also very small The protein is derived in the processing of castor beans, the oil from which is used in a number of diverse industrial settings, including the manufacture of brake and hydraulic fl uid [13] The waste mash, or aqueous phase of the oil production, contains
5 – 10% ricin, which can then be isolated using chromatography The toxins RCL III and RCL IV are relatively small dimeric pro-teins consisting of an “ A ” and “ B ” chain After entry into the cell
by binding to the cell surface glycoproteins, the toxin inhibits the 60S ribosomal subunit preventing continued protein synthesis The interruption of protein synthesis eventually leads to cell death [13]
In the event of inhalational exposure, symptoms are related to irritation of the lungs Respiratory symptoms will begin usually
4 – 8 hours after the exposure Early symptoms can include fever, chest tightness, cough and dyspnea Within 1 – 2 days, severe infl ammation of the respiratory tract, cell death, and the develop-ment of acute respiratory distress syndrome may be expected The only treatment is respiratory support with mechanical ven-tilation [3,5] There has been concern that ricin may be used to contaminate the water or food supply In the event of a gastroin-testinal exposure, necrosis of the gastroingastroin-testinal epithelium as
pregnancy and the very high morbidity and mortality of the
disease itself, most would agree that, if indicated, the prophylactic
antibiotics should be given
Viral h emorrhagic f evers
Extremely infectious body fl uids also raise the potential for
wide-spread transmission of some of the most feared tropical
hemor-rhagic viruses, such as Ebola or Marburg These viruses could
conceivably mutate to spread by inhalational routes that would
allow wider dissemination One documented outbreak of Ebola
Zaire virus killed 9 out of 10 infected victims [11] With no
known cure or vaccine, intensive support and isolation are the
only available responses, and any widespread infection would
likely overload our current medical system One has only to read
an account of these viruses [11] to appreciate that advance
prepa-ration and containment may be our best approach
Q f ever
Q fever is caused by an intracellular bacterium, Coxiella burnetii
This agent may be considered for use in bioterrorism because of
the ease with which it causes infection [5] Most
immunocompetent persons have a self limited infection without serious long
term complications, although chronic infection and endocarditis
may occur in a small proportion of infected individuals and this
can be debilitating An intentional release of Q fever would most
likely cause social disruption and psychological effects rather than
mass casualties The organism has long been known for its
asso-ciation with infection leading to abortion in animals More recent
information suggests that there is a similar effect on fetal loss in
humans as well
Q fever is generally obtained through inhalation of Coxiella
organisms The organisms are carried in body fl uids such as the
amniotic fl uid of farm animals The incubation period is between
2 and 14 days The clinical manifestations are similar to other
non - specifi c viral illnesses with fever, chills and headache The
patient may also experience malaise, anorexia and weight loss
More serious complications include neurologic symptoms in at
least 23% of acute cases [5]
The diagnosis is generally made on the basis of the clinical
complaints along with the presence of patchy infi ltrates seen on
chest X - ray and a history consistent with exposure Serology for
Coxiella IgG and IgM may be useful, with antibodies appearing
during the second week of the illness The typical treatment for
a non - pregnant adult is doxycycline twice a day for 5 – 7 days
Fluoroquinolones can also be used The disease is not thought to
be contagious from person to person [5]
While Q fever has long been known to cause low birth weight
and abortion in farm animals, more recent data from France
suggest that there is also a signifi cant effect on human pregnancy
[12] Acute infection during the fi rst trimester leads to a very high
rate of abortion in untreated patients Acute infection in the
second or third trimester is less commonly associated with fetal
loss but can be associated with low birth weight and premature
delivery [12] The recommended treatment is trimethoprim
Trang 7agents are usually clear and colorless and may be disseminated as either a vapor or liquid Exposure may occur through skin absorption, inhalation, or gastrointestinal ingestion
Patients who have had signifi cant exposure or who are present-ing with obvious symptoms should be treated with atropine and pralidoxime (2 - PAM) [14,15] Atropine is commonly given as a
