1480 Essential Readings In World Politics - Second Edition.docx

EssentialReadingsi n WorldPolitics SE CO N D ED I T I O N TheNortonSeriesinWorldPoliticsJa ckSnyder,GeneralEditor EssentialsofInternationalRelations KarenA M i n g s t FromVotingtoViolence Democratiza[.]

EssentialReadingsi n WorldPolitics

S E C O N D ED I T I O N

TheNortonSeriesinWorldPoliticsJackSnyder,GeneralEditor

Copyright©2004,2001byW W.Norton8cCompany, Inc.

GEORGERK ENNAN( " X " ) "TheS o u r c e s o f S o v i e t C o n d u c t " 2 8

JOHNL E W I SG A D D I S "TheL o n g P e a c e : E l e m e n t s o f Stabilityint h e P o s t w a r I n t e r

n a t i o n a l System"3 3

v

"Wara s an Instrumentof Policy,"F RO MOnW a r 297

"TheD ip lo ma c y ofViolence,"F R O MArmsandInfluence3 0

1 "Cooperation undert h e SecurityD i l e m m a " 309

Thisreader is a quintessential collaborative effort between the two editorsandAnnMarcy of W W Norton In a flurry of e-mails during 2003, theco-editors suggested articles for inclusion, traced the sources, and rejected orac-ceptedthem,defendingchoicestoskepticalcolleagues.It becameapparentduringthe process that the co-editors, while both international relations schol-ars, readvery different literatures This book represents a product of that collab-orativep ro c e s s andis allthebetterfor thedifferences

co-The articles have been selected to meet several criteria First, the collection

isdesigned to augment and amplify the coreEssentials of International Relationstext (third edition) by Karen Mingst The chapters in this book follow those inthe text.

Second, the selections are purposefully eclectic, that is, keytheoreticalarticlesare paired with contemporary piecesfound in the popularliterature.When possible articles have been chosen to reflect diverse theoreticalperspec-tives and policy viewpoints The articles are also both readable andengaging toundergraduates The co-editors struggled to maintain the integrity ofthe chal-lenging pieces, while making them accessible to undergraduates at avariety ofcollegesanduniversities

Special thanks go to those individuals who provided reviews of the first tion of this book and offered their own suggestions and reflections basedonteaching experience, Our product benefited greatly from these evaluations,al-though had we included all the suggestions, the book would have been thou-sandsof pages!AnnMarcy orchestrated the process, reacting to oursuggestions,mediating our differences, and keeping us "on task." To her, weowe a specialthanks Andrea Haver guided the manuscript through thepermissions and edit-ingprocess,averylabor-intensivetask

edi-Essential ReadingsinWorld Politics

S E C O N D E D I T I O N

andtheoryinaspecialissueofInternationalSecurity,JohnLewisGaddis,apromi-nentdiplomatichistorianatYaleUniversity,acknowledgesthathistorianspaytoolittle attention to methodology but chastises political scientists for using methodsthat overgeneralize by searching for timeless laws of politics Finding

commongroundbetweenthesedivergentapproaches,hearguesthatstudentsofpoliticsshould use the past not to try to predict the future, but to help people

understandpoliticaldevelopmentsastheyunfold.

Both historical analysis and philosophical discourse contribute to the study ofinternational relations The historian of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, usesthe Melian Dialogue Inthis classic realist/idealist dilemma, the leaders of Melosponderthefateoftheisland,decidingwhethertofighttheirantagonists,theAthe- nians,ortorelyonthegodsandtheenemyofAthens,theLacedaemonians(alsoknown as Spartans), for their safety Centuries later, in 1795, the philosopher Im-

manuelKantpositedthatagroupofrepublicanstateswithrepresentativeformsofgovernment that were accountable to their citizens would be ableto form an effec-tive league of peace That observation has generated a plethora of theoretical

andempiricalresearchknownasthedemocraticpeacedebate.InEssentials,Mingst

usesthedebatetoillustratehowpoliticalscientistsconductinternationalrelationsresearch Michael Doyle's article on "Liberalism and World Politics," excerpted inChapter 3, sparked the contemporary debate on this topic And an importantstatement on the status of that debate is presented in Bruce Russett and

JohnOneal'sTriangulatingPeace:Democracy,Interdependence,andInternationalOrga nizations(2002)whichintegratesacomprehensivebodyofresearchfindingsonthedemoc raticdebate.

S T E P H E N M W A L T

InternationalRelations: One

World,ManyTheories

Why should policymakers and

practition-ers care about the scholarly study of

Thosewhoconduct

foreignpolicyoftendismissacademictheorists(fre-quently, one must admit, with good reason), butthere is an

inescapable link between the abstractworld of

theory and the real world of policy Weneed

theories to make sense of the blizzardof

infor-mation that bombards us daily.Even

policymakerswho are contemptuous of "theory" must rely ontheir

own (often unstated) ideas about how

theworldworksinordertodecidewhattodo.Itishardto

make good policy if one's basic organizing

princi-plesareflawed,justasitishardtoconstructgoodtheori

eswithoutknowingalotabouttherealworld.Everyoneuses

theories—whether he or she knows itor not—and

disagreements about policyusually reston more

fundamentaldisagreements about the

ba-sicforcesthatshapeinternational outcomes

Take,forexample,thecurrent debate onhow

to respond to China From one

perspective,China's ascentis the latest example of

the tendencyfor rising powers to alter the global

balance ofpower in potentially dangerousways,

especially astheir growing influence makes them more

ambi-tious From another perspective, the key to

China'sfuture conduct is whether its behavior

will bemodified by its integration into world

markets andby the (inevitable?) spread of

democratic princi-ples From yet another

viewpoint, relations be-tween China and the rest

of the world will beshaped by issuesof

cultureand identity: WillChina see itself (and be

seen by others) as a normalmember of the world community or

a singular so-cietythatdeservesspecialtreatment?

FromForeignPolicy,no,110(spring1998):29-44.

Inthesameway,thedebateoverNATOexpan-sionlooks different depending on which theoryone employs From a

"realist" perspective,NATOexpansion is aneffort to extend Western influ- ence—wellbeyond the traditional sphere of U.S.vital interests—during a period of Russian weak-ness and is likely to provoke a harsh responsefromMoscow From a liberal perspective,however,ex-pansionwill reinforce the nascent democraciesofCentralEuropeandextendNATO'sconflict-management mechanisms to a potentially turbu-lentregion.Athirdviewmightstressthe

valueofincorporating the Czech Republic, Hungary, andPoland

community,whosemembersshareacommonidentitythathasmadewarlargelyunthinkable

No single approach can capture all the plexity of contemporary world politics.Therefore,we are better off with a diverse array ofcompetingideas rather than a single theoreticalorthodoxy.Competition between theories helpsreveal theirstrengths and weaknesses and spurssubsequentre-finements,while revealing flaws inconventionalwisdom Although we should takecare to em-phasize inventiveness over invective,

com-we shouldcom-welcome and encourage theheterogeneityof con-temporary scholarship,

WhereAreWeC o m i n g F r o m ?

