Quantitative Assessment of Vertical Restraints and Integrationif they believe that once they’ve built up the product some downtown store will takethe business away by advertising it at a
Trang 1548 10 Quantitative Assessment of Vertical Restraints and Integration
if they believe that once they’ve built up the product some downtown store will takethe business away by advertising it at a lower price We cannot afford to become atarget for stores which base their promotional appeal on someone else’s name, thebest known name they can lay their hands on.41
Clearly, Corning’s view was that RPM in this case was geared toward reducinghorizontal externalities between retailers of the form that led to bad outcomes forthe manufacturer In particular, the incentive to free-ride on rivals’ provision ofservice combines poorly with the lack of incentive to take into account the effects
on rival’s sales if I undercut their prices Absent the service dimension, the horizontalpricing externality between competitors is the main force we think of as driving goodoutcomes for consumers On the other hand, with the service dimension added,providing a second horizontal externality between retailers, the net effects of theexternalities on overall welfare are less clear cut Finally, the manufacturer, Corning,will clearly be affected by such decisions being made downstream so there areimportant vertical externalities here
The timeline of events was as follows On October 8, 1971, the FTC announced
a “price fixing” challenge to Corning’s RPM policy On January 16, 1973 the FTCissued a press release saying that an administrative law judge (ALJ), the FTC’shearing examiner, had ruled in Corning’s favor on all counts This was subsequentlyappealed by the FTC complaint counsel On June 17, 1973 the full FTC announcedtheir appeal decision, which reversed the administrative law judge’s initial decision
on the central RPM issue On January 29, 1975, the U.S Court of Appeals upheldthe FTC decision
Ippolito and Overstreet argue that stock market evidence may have the power todistinguish between a number of basic hypotheses about the role of RPM in thismarket
(i) If the resale price maintenance was a device to cartelize the market at the retaillevel, a prohibition of RPM would increase the profits of all glass housewareproducers
(ii) An increase in retail competition (downstream) would increase the total profits
of all manufacturers (upstream) If on the other hand RPM was an attempt tocartelize the industry at the manufacturer level, the prohibition of the practicewould cause profits for all manufacturers to decrease
(iii) Finally, if, as Corning claimed, the practice was only trying to elicit servicesfrom retailers, the end of RPM would hurt the profits of Corning as well asthat of competitors that were using RPM It would either have a zero or apositive effect on competitors that were not using RPM This was the case ofAnchor Hocking, Corning’s closest competitor
41 Quoted in Ippolito and Overstreet (1996, p 291).
Trang 210.2 Measuring the Effect of Vertical Restraints 549
Table 10.6. Predicted effect of eliminating Corning’s use of RPM
Economic theory Corning Anchor Hocking Other competitorsDealer collusion/
Source: Ippolito and Overstreet (1996).
The table below shows Ippolito and Overstreet’s predicted effects of a successfulFTC case on stock values under alternative theories of resale price maintenance
In reality, the prediction of the elimination of RPM on competitors in the casewhere RPM induces promotional and sales effort is not so obvious For example, itcould be that promotional efforts to promote Corning glassware increase the totaldemand for glassware positively, affecting Anchor Hocking’s sales in the process
In such cases, where the marginal consumer reacting to the promotion is morethe person who does not buy glassware as opposed to the person who is already
a glassware customer from another brand, Corning’s close competitors might behurt by the end of the practice and the promotional effort it elicited The effect
of an end to RPM on competitors can therefore be ambiguous depending on thedistribution of consumer preferences and the relative importance and effect of theprice and advertisement efforts Finally, if Corning and Anchor Hocking are brandedsubstitutes, the decrease in the price of one of them after the elimination of RPM maytrigger the decrease of the price of the other since the two goods will be strategiccomplements This is another reason why we might in truth expect to see closecompetitors be hurt by the elimination of RPM
Such concerns around the identification of harm (or otherwise) from RPM areserious and it is not immediately clear that the identification strategy always (or evenoften) works to tell apart a use of RPM that serves as a manufacturer’s collusivemechanism from the use of RPM that has the simple purpose of increasing retailer’ssales effort On the other hand, as will be clear from our discussion at numerouspoints in this book, unambiguous identification results are rare and generally empir-ical exercises can be useful to undertake even if in order to place evidential weight
on the results they need to be complemented with other pieces of evidence Here,for example, we note that the extent of advertising spillovers is quantifiable and