1 - mg intramuscular or intravenous dose and is sometimes avail-able for self - administration via an auto - injector The patient should be reevaluated every 3 – 5 minutes, and repeat doses may
be given (up to 6 mg total) until secretions decrease and ventila-tion improves Pralidoxime, which reactivates the acetylcholines-terase at the nicotinic receptor, can also be given as a 600 – 1000 mg intramuscular injection or as a slow intravenous infusion [14,15]
In the event of severe respiratory compromise, intubation and mechanical ventilation may be required Severely affected victims should be given a benzodiazepine (diazepam, lorazepam, or mid-azolam) to raise the seizure threshold and help prevent secondary anoxic brain injury [15] Successfully treated patients will begin
to recover within a few hours, but neurological symptoms may last for weeks
There is little information on the fetal effects of such an expo-sure The fetus will be particularly susceptible to any respiratory depression or anoxia in the mother Theoretically, these com-pounds may be able to reach the fetal brain with resultant behav-ioral depression likely, and this may alter fetal biophysical and non - stress testing Ultimately, fetal survival will depend on expe-ditious care of the mother
Vesicants and p ulmonary a gents
Vesicants, such as mustard gas and Lewisite, are easily absorbed through the skin and mucous membranes [15] The damage may not be evident until hours after the exposure Damage is caused
by cross - linking and methylation of DNA Blisters may form on the skin in the early stages Skin sloughing will later place the patient at risk for secondary infection Similarly, damage to lung tissues results in a chemical pneumonia that may also lead to secondary infection Mortality is generally low from an acute attack, but the number of people affected may be high, and because of the high morbidity associated with these agents caring for these victims, will consume signifi cant medical resources [14,15]
In a similar vein, pulmonary agents, such as phosgene and chlorine, lead to respiratory tract injury within hours, with damage to the alveolar – capillary membrane and subsequent pul-monary edema Victims of phosgene usually require mechanical ventilation and careful management of fl uid balance, but survival beyond 48 hours suggests that recovery is likely [14,15]
Radiation
Public concern over radiation exposure has been elevated by worries about the safety of nuclear power facilities, the transport and disposal of nuclear waste, and the threatened use of radiation contaminated weapons – so - called “ dirty bombs ” Much is known about the consequences of inadvertent exposure Damage
well as damage to spleen, liver and kidneys may occur Symptoms
might manifest as abdominal cramps and nausea, as well as high
output gastrointestinal fl uid loss Ricin is thought to be much less
toxic when ingested rather than inhaled, although a large
gastro-intestinal exposure could lead to enough necrotic multiorgan
damage to produce hemorrhage and hypovolemic shock [3,5]
The diagnosis can be confi rmed by ELISA testing Patients
should be treated with decontamination including removal of
garments and cleansing of the body with soap and water Outside
of contact with residual, undetected toxin remaining on the
victim, there is thought to be little secondary risk to emergency
department personnel; however, universal contact precautions
should be observed There is no direct antidote to the toxin,
although gastric decontamination with charcoal may be benefi
-cial in some cases [3,5] Supportive care is the main approach to
management In the case of exposure during pregnancy, the
molecular weight of the toxin makes it unlikely to cross the
pla-cental barrier The outcome for the baby will depend on maternal
response to supportive care
Toxins or c hemicals
There are several compounds that may represent mass risk either
as the result of a deliberate act (e.g release of a nerve gas in the
Tokyo subway system in 1995), or as a result of an industrial
accident Chemical weapons may be classifi ed either by their
lethality or by their ability to persist in the environment [14]
Lethal agents are classifi ed into four categories: nerve agents or
anticholinesterases, vesicants or blistering agents, choking or
pul-monary agents, and cyanogens or “ blood ” agents [15] For the
most part, care of the pregnant patient will differ little from that
in the non - pregnant patient, especially prior to fetal viability As
in trauma situations, the health and survival of the fetus depend
most upon the mother ’ s condition, as a result of both the