The study of international affairs is best

betweentherealist, liberal, and radical traditions.Realism em-phasizes the enduring propensity forconflict be-tween states;liberalism identifiesseveral ways tomitigate these conflictive

radi-caltraditiondescr ibes howthee ntir e s y s t e m

o f

siM'itt'NM W A I T:InternationalR e l a t i o n s 5

on the power of states, liberalism generally

sawstatesasthecentralplayersininternationalaffairs

Allliberal theories implied that cooperation

wasmorepervasive than even the defensive

version ofrealism allowed, but each view offereda

differentrecipefor promotingit

R A D I C A LA P P R O A C H E S

Until the 1980s, marxism was the main

alternativeto the mainstream realist and liberal

traditions.Where realism and liberalism took the

state systemfor granted, marxism offered both a

ex-planationforinternationalconflictandablueprintforfu

ndamentallytransformingtheexistinginter-nationalorder

Orthodox marxist theory saw capitalism as

thecentral cause of international conflict

Capitaliststates battledeach other as a consequence

of theirincessant struggle forprofits and battled

socialiststates because they saw in them the

seedsof theirown destruction Neomarxist

the-

ory,bycontrast,focusedonrelationsbetweenad-vanced capitalist powers and lessdeveloped

statesand argued that the former—aided by an unholyalliance

with the ruling classes of the developingworld—

had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solution was to

overthrowthese parasitic elitesand install a

committedtoa u t o n o m o u s d e v e l o p m e n t

Both of these theories were largely

discreditedbefore the Cold War even ended The

extensivehistoryofeconomicandmilitarycooperat

ionamong the advanced industrial powers

showedthat capitalism did not inevitably lead to

conflict.The bitter schisms that divided the communistworld

showed that socialism did not always pro-mote

harmony Dependencytheory suffered simi-lar

empirical setbacks as it became increasinglyclear that, first,

active participation in the worldeconomy wasa

better route to prosperity than

of language anddiscourse in shaping socialoutcomes However,because these scholarsfocused initially on criticiz-ing the mainstream paradigms butdid not offerpositive alternatives to them,theyremained a self-consciously dissident minority formostofthe1980s

D O M E S T I CP O L I T I C SNot all Cold War scholarship on international af-fairs fit neatly into the realist, liberal, or marxistparadigms Inparticular, a number of importantworks focused

on the characteristics of states, ernmentalorganizations,or individualleaders.Thedemocratic strandof liberal theory fits underthisheading, as do the efforts of scholars suchasGraham Allison and John Steinbruner to useorga-nization theory and bureaucratic politics toexplainforeign policy behavior, and those ofJervis,

gov-tive psychology For themost part, these effortsdidnot seek to provide a general theory ofinterna-tional behavior but to identify otherfactors thatmight lead states to behave contrarytothe predic-tions of the realist or liberal approaches Thus,much ofthis literature should be regarded asacomplement to the three main paradigmsratherthan as a rival approach for analysis of theinterna-tionalsystemasawhole

IrvingJanis,andothers,whichappliedsocialandcogni-NewWrinklesinOldParadigms

Scholarship on international affairs hasdiversifiedsignificantly since the end of the ColdWar Non-Americanvoicesaremoreprominent,awiderrange of methods and theories are seen aslegiti-mate, and new issues such as ethnicconflict,thee n v i r o n m e n t , andt h e f u t u r e o

f t h e s t a t e

have been placed onthe agenda of scholars

every-where

Yet thesense of deja vu is equally striking

In-stead of resolvingthe struggle between

competingtheoretical traditions, the end of the Cold

War hasmerelylaunched a new series of debates

Ironically,even as many societiesembrace similar

ideals ofdemocracy, free markets, and human

rights, thescholars who study these

A recentcontribution of realist theory is its

at-tention to the problem of relative and

institutionalises' claimthat international

institutionswould enable statesto forego

short-term advantages for the sake ofgreater long-short-term

gains, realists such as JosephGriecoand Stephen

Krasner point out that anar-chy forces states to

theabsolutegainsfromcooperationand the way that

gainsare distributed among participants The

logic isstraightforward;If one state reaps larger

gainsthan its partners, it will gradually become

stronger,and its partnerswill eventually become

more vul-nerable,

Realists havealso been quick to explore a

vari-ety of new issues Barry Posen offers a

realistexpla-nation for ethnic conflict, noting that the

breakupofmultiethnicstatescouldplacerivalethnic

groups in an anarchic setting, thereby

triggeringintensefears and tempting each group to

use forcetoimprove its relativeposition This

problemwouldbe particularly severe when each

group'sterritory contained enclavesinhabited by

their eth-nic rivals—asin the former Yugoslavia—

becauseeach side would be tempted to "cleanse"

(preemp-tively)thesealienminoritiesandexpandtoincor-porate any others from their ethnic group that layoutside their

borders Realists have alsocautionedthat

NATO,absentaclearenemy,wouldlikelyface

increasingstrains and that expanding itspresenceeastward would jeopardizerelations withRussia.Finally,scholarssuchasMichaelMastandunohaveargued that U.S foreignpolicy is generallyconsis-tent with realistprinciples, insofar as itsactions arestill designed to preserve U.S.predominance andto shape a postwarorder thatadvances Americaninterests

The most interesting conceptualdevelopmentwithinthe realist paradigm has beenthe emerg-ing split betweenthe "defensive" and

"offensive"strandsof thought.Defensive realistssuch asWaltz,Van Evera, and Jack Snyderassumed thatstates had little intrinsic interestinmilitary con-quest and argued thatthe costs ofexpansion gen-erallyoutweighed the benefits.Accordingly, theymaintained that greatpowerwars occurred largelybecause domestic groupsfostered exaggeratedper-ceptions of threat and anexcessive faithin the effi-cacyofmilitaryforce.Thisviewisnowbeingchallengedalongseveralfronts First, asRandall Schweller notes, the neore-alistassumption that statesmerely seek tosurvive"stackedthe deck" in favor of the statusquo be-cause it precludedthe threat of predatoryrevision-ist states—nations suchas Adolf Hitler'sGermanyor Napoleon Bonaparte's Francethat

"value whatthey covet far more than what theypossess" andare willing to risk annihilation toachieve

theiraims.Second,PeterLiberman,inhisbookDoes ConquestPay?,usesanumberofhistoricalcases—

such as the Nazi occupation of WesternEuropeand Soviet hegemony over EasternEurope—toshow that the benefitsof conquest oftenexceed thecosts, thereby casting doubt on theclaim thatmilitary expansion is no longer cost-effective.Third, offensive realists suchas EricLabs, JohnMearsheimer, and FareedZakariaargue that anar-chy encourages all states to try tomaximize theirrelativestrength simply because nostate can everbe sure when a truly revisionistpower mightemerge