so that explanation of the results can be tested or at least a qualitative judgementmade
Ippolito and Overstreet (1996) estimate whether firms had an abnormal returnaround the day of events that ruled for or against resale price maintenance They run
Trang 3550 10 Quantitative Assessment of Vertical Restraints and Integration
the following regression:
Ri t D aiC biRmtC ciDtC ei t;where ai is a firm-specific effect, Ri t is the percentage return of firm i on day t ,
Rmtis the percentage return of a value-weighted portfolio of the New York StockExchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (ASE) stocks on day t , Dt is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the days in the event window and 0otherwise, and ei t is a random error term for firm i on day t The event windowcovers three to four days before and after the actual event The motivation for thisequation can be found in the capital asset pricing models (CAPMs) described inmost finance books and we do not reiterate that here (see, for example, Campbell
et al 1997) Note that the coefficient ciis the average per day of abnormal returns.With this specification, cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using
CARtD ciDays in event windowt:The regression results on the effect of the events on the value of the Corning stockare presented in table 10.7 There is a negative effect on the valuation of the com-pany after the FTC’s announcement of the investigation The interim reversal had avery small positive effect The FTC reversal and upholding of the case had anothernegative effect on the firm valuation and the decision of the Seventh Circuit AppealsCourt had no particular effect on the stock prices
The cumulative abnormal return is a negative 12% in the five days before theannouncement of the FTC investigation Trading volumes presented in the paper doshow abnormal activity right before the FTC announcement which, in the absence
of other news at the time, appears to be highly suggestive that some traders wereoperating based on inside information In the case of the second event, the CAR show
a positive effect on the benefits of Corning, which the authors report is particularly
marked after the decision to dismiss the charges was published in the Wall Street Journal.
The event study using Corning stock data indicates that investors in Corningvalue RPM as having a positive impact on the profits of Corning However, such anobservation is consistent with either RPM acting to facilitate downstream price fixing(reduction in intrabrand competition) or simply solving the free-rider problem inservice provision In order to attempt to discriminate between these stories we need
to (at least) look at what happens to the expected profits of competitors A positiveeffect of the demise of RPM on Corning’s competitors could be consistent with theprincipal–agent theory On the other hand, a negative effect of the elimination ofRPM could be consistent with either a price-fixing world (or perhaps a situation
in which competitors derive positive externalities from Corning’s investment inservices and promotion)
The results (reported in table 10.8) indicate that RPM by Corning was perceived
to also favor its nearest competitor Anchor Hocking The FTC reversal of the ALJ
Trang 410.2 Measuring the Effect of Vertical Restraints 551
Table 10.7. Changes in Corning stock value at events in FTC case
Cumulative abnormal return
Notes: t -statistics are in parentheses FTC, Federal Trade Commission; ALJ, Administrative Law Judge.
“B” indicates that the window for the cumulative average return begins the required number of days
before the event and ends with the event day “A” indicates windows beginning at the event day with the required number of days after the event.
aThe Washington Star carried the story on Friday afternoon, and the Wall Street Journal on Monday,
October 11.
bFederal Trade Commission press releases were issued on the day before the Wall Street Journal stories.
cThere was no Wall Street Journal story for this event.
Significant at the 90% level of confidence.
Significant at the 95% level of confidence.
Source: Ippolito and Overstreet (1996).
decision in favor of Corning (i.e., a finding against RPM) is associated with a7.6% decline in returns for Anchor Hocking Such a result is inconsistent withCorning’s RPM only benefiting Corning To help tell apart the potential explana-tions for this finding, Ippolito and Overstreet present another interesting piece ofevidence Specifically, they show that after the Appeals Court decision in 1975declaring Corning’s RPM activities illegal, Corning sharply increased its adver-tising expenses That response is consistent with a story where RPM was serving
to provide demand-enhancing services that were replaced with advertisement lowing the judgment Rather strikingly, Anchor Hocking’s advertisement activitiesremained largely unchanged
Trang 5fol-552 10 Quantitative Assessment of Vertical Restraints and Integration
Table 10.8. Results of the event study regression on Anchor Hocking stock
Cumulative abnormal return
Notes: t -statistics are in parentheses FTC, Federal Trade Commission; ALJ, Administrative Law Judge.
