The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 38 doc

A theory of grammar is said to be explanatorily adequate if it is the descriptive grammar which records the knowledge of language speakers have actually acquired and the structural descr

sensory items rather than physical things He describes

himself as a nominalist and The Structure of Appearance as

formulated in nominalistic terms Goodman’s

*nominal-ism is sometimes described as a rejection of classes, but

may best be summed up in his words: ‘the nominalist

rec-ognizes no distinction of entities without a distinction of

content’ According to Goodman, then, the class whose

members are the counties of Utah is not to be

distin-guished from the class of acres of Utah or from the single

individual, the state of Utah This view has been described

as a ‘simple materialism’ based on the ‘crude principle’

that the entities supposed unintelligible (classes as distinct

from their members) are those things we cannot point at

or hold in our hands

In Fact, Fiction, and Forecast Goodman proposed his

‘new riddle of induction’ Hume had seen that we make

predictions based on regularities in experience, while

arguing that there was no rational basis for this But not all

observed regularities form the basis for predictions:

though all examined emeralds are *grue we do not

imagine that all emeralds are

Goodman was an art collector, and this interest was

also reflected in his philosophical writings In Languages of

Art (1968) he discusses such topics as representation,

expression, and authenticity from the perspective of what

he calls ‘a general theory of symbols’ m.c

*aesthetics, history of; aesthetics, problems of

N Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th edn (Cambridge,

Mass., 1983)

—— Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, 1978).

R Rudner and I Scheffler (eds.), Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of

Nelson Goodman (Indianapolis, 1972).

good will Moral agents, on a Kantian view, can be held

accountable for the orientation of their will, as they can

not for their physical and psychological make-up The will

has to be seen as free—initiating action because duty calls

for it, or else assenting—also freely—to action out of

inclin-ation Thus, distinctive or ‘genuine’ moral worth lies not

simply in the mere performance of right acts, but in doing

them from a motive of duty—that is, from a good will,

steadily aligned to whatever duty requires Such a view is

of course compatible with a concern about the

conse-quences of action—but only so long as the supreme value

of the good will itself is not lost from sight Moral theorists

dispute whether this account warps and narrows the

range of moral appraisal, by undervaluing spontaneous

goodness and goodness of character But it is hard not to

agree that my good will is morally appraisable in a

distinct-ive and strong sense It monitors, endorses, rejects, and

modifies the components of my temperament and

charac-ter for whose existence I am not in the same

thorough-going way responsible What I choose to make of these

components or do with them is indeed morally

apprais-able, and is a matter of attention and will r.w.h

*consequentialism

H J Paton, The Categorical Imperative (London, 1948).

Gorgias(5th century bc) The most celebrated rhetorician

of the century From Leontini in Sicily, he was a prom-inent figure in the sophistic movement in Athens in the last quarter of the century (*Sophists.) He also had philosoph-ical interests, and was reputedly a pupil of Empedocles The surviving portions of his works not only attest his florid rhetorical style, but also touch on some substantial

issues, including responsibility (in his Defence of Helen) The curious essay On What Is Not is an application (of

dubi-ous seridubi-ousness) of Eleatic argumentative techniques to establish a variety of sceptical and nihilistic conclusions

He figures prominently in Plato’s Gorgias. c.c.w.t

W K C Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, iii (Cambridge,

1969), ch 11.2

grace.That which is granted by the will of God Divine assistance, especially that conducive to sanctification and salvation It is argued, for example by Augustine, Luther, and Calvin (following Romans 9: 11–26), that the grace of God does not depend on merit Augustine distinguishes

grace necessary for action (adiutorium sine quo non fit) from grace sufficient for action (adiutorium quo fit) Aquinas calls

the inspiring presence of God in the soul ‘habitual grace’

or ‘sanctifying grace’, and divine intervention causing a good human act ‘actual’ grace The ability to not act sin-fully since the Fall, the salvation of the soul, and the pos-session of Christian faith itself are arguably by the grace of God The sacraments are symbols or instruments for the reception of grace, but grace may be bestowed without

Augustine, De Corruptione et Gratia xii 34.

Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae q 110 a.1 Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans (1515–16).

Jean Calvin, Institutesiii xxi 1, 5

grammar.A formal system for describing the structure of natural languages The term is used, in one sense, to mean traditional grammar, and in another, more theoretical sense, to mean generative grammar Traditional gram-mar at best describes ideals of practice offering prescrip-tive rules that tell us how others would like us to use our language It is alleged that it can provide philosophical insight into the presuppositions harboured in ordinary language, and that correct attention to it resolves philo-sophical misunderstanding

Grammar in the more technical sense, given precision

by Chomsky’s notion of a generative grammar, is a system

of rules or principles from which can be derived all and only the grammatical *sentences of a language The task

in constructing grammars for particular languages is to design a formal system that will account for most of the facts with the fewest number of independent principles and posits Such a grammar is generative in the formal sense that it makes it explicit how all of the permissible sequences of words follow from a finite set of principles and a finite stock of vocabulary (lexical) items

The theory of grammar studies linguistic competence, not performance; i.e it accounts for what speakers know