These differences help explain why agree over issues such as the future ofEurope.Fordefensive realists such as Van Evera, war israrelyprofitableandusuallyresultsfrommilitarism,hy-

realistsdis-pernationalism, or someother distorting

domesticfactor Because Van Evera believessuch

forces arelargely absent in post-Cold War Europe, he con-cludes

that the region is "primed for peace." Bycontrast,

Mearsheimerand other offensive realistsbelieve that

anarchy forces great powers to com-pete irrespective of their

internal characteristicsand that security

competition will return to Eu-ropeas soon as

theU.S.pacifieriswithdrawn

NEWLIFEF O RL I B E R A L I S M

The defeat of communism sparked a round of

self-congratulation in the West, best exemplified

byFrancisFukuyama'sinfamousclaimthathu-mankind had now reached the "end of

history."History has paid little attention to this

boast, butthe triumph of the West did give a

notable boost toallthreestrandsofliberalthought

By far the most interesting and important

de-velopment has been the lively debate on the

"de-mocratic peace," Although the most recent phase

ofthis debate had begun even before the Soviet Unioncollapsed, it became more

influential as the numberof democraciesbegan to increase and

as evidence ofthisrelationshipbegantoaccumulate

Democratic peace theory is a refinement of

democracieswereinherentlymorepeacefulthanaut

ocraticstates.Itrestsonthebelief that although democracies seem to

fight warsas often as other states, they rarely, if ever, fightone

another.Scholarssuch as Michael Doyle,James

Lee Ray, and Bruce Russett have offered

thistendency,themostpopularbeingthatdemocraci

esembracenorms of compromisethat bar the use of

forceagainst groups espousing similar

principles It ishard to think of a more

influential, recent aca-demic debate, insofar as the

belief that "democra-cies don't fight each other"

has been an importantjustification for the Clinton administration's

do so, but it is widely agreed thattheycannotforcestatestobehaveinwaysthatarecon-trary to the states' own selfish interests On theother hand,institutionalistssuch as John Duffieldand RobertMcCalla have extended the theory intonew substantive areas,most notably the study ofNATO For these

institu-tionalizedcharacterhelpsexplainwhyithasbeenable tosurvive and adapt, despite the disappear-anceofitsmainadversary.The economic strand of liberal theory is still in-fluential as well In particular, a number of scholarshave recentlysuggestedthat the "globalization" ofworld markets, therise of transnational networksand nongovernmentalorganizations, and the rapidspread of globalcommunications technology areunderminingthepowerofstatesandshiftingattentionawayfrommilitarysecuritytowardeco-nomicsand social welfare The details

butthebasiclogicisfamiliar:Associetiesaroundtheglo

be become enmeshed in a web of economic andsocialconnections,the costs of disrupting these tieswilleffectively preclude unilateral state actions, es-peciallytheuseofforce.This perspective implies that war willremaina remote possibility among the advancedindus-trial democracies It also suggests thatbringingChina and Russia into the relentlessembrace ofworld capitalism is the best way topromote bothprosperity and peace, particularly

if this processcreates a strong middle class inthese states and re-inforces pressures todemocratize.Get these soci-eties hooked on prosperity andcompetition will beconfinedtotheeconomicrealm,This view has been challenged by scholarswhoarguethattheactualscopeof"globalization"ismod-est and that these various transactions stilltakeplacein environmentsthat are shaped andregulated bystates Nonetheless,the belief thateconomic forcesare superseding traditionalgreat

en-joyswidespreadacceptanceamongscholars,pundits,andpolicymakers,andtheroleofthestateislikelytobe

animportanttopicforfutureacademicinquiry,

Sectsandshapesbeliefs and interests, and

estab•lishes accepted norms of behavior.Consequently,constructivism is especially attentive

to the sourcesof change, and this approach has

largelyreplacedmarxism asthepreeminent radical perspectiveoninternationala f f c i r s ,

The endof theColdWar playedan importantrole

theoriesbecauserealism and liberalism both failed to anticipate thiseventandhadsometrouble explainingit.Con-

ttructtvteh a d a n explanation;Sp e ci fi cal ly , f o

r m e r

president Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized

Sovietforeign policy because he embraced new

ideas suchas"commonsecurity."

Moreover,giventhatweliveinanerawhereoldnorms

are being challenged, once clear boundariesare

dissolving, and issuesof identity are

becomingmore salient, it is hardly surprising that

scholars havebeen drawn to approachesthat place

these issuesfront and center From a constructivist

perspective,infact, the central issue in the post-Cold War world ishow

different groups conceive theiridentities and

in-terests Although power is not irrelevant,

construc-tivism emphasizes how ideas and identities

arecreated,howtheyevolve,andhowtheyshapetheways

tatesunderstand and respond to their

situation.Therefore, it matters whether

Europeansdefine them-selves primarilyin national

or continental terms;whetherGermany and Japan

redefinetheir pastsin ways that encourage their

adoptingmore activeinternationalroles; and

whether the United Statesembraces or rejects its

identity as "globalpolice-man."

Constructivist theories are quite diverse and

donot offer a unified set of predictions on any

oftheseissues.Atapurelyconceptuallevel,Alexan-der Wendt has argued that the realist conceptionof anarchy does

not adequately explain why con-flict occurs between

states The real issue is howanarchy is understood—in

Wendt's words, "Anar-chy is what states make of

it." Another strand ofconstructivisttheory has

focused on the future ofthe territorial state,

suggesting that transnationalcommunication and

shared civic values are under-mining traditional

national loyalties and creatingradically new

forms of political association Otherconstructivists

focus on the role of norms, arguingthat

international law and other normative

princi-pleshave eroded earlier notions of sovereignty

andaltered the legitimate purposes for which

statepower may be employed The common

theme ineach of these strands is thecapacity of

discourse toshape how political actors define

leadtosuboptimalinternationalbehavior.GeorgeDowns, David Rocke, and others have also ex-plored how domestic institutions can helpstatesdeal with the perennial problem ofuncertainty,while students of psychologyhaveapplied prospecttheory and other new tools to

decisionmakersfailtoactinarationalfashion.The past decade has also witnessedanex-plosionof interest in the concept of culture, a de-velopment that overlaps with theconstructivistemphasisontheimportanceofideas

a nd no rms,

* * * Thistrendispartlyareflectionofthebroaderinterest in cultural issues in the academicworld (andwithin the public debate as well) andpartly a response to theupsurge in ethnic, nation-alist, and cultural conflicts since thedemise of theSovietUnion

Tomorrow'sConceptualToolbox

While these debates reflectthe diversity of porary scholarship on international affairs,thereare also obvious signsof convergence, Mostrealistsrecognize that nationalism, militarism, ethnicity,and other

liberalsacknowledgethatpoweriscentraltointernationalbehavior;andsomeconstructivistsadmitthatideaswill have greater impact when backedbypowerful states and reinforced by enduringmate-rial forces The boundaries of each paradigm aresomewhatpermeable, andthere is ample opportu-nityforintellectualarbitrage,

** *

In short, each of thesecompeting perspectives tures important aspects of world politics, Our un-derstandingwouldbeimpoverishedwereour

cap-confined to only one of them The "com-role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of plomat" of the future should remain cog-mestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflectonofrealism'semphasis o nt he inescapableconstructivism'svi sion ofchange.

ri-o a re engagedin c ri-onstantfeuds ridiculi

course, not the long and uneasy

relation-tween theorists and historians of world

inthedirectionof interdisciplinaryation, rather in

the way sovereign states putte appearances at

theUnited Nations;real-wever,fallsfar short

Laboratoryv e r s u s T h o u g

h t Experiments

It might help, in thinking about this possibility,tosetasidedisciplinaryboundariesforamomentandconsider a simple question: can we, ininvestigatingphenomena,r e p l i c a t e p h e n o m e n a ?Certain fields do this all the time Theyrelyuponcontrolledreproducibleexperimentation;they are able to re-run sequences of events,varyingconditions in such a way as to establishcauses, cor-relations, and consequences

Mathematicians re-calculatepitomillions of

withabsoluteconfidencethatitsbasicvaluewillremainwhat it has been for thousands of years Physicsand chemistry areonly slightly less reliable,for al-thoughinvestigatorscannotalwaysbesurewhatishappeningatsubatomiclevels,theydogetsimilar

results when they perform experimentsunder

sim-ilar conditions, and they probably always will Ver-ification, within

these disciplines, repeats actualprocesses.Time

and space are compressed and

centrifuges,and electron microscopes can-not

manage They then look for evidence suggest-ing which of these

mental exercises comes closestto explaining their

real-time observations Repro-ducibility exists

only as a consensusthat such cor-respondences seem

plausible The only way we

canre-runthiskindofhistoryistoimagineit.5

Both of these methods—laboratory and

thoughtexperiments—are indisputably "scientific." Theydiffer

dramatically, though, in their reliance

so vivid that it allowed experimentswith

phenomena too largeto fit not just his labora-tory but

his galaxy?Or Darwin without the abilityto conceive a

timescale extending hundreds of mil-lions of years?