“B” indicates that the window for the cumulative average return begins the required number of days
before the event and ends with the event day “A” indicates windows beginning at the event day with the required number of days after the event.
a Except as reported for the Seventh Circuit Decision, no other events related to Anchor Hocking were
reported in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times near the case events.
b On February 28, 1975, Anchor Hocking agreed to acquire Amerock Corp., which was reported by
the Wall Street Journal on March 5 This event may confound the interpretation of the Seventh Circuit
Appeals decision.
Significant at the 90% level of confidence.
Significant at the 95% level of confidence.
Source: Ippolito and Overstreet (1996).
10.2.6 Discussion
This chapter has examined a relatively small number of recent or classic pieces ofempirical work in the arena of vertical restraints and vertical integration While ourreview has necessarily been a focused one, the literature on vertical restraints isneither large nor comprehensive at this point Our aim has been to provide enoughsubstance and detail about a small number of papers to help investigators movefrom these empirical examples to both the rest of the literature and perhaps moreimportantly toward designing and undertaking such analyses for bespoke projects
Trang 610.3 Conclusions 553Doing so is by no means an easy task We hope that the material in this chapter(i) helps the reader to understand the kinds of approaches will be useful in evaluatingvertical restrictions, (ii) provides sufficient introduction to encourage case handlersthat there are helpful contributions available from the academic and case literature,and (iii) that there is certainly some exciting research in this area yet to come(e.g., around empirical effects of vertical integration on service provision or theappropriate approach to resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, or exclusivedealing).
Lafontaine and Slade (2005) provide a complementary review of the currentempirical literature on vertical restraints While we have focused on the empiricaltools that have proven useful in a range of papers, they provide an important contri-bution by pulling together the limited evidence currently available in the literature.They argue that, at least in industries where academics have undertaken work—mostly the beer, gasoline, and auto-distribution industries—the empirical evidencefrom the academic literature suggests that vertical restraints are generally associatedwith positive net welfare effects.42Thus, the balance of work on vertical restraintsand mergers does not suggest a general policy stance that is hostile toward them Atthe same time, agencies will want to remain vigilant since we now have coherenteconomic theory suggesting that on occasion vertical restraints and vertical mergersmay be welfare reducing
Competition policy conferences across the world, like Lafontaine and Slade, have
in recent years noted that there are currently rather a small number of such studies,and that there is no doubt that there remains a great deal that we have yet to learn Interms of the balance of evidence (and experience) we note somewhat of a differencebetween past antitrust intervention, where, in the round, agencies appear to havefound problems with at least some vertical mergers and restraints and the messagefrom Lafontaine and Slade summarizing the available academic literature Whereverthe debate eventually rests, we hope that the material in this chapter encouragesmore and better empirical work, some of which should occur within the context of
casework or ex post reviews.
The effect of vertical restraints on the market may be captured using form regressions whenever there is enough relevant variation in the data toidentify the effect Natural experiments such as the prohibition of a practicecan also provide good opportunities for useful regression analysis
reduced- Structural estimation allows us to model a world without the practice even
if that world does not currently exist, much as we do when estimating the
42 For a rare and very welcome examination of the relationship between vertical integration and productivity, see also Syverson and Hortascu (2007).
Trang 7554 10 Quantitative Assessment of Vertical Restraints and Integration
effect of anticipated horizontal mergers Exactly the same caveats regardingthe validity of the structural assumptions and the need for reality checks apply
to the analysis of vertical mergers as those which apply to horizontal mergers.However, here generally the caseworker has far more work to do (multiplemarket definitions, some efficiency analysis (e.g., the likely extent of reduction
in double marginalization), as well as an evaluation of the effectiveness ofgiving a rival market power on driving sales to your downstream division)
As a result, robustness checks in analysis may well need to be even moreextensive
Event studies focusing on the time when an investigation of a practice isannounced may shed light on the markets’ appreciation of the profitability
of the practice Such studies may under specific assumptions be sufficient
to discriminate between potential pro- and anticompetitive motivations forvertical restraints
The theory of vertical restraints and/or vertical mergers suggests that there aremany efficiency-based reasons to vertically integrate or use vertical restraints.Namely, such restrictions may decrease transaction costs or solve vertical orhorizontal externality problems such as those caused by double marginaliza-tion or vertical service externalities or free-riding in the provision of service
by retailers
In many instances, different types of vertical restraints can be used to solveexternality problems Economic theory does not typically provide unambigu-ous predictions about whether a given vertical practice is likely to be good orbad for consumer welfare Predictions about the impact of vertical mergers