imme-diate and the prolonged supportive care
Whenever a chemical threat is suspected, the medical team
should wear protective equipment including rubber boots and
impermeable suits Decontamination of the victims is a high
pri-ority, and patients should be moved to a well - ventilated setting
for safe disposal of clothing and decontamination of the skin [14]
Dilute sodium hypochlorite solution is preferred to water, and
the eyes should be irrigated with large amounts of water or
normal saline [14]
Nerve a gents – a cetylcholinesterase i nhibitors
Organophosphorus compounds such as tabun, sarin, soman, and
VX primarily act through the inhibition of acetylcholinesterase at
synapses and neuromuscular junctions [14,15] Tyrylcholinesterase
in plasma, and acetylcholinesterase in the red blood cell, are also
inhibited by these agents The result is an excess of acetylcholine
leading to bronchial hypersecretion and bronchoconstriction,
mental status changes, nausea, vomiting, and muscle
fascicula-tions and weakness [15] A large exposure may be rapidly fatal
with loss of consciousness, seizures, and apnea from respiratory
muscle paralysis and central nervous system depression The
Trang 8tual recovery [18] Severe organ dysfunction may be present, including low white blood cell counts leading to immunodefi -ciency A gastrointestinal syndrome also may occur with loss of the cells lining the small and large intestines, leading to water and electrolyte loss through vomiting, diarrhea and impaired absorp-tion The patient may also demonstrate confusion and disorienta-tion resulting from the dramatic changes of dehydradisorienta-tion and electrolyte imbalance Such mental status changes, including periods of unconsciousness, are a poor prognostic sign [18] Full recovery is possible and may occur over a prolonged period of time, from several weeks to 2 years
The initial management of a large radiation exposure includes treating traumatic injuries (fractures, lacerations) as they would normally be managed In addition, care should be taken to remove external contaminants The history should focus on the details of the source of exposure including the type of radiation, the proximity to the source, and the duration of the exposure [18] A careful medical history should be obtained and, in preg-nant women, an estimate of the gestational age and a summary
of the pregnancy history should be included Diagnosis of ARS may be aided by following the complete blood count every 4 – 6 hours A signifi cant drop in the absolute lymphocyte count and platelet count may aid in timing the exposure Suspected expo-sures less than 2 Gy may not require hospitalization Prospective evaluation of the white blood cell count and the cell differential count over the course of the next few days may be appropriate Nausea and vomiting might not be present in the early phase for someone with less than 7.5 Gy of exposure (see Table 52.2 ) [16,18]
For more severe ARS with a known higher exposed dose, sup-portive care should be the rule Careful history and physical examination is imperative Nausea and vomiting can be initially managed with selective serotonin 5HT 3 receptor antagonists [18] Admission to hospital will be necessary The anticipated drop in blood cell counts merits prophylactic use of antiviral prophylaxis and possibly neutropenic precautions Management should be performed in conjunction with a hematologist or others knowl-edgeable in radiation illness
Potassium iodide has been considered as a means of protecting thyroid function in the event of an acute population exposure to radiation [19] This becomes useful primarily in the event of
can range from skin reddening to cancer induction and death
Particularly relevant to pregnancy is the fact that fetuses and
children (in whom there is ongoing rapid cell division) are more
susceptible to the subtle effects of radiation exposure than are
adults [16,17] Damage is also cumulative, with increasing or
repetitive exposures resulting in more severe damage [16]
“ Dirty bombs ” are typically intended to spread radiation in
such a way as to make large areas uninhabitable Depending on
the source, the amount of radiation released from such a weapon
is unlikely to cause severe forms of acute radiation syndrome
[16] According to the United Nations ’ report of Iraq ’ s testing of
dirty bombs in 1987, the Iraqis deemed that radiation levels
achieved were too low to cause signifi cant damage and the project
was abandoned In a modern context, such weapons would likely
be used to disrupt routines and generate fear in the general
public
Management of the initial exposure to radiation revolves
around limiting the amount of time near the source, increasing