Or AlfredWegener without visualiz-ing a globe on

which whole continents could cometogether and

drift apart? What is the reconstruc-tion of

dinosaurs and other ancient creaturesfromfossils, if

not a fitting of imagined flesh to survivingbones and

shells,orat least toimpressions ofthem?6

Historians function in just this way,

to be fictional fragments to fill gaps inthearchivalrecord;9manyothershavenodoubtdonesowithoutbeingquitesohonestaboutit

And what of the obvious next step, which is theconstruction of explicitly fictional accounts—nov-els,plays,poems,films?Dothesealsonot simulatereality by revealing aspects of humanbehavior

thatwouldbedifficulttodocumentinanyotherway?Surely Shakespeare'scontributiontoourunder-standingofhumannaturewasatleastasg r e a t asFreud's—even if he did take liberties withthehis-torical record at least asgreatasthoseof

OliverStone.10Mypoint,then,isthatwheneverwesetout

toexplainphenomenawecannotreplicate,everyone insomeway oranotherreliesupon actsofimagination.

PoliticalS c i e nc e a s L a b o r a

t o r y Science?

Where does political science fit within this rangeofpossibilities extending from physics to poetry?From thisoutsider's perspective, at least, the fieldseems tornbetween the substance with which itdeals—nonreplicablehumanaffairs—andthemethodsmany of its practitioners want to employ,whichare those of the replicable laboratory sci-ences.11Thestrainsthisstraddleproducescanbepainf

ul indeed, It has never been clear to me whypoliticalscientists model their discipline on mathe-matics, physics, and

couldhavechosengeology,paleontology,andbiology.Iam convinced, though, that these disciplinary pref-erences generatemost of the conflicts—and theincomprehension

Con-siderthefollowing:

The quest for parsimony.Political

scientistsseemto assume that simple mechanisms

—some-what likeentropy or electromagnetism—drive hu-manevents,andthatifwecanonlydiscoverwhat

they are, we can use them to make

predictions.Historianswouldacknowledgesomesu

chpat-terns: people grow old and die; reproduction re-quires sex;

gravity keeps us from floating off intospace

Reliable though these are, however, we re-gard

them as insuffciently discriminating in

theireffects to provide much useful

informationbeyondwhatmostofusalreadyknow

For international relationstheorists to

insistthat all nations within an anarchic system

practiceself-help strikes us as a little like saying

that fishwithin water must learn to swim It is

neither un-true nor untrival—just uninteresting

Anyone whoknows the nature of fish, water, and states will

havealready figured it out Such pronouncements

onlyraise further questions: what is meant by

"anar-chy," "self-help," and "system"? But here

clearbecausesomuchdependsupon context From a historian's

viewpoint parsi-mony postpones more than it provides

—except,perhaps, for the vicarious thrill of

appearing to dophysics.12

wouldprobablysay,inexplainingtheaccident.Butthiscould hardly have happened had the path notbeen icy, had the victim not

itthatday,hadhenotbeenborn,hadtectonicprocessesnot uplifted the mountain, had thelawofgravitynotapplied.14Sowhataretheindepen-dent variables in this instance? Historiansmightspecify the event's immediate,intermediate, anddistant causes; but they would

insistupontheirinterdependence.15Giventheexamp

entific" than if they attempted to distinguish inde-pendentfromdependentvariables?

leofevolutionarybiology,wouldtheybeanyless"Accountingfor change.Here too political

sci-ence tiltstoward the replicable scisci-ences despitethenonreplicable characterof the subjects withwhichitdeals.Suchsciencesassumeconstancy:principlesareexpectedto

workinthesamewayacrosstimeand space Internationalrelations theorists fol-low this procedure when they treatconcepts like"balancing," "bandwagoning," and

"deterrence"ashavingequivalentmeaningsacrosscenturiesand

Distinctionsbetweenindependentanddependentcultures.16Historiansknow,though,thatevery

variables.Formostphenomena,politicalscientistsclaim, there

is some determining antecedent: as inchemistry, one seeks to sort out active

from inac-tive or partially active agents, thereby

establishingcausation But why chemistry, when biology—afield

much closer to the human

as of animals, plants,and whatever newly dis-covered

organisms may lie in between, are takenfor granted But

events—shiftingconti-nents,globalwarmingorcooling,giantkilleraster-oids—

ensure that any replay of evolution, werethat

somehow possible, would produce vastly

mannerthatamberfreezesflies

Nonreplicable sciences share ourskepticism.Biology, geology, paleontology, andastronomyconcern themselves as much with

withstability;sotoodoesmedicine,anappliedsciencethatcombinesarelianceonreplicationwithanac-knowledgment ofevolution Physicians seek verifi-cationbyrepeatingphenomena,tobesure:thatiswhat casehistories are all about But they findlong-termpredictionproblematic.Particulartreat-

mentsproduceknownresultsagainstcertaindiseases

—for the moment Viruses,however, canevolvemeans of defending themselves, sothatwhatworkstodaymaynotadecadehence.17Re-producible results, in this field, can make the dif-ference between life and death They guaranteelessthanonemightthink,though,aboutthefuture

Do societies develop the equivalentsofmedicalvulnerabilitiesandimmunities?

Canthesechange,so that what may hold up as ageneralizationabouttherecentpast—

forexample,thatdemocraciesdo

not fight each other—may not for all time to come?

Scientists used to think that proteins could not pos-sibly be

infectiousagents Now, with mad cows,

itappearsasthoughtheycan.18Butthathardlymeansth

atallproteins are infectious—it only means

thatweneedtoqualifyourgeneralizations

Commensurability.Replicable sciences

assumecommensurate standardsof measurement:

all whoaspire to reproducibleexperimentation

must sharethe same definitions of kilograms, voltages,

andmolecular weights How close are we to

agreement,though, on the meaning of terms like "power,"

or"hegemony," or "democracy"?Many political

sci-entists see the "democratic peace" hypothesis ashinging

precariously on whether Imperial Ger-many was

a democracy in 1914 But historians,who are in

the best position to know, disagree

onthispoint,justasobserversatthetimedid.19Therea

son is that we have no universally

acceptedstandardforwhatademocracyactuallyis

Would historians then jettison the concept of

a"democratic peace" if there should prove to

besuch a glaring exception to it? I think

not,preciselybecause we distrustabsolute standards We

wouldprobably acknowledge the anomaly,

speculate as toits causes,and yet insist that

Historians' interpretations, like life, evolve

Welivewith shifting sands, and hence prefer

explana-tory tents to temples Yet on the basis of what

theyunderstandus to have concluded, our political

sci-ence colleaguesmake categorical judgments

aboutthe past all the time, confidently

incorporatingthemwithintheirdatabases.21Nowon

derwestandin awe of their edifices, while finding

it prudentnottoe nt er th e m

Objectivity.Thomas Kuhn showed years

agothat even in the most rigorous sciences the

tempta-tion to see what one seeks can be

overwhelming;postmodernismhas pushed the insight

up.Physicistswhocouldnotsettlesofundamentalanissueaswhetherlightis aparticleorawaveman-aged,nonetheless,tobuildanatomicbomb.24

Do political scientists think objectivity ble? I find this question surprisingly hard to an-swer.To be sure, vast amounts of time andenergygo into perfecting methodologies whosepurposeseems to be to remove any possibilityofbias: thedetermination certainly exists, morethan in his-tory and perhaps even physics, to agree

possi-on the fun-damentals before attemptinggeneralization.Andyet,itisstrikinghowmanyarticlesininternationalrelations theory—especially inthisjournal—beginwith professionsof belief, followed

by quotationsfrom what would appear to be sacredtexts Dog-mas are defended and heresiescondemned, withthe entirely predictable result

atleast)thatsectsproliferate.25Whetherwearereallydealing with science or faith,therefor—or per-

hapsascienceboundedbyfaith—remainsunclear.