on prices, for example, are fundamentally ambiguous whenever own costsfall (say, because of a decline in transactions costs or double marginalization)but the opportunity of, for instance, using full or partial foreclosure strategiesmeans there is a potential for vertically integrated firms to “raise rivals’ costs.”This is a direct contrast in particular to the theoretical prediction about theprice effect of a horizontal merger between firms producing substitutes Incasework, the ambiguity means that sometimes both pro- and anticompetitiveexplanations are consistent with the available evidence on the effect of a givenvertical restraint and agencies may need to undertake a considerable amount
of work to tell apart the two stories
Trang 8Since competition policy is now largely “effects” based, it is vital that the tion policy and economics communities continue to develop ways in which we canempirically evaluate the actual effect of potentially anticompetitive but also poten-tially desirable practices Throughout this book, we have attempted to carefullyexamine both of the two main approaches to undertaking such empirical work ineconomics Along the way, and equally importantly, we have tried to provide a clearstatement of the basis for each of the approaches that emerges from economic theory.The first general method we have looked at involves the estimation of reduced-form regressions of equilibrium market outcomes on factors that determine thoseequilibrium outcomes including some indicator variable for a practice of interest Wehave generally argued that reduced-form approaches are ideally informed by somekind of experiment in the data that constitutes an appropriate “natural experiment”for the issue being studied We noted that reduced-form approaches to estimating theimpact of a practice, in the last chapter a vertical practice, on equilibrium outcomesgenerally requires being able to compare outcomes in a situation with and withoutthe practice In addition we must be sure that there are no systematic differencesbetween the two samples that we are comparing except for the difference in theconduct that we are assessing, or at least as sure as we can be The chances ofbeing able to do so are best when we have a natural experiment which exogenouslyimposes or eliminates a conduct and also probably some form of local markets.The second general method we have looked at involved a structural approach,building explicit models of consumer and/or firm behavior One great advantage ofstructural modeling is that it enables us to develop predictions for what might hap-pen in a world not yet observed That is the very essence of policymaking However,
competi-we have also noted that structural models will typically rely heavily on assumptionswhich must be sound and justifiable, at least as reasonable approximations to behav-ior in the world, in order for the results of any prediction exercise to be credible
We also emphasized throughout that the use of structural models can only go hand
in hand with a process of “reality checking” and model testing in order to carefullyevaluate and ultimately ideally verify the performance of the model being used Thebottom line on structural modeling is perhaps unsurprising: (1) if a model is a poorapproximation of the world, it will probably provide a poor basis for making fore-casts, and (2) modeling the world is what economists can and should do and whilemodels are always approximations, the reality is that in industrial organization themodels have improved substantially over the last few decades
Trang 9556 Conclusion
Which methodology to use will be a matter of judgment by the economist on a caseteam, ideally informed by her colleagues about such things as potentially appropriatenatural experiments The best method will greatly depend on the details of thecase, the data available, and the question(s) which must be answered Attempting toundertake a sound empirical exercise will often be informative even if analysts donot get so far as to build a sophisticated economic model We often learn far moreabout an industry by examining data sets carefully than we would by listening toanecdotes from a variety of commentators on that industry In terms of the variety
of evidence we receive during investigations, cold hard numbers are attractive forcompetition authorities and probably many authorities do not currently do as much
as they could to fully exploit the useful information available from market-, firm-,and consumer-level data We hope this book will provide at least a small contribution
to encourage agencies to do more
Trang 10Abrantes-Metz, R M., L Froeb, J Geweke, and C Taylor 2006 A variance screen for
collusion International Journal of Industrial Organization 24:467–86.
Abreu, D 1986 Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames Journal of Economic Theory
39:191–225
Abreu, D., D Pearce, and E Stacchetti 1990 Toward a theory of discounted repeated games
with imperfect monitoring Econometrica 58:1041–63.
Ackerberg, D., K Caves, and G Frazer 2006 Structural identification of production tions UCLA Working Paper
func-Aghion, P., and R Griffith 2008 Competition and Growth: Reconciling Theory and Evidence.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Aigner, D., and S Chu 1968 On estimating the industry production function American
Anderson, T W 1958 Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis Wiley.
Andrews, D 1994 Empirical process methods in econometrics In Handbook of Econometrics
(ed R F Engle and D McFadden), volume 4, pp 2247–94 New York: North-Holland
Angrist, J 2004 Treatment effect heterogeneity in theory and practice Economic Journal
114:52–83
Angrist, J., K Graddy, and G W Imbens 2000 Instrumental variables estimators in
simul-taneous equations models with an application to the demand for fish Review of Economic
Studies 67:499–527.