350 Goodman, Nelson

about their language, not all the uses they make of it This is

because performance may be full of slips of the tongue,

inattention, false starts, mistakes speakers would like to

correct on reflection, etc A theory of performance would

have to include not just a theory of linguistic mastery but

also psychological theories of memory, perception,

atten-tion, and motor functioning which all contribute to actual

language use This means that the data for theories of

gram-mar will always be indirect In addition to verbal behaviour,

linguists elicit judgements from speakers (misleadingly

called intuitions) about which strings of words are

gram-matical, or belong to their language For example, ‘George

drank the wine’ and even the semantically anomalous ‘The

wine drank George’ are grammatical; whereas ‘George

wine drank the’ is not To use it to say what the first sentence

says is not to be speaking English Judgements about what is

grammatical, however, are not always reliable; they simply

provide the best available evidence of which sentences are

well formed (i.e grammatical) in the speaker’s language

Speakers may find some sentences ungrammatical at

first due to parsing problems Well-known examples are

centre-embedded constructions such as ‘The girl the cat

the dog bit scratched cried’ (cf ‘The boy the dog bit cried’),

and garden-path sentences such as ‘The horse raced past

the barn fell’ Difficulties with these are due to processing

and memory limitations Hence even the mentalist

hypothesis that grammar is a cognitive state has to

distin-guish grammars as bodies of knowledge, from parsers as

systems of processing rules for producing and

compre-hending strings

A grammar that generates all and only the grammatical

sentences of a speaker’s language is said to be

observation-ally adequate A grammar is said to be descriptively adequate

when it also assigns structural descriptions to those

strings Grammar is really the theory of syntactic

struc-tures rather than word strings, since it must account for

grammatical relations between sentences and explain

why certain structures are ruled out To do this it must

postulate real, though hidden, levels of syntactic

represen-tation (*Structure, deep and surface.) For example, the

sentences ‘John is easy to please’ and ‘John is eager to

please’ look on the surface like similar arrangements of

words of the same grammatical category But the first can

be transformed into the sentence ‘It is easy to please John’,

whereas the second has no related form ‘It is eager to

please John’ This is because ‘John’ is the object of ‘to

please’ in the first structure, but the subject in the second

(Chomsky argues that these subject and object positions

should be marked in the syntax by empty categories.)

Sen-tences are hierarchical, not linear, arrangements of

con-stituents, where constituent structures are units of syntax

larger than the word and smaller than the sentence All

sentences contain groupings like noun phrase and verb

phrase which mark major constituent boundaries These

phrase structures can be represented by tree diagrams, or

labelled and bracketed strings; e.g [S[NPThe horse raced

past the barn] [VPfell] ] A theory of grammar is said to be

explanatorily adequate if it is the descriptive grammar

which records the knowledge of language speakers have actually acquired and the structural descriptions they assign to their sentences, i.e if it is psychologically real

b.c.s

N Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.,

1965)

J Katz (ed.), The Philosophy of Linguistics (Oxford, 1985).

P Sells, Lectures on Contemporary Syntactic Theories (Stanford,

Calif., 1985)

grammar, autonomy of In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein

argued that language is answerable to the essential nature

of reality The logical syntax of simple names (their com-binatorial possibilities) must mirror the metaphysical combinatorial possibilities of the simple objects that are

their meanings Names are connected with the objects in

reality which are their meanings by word–world correl-ations Similarly, the use of the negation sign must reflect the essence of the operation of negation, etc

In Philosophical Grammar, chapters ii and x, he repudi-ated this view He ceased to employ the term ‘logical syn-tax’, no longer believing that there is a philosophically significant distinction between syntactical (formation) rules and semantical rules ‘connecting language with real-ity’ (e.g by means of ostensive definitions) Ostensive definitions appear to connect words with objects and properties in reality, but this appearance is deceptive The object pointed at in an ostensive definition of a colour-word, for example, is being used as a sample, and a sample

is part of the means of representation, not an object repre-sented (described) by the ostensive definition This is

evi-dent from the fact that instead of the description ‘A is red’ one may say ‘A is this↑colour [pointing at a sample]’, sub-stituting a sample, deictic gesture and indexical for the word ‘red’ Here the *ostensive definition is visibly func-tioning as a substitution rule So ostensive definition remains within language and does not connect language and reality

*Grammar, he now suggested, is constituted by all the linguistic rules that determine the sense of an expression Here

he diverged from the customary use of ‘grammar’ (which excludes explanations of word-meaning, and admits as grammatical sequences of words that lack sense) But he denied that there are two different kinds of grammar, ordin-ary grammar and philosophical grammar Rather there are two different kinds of interest in the rules of language, the grammarian’s and the philosopher’s The latter’s interest is guided by the purpose of resolving philosoph-ical problems

Wittgenstein now argued, contrary to his earlier view, that grammar is ‘arbitrary’ or autonomous, i.e that it is not answerable to the nature of things The idea that grammar can be justified by reference to reality in the sense in which an empirical proposition is justified by ref-erence to what makes it true is incoherent The rules for the use of names, e.g ‘red’, do not mirror the metaphys-ical nature of the colour, but constitute it Similarly, the rules for the use of the negation sign do not reflect the

grammar, autonomy of 351

nature of negation, but determine it ‘Grammatical

prop-ositions’, e.g ‘Nothing can be red and green all over’, are

in effect rules, not descriptions of reality What appear to

be metaphysical necessities are in effect no more than the

shadows cast upon the world by our methods of

represen-tation, our rules for the use of expressions Concepts are

not ‘correct’, let alone justifiable as true, but only more or

less useful for our purposes Alternative grammars are

conceivable They are constrained, but not made more or

less correct, by our nature (e.g by our perceptual and

intellectual capacities) and by the contingencies of the

P M S Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of

Wittgenstein, rev edn (Oxford, 1986), 179–92.

grammatical proposition Term of art used by the later

Wittgenstein to signify a proposition which appears to

state truths about the nature of things, but whose actual

role is to give a rule for the use of its constituent

expres-sions ‘Red is a colour’, ‘Nothing can be red and green all

over simultaneously’, ‘Red is darker than pink’ look as if

they state necessary truths about the nature of colours

Actually they specify rules for the use of colour words,

namely that if something is red, it can also be said to be

coloured; if something is red all over, it cannot also be said

to be green all over; if A is red and B pink, then the

infer-ence that A is darker than B is licit Wittgenstein argued

that what appear to be necessary metaphysical truths are

at best grammatical propositions p.m.s.h

G P Baker and P M S Hacker, An Analytical Commentary on the

Philosophical Investigations, ii: Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar

and Necessity (Oxford, 1985), 269–73.

Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937) Born in Sardinia, Gramsci

was a founder-member and the principal ideologist of the

Italian Communist Party, which he briefly led prior to his

imprisonment by Mussolini Whilst in jail, where he

remained until his death, he wrote the Prison Notebooks.