SeekingC o m m o n G r o u n d

Where, then, might historians and political tists find common ground? Surely, as a start, in thesubjects withwhich we deal: we share a focus onpeople andthe waysthey organize their affairs, noton processesthat take place inside laboratories Wedealinescapably,therefore,withnonreplicablephenomena;this by no means requires, however,that we do sounscientifically There is a long andfruitfultradition within what we might callthe"evolutionary"sciences for finding patterns inpar-

scien-ticularitiesthatchangeovertime.26Whichofourtwodisciplines best reflects it is aninterestingquestion

My preliminary conclusion is that the

histori-ans, without trying tobe scientific,manage

thisbetter than most of them realize; but that the

po-litical scientists, by trying to be too scientific,

ac-complishlessthantheymight.Historiansare"evolutio

nary" by instinctif notformaltraining:were they to

make their methods more explicit

(astheycertainlyshould),27theymightfindmoreinco

mmon with other sciences than they expect

Po-litical scientists, conversely, are explicit to a

fault:their problem is that they cannot seem to

replicableornonreplica-ble—theywanttod o

But is there really a choice?I detect,

amongsome political scientists, a growing sense

that thereis not: that insurmountable difficulties

arise whenone tries to apply the methods of

replicable scienceto the nonreplicable realm of

Thishasled,amongotherthings,toaninterestin"proces

s-tracing" as a way of extracting generali-ties from

unique sequences of events."How is thisdifferent,

though, from the construction of narra-tives,

whichis what historiansdo?It ishere,Ithink—in a

careful comparisonof whatour twofieldsmean by

"narrative"and "process-tracing"—that the most

promising opportunities for

without some prior assumptions as to what

theseare and what we need to know about them: in

thissense, they depend upon theory They also,

how-ever, require facts—even awkward ones

inconsis-tent with theories—for without these no

link to thepast could even exist What results is a

kind of tai-loring: we seek the best "fit" given the

materials

athand,withouttheslightestillusionthatwearereplicat

ing whatever it is they cover,or that

ourhandiworkwill"wearwell"foralltimetocome

Norcanwefunc tion w ithou t imagination: li

k ea good tailor, we try to see things from the perspec-tive of our

subjects and onlythenmakealterationsbased upon

our own Implicit in all of this is somesenseofwhatmight havebeen; the assumptionthat history

did nothaveto have happened in theway it did, and

that many of our conclusions aboutwhat did happeninvolve an implicit considerationofpathsnottaken—whichisofcoursefiction.29Are such methods

"scientific"? Of course they are:"hard"scientistsponder alternative scenarios allthe time, often onthe basis of intuitive, even aes-thetic,judgments.30Canpoliticalscientistslivewithsuch methods? If their rapidly developing in-terestincounterfactualsisany indication,theyhavealreadybeguntodoso.31

Our fields, therefore, may have more in mon than their "narcissism of minordifferences"has allowed them to acknowledge.Both disciplinesfall squarely within the spectrum of "nonreplica-ble"sciences Both trace processes over time.Bothemploy imagination Both use counterfactual rea-soning Butwhat about prediction, or at least pol-icyimplications? Most historians shy fromthesepriorities likevampiresconfrontedwithcrosses.Many political scientists embracethem enthusias-tically Ifcommonground existshere, it may behardtofin d

com-Preparing, NotP r e d i c t i n g

Return, though, to our initial distinctionbetweenreplicable and nonreplicable sciences Theformerassumethatknowingthepastwillrevealthefuture;thelatteravoidsuchclaims,butseeknonethe

withwhateveristoc ome

No one can be certain where or when thenextgreat earthquake will occur It is helpful toknow,though, that such upheavals take place morefre-quently in California than in Kansas: thatpeoplewho live along the San Andreas Faultshould con-figure their houses against seismicshocks, not fun-nel clouds.Nobodywould prudently

yet,onwhowillplayinthe***WorldSeries.It seems

safe enough to assume, though, that

proficiencywill determine which teams get there:

achieving it,too,is a kind of configuring against

contingen-cies.32Noteventhemostcapablewarplannercanpredi

ct where the next war will occur, or what

itsoutcome will be But is it equally clear that

warplanning should therefore cease? The point,

in allof these instances, is not so much topredictthe

fu-tureastoprepareforit.

Training is not forecasting What it does do

isexpand ranges of experience,both directly and

vic-ariously, so thatwe can increase our skills, our

sta-mina—and,if

allgoeswell,ourwisdom.Theprinciple is much the

same whether one is workingout in a gym, flying a

H.McNeill.Here too there is, or at leastcould be,

common ground for historians and po-litical scientists: the

terrain upon which to trainmay be more

accessible—and hospitable—than atfirst glance it might

appear to be It deserves, at aminimum,jointexploration

NOTES

1 Sigmund Freud,Civilization and Its

Discon-tents,James Strachey, trans,and ed.

(NewYork:Norton,1961),p.72

2 Onnationalism,seeE,J.Hobsbawm,Nationsand

NationalismSince1780;Programme,Myth,and

Reality(Cambridge,U.K.:CambridgeUniversi

ty Press,1990), and Benedict

Ander-son,Imagined Communities: Reflections on

theOriginandSpreadof Nationalism,rev.ed.

(NewYork:Verso,1991)

3 Dorothy Ross, inThe Origins of American

So-cial Science(New York: Cambridge

UniversityPress, 1991), pp 257-300, discusses

how his-torians and political scientists came to

regardthemselvesasdistinctcommunities

4 We do, however, now have limited

real-timeevidence for Darwin's theory of natural

selec-tion See Jonathan Weiner,The Beak of theFinch:

A Story of Evolution in Our

"Prong-horn's Speed May Be Legacy of PastPreda-

tors,"NewYorkTimes,December24,1 9 9 6

Life:TheBurgess Shale and the Nature of History(NewYork: Norton, 1989), provides

one of the bestexplanationsofhowitisd o ne

7 John H.Goldthorpe, in "The Uses ofHistoryin Sociology: Reflections on Some

Recent Ten-dencies,"British Journal of Sociology,Vol.42(June 1991), pp 213-214,

makes this point ad-mirably

8 Lawrence Stone,"The Revival of

NewOldHistory,"Past andPresent,Vol.85

"Whatdistinguishes'historical'from'fictional'sto-ries," Hayden White has argued, "is firstandforemost their content, rather than theirform.The content of historical stories is realevents,events that really happened, rather thanimagi-nary events, events invented by the

narrator."See Hayden White,The Content of the Form:NarrativeDiscourse and Historical Representa-tion(Baltimore,Md.:Johns Hopkins