Angrist, J., G Imbens, and D Rubin 1996 Identification of causal effects using instrumental
variables Journal of the American Statistical Association 91:444–55.
Ashenfelter, O., D Ashmore, J Baker, and D Hosken 2006 Econometric analysis of pricing
in FTC v Staples International Journal of the Economics of Business 13:265–79.
Ashurst 2004 Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of ECcompetition rules Part 2 Analysis of economic models for the calculation of damages.Study prepared for the European Commission
Asker, J 2005 Diagnosing foreclosure due to exclusive dealing Working Paper, Stern School
of Business at NYU
Aslanbeigui, N., and M Naples 1997 Scissors or horizon: neoclassical debates about returns
to scale, costs, and long-run supply, 1926–1942 Southern Economic Journal 64:1926–42 Athey, S., and P Haile 2002 Identification of standard auction models Econometrica 70:
107–40
Bailey, E 1981 Contestability and the design of regulatory and antitrust policy American
Economic Review 71:179–83.
Trang 11558 References Bailey, E., and A Friedlander 1982 Market structure and multiproduct industries Journal
of Economic Literature 20:1024–48.
Bain, J S 1950 Workable competition in oligopoly: theoretical considerations and empirical
evidence American Economic Review 40:35–47.
1951 Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American manufacturing 1936–
1940 Quarterly Journal of Economics 65:293–324.
1956 Barriers to New Competition Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bajari, P., and L Ye 2001 Competition versus collusion in procurement auctions: cation and testing Working Paper 01001, Department of Economics, Stanford University.Bajari, P., and G Summers 2002 Detecting collusion in procurement auctions: a selective
identifi-survey of recent research Antitrust Law Journal 70:143–70.
Baker, J B 1989 Identifying cartel policing under uncertainty: the U.S steel industry, 1933–
1939 Journal of Law & Economics 32(2):47–76.
1996 Identifying horizontal price fixing in the electronic marketplace Antitrust Law
Baker, J., and R Pitofsky 2007 A turning point in merger enforcement: Federal Trade
Commission v Staples In Antitrust Stories (ed E Fox and D Crane) Foundation Press.
Baker, J., and C Shapiro 2008 Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement In Where
the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on Antitrust (ed R Pitofsky) Oxford University Press.
Bakos, Y., and E Brynjolfsson 1998 Bundling information goods: pricing, profits andefficiency NBER Working Paper 11488 (Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=11488.)Baldwin, L., R Marshall, and J.-F Richard 1997 Bidder collusion at forest service timber
sales Journal of Political Economy 105:657–99.
Baltagi, B 2001 Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 2nd edn Wiley.
Banerjee, A., J Dolado, J Galbraith, and D Hendry 2003 Co-integration, Error Correction,
and the Econometric Analysis of Non-Stationary Data Oxford University Press.
Banker, R D., A Charnes, and W Cooper 1984 Some models for estimating technical and
scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis Management Science 30:1078–92.
Banks, J., R Blundell, and A Lewbel 1997 Quadratic Engel curves and consumer demand
Review of Economics and Statistics 79:527–39.
Barten, A P 1969 Maximum likelihood estimation of a complete system of demand
equations European Economic Review 1:7–73.
1977 The systems of consumer demand functions approach: a review Econometrica
45:23–51
Baumol, W., J Panzar, and R Willig 1982 Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Bennion, E 1952 The Cowles Commission’s “simultaneous equation approach”: a simplified
example Review of Economics and Statistics 34:49–56.
Berndt, E 1991 The Practice of Econometrics: Classical and Contemporary Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley
Trang 12References 559Berndt, E., and N E Savin 1975 Estimation and hypothesis testing in singular equations
with autoregressive disturbances Econometrica 43:937–57.
Bernheim, B D 2002 Expert report of B Douglas Bernheim in RE: Vitamins AntitrustLitigation, M.D.L no 1285, United States District Court for the District of Columbia,May 24
Bernheim, B D., and M Whinston 1990 Multi-market contact and collusive behaviour
RAND Journal of Economics 21:1–26.
1998 Exclusive dealing Journal of Political Economy 106:64–103.
Berry, S T 1992 Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry Econometrica 60:
889–917
1994 Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation RAND Journal of
Economics 25:242–62.