These are generally regarded as amongst the founding

documents of Western Marxism Drawing on the writings

of Croce, Gramsci modified orthodox historical

material-ism so as to give an independent role to human

conscious-ness and hence to the superstructure relative to the

economic base He used this insight to develop the

con-cept of hegemony, or ideological power, to explain the

resilience of liberal democracy in the advanced industrial

nations of the West He argued that in order to overthrow

the state in such countries, revolutionary parties must first

overcome the sources of hegemonic power within civil

society, such as churches, schools, and the media r.p.b

*dialectical materialism

Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schecter, Gramsci and the Italian

State (Manchester, 1993).

greatest happiness principle This is one name for the

leading principle of *utilitarianism, and one which

Ben-tham specifically gave to his central principle towards the

end of his life The main reason for the change was that he thought that ‘happiness’ was a clearer designation than

*‘utility’ for the right end of action; the happiness to be considered was of everyone affected by a proposed action

Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legis-lation, 2nd edn (1823), ch.1, sect.1, n.

great man theory of history An expression used to refer

to the claim that the course of the historical process is basic-ally governed by the actions of outstanding individuals, a contention encapsulated in Carlyle’s famous dictum that history is ‘the biography of great men’ Its nineteenth-century opponents, who included Engels, Tolstoy, and Herbert Spencer, argued instead that history was ulti-mately determined by such general factors as economic or social relations, the individuals wielding power being themselves the products or instruments of society Despite the intrinsic interest of problems concerning the role of the individual in history, debates on this score have tended to be vitiated by uncritically monistic conceptions

of historical causation, failures to distinguish between the necessary and sufficient conditions of events, and diver-gences in the criteria employed for estimating the nature and extent of social influence or importance p.l.g

*superman

S Hook, The Hero in History (New York, 1943).

great-souled man Greatness of soul (Greek megalop-sukhia, rendered into Latin as magnanimitas) is a

self-referential evaluative disposition characteristic of Aristotle’s virtuous agent, consisting in a proper sense of his own worth, manifesting itself in the desire to be honoured for his virtues by his equals (coupled with indif-ference to the opinion of inferiors) and in self-conscious dignity of demeanour (verging on pomposity to the mod-ern eye) Despite the etymological connection, it is nearer

to pride than to magnanimity; while the great-souled man appears magnanimous, e.g in forgiving injuries, he does

so not from generosity of spirit, but because nursing

*superman

W F R Hardie, ‘ “Magnanimity” in Aristotle’s Ethics’, Phronesis

(1978)

Greek philosophy: see ancient philosophy; Greek

philoso-phy, modern

Greek philosophy, modern What point of origin one selects for modern Greek philosophy is to a certain extent

an arbitrary matter For, on the one hand, intellectual phe-nomena never fall neatly into line with the facts of history, while, on the other, modern Greek philosophy has its roots deep in antiquity, being the prolongation of the clas-sical and Christian spirit during Byzantine rule and the Turkish occupation

352 grammar, autonomy of

With this caveat, one can usefully think of ‘early

mod-ern Greek philosophy’ as lasting from the year 1453 (the

Fall of Constantinople) to the year 1821 (the start of the

struggle for national independence) This whole period

has certain distinctive features: its attachment to ideals,

its Graeco-Christian values, and its unremitting efforts to

inform and awaken Hellenic consciousness ‘Later

modern Greek philosophy’ (and it is with this that the

pre-sent article is chiefly concerned) emerges from the

revolu-tion of 1821 Greece breaks free from the Ottoman

Empire, and organizes herself into a nation state

Decisively influenced by the new freedom of thought and

action, modern Greek philosophy manifests a number of

tendencies

1 Ancient authors are published, annotated,

trans-lated, and interpreted Thinkers turn to the great

philoso-phers of the past—in particular Plato and Aristotle—for

inspiration A halt is called to the conflict between

Platon-ists and Aristotelians that had prevailed in Byzantium and

throughout early modern Greek philosophy Though a

majority of intellectuals opt for *Platonism, they take

proper account of Aristotle, a large number of whose

doc-trines win acceptance Simultaneously there develops a

sort of *scholasticism: the idea that faithfully copying the

language of the ancient Greeks is the means whereby to

advance spiritual culture

2 Christian authors are published, and commentaries

on them are written This is because those engaged in

phil-osophy are also theologians, with a lively faith in the

power of Christianity to mould the individual, especially

from the perspective of the Greek Orthodox religion

(The second tendency is not seldom at loggerheads with

the first; but both are in agreement as regards the need for

a ‘learned’ language.)

3 A majority of philosophers attempt a synthesis of

Greek and Christian values in the light of the applied

sci-ences now under cultivation in western Europe The

major figure in the nineteenth century is Peter

Vrạlas-Armenis (1812–84) Vrạlas-Vrạlas-Armenis accepts Plato’s

the-ory of *innate ideas His ontology is based on Aristotle’s

method in the Categories, whereas his argument for a

provident deity is derived from the Christian creed

Parallel with this, he endeavours to assimilate the

scientific findings of his time and to synthesize them into a

unified theory of the cosmos and humankind

This trend towards synthesis had a new lease of life in the

twentieth century, in response to various stimuli: *Kantian

ethics, the work of the Baden and Marburg Schools, Hegel’s

system, and Herbart and Wundt’s philosophy No one

school is dominant: instead, an eclectic spirit makes itself

felt The specificity of the cultural sciences is recognized In

the search for a more convincing theory of values, new

methodological criteria are adopted Outstanding figures in

this movement include Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987),

President of the Greek Republic, the politician and

Prime Minister Panayotis Kanellopoulos (1902–86),

Theophilos Voreas (1873–1954), John Theodorakopoulos

(1900–81), Christos Androutsos (1869–1935), and Alexan-der Tsirintanis (1903–77)

4 From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, there is a radically different philosophical move-ment which questions traditional solutions and looks for alternatives in *positivism and in a mechanistic account of life and the universe A considerable number of its adher-ents embrace *materialism and follow the *Marxist view

of man and society Three very representative figures in this movement are George Skliros (1877–1919), Demetrios Glinos (1882–1943), and Avrotelis Eleft-heropoulos (1869–1964)

5 After the Second World War, a dialogue develops between modern Greek philosophy and contemporary modes of thought such as *analytic philosophy, *existen-tialism, *philosophy of language, *phenomenology, the

*Frankfurt School, *Thomism, personalism Though the description and analysis of present currents of European thought is carried out by university lecturers and teachers

in institutes of philosophy, one cannot make great claims for the existence of any philosophical school Today’s Greek philosopher continues to be an eclectic cherishing a belief in the regenerative powers of humanism g.b

*ancient philosophy

C Cavarnos, Modern Greek Thought (Belmont, Mass., 1969).