Univer-sityPress,1987),p 27

9 Simon Schama,Dead Certainties: UnwarrantedSpeculations(New York:

Unredeemed Captive: A Fam-ily Story from Early America(New York: Ran-domHouse,1994)

10 Edmund S Morgan discusses these issuesinreviewing Arthur Miller's screenplay

forthefilm version ofThe Cruciblein theNew YorkReview of Books,Vol.44 (January 9, 1997),

pp.4-6 For a fine novel that illustrates clearly thegap between

archivesandwhatreallyhappened,seeA.S.Byatt,

Possession: A Romance(New York:

RandomHouse,1990)

History,Theory,andCommonGround i7

11 Foran expansionof thisargument,seeJohnLewis

Gaddis, “History, Science, and the Studyof

othersocial scientists,canin amannerot

speakingreplicatecurrentphe nomeniibyurea ns tif

gton, D.C.:United StiltedI ristitute

ofPeaCt,1993),pp l4G-14 1, and Gary King,

I3.fiould's lVorirfrJttf Li/e again provicfes the

bestoverall ¢tiscrlssiun.But see also Cclin T\

Idle,The TimeirjyreHistory S Million Years nf

Hu-rn‹triImprint(New York: $imon and

9chuster,1996),pp d'1,99-1 0 0

1958(Ithaca,N.Y,:CornellUniversityPress,1 9 9

1949-2 )

17 See, for example, Nicholas D Kristofi,

“MalariaMakes a Comeback, And Is Jvtore Deadly

(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1996).Thec

h e m i s t C a r l Djtrassi'snovci,TheI3ai,irhitkiGn Huhit( N e w York: Penguin, 1994), illustratesthe

problemfronta differentv ie wp o in t See,fe ar txump[e,Joy ce Appleby,L y n n H u n t ,

andMargaretJacobs,1ellingtheTrutltAbo atHista rd(NewY o r k : N o r t o n ,

v ity F o r anI5 So too wotild policymakers See Cicorge, Bring-

ingtheGrtp,p p 5—6

16 PaulW Schrocdermakes this point abouttime

in ”Historical Re:ility vs Neo-realist

’l’he-ory," iniernorional Security,Vol,19, No

1(.Summer1994),especiallypp 116-124.For

a similar argument al›out cultural spuce,see

Shu Guang Khang, Jefcrrrriee rind

8mm-

gicCulture:C8ineie-AmericanConJontctioos,

excellenti n t r o c l u c t i o n t o thedebateoverp o s t modernism, see Lync Hunt and Jacques

-Revel,eds.,Histories.' FrenchCOrfSf7U€tionsof the Past(NewYork:NewPress,1995).

24 ruriunofthtGraunâs/

lohnZtman,RelinbltKnawledge.AnExplo-orBeliefthScience(Cambridge,U,K.:C a m b r i d

g e U n i v e r s i t y Press,1978),p p 6—t0.

25 Aq u i c k s u r v t y r e v e a l s t h a t " r e a l i s

m ” n o w

MelianDialogue

adaptedbySureshtBald

twasthesixteenthyearofthePeloponnesianWar,butforthelast six

adapted by Suresht Bald,Williamette Uni-versity

signed a treatyof peace and friendship;however,this treaty did not dissipate thedistrustthat existedbetween them Each feared the other'shegemonicdesignsonthePeloponneseandsoughttoincreaseits power to thwart the other's ambitions With-out openlyattacking the other, each used persua-sion,coercion,and subversion to strengthen itselfandweaken its rival This struggle for hegemonyby Athens and Sparta was felt

bysmall,hitherto"independent"stateswhowere

now being forced to take sides in the bipolar

Greekworld of the fifth century B C One such state

wasMelos

Despite being one of the few island colonies

ofSparta,Meloshadremained neutral in the

strug-glebetweenSpartaandAthens.Itsneutrality,however,

was unacceptable to the Athenians,

who,accompaniedbyoverwhelmingmilitary

andnavalpower, arrived in Melos to pressure it into

submis-sion.After strategically positioning

theirpowerfulfleet, the Athenian generals sent

tonegotiatet h e i s l a n d ' s s u r r e n d e r

The commissioners of Melos agreed to

meetthe envoys in private They were afraid the

Atheni-ans,known for their rhetorical skills, might

swaythe people if allowed a publicforum.The

envoyscamewithan offer that if the Melians

submittedandbecamepartoftheAthenian empire,

theirpeople and their possessionswouldnot be

harmed.The Melians argued that by the law of

nations theyhad the right toremain neutral, and no

nation hadtherightto attack without provocation

Havingbeen a free state for seven hundred years they

werenot ready to give up that freedom Thucydides

cap-turestheexchangebetweentheMeliancommis-sionersandt h e Athenianenvoys:

MELIANS: All we can reasonably expect from

thisnegotiation is war, if we prove to have

submit,andinthecontrarycase,slavery

A T H E N I A N S :, We shall not trouble you with spe-cious pretenses—

eitherof how we have a right toour empire

becausewe overthrew the Mede, orare now

attacking you becauseof the wrong thatyou have

done us—and make a long speechthat would not be

believed; and in return we hopethat you, instead of

thinking to influence us bysaying that you did not join the

Lacedaemonians,although their colonists, or that

pro-T h e yremindedtheAtheniansthatadaymight comewhenthe Atheniansthemselves would needsuchprotection

ButtheAthenianswerenot persuaded.Tothem,Melos'submissionwasin the interestoftheirempire,andMelos

MELIANS:And how pray,c o u l d i t t u r n o u t

a s g o o d forustoserveasforyoutorule?

ATHENIANS:Because you wouldhave the advantageofsubmitting before suffering the worst,andweshouldgainbynotdestroyingyou

M E L I A N S :SOyou wouldnot consenttoourbeingneutral,friends instead of enemies, butalliesofneitherside

A T H E N I A N S : NO;for your hostility cannot so muchhurtusasyourfriendshipwillbeanargumenttoou

r subjects of ourweakness, and your enmityofourpower.(332)

When the Melians asked if that was their

"ideaofequity,"t h e A t h e n i a n s r e s p o n d e d ,

As far as right goes , one has as much of it astheother, and if any maintain their independence itisbecause they are strong,and that if we do notmolestthemitisbecauseweareafraid.( 3 3 2 )

By subjugating the Meliansthe Athenians hopednotonlytoextendtheirempirebut also to im-prove theirimage and thus their security To allowthe weakerMelians to remain free, according totheAthenians, wouldreflect negatively on Athe-nianpower

AwareoftheirweakpositiontheMelianshopedthatthe justiceof their cause wouldgainthem the support of the gods, "and what wewantin power will be made up by the alliance withtheLacedaemonians, who are bound, if only forveryshame,t o c o m e t o theaid oftheirkindred."