the distance from the source, and use of physical barriers, such
as glass or concrete to shield an individual from exposure [16]
In the event of an exposure, it is recommended that exposed
individuals leave the area on foot (as opposed to using cars or
public transportation that may harbor contaminated dusts), and
to make use of barriers by entering buildings Clothes should be
removed and bagged for later disposal A shower may remove
contaminated dust or debris from the skin [16] These principles
of contamination must also be considered for the patient
present-ing to the hospital or clinic for evaluation
Radiation exposure can result in signifi cant dysfunction to
many organs Depending on the dose and duration of exposure,
as well as the mechanism of exposure, injuries may range from
local (such as a burn) to more widespread injury such as acute
radiation syndrome (ARS) [18] A local injury often involves
exposed contact areas like the hands Patients may present with
erythema, blistering, desquamation, and ulceration of the skin
The patient may or may not know when the exposure occurred
For example, handling an unknown metallic object might be the
source of exposure Such injuries generally evolve slowly and the
full extent of injury may not be known for several weeks
Conventional wound management may be ineffective [18]
The acute radiation syndrome (ARS) is a quickly developing
illness caused by a total body exposure to radiation It is
charac-terized by simultaneous damage to several organ systems from
ionizing radiation that caused defi ciency in cell numbers or cell
function Radioactive sources provoking ARS might consist of
machines that emit gamma rays, X - rays, or neutrons There are
three phases of ARS [18] The fi rst is a prodromal phase in which
a patient might experience nausea, vomiting and loss of appetite
Generally these symptoms disappear within a day or two and a
symptom - free latent period may follow The length of the latent
period may vary depending on the radiation dose A period of
fully expressed illness may then follow with electrolyte
imbal-ances, diarrhea, hematologic abnormalities, and even CNS
changes The overt illness results either in death or in slow,
Table 52.2 Biological effects of total body irradiation [16]
Amount of exposure Effect
50 mGy (5 rads) No detectable injury
1 Gy (100 rads) Nausea and vomiting for 1 – 2 days, temporary drop
in new blood cell production 3.5 Gy (350 rads) Nausea and vomiting initially, followed by periods of
apparent wellness At 3 – 4 weeks, may see defi ciencies of white blood cells and platelets
> 3.5 Gy May be fatal
Trang 9members of other relevant hospital departments, such as emer-gency medicine, critical care, and the fi rst - response and transport teams, is essential Helpful resources and training centers exist, including the Department of Energy - sponsored Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) program
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Department of Homeland Security ’ s Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama
References
1 Disaster management In: Holleran RS , ed Air and Surface Patient Transport: Principles and Practice , 3rd edn St Louis : Mosby , 2003
2 Bleck TP Fundamentals of disaster management In: Farmer JC ,
Jimenez EJ , Talmor DS , Zimmerman JL , eds Fundamentals of Disaster Management Des Plaines, IL : Society of Critical Care Medicine , 2003 :
1 – 8
3 Moran GJ Threats in bioterrorism II: CDC category B and C agents
Emerg Med Clin N Am 2002 ; 20 : 311 – 330
4 Darling RG , Catlett CL , Huebner KD , Jarrett DG Threats in
bioter-rorism I: CDC category A agents Emerg Med Clin N Am 2002 ; 20 :
273 – 309
5 Agrawal AG , O ’ Grady NP Biologic agents and syndromes In: Farmer
JC , Jimenez EJ , Talmor DS , Zimmerman JL , eds Fundamentals of Disaster Management Des Plaines, IL : Society of Critical Care Medicine , 2003 : 71 – 93
6 Inglesby TV , O ’ Toole T , Henderson DA , Bartlett JG , Ascher MS , Eitzen E , et al Anthrax as a biological weapon, 2002; updated
recom-mendations for management JAMA 2002 ; 287 ( 17 ): 2236 – 2252
7 White SR , Henretig FM , Dukes RG Medical management of vulner-able populations and co - morbid conditions of victims of
bioterror-ism Emerg Med Clin N Am 2002 ; 20 : 365 – 392
8 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Management
of asymptomatic pregnant or lactating women exposed to anthrax ACOG Committee Opinion No 268 Obstet Gynecol 2002 ; 99 :
366 – 368
9 Wiesen AR , Littell CT Relationship between prepregnancy anthrax vaccination and pregnancy and birth outcomes among US army
women JAMA 2002 ; 287 ( 12 ): 1556 – 1560
10 Suarez VR , Hankins GDV Smallpox and pregnancy: from eradicated