G E Voumvlinopoulos, Bibliographie critique de la philosophie grecque (Athens, 1966).

Green, Thomas Hill (1836–82) English idealist philoso-pher and liberal political theorist His *idealism logically entails that something’s being what it is essentially con-sists in its being related to other things According to Green, no relations can be detected empirically, but they may be known by the rational self-conscious minds that construct them Green emphasizes that this idealism is anti-empiricist because it includes the denial that what something is may be known by sense experience Indeed, Green’s contributions to the edition of Hume’s works he helped to compile are critical of Hume’s empiricism and his naturalism

Green’s *liberalism is the doctrine that a minimal state

is justified in so far as it maximizes the freedom of the indi-vidual Hence the state may intervene to prevent the free-dom of some citizens being curtailed by others Green’s holistic view of the state owes more to Hegel than to clas-sical English liberalism, despite Green’s endorsement of the principle that each individual’s freedom should be maximized in so far as this is consistent with a similar

T H Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford, 1883; new edn with

introduction by D Brink, Oxford, 2003)

Gregory of Rimini (c.1300–58) A member of the Eremite

Order of St Augustine, he taught at Paris, Bologna, Padua, and Perugia, and was Prior General of his order from 1357 till his death He wrote an influential commentary on the

Sentences of Peter of Lombard, in which he has a good deal

Gregory of Rimini 353

to say about our knowledge of the external world He

accepts the common view that perception of the outer

world requires species which emanate from outer objects

and strike our receptors, and argues that in the absence of

those objects we still know them, though ‘abstractively’,

because we have intuitive, that is, immediate knowledge

of the species which have lodged in our minds In the case

of our knowledge of outer objects, it is immediate in that

though we cannot see such an object without the aid of

the species emanating from it, we do not see the species

themselves; the causal role they play does not involve

their being perceived To say otherwise would be to

deny that we can have intuitive knowledge of external

G Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth

Century Thought (Manchester, 1961).

Grelling’s paradox Due to Kurt Grelling (1886–1941),

who was killed by the Nazis while trying to escape across

the Pyrenees Grelling defined the adjective

‘hetero-logical’ to mean the same as ‘not self-applicable’ This seems

to entail that ‘heterological’ is heterological if and only if it

is not heterological, which is impossible Now whether

‘not self-applicable’ is self-applicable depends entirely on

what that phrase means in application to itself If it means

‘expresses in itself a property it does not instantiate’ then it

is not self-applicable (and ‘heterological’ is heterological)

because the phrase (the word), in itself, does not express

any property It expresses different properties depending

on its application If it means ‘yields a true sentence when

grammatically self-applied’, then ‘ “Not self-applicable” is

not self-applicable’ is a version of the *liar paradox, and

Kurt Grelling, ‘The Logical Paradoxes’, Mind (1936).

—— and L Nelson, ‘Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxien von

Russell und Burali-Forti’, Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule

(1907–8)

Grice, H Paul (1913–88) English philosopher best known

for his work on meaning, especially the relation between

speaker meaning and linguistic meaning Grice, who was

at Oxford until 1967 and at Berkeley thereafter,

intro-duced several notions commonly employed by

philoso-phers today These include conversational implicature, what

a speaker implies as opposed to what he says or what his

words imply, and reflexive intention, a notion central to the

idea of speaker meaning (or *communication) Grice

maintained that speaker meaning is prior to linguistic

meaning, i.e that *semantics reduces to *propositional

attitude psychology Taken together, his notions have

helped linguists as well as philosophers draw the line

between semantics and pragmatics The distinction

between meaning and use has squelched such formerly

popular philosophical claims as that looking red precludes

being red or that believing something precludes knowing

it, claims which were based on the fact that it is misleading

to make a weaker statement when a stronger one is

Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).

—— Aspects of Reason (Oxford, 2001).

Griffin, James (1933– ) Moral philosopher best known for work on *well-being, interpersonal comparison of well-being, and consequentialism His first book was

Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism (Oxford, 1964) In Well-Being (Oxford, 1986), Griffin argues for an

‘informed-desire theory’: well-being consists in the possession of those objects one would desire if rational and informed These are accomplishment, the components of human existence (autonomy, basic capabilities to act, etc.), under-standing, enjoyment, and deep personal relations The good-making property of these objects is not their fulfill-ing desires, so Griffin is best interpreted as movfulfill-ing beyond

a preference-based theory of well-being to an objective account in the tradition of Aristotle, G E Moore, and Rashdall Though Griffin sees promotion of well-being as the animating aim of morality, he is not clearly utilitarian

He stresses the many levels of moral thinking—personal, political, etc.—and each level has its own characteristic

*consequentialism

J Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford, 1986).

—— ‘Well-being and its Interpersonal Comparability’, in

D Seanor and N Fotion (eds.), Hare and Critics (Oxford, 1988).

—— Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford,

1996)

Grossmann, Reinhardt (1931– ) Born in Berlin; profes-sor at Indiana University, Bloomington, since 1962 Gross-mann’s work is notable for its openness to both contemporary ‘analytical’ philosophy and ‘modern contin-ental philosophy’ For example, he is the author of not

only Reflections on Frege’s Philosophy (1969) but also Meinong (1974) and Phenomenology and Existentialism

(1984) In his own thinking, Grossmann has developed a neo-Kantian epistemology according to which what passes for reality is determined by an intellectual

categor-ial framework This is apparent in The Structure of Mind (1965) and The Categorial Structure of the World (1983).

s.p

*Meinong

Grosseteste, Robert (c.1170–1253) A Suffolk man, he became Chancellor of Oxford University c.1221,

Arch-deacon of Leicester in 1229, and was Bishop of Lincoln from 1235 till his death in 1253 He wrote on a wide range

of topics in philosophy and theology from an essentially Augustinian perspective In line with that perspective, which itself is strongly influenced by Platonic and biblical ideas, he placed the concept of light at the centre of his metaphysics, and also at the centre of his epistemology, where he gives an account of human understanding in terms of natural, and ultimately divine, illumination Grosseteste also composed numerous scientific treatises, being one of a small but growing band who recognized the

354 Gregory of Rimini

importance of experiment in the establishment of

scientific truth He was a pioneer in the Christian West as

a translator of Aristotle from Greek into Latin a.bro

J McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 2002).

Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645) Lawyer, poet, and

theolo-gian, he mediated classical and medieval political and legal

theory to the Enlightenment While Descartes meditated

in army winter quarters, Grotius was a political prisoner

planning his masterwork, De Iure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law

[and Rights and Wrongs] of War and Peace, 1625)

The philosophical concepts he elaborated with juridical

learning and creative statesmanship were transposed

from late medieval theology Moral requirements would

be valid even if one granted (etiamsi daremus) God’s

non-existence Natural moral law identifies acts as morally

necessary or base (and divinely commanded or forbidden)

because ‘conformable (or disconformable) with rational

and social nature’ *Rights are powers or liberties; political

society is for safeguarding individual moral rights

Hume’s celebrated ‘is–ought’ paragraph targets his

eva-sive natural law theory, Rousseau’s Social Contract his

Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and

Develop-ment (Cambridge, 1979).

—— Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge, 1993).

grue.Imagine a time t—say midnight on 1 January 2020.

Define ‘x is grue’ to mean ‘x is examined before t and is

green or x is examined after t and is blue’ If

generaliza-tions are confirmed by their instances, then the fact that all

emeralds so far examined are green confirms the

general-ization that all emeralds are grue as well as the

generaliza-tion that all emeralds are green: but the consequences of

the two generalizations are different and the former seems

quite bizarre This is Goodman’s ‘new riddle of

*induc-tion’ Goodman introduced the idea of the entrenchment

of a predicate (or more properly its extension) in an

attempt to distinguish those generalizations which are

genuinely confirmed by their instances m.c

N Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th edn (Cambridge,

Mass., 1983)

Grünbaum, Adolf (1923– ) A prolific philosopher of

sci-ence, he has made many contributions to both philosophy

of physics and philosophy of psychiatry Perhaps the most

striking claim argued for in his Philosophical Problems of

Space and Time (1963; expanded edn 1973) is the thesis that

physical geometry and chronometry are, in part, matters of

convention because continuous physical space and time are

metrically amorphous His influential The Foundations of

Psychoanalysis (1984) contains a critique of the scientific

cre-dentials of Freudian psychoanalytic theory; it argues that

there are methodological and epistemological reasons to

think that some central Freudian doctrines are not well

sup-ported by empirical evidence Grünbaum’s more recent

studies in the philosophy of psychoanalysis treat in detail

such topics as the psychoanalytic theory of transference,

the viability of the single-subject case-study method, the placebo concept, and the dream theory p.l.q

*psychoanalysis, philosophical problems of

A Grünbaum, Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis

(Madison, Conn., 1993)

guilt.The state imputed to a person who has done moral or legal wrong It is distinguishable from having a sense, or feelings, of guilt, since a guilty person may not experience such feelings, and an innocent person may be burdened by unwarranted feelings of guilt The crux is the question: Was avoidable wrong done by this responsible moral agent? Full acceptance and realization of guilt involves remorse and desire to expiate the wrong done Ill-managed or excessive guilt can be morally crippling: but equally damaging to moral seriousness is the attempt to disown real guilt—as pathological or as never more than the effect of external conditioning Mature commitment

to moral obligations deeply affects a person’s conception

of his own identity, and entails a strong sense of guilty

fail-ure on being disloyal to them Yet guilt is not simply

self-reproach: it is inseparable from awareness of the harm, or neglect, brought about to the others affected by one’s action or inaction

The neighbouring concept of shame both overlaps and diverges interestingly from the logical behaviour of guilt

A sense of shame is a sensitivity to the moral criticism of others—especially when one is tempted to fall short of basic standards of decency or integrity To be ashamed is not only to acknowledge one’s objective guilt, but also to

be painfully and depressedly aware of moral failure, of lost esteem and self-esteem, prompting withdrawal from others’ gaze To be shameless (compare guiltless!) is to lack such sensitivity: when I am guilty, I ought to be

*forgiveness

R Spaemann, Basic Moral Concepts (London, 1989), chs 6 and 7.

guru.The Sanskrit word means ‘weighty’ A guru is a pre-ceptor who had the weighty role of preserving the oral wisdom called Veda Veda is supposed to have been taught originally by God, who is the primordial guru In ancient times pupils staying at a guru’s home for twelve years had to learn Vedic hymns and rituals, along with phonetics, grammar, astronomy, metrics, rhetoric, logic, and metaphysics A worshipful attitude towards a guru is inherent in Indian culture—whence the perverted West-ern use of the term for a cult-leader In the tradition of

*Tantra, the word is broken up into gu meaning ‘darkness’ and ru meaning ‘light’, signifying the role of a spiritual

eye-opener Buddhism, which denies the knowledge-yielding capacity of testimony, recommends reliance on one’s own

*Veda¯nta; Indian philosophy

‘Guru’, in S Schumacher and G Woerner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion, tr Michael H Kohn et al.