A T H E N I A N S Ofthegodswebelieve,andofmen

we know, that by a necessarylaw of theirnaturetheyrulewherevertheycan.Anditisnotasifwewerethefirsttomakethislaw,ortoactuponit

when made:we found it existing before us,

andwillleaveittoexistforeverafterus;allwedoistom

ake use of it, knowing thatyou and

everybodyelse havingthe same power as we

have, would dothesameaswedo.Thus,

asfarasthegodsareconcerned we have no fear

and no reason to fearthat we shall be at a

disadvantage But yournotion about the

Lacedaemonians,which leadsyouto believe

that shame will make them

rstrongestar-guments depend upon hope andthe future,

andyour actual resources are too scantyas

comparedto those arrayed against you,for you to

InthewarthatensuedtheMeliansweresoundlydefeated.TheAtheniansshowednomercy, killing allthe adult males and selling thewomen andchildren as slaves Subsequently, theysent outfive hundred colonists to settle inMelos,whichbecameanAtheniancolony

To Perpetual Peace:APhilosophicalSk etch

** *

The state of peace among menlivingin close

prox-imity is not the natural state ***; instead,

thenatural state is a one of war,whichdoes not

justconsist in open hostilities, but also in the

constantand enduring threat of them.The state of

peacemust therefore beestablished,forthe

suspension ofhostilities does not provide the security of

peace,andunlessthis securityispledged

byoneneighbor

FromImmanuelKant,.PerpetualPeace,andOtherEssayson Politics,

History, and Morals,trans Ted Humphrey(Indianapolis:Hackett

Publishing, 1983), 110-18 Boththe author's andthe

translator's notes have been

omit-ted.Bracketededitorialinsertionsarethetranslator's

to another (which can happen only in a state

oflawfulness),the latter, from whom such

securityhas been requested, can treat the former as

an en-emy

FirstDefinitiveA r t i c l e ofPerpetualPea ce:TheCivilConstitutionofEveryNationS h o

u l d BeR e p u b l i c a n

The sole established constitution that follows fromtheideaofanoriginalcontract,t h e oneonwhichall of a nation's just legislation must be based, is re-

publican.F o r , first,itaccordswiththeprinciplesoft

hefreedomofthemembersofasociety(asmen),

second, it accords with the principles of

thedepen-denceof everyone on a single, common[source

of]legislation (as subjects), and third, it accords

Now in addition to the purity of its origin,

apurity whose source is the pure concept of

right,the republican constitution also providesfor

thisdesirable result, namely, perpetual peace, and

thereason for this is as follows: If (as must

inevitablybe the case, giventhis formof

constitution)theconsent of the citizenry is required

in order to de-termine whether or not there will be

nat-uralthattheyconsiderallitscalamitiesbeforecommitti

ng themselves to so risky a game (Amongthese are

doing the fighting themselves, paying thecosts of

war fromtheir own resources, having torepair at

great sacrifice the war's devastation, and,finally,

the ultimate evil that would make peace it-self

better, never being able—because of new

andconstantwars—toexpunge the burden of

debt.)By

contrast,underanonrepublicanconstitution,where

subjects are not citizens, the easiest thing inthe

world to do is to declare war Here the ruler isnot

afellow citizen,but the nation's owner, andwar

does not affect his table, his hunt, his places

ofpleasure,his court festivals,and so on Thus,

hecan decide to go to war for the most meaningless

ofreasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure party,

andhecan blithely leave its

justification(whichde-cency requires)to his diplomatic corps, who are

al-wayspreparedfor suchexercises

The following comments are necessary to

preventconfusing(assooftenhappens) the

republicanform of constitution with the democratic

one: Theforms of a nation(civitas)can be analyzed

eitheron the basis of the persons who possess the

highestpolitical authority or on the basisof the way

thepeoplearegovernedby their ruler, whoever he

maybe.Thefirst iscalledtheformofsovereignty* **,

of which only three kinds are possible,

specifically,where either one, orseveralin association, orallthose together who make up civil society possessthe sovereign power (Autocracy,

Aristocracy andDemocracy, the power of amonarch, the power ofa nobility, the power of a people) The second is

theform of government(formaregiminis)and

cerns the way in which a nation, based on its stitution(theactof thegeneral willwhereby agroupbecomes a people), exercises its authority

con-Inthisregard,governmentiseitherrepublicanordespot

ic Republicanismis that political principlewhereby

executivepower (the government) is sepa-ratedfrom legislative power In a despotism therulerindependently executes laws that it has itselfmade;here rulers have taken hold of the public willandtreated it as their own private will Among

thethreeformsofgovernment,democracy,intheprope

r sense of the term, is necessarily

adespotism,because it sets up an executive power in whichall citizens make decisions about

and, if needbe, againstone(whotherefore does notagree);consequently, all, who are not quite all,decide, sothatthe generalwillcontradicts bothitselfandfreedom

Every form of government thatis tativeis properly speakingwithout form,becauseoneandthe samepersoncanno more

oneandt h e s a m e t i m e t h e l e g i s l a t o r a n d e x e c

u t o r o f his will (than the universal proposition canserve asthe major premise in a syllogism and at thesametime be the subsumption of theparticularunder itin the minor premise) And although theother

twoformsofpoliticalconstitutionaredefectiveinasmuch asthey always leave room for a demo-craticform of government, itis nonetheless possi-ble thatthey assume aform of government thataccords

with thespiritof a representative system:As Friederick II at leastsaid,"I am merely the na-

tion'shighestservant,"Thedemocraticsystemmakesthis impossible, for everyone wants to rule.Onecan therefore say, the smaller the numberofpersons who exercise the power of the nation(thenumberof rulers), the more they representandthec l o s e r t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a p

pr oxima t es

the possibility of republicanism, and thus, the

con-stitution can hope through gradual reforms

finallyto becomerepublican.For this reason,

attainingthis state that embodiesa completely just

constitu-tion is more difficult in an aristocracy

than in amonarchy, and, except by violent

revolution, thereis nopossibility of attaining itina

democracy.Nonetheless,thepeopleareincomparably

moreconcerned with the form of government than

withtheformof constitution (although a great deal

de-pends on the degree to which the latter is suited

tothe goals of the former) But if the form of

govern-ment is to cohere with the concept of right,

it mustincludethe representative system, which is

possibleonly in a republican form of government and

with-outwhich(no matter what the constitution maybe)

government is despotic and brutish None ofthe

ancient so-called republics were aware of this,and

consequently they inevitably degenerated

intodespotism; still, this is more bearable under a

sin-gle person's rulership than other forms of

As nations, peoples can be regarded as single

indi-viduals who injure one another through their

closeproximitywhile living in the state of nature

(i.e.,independently of external laws) For the sake

of itsown security, each nation can and should

demandthat the others enter into a contract

resembling thecivilone and guaranteeing the rights

federationofnations,butitmustnotbeanationconsisting

of nations The latter would becontradictory, for in every

nation there exists therelation ofruler(legislator)

tosubject(those whoobey, the people); however,

many nations in a sin-gle nation would constitute

only a single nation,whichcontradicts our

assumption (since we arehere weighing the rights

ofnationsin relation toone another, rather than

fusing them into a singlenation)