disease to bioterrorist threat Obstet Gynecol 2002 ; 100 : 87 – 93
11 Preston R The Hot Zone New York : Random House , 1994
12 Raoult D , Fenollar F , Stein A Q fever during pregnancy Arch Intern Med 2002 ; 162 : 701 – 704
13 Mirarchi FL CBRNE – Ricin Available at www.emedicine.com/ emerg/topic889.htm
14 Evison D , Hinsley D , Rice P Chemical weapons BMJ 2002 ; 324 :
332 – 335
15 Lantz G , Talmor DS Chemical agents and syndromes In: Farmer JC ,
Jimenez EJ , Talmor DS , Zimmerman JL , eds Fundamentals of Disaster Management Des Plaines, IL : Society of Critical Care Medicine , 2003 :
57 – 70
16 Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site Guidance for Radiation Accident Management Types of radiation exposure Available at http://orise orau.gov/reacts/guide/injury.htm Retrieved January 7, 2007
exposure to radioactive iodine, which is typically present early in
a nuclear explosion and decays rapidly Radioactive iodine is
potentially taken up by the thyroid gland and leads to destruction
of the normal glandular tissue Potassium iodide salt taken within
the fi rst 3 – 4 hours of an event saturates the thyroid gland ’ s iodine
uptake mechanism, blocking uptake of the radioactive form Due
to the quick decay of radioactive iodine, only a single dose is
usually needed [19]
Because of the relatively greater activity of the thyroid gland in
children, potassium iodide is recommended for children as well
Adults should receive one tablet or 130 mg Children aged 3 – 18
are to receive one half - tablet (65 mg) Children aged 1 – 3 years
receive 32 mg, and under 1 year of age, 16 mg is the recommended
dose The adult dose therapy is recommended for pregnant
women, as the fetus is also susceptible Women who are
breast-feeding should also be given the usual adult dose, and the child
should receive the appropriate dose based on age [19]
Unfortunately, high - dose radiation exposure can have severe
effects on the developing fetus Estimates of the risk of injury
from ionizing radiation are based in part on reports from
Hiroshima and Nagasaki following the atomic explosions there
Along with other data, a linear relationship has been used to
estimate risks to the fetus from smaller exposures While no direct
evidence links exposure to diagnostic medical imaging tests with
childhood cancers or birth defects [17,20] , exposures from an
intentional event could pose signifi cant fetal risk due to a much
higher dose of ionizing radiation
In the case of the pre - implantation embryo, the most likely
outcomes are either no detectable effect or complete loss of the
embryo [17,20] For example, an exposure of 10,000 millirads
(mrads) is associated with a 2% risk of death for the pre -
implan-tation embryo [20] In the fi rst trimester, the threshold for
detect-ing an increased risk of birth defects, such as brain malformation
or injury to the mid - face, teeth or genitalia, is 5000 – 25 000 mrad
Microcephaly, developmental delay, and cognitive impairment
can occur with large exposures, (greater than 12 000 – 20 000 mrad)
particularly between 8 and 15 weeks [17,20] Developmental
delay and impairment may occur later in the gestation, but at
doses that would induce ARS in the mother The expected risk of
mental impairment in the fetus exposed to 100 rad (1 Gy) is
approximately 40%, while the risk climbs to 60% with 150 rad of
ionizing radiation [17]
Summary
Most new information on these described agents will likely come
in the form of case reports from isolated exposures or events
Basic science research must continue to discover the complex
microbiology of some of these agents, particularly as it is altered
by pregnancy The most critical immediate need is for systems
preparation A written, well - instructed triage and management
plan, including back - up plans for communication and personnel,
is a necessary fi rst step Collaboration between obstetricians and
Trang 10drome Available at http://orise.orau.gov/reacts/guide/syndrome htm Retrieved January 7, 2007
19 Centers for Disease Control Emergency Preparedness and Response Radiation emergencies: potassium iodide Available at www.bt.cdc gov/radiation/ki.asp
20 Miller JC Risks from ionizing radiation in pregnancy Radiology Rounds 2004 ; 2 ( 2 )
17 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Guidelines for
diagnostic imaging during pregnancy ACOG Committee Opinion
No 158, 1995 Available at
www.acog.com/publications/commit-tee_opinions/bco158.htm Retrieved January 1, 2001
18 Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Radiation Emergency
Assistance Center/Training Site Guidance for Radiation Accident
Management Managing radiation emergencies: acute radiation