(Boston, 1989)

guru 355

Habermas, Jürgen (1929– ) A second-generation

mem-ber of the *Frankfurt School whose work has ranged

widely over issues in epistemology, philosophy of

lan-guage, political and constitutional theory, ethics, and

aes-thetics In the late twentieth century the most eminent (as

well as controversial) figure in German socio-cultural

debate, chiefly because he engaged with these issues not

only at a specialist or academic level but also through

regu-lar interventions in the broader public sphere Indeed, it is

among his leading claims that this kind of two-way flow

between ‘expert’ discourses and matters of shared

com-munal concern is vital to preserving the values of an open

participant democracy Hence Habermas’s many

journal-istic writings about the post-war West German

constitu-tion, about developments in the wake of unificaconstitu-tion,

about asylum-seekers, global justice, and the issue of

national identity vis-à-vis the prospects for a federal

Europe conceived in terms of a ‘cosmopolitical’

(post-nationalist) agenda His earlier contribution to the

so-called Historikerstreit—the debate about right-wing

revisionist accounts of the Holocaust—is one striking

instance of Habermas’s role as a public intellectual in the

wider context of ethico-political discussion Most recently

he has carried this thinking forward to take account of the

drastically changed world situation since the events of

11 September 2001 and the emergence of a US foreign

policy with thinly veiled global geo-strategic aims

Perhaps the most impressive feature of Habermas’s

work is the way that these interests link up with his other,

more ‘purely’ philosophical concerns Influenced by, but

also taking issue with, his teacher, Adorno, Habermas has

devoted great energy to defending and reclaiming the

val-ues of Enlightenment critique, or what he calls the

‘philo-sophical discourse of modernity’ In early texts, such as

Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), he adopts a broadly

Kantian but also Marxist-inflected approach, one that

seeks to reconstruct the genealogy of the modern natural

and human sciences by inquiring back into their social,

historical, and epistemological conditions of emergence

What this reveals is a process of increasing specialization

in the various spheres of knowledge-constitutive interest,

leading to a point where there seems little hope of an

informed critical dialogue between them Thus thought

gives way to a nạve or unreflecting (positivist) conception

of scientific method, on the one hand, and on the other—

in philosophy and the humanistic disciplines—to various forms of subjectivist, relativist, or downright irrationalist belief Habermas’s aim is to offer an alternative account of

this history that draws out both its symptomatic blind spots of prejudice, ideological investment, etc., and those

critical or emancipatory resources which can yet be re-covered through a reading alert to their presence in the texts of that same tradition Hence his departure from Adorno’s mode of ‘negative dialectics’, a thinking that implacably refused the assurances of system or method, and which held out remorselessly against all ideas of achieved rational consensus For Habermas, as likewise for Kant, such ideas have an indispensable role in orientat-ing thought toward a regulative notion of truth at the end

of inquiry

In his later (post-1970) work Habermas adopts a very different perspective, an account of ‘communicative action’ derived largely from speech-act theory, socio-linguistics, and ideas about conversational implicature developed by thinkers like Paul Grice One reason for this turn toward language (or *discourse) is no doubt the cur-rently widespread rejection of ‘foundationalist’ argu-ments in whatever shape or form Another is Habermas’s growing conviction that Enlightenment thinking—or the

‘unfinished project’ of modernity—had run into precisely such criticism through its over-reliance on a subject-centred epistemological paradigm His aim is therefore to reformulate that project in terms of a ‘transcendental pragmatics’, a theory that retains the basic commitment

to values of truth, critique, and rational consensus, but which pins its faith on the regulative precept of an ‘ideal speech situation’, a public sphere of uncoerced participant debate wherein those values might yet achieve their fullest, least impeded, or distorted expression Only thus can Enlightenment thinking make good its emancipatory claims without falling prey to the objections mounted by wholesale pragmatists (such as Richard Rorty) who carry this linguistic turn to the point of equating truth with whatever is currently and contingently ‘good in the way

of belief ’ During the past decade Habermas has shown

a heightened awareness of developments in Anglo-American philosophy Of particular interest is his lengthy exchange with Robert Brandom with regard to the latter’s

H

inferentialist account of epistemic commitment, an

account which (as both parties agree) exhibits certain

striking points of similarity and contrast with Habermas’s

theory of communicative action He has also—in works

like Justification and Application—explored the

conse-quences of that theory for debates in ethics, jurisprudence,

and other normative discourses

Commentators differ sharply in their views as to how

far this project stands up to the objections brought against

it from various quarters, e.g by post-modernists and

hermeneutic thinkers in the line of descent from Heidegger

and Gadamer On one point at least there is general

agreement: that Habermas has always sought to combine

these philosophical interests with an active commitment

to promoting informed discussion on issues of urgent

socio-political concern It is an example all the more

impressive when compared with the stance adopted by

those in the post-modern (counter-Enlightenment) camp

who have no time for such old-fashioned ideas as ‘the

political responsibility of the intellectuals’ c.n

Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, tr Jeremy

J Shapiro (London, 1972)

—— The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., tr Thomas

McCarthy (Boston, 1984 and 1989)

—— Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics,

tr Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Mass., 1993)

—— The Habermas Reader, ed William Outhwaite (Oxford, 1996).

habit memory: see memory.

Hacking, Ian (1936– ) Canadian philosopher, long based at

the University of Toronto Insisting upon the importance of

the empirical, Hacking argues that philosophers too often

over-value theory, and hence he would like to promote a

‘back to Bacon’ movement Consistently, he accepts a

doctrine of *natural kinds, argues for epistemological

dif-ferences between the natural and social sciences, and

views realism–anti-realism debates which fail to take

account of actual scientific practices (both in cosmology

and in the microcosm) as empty He is a noted Leibniz

scholar In The Emergence of Probability (1975) and The

Tam-ing of Chance (1990) he has given us ground-breakTam-ing

accounts of two important periods in the history of

*prob-ability In philosophy of language he has mustered

empir-ical evidence against claimed radempir-ical mistranslation, and

similarly has contrasted actual languages without

particu-lars (Wakashan languages such as Nootka and Kwakiutl)

to Strawson’s theoretical views j.j.m

Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge, 1983).

—— The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).

haecceity. A *property is something such that some

things have or exemplify it; for example, red objects

exem-plify the property being red A haecceity or individual

essence is a property such that exactly one individual thing

can have it Thus, Socrates has the individual property of

being Socrates Some philosophers (e.g Chisholm) argue,

however, that there are no individual essences, only the

property of being self-identical and concrete individuals

*qualities; individual property; essence

A Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974) Cf

R M Chisholm, On Metaphysics (Minneapolis, 1989).