Berry, S., and P Reiss 2007 Empirical models of entry and market structure In Handbook
of Industrial Organization, volume 3 Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Berry, S T., J Levinsohn, and A Pakes 1995 Automobile prices in market equilibrium
Econometrica 63:841–90.
Berry, S., O Linton, and A Pakes 2004 Limit theorems for estimating the parameters of
differentiated product demand systems Review of Economic Studies 71:613–54 Bertrand, J 1883 Th´eorie math´ematique de la richesse sociale Journal des Savants 67:499–
508
Binmore, K 1983 Calculus Cambridge University Press.
Blumenthal, W (ed.) 1985 Horizontal Mergers: Law and Policy American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law Monograph 12 American Bar Association
Bolotova, Y., J M Connor, and D J Miller 2008 The impact of collusion on price behavior:
empirical results from two recent cases International Journal of Industrial Organization
26:1290–307
Bond, R., and W Greenberg 1976 Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy: a
comment Journal of Law and Economics 19:201–4.
Bonnet, C., P Dubois, and M Simioni 2006 Two-part tariffs versus linear pricing betweenmanufacturers and retailers: empirical tests on differentiated products markets CEPRWorking Paper 6016
Borenstein, S., and A Shepard 1996 Dynamic pricing in retail gasoline markets RAND
Journal of Economics 27:429–51.
Borenstein, S., J Bushnell, and F Wolak 2002 Measuring market inefficiencies in
Cal-ifornia’s restructured wholesale electricity market American Economic Review 92:
1376–405
Bowlin, W., W Charnes, W Cooper, and H Sherman 1985 Data envelopment analysis
and regression approaches to efficiency estimation and evaluation Annals of Operations
Research 2:113–38.
Box, G., and D Cox 1964 An analysis of transformations Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society B 26:211–64.
Boyd, J., and K Mellman 1980 The effect of fuel economy standards on the U.S automotive
market: a hedonic demand analysis Transportation Research 14:367–8.
Brenkers, R., and F Verboven 2005 Market definition with differentiated products: lessonsfrom the car market CEPR Discussion Paper 5249
2006 Liberalizing a distribution system: the European car market Journal of the
European Economic Association 4(1):216–51.
Breslaw, J., and J B Smith 1995 A simple and efficient method for estimating the magnitude
and precision of welfare changes Journal of Applied Econometrics 10:313–27.
Trang 13560 References Bresnahan, T F 1981 Duopoly models with consistent conjectures American Economic
Review 71:934–45.
1982 The oligopoly solution concept is identified Economics Letters 10:87–92.
1987 Competition and collusion in the American automobile market: the 1955 price
war Journal of Industrial Economics 35:457–82.
1989 Empirical studies of industries with market power In Handbook of
Indus-trial Organization (ed R Schmalensee and R Willig), volume 2, 1st edn, pp 1011–57.
1991b Empirical models of discrete games Journal of Econometrics 48(1–2):57–81.
Brock, W., and J A Scheinkman 1985 Price setting supergames with capacity constraints
Review of Economic Studies 52:371–82.
Brown, S., and J Warner 1985 Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies Journal
of Financial Economics 14:3–31.
Bultez, A V., and P A Naert 1975 Consistent sum-constrained models Journal of the
American Statistical Association 70:529–35.
Cameron, A C., and P K Trevedi 2005 Microeconomics: methods and applications.Cambridge University Press
Campbell, J., A Lo, and C MacKinlay 1997 The Econometrics of Financial Markets.
Princeton University Press
Campos, J., N Ericsson, and D Hendry 2005 General to specific modelling: an overview andselected bibliography International Finance Discussion Paper 838, Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
Capps, C., D Dranove, S Greenstein, and M Sattherthwaite 2001 The silent majority fallacy
of the Elzinga–Hogarty criteria: a critique and new approach to analyzing hospital mergers.NBER Working Paper 8216
Cardell, N S 1997 Variance component structures for the extreme-value and
logis-tic distributions with applications to models of heterogeneity Econometric Theory 13:
Carlton, D., and M Waldman 2002 The strategic use of tying to preserve and create market
power in evolving industries RAND Journal of Economics 33:194–220.
Castanias, R., and H Johnson 1993 Gas wars: retail gasoline price fluctuations Review of
Economics and Statistics 75:171–74.
Chamberlain, G 1982 Multivariate regression models for panel data Journal of
Economet-rics 18:5–46.