Halevi, Judah (before 1075–c.1141) Hebrew poet and

philosopher Of a cultured family in the early Recon-quista, Halevi travelled widely in Muslim and Christian Spain, winning fame for his poems, the finest in Hebrew since the Bible As the Almoravid invasion devastated his world, Halevi practised medicine and wrote songs of love, wine, friendship, faith, and witness to the destruction around him

Halevi’s philosophic dialogue the Kuzari pictures the

conversations that led the Khazar king to his historic con-version to Judaism Having dreamed that his intentions but not his actions are pleasing to God, the king summons advisers The intellectualism of the philosopher, he finds, critically needs fleshing out by ethical culture Christian and Muslim doctrines clearly depend on Jewish lore When a rabbi is finally summoned, he rests his case not on abstract reasoning but on historical experience, urging the primacy of the land, language, and peoplehood of Israel and addressing pure theology only after the Khazar is committed to the historic faith of Israel

Although widely cited as an anti-philosophical thinker,

Halevi is a serious internal critic of philosophy His

strik-ingly modern rejection of the baroque ontology of disem-bodied intellects between God and nature aids his philosophical task of showing how God’s word enspirits the people of Israel, empowering them to achieve their mission to the nations Like his literary persona, Halevi could not remain exiled in ‘the farthest West’ He left Spain for the Land of Israel, where, according to legend,

he was ridden down by an Arab and slain l.e.g

Judah Halevi, The Kuzari, tr H Hirschfeld (New York, 1964) The original title is preserved in The Book of Vindication and Evidence

in Behalf of the Despised Faith Critical edn by David Baneth

( Jerusalem, 1977)

hallucination.Seeing and hearing things when there is nothing of the sort to be seen or heard What we observe

is usually explained by our surroundings, so theorists readily assume that hallucinations are similarly explained

by something image-like and introspectible in our heads Philosophers who reject this as armchair psychology sug-gest that hallucinators just form false *beliefs about what they perceive, whatever produces them being unavailable

to the victim (if not to brain scientists) This ‘belief ’ description, however, looks too intellectual if interpreted

as entertaining thoughts about what you perceive, and too thin if interpreted as a disposition to act as if you per-ceive it; it is still hard to resist the idea that any false beliefs

formed by hallucinators are based on what is happening to them, which is something like seeing or hearing So what

hallucination 357

P Smith and O R Jones, The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge,

1986), chs 7 and 8

Hamilton, William (1788–1856) Educated at Glasgow,

Edinburgh, and Oxford, Hamilton first professed civil

his-tory at Edinburgh in 1821 He later transferred to logic and

metaphysics, achieving eminence as a teacher and editor

His invaluable editions of Dugald Stewart and Reid are

scholarly but patronizing He criticizes Reid effectively,

yet misrepresents him as saying that sensation is a

subjective feeling of pleasure or pain He deliberately set

out to counterbalance the materialism of natural science

which ignores God, freedom, and immortality Believing

*knowledge to be perceptual, he called himself a ‘natural

or intuitive realist’, although he admitted unconscious

modifications of mind not accessible to consciousness but

revealed through associations of ideas Mill pointed out

his inconsistency in holding that the primary qualities of

objects are known while objects in themselves are not

v.h

William Hamilton, Lectures of Metaphysics and Logic, ed H L.

Mansell and J Veitch (Edinburgh, 1869)

Hamlyn, David W (1924– ) Professor of Philosophy at

Birkbeck College, London (1964–88), and editor of Mind

(1972–84) Interests in Aristotle (translation of De anima

with commentary (Oxford, 1968) ) and in Wittgenstein

have influenced Hamlyn’s approach to questions in

epistemology and philosophy of psychology His central

thesis (developed in Experience and the Growth of

Under-standing (London, 1978), Perception, Learning and the Self

(London, 1983), and In and Out of the Black Box (Oxford,

1990) ) is that in order to be a knower a being must be

active and seek to regulate its beliefs in accord with a

norm of truth; this requires membership of a community,

interaction with which involves emotional responses

In short, knowers are social, affective agents The other

main area of Hamlyn’s writing is history of philosophy

j.hal

*epistemology, history of; epistemology, problems of

Hampshire, Stuart Newton (1914–2004) English

philoso-pher with special interests in the philosophical theory of

freedom and the philosophy of mind

In the course of a long career in which he was Grote

Professor of Philosophy at University College London, a

professor at several American universities, and Warden of

Wadham College, Oxford, Stuart Hampshire developed a

distinctive and influential position The key to his position

is perhaps to be found in his early book Spinoza (1951) in

which he explores Spinoza’s conception of mind and will

These ideas were developed in much more detail in his

major work Thought and Action (1959) In this book he

examines a set of contrasts between that which is

unavoidable in human thought and that which is

contin-gent; between knowledge and decision; criticism and

practice; philosophy and experience These contrasts con-tinued to occupy his thinking in several later works He was married to Nancy Cartwright r.s.d

*London philosophy

Hannay, Alastair(1932– ) Professor emeritus at the Uni-versity of Oslo, educated in Edinburgh and London, he continues the Scottish tradition of subjective idealism In

Mental Images (1971, reprinted 2003) he argues that visual

images, like physical portraits, resemble visible objects As

a kind of sensation a mental image has material properties

of its own which allow it to picture He thus contradicts Ryle and Dennett Hannay has translated Kierkegaard, and written an intellectual biography and a monograph about his philosophy Under Hannay’s direction (managing

edi-tor 1962–71, ediedi-tor 1971–2002), Inquiry grew into a widely read philosophical journal Human Consciousness (1990)

reviews contemporary theories of human consciousness while maintaining a characteristic conservatism Hannay argues that consciousness and the first-person point of view cannot be analysed or displaced by scientific material-ism, nor can they be explained functionally, a view close to that of Reid, Hamilton, and Ferrier v.h

*Kierkegaard

Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (Arguments of the Philosophers,

London, 1982, rev edn 1991)

—— Kierkegaard: A Biography (London, 2001).

—— Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays (London, 2003).

Hao Wang: see Wang, Hao.

happiness. Philosophical discussion of the concept of

‘happiness’ has tended to be found mainly within moral philosophy It is associated especially with the classical

*utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill

The utilitarians assert that happiness is as a matter of fact

the ultimate aim at which all human actions are directed and that it is therefore the ultimate standard by which to

judge the rightness or wrongness of actions ‘Actions are

right’, says Mill, ‘in proportion as they tend to promote happiness’—that is to say, ‘the general happiness’, the hap-piness of all concerned

Still following Bentham, Mill goes on to equate happi-ness with ‘pleasure and the absence of pain’ For Bentham the identity of ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ is quite straight-forward An action’s tendency to promote happiness is determined simply by adding up the amounts of pleasure, and subtracting the amounts of pain, which it will pro-duce It is a matter solely of quantitative factors such as the intensity and the duration of the pleasurable and painful feelings

Mill is aware that this is altogether too crude

Happi-ness, he acknowledges, depends not only on the quantity but also on the quality of pleasures Human beings,

because of the distinctively human capacities they possess, require more to make them happy than the accumulation

of pleasurable sensations They are made happy not by the

358 hallucination

‘lower pleasures’ but by the ‘higher pleasures’—‘the

pleas-ures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of

the moral sentiments’

Mill departs still further from the purely quantitative

notion of happiness when he recognizes that it is not just a

sum of unrelated experiences but an ordered whole To

say that human beings aim at happiness is not to deny that

they pursue more specific goals such as knowledge or

artistic and cultural activity or moral goodness, and that

they pursue these things for their own sake These are

some of the ‘ingredients’ which go to make up a life of

happiness

Mill is here attempting, perhaps unsuccessfully, to

combine two traditions of thought about ‘happiness’ The

identification of ‘happiness’ with ‘pleasure’ we may call

the ‘hedonistic’ conception of happiness This we may

contrast with what has been called the ‘eudaimonistic’

conception of happiness The term comes from the Greek

word *‘eudaimonia’, which is usually translated as

‘happi-ness’ Although one of the Greek philosophical schools,

*Epicureanism, did identify eudaimonia with pleasure, the

Greek concept lends itself less easily than the English term

to this identification In English one can speak of ‘feeling

happy’, and although the relation between such states of

feeling and a life of happiness is not entirely clear, they are

undoubtedly connected—one could not be said to have a

happy life if one never felt happy The term eudaimonia

refers not so much to a psychological state as to the

objective character of a person’s life

The classic account of eudaimonia is given by Aristotle.

He emphasizes that it has to do with the quality of one’s

life as a whole; indeed, he sees some plausibility in the

traditional aphorism ‘Call no man happy until he is dead’

(though he also recognizes that there is little plausibility in

calling someone happy after he is dead) For Aristotle

hap-piness is to be identified above all with the fulfilment of

one’s distinctively human potentialities These are located

in the exercise of reason, in both its practical and its

theor-etical form Aristotle is thus the ancestor of one strand in

Mill, and of that general conception of ‘happiness’ which

links it with ideas of ‘fulfilment’ and ‘self-realization’

r.j.n

*well-being; hedonic calculus

J Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York, 1993).

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, various edns (e.g Harmondsworth,

1976)

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, various editions (e.g London,

1962)

Elizabeth Telfer, Happiness (London, 1980).

hard determinism: see freedom and determinism.

Hare, Richard M (1919–2002) Probably the most

influen-tial moral philosopher of his generation, Hare’s ideas very

largely shaped Anglo-American moral theory for upwards

of twenty years, from the mid-1950s His best-known

works are The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952) and

Free-dom and Reason (Oxford, 1963), in which he explores

fun-damental questions regarding the meaning of value and moral words such as *‘good’ and *‘ought’, and regarding the foundations of moral reasoning Hare argues that moral judgements have ‘prescriptive’ meaning, and imply universal imperatives For instance, to declare something wrong is not (or is not principally) to indicate that it has some property of ‘wrongness’, but is to prescribe or direct its avoidance by anyone relevantly circumstanced Because prescribing the doing or avoidance of something

is logically distinct from giving a factual, descriptive account of the nature of the situation, Hare holds that there is no logical relationship between the facts of any case and the moral judgement we may make about it But because of the universal (or ‘universalizable’) side of moral prescriptions, a person may be given cause to change his moral position by pointing out that it will also apply to himself in like circumstances He will then realize that he is inconsistent if he does not wish to accept the pre-scription as applied to himself but still wishes to judge others in these terms He must in consistency withdraw and revise his initial judgement Hare’s full statement of his developed theory of moral judgement and reasoning is

in Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981).

In later years, Hare made extensive application of his theoretical principles to practical questions of morality, the environment, education, and so on Several collec-tions of his essays in these areas have appeared, including

Essays on Political Morality (Oxford, 1989) and Essays on Religion and Education (Oxford, 1992) Hare also wrote a

short book on Plato (Oxford, 1982) He was White’s Pro-fessor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford from 1966 until

1983, and he held many visiting professorships particu-larly in America and in Australia A collection of essays

debating his work was published in 1988, Hare and Critics

(ed D Seanor and N Fotion, Oxford) n.j.h.d

*prescriptivism; universalizability

harm.Important to ethics and political philosophy, the concept is difficult to pin down One view concentrates on consequences A person is harmed by another if the actions of the ‘harmer’ negatively affect the interests of her victim However, this must be specified further If my health, say, was going to improve enormously relative to now, and you intervene (lightly poisoning me) so that it improves, but not as much as it would have, you have nevertheless harmed me in spite of my positive increase in health One could instead say that harm is making me worse off than I would have been This still faces a prob-lem of overdetermination: what if Jane shoots me a millisecond before a boulder falls on me? She can argue that I am no worse off than I would have been had she not shot me; either way I am dead But it still seems that she harmed me, even if it made me no worse off Further, not all negative effects on my interests count as harm Being fined thousands of pounds for fraud, whilst negatively affecting my interests, or losing my house because of another’s contract enforcement, may not count as being

harm 359