1984 Panel data In Handbook of Econometrics (ed Z Griliches and M Intrilligator),
volume 2 Amsterdam: North-Holland
Charnes, A., W Cooper, and E Rhodes 1978 Measuring the efficiency of decision making
units European Journal of Operations Research 2:429–44.
Chowdhury, P 2002 Limit-pricing as Bertrand equilibrium Economic Theory 19:811–22.
Chevalier, J A., and F M Scott Morton 2008 State casket sales and restrictions: a pointless
undertaking? Journal of Law and Economics 51:1–23.
Trang 14References 561Chipty, T 2001 Vertical integration, market foreclosure, and consumer welfare in the cable
television industry American Economic Review 91:428–53.
Chissick, M., and A Kelman 2002 Electronic Commerce: Law and Practice, 3rd edn Sweet
Chu, S H 1978 On the statistical estimation of parametric frontier production functions: a
reply and further comments Review of Economics and Statistics 60:479–81.
Church, J 2004 The impact of vertical and conglomerate mergers Mimeo, DirectorateGeneral for Competition, European Commission
2008 Vertical mergers Issues in Competition Law and Policy 2:1455 (ABA Section
of Antitrust Law)
Clarke, R., S Davies, and M Waterson 1984 The profitability-concentration relation: market
power or efficiency Journal of Industrial Economics 32:435–50.
Coase, R 1988 The Firm, the Market and the Law University of Chicago Press.
Cobb, C., and P H Douglas 1928 A theory of production American Economic Review 18:
139–65
Coelli, T., P Rao, C O’Donnell, and G Battesse 2005 An Introduction to Efficiency and
Productivity Analysis Springer.
Comanor, W., and H Frech 1985 The competitive effects of vertical agreements American
Economic Review 75:1057–62.
Competition Commission 2000 Nutreco Holding NV and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd: a report
on the proposed merger
2007 Greif Inc Blagden Packaging Group—Final report summary (Available atwww.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2007/blagden/index.htm.)
Compte, O., F Jenny, and P Rey 2002 Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion European
2004 Global cartels redux: the amino acid lysine antitrust litigation In The Antitrust
Revolution (ed J E Kwoka Jr and L J White), 4th edn Oxford University Press.
2005 Collusion and price dispersion Purdue University, Department Staff Paper 10-14 2008 Forensic economics: an introduction with special emphasis on price fixing
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4(1):31–59.
Cooper, D., and K.-U K¨uhn 2009 Communication, renegotiation, and the scope forcollusion Mimeo, University of Michigan
Cooper, W., L Seiford, and K Tone 2007 Data Envelopment Analysis: A Comprehensive
Text with Models, Applications, References and DEA-Solver Software Springer.
Corts, K 1999 Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power Journal of
Econometrics 88:227–50.
Cournot, A 1938 Recherche sur les Principes Math´ematiques de la Th´eorie des Richesses.
Paris: Gerard Jorlan Ed
Cowling, K., and M Waterson 1976 Price cost margins and market structure Economica
43:267–74
Trang 15562 References
Crawford, G 2000 The impact of the 1992 Cable Act on household demand and welfare
RAND Journal of Economics 31:422–50.
2005 The discriminatory incentives to bundle in the cable television market
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 6(1):41–78.
Crooke, P., L M Froeb, S Tschantz, and G J Werden 1999 Effects of the assumed demand
system on simulated postmerger equilibrium Review of Industrial Organization 15(3):
205–17
Dalkir, S., and F R Warren-Boulton 1999 Prices, market definition, and the effects of
merger: Staples–Office Depot (1997) In The Antitrust Revolution (ed J E Kwoka Jr and
L J White), 3rd edn, pp 143–64 Oxford University Press
d’Aspremont, C., J J Gabszewicz, and J F Thisse 1979 On Hotelling’s “stability in
2005 The effect of local competition on admission prices in the U.S motion picture
exhibition market Journal of Law and Economics 48:677–707.
2006a Spatial competition in retail markets: movie theaters RAND Journal of
Economics 37: 964–82.
2006b The discrete choice analytically flexible (DCAF) model of demand fordifferentiated products CEPR Discussion Paper 5880
2006c Estimation of quantity games in the presence of indivisibilities and
heteroge-neous firms Journal of Econometrics 134(1):187–214.
2006d Identification of the oligopoly solution concept in a differentiated productindustry: necessary and sufficient conditions Mimeo, London School of Economics 2006e Measuring market expansion and business stealing effects of entry in the U.S
motion picture exhibition market Journal of Industrial Economics 54:293–321.
2006f Coordinated effects merger simulation with linear demands Mimeo, U.K.Competition Commission
Davis, P., and C Huse 2009 Coordinated effects merger simulation in the network servermarket Mimeo, U.K Competition Commission
Davis, P., and P Sabbatini 2009 Coordinated effects merger simulation Mimeo
Deaton, A., and J Muellbauer 1980a An almost ideal demand system American Economic
Review 70:312–26.
1980b Economics and Consumer Behaviour Cambridge University Press.
Debreu, G 1974 Excess demand functions Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1):15–21 Demsetz, H 1973 Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy Journal of Law and
Economics 16:1–9.
Deneckere, R., and C Davidson 1986 Long-run competition in capacity, short-run
competition in price and the Cournot model RAND Journal of Economics 16:404–15 Deprins, D., and H Tulkens 1984 Measuring labor inefficiency in post offices In The Perfor-
mance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurements (ed M Marchand, P Pestieau,
and H Tulkens) Amsterdam: North-Holland
Dickey, D., and W Fuller 1979 Distribution of the estimators for auto-regressive time series
with a unit root Journal of the American Statistical Association 74:427–31.
Trang 16References 563
Diewert, E 1976 Exact and superlative index numbers Journal of Econometrics 46:115–45.
Dobson, P., and M Waterson 1996 Vertical restraints and competition policy U.K Office
of Fair Trading, Research Paper 12
Domowitz, I., G Hubbard, and B Petersen 1988 Market structure and cyclical fluctuations
in U.S manufacturing Review of Economics and Statistics 70:55–66.
Dorfman, R., and P Steiner 1954 Optimal advertising and optimal quality American
Economic Review 44:826–36.
Doyle, J., E Muehlegger, and K Samphantharak 2008 Edgeworth cycles revisited NBERWorking Paper 14162
Dubin, J., and D McFadden 1984 An econometric analysis of residential electric appliance
holdings and consumption Econometrica 52:345–62.
Dubois, P., and C Bonnet 2008 Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers andretailers allowing for non-linear pricing and resale price maintenance IDEI Working Paper519
Dunne, T., M Roberts, and L Samuelson 1988 Patterns of firm entry and exit in U.S
manufacturing industries RAND Journal of Economics 19:495–515.
Duso, T., K Gugler, and B.Yurtoglu 2006a Is the event study methodology useful for mergeranalysis? A comparison of stock market and accounting data Mimeo, WissenschaftzentrumBerlin f¨ur Sozialforschung SP-II 2006-19
Duso, T., D Neven, and L H R¨oller 2006b The political economy of European merger
control Journal of Law and Economics 50:455–89.
Eccles, R H 1981 The quasi-firm in the construction industry Journal of Economic
Behaviour and Organization 2:335–58.
Eckbo, B E 1983 Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth Journal of
Financial Economics 11:241–73.
Efron, B., and R Tibshirani 1994 An Introduction to the Bootstrap Chapman & Hall Eichenwald, K 1997 The tale of the secret tapes New York Times, November 16, 1997 1998 Videotapes take star role at Archer Daniels trial New York Times, August 4, 1998.
Elzinger, K., and T Hogarty 1973 The problem of geographic market delineation in
antimerger suits Antitrust Bulletin 18:45–81.
1978 The problem of geographic market delineation revisited: the case of coal Antitrust
Bulletin 23:1–18.
Engle, R., and C Granger 1987 Co-integration and error correction: representation,
estimation and testing Econometrica 55:251–71.
Ericson, R., and A Pakes 1995 Markov-perfect industry dynamics: a framework for
empirical work Review of Economic Studies 62:53–82.
Evans, D S., and J Heckman 1984a A test for subadditivity of the cost function with an
application to the Bell system American Economic Review 74:615–23.
1984b Multiproduct cost function estimates and natural monopoly test for the Bell
system In Breaking Up Bell (ed D S Evans) Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1986 A test for subadditivity of the cost function with an application to the Bell system:
erratum American Economic Review 76:856–58.
Fama, E., and K French 1993 Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
Journal of Financial Economics 33:3–56.
1996 Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies Journal of Finance 51(1):
55–84
Fare, R., S Grosskopf, and C Lovell 1995 Production Frontiers Cambridge University
Press