Just as we view with deep disdain the mentof savages to their lawless freedom—prefer-ring to scuffle without end rather thantoplacethemselves under lawful restraints that theythem-selves constitute, consequently preferring amadfreedom to a rational one—and consider itbar-barous, rude, and brutishly degrading ofhuman-ity, so also should we think that civilizedpeoples(each one united into a nation) wouldhasten asquickly as possible to escape so similar astate ofabandonment Instead, however,

attach-eachnationseesits majesty(for it is absurd to speak

of the majestyof a people) to consist in not beingsubject to anyexternal legal constraint, and theglory of its rulerconsists in being able, without

him-self,tocommandmanythousandstosacrificethemselvesforamatterthatdoesnot concernthem Theprimary difference between EuropeanandAmerican savages is this, that while many ofthelatter tribeshavebeen completelyeatenbytheirenemies, the former know how to make bet-teruse of those they have conquered than to con-sumethem:theyincreasethenumberoftheirsubjectsand thus also the quantity ofinstrumentstheyhaveto

wageevenmoreextensivewars

Given the depravity of human nature, which isrevealedandcanbeglimpsedinthefreerelationsamongnations(t ho ug h deeply concealedbygov-ernmental restraints in law governed civil-

society),one must wonder why the wordrighthas not

beencompletelyd is c a r d e d f r o m t h e p o l i t i c s o f wa

ra s pedantic,orwhynonationhasopenlyventuredtodeclare that it should be.For while Hugo

Grotius,Pufendorf,Vattel,and otherswhosephilosophi-callyanddiplomatically formulatedcodesd on o tand cannot have the slightest legal force (since na-tionsdonotstandunderanycommonexternalconstraints),arealw ayspiously citedi n justifica-tionof a war ofaggression (and who therefore pro-

videonlycoldcomfort),noexamplecanbegivenof anation having foregone its intention[of

goingtowar]b a s e d ontheargumentsprovidedbysuchimportantmen.Thehomagethateverynationpays(atleastinwords)totheconceptof

rightproves,n o n e t h e l e s s , t h a t t h e r e i s i n

m a n a s t i l l greater,thoughpresentlydormant,moralaptitude

tomaster the evil principle in himself (a

Nations canpressfor their rights only by wag-ing

war and never in a trial before

anindependenttribunal,butwaranditsfavorable

consequence,victory, cannot determine the

right.Andalthougha treatyof peacecan put an end to

some particularwar,itcannotendthestateof war (the

tendencyalways to find a new pretext for war)

(Andthis sit-uationcannot straightforwardlybe

declared un-just,since in this circumstance each

nation is judgeof its own case.)Norcan one say of

nations as re-gardstheir rights what one can say

concerning thenatural rights of men in a state of

shouldabandonthisstate."(Forasnations they already

amongnations peace can be neither inauguratednor

guar-anteed A league of a special sort must therefore

beestablished,onethat we can callaleague of

peace(foedus pacificum),whichwillbe

peace(pactumpacis)because thelatter seeks merely to

stoponewar, while the for-mer seeks to endallwars

forever This league doesnotseekanypowerof

thesortpossessedbynations, but only the

maintenance and securityof each nation's own

freedom, as well as that oftheothernations leagued

withit, without theirhaving therebytosubject

themselves to civil lawsand their constraints (as

That a peoplemight say, "There should benowara m o n g u s , f o r w e w a n t t o f o r m o u r s e l

v e s i n t o a nation, i.e., place ourselves under asupreme leg-islative,executive, and judicial power

to resolveourconflictspeacefully,"isunderstandable.Butwhenanation

says,"Thereshouldbenowar be-tween me and other

nosupremelegislativepowertoguaranteememyrightsandhimhis,"thenif theredoesnot exist asurrogate of the union in a civil society,which is afreefederation,itis impossible tounderstand whatthe basis for so entrusting my rights

is Such a fed-erationis necessarily tied rationally tothe conceptof the right of nations, at least if thislatter notionhasa nyme aning

The conceptof theright of nations as a right togo

to war is meaningless (for it would then betherighttodeterminetherightnotbyindependent,universally

sidedmaximsbacked

validlawsthatrestrictthefreedomofeveryone,butbyone-byforce).Consequently,theconceptoftherightofnations

itservesjustlythosemen who are disposed toseekoneanother's destruction and thus to findperpet-ual peace in the grave that covers all thehorrors

ofviolenceanditsperpetrators.Reasoncanproviderelatednationswithnoothermeans for emergingfrom thestate of lawlessness,whichconsists solelyof war, than

(lawless)freedom,justasindividualpersonsdo,and,byaccommodatingthemselvestotheconstraintsofcommonla

w, establish anation of peoples (civitasgentium)that (continually growing)willfinally in-clude all the

people of the earth But they do notwillto dothisbecauseit does not conform totheirideao f t h e righto f nations, andc o n s e q u e n t l

y t h e y

discard inhypothesiswhat is true inthesis.So

(ifeverything is not to be lost) in place of the

positiveidea ofa world republicthey put only

thenegativesurrogate of an enduring, ever

expandingfedera-tionthat p r e v e n t s w a r a n d c u r b s the t e n d e n c

y of

that hostile inclination todefy the law,thoughtherewill always be constant danger of their break-ingloose.* * *

Core ideas about international relations, introduced in Chapter I and

elaboratedin Chapter 3 ofEssentials,haveemerged as responses to the historic

diplomaticchallenges of the twentieth century The selections in this chapter

U.S Congress in January 1918, summarizes some of the key points emerging

fromliberaltheory.Wilsonblamespowerpolitics,secretdiplomacy,andautocraticlead-ers for the

devastating world war He suggests that with the spread of

democracyandthecreationofa"leagueofnations," aggressionwouldbestopped.

The Cold War also providesthe historical setting for therealist / liberal

per-spective.In1947GeorgeF.Kennan,thendirectoroftheStateDepartment'sPolicyPlanning

Staff, penned his famous "X" article, which assesses Soviet conduct

andprovidestheintellectual justification for Cold War containment policy.Using

real-ist logic, he suggests that counter-force must be applied to prevent Soviet

expan-sion.F i n a l l y , J ohnL ew is Ga ddis describest h e ColdWar, o n e ofthe

It willbeour wishandpurposethattheprocesses of

peace, when they are begun, shall beabsolutely

open and that they shall involve andpermit

henceforthno secret understandings of anykind

The day of conquest and aggrandizement isgone

by; so is also the day of secret covenants en-tered

into in the interest of particular governmentsand

likely at some unlooked-for moment to upsetthe

peace of the world It is this happy fact,

nowcleartotheviewofeverypublicmanwhosethoug

hts do not still linger in an age that is deadand

gone, which makes it possible for every

nationwhose purposes are consistent with justice and thepeace of the world

to avow now or at any othertimetheobjectsithasinview

We entered thiswar because violations of

righthad occurred which touched us to the quick

andmade thelife of our own people impossible

unlessthey were corrected and the world secured

onceand for all against their recurrence, What we

de-mand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar

toourselves It is that the world be made fit and

safeto live in; and particularly that it be made safe

forevery peace-lovingnation which, like our

own,wishes to live its own life, determine its own

insti-tutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by theother people of

the world as against force and self-ish

aggression.Allthe peoples of the world are ineffect

partners in thisinterest, and for our ownpart we

see very clearly that unless justice be doneto others it

will not be done to us The program ofthe world's peace,

therefore, is our program; andthat program, the

only possible program, as we seeit,isthis:

II Absolutefreedomofnavigation upontheseas, outside territorial waters, alikeinpeace and in war, except as the seasmay

be closed in whole or in part by ternational action for the enforcementofinternationalc o v e n a n ts

in-III The removal, sofar as possible, ofalleconomic barriers and theestablishmentof an equality of tradeconditionsamongall the nationsconsenting to the peaceand associatingthemselves for its main-tenance

IV Adequateguaranteesgivenandtakenthatnational armaments will be reducedtothe lowest point consistent with do-mestics a f e t y

V A free, open-minded, and absolutely partial adjustment of all colonialclaims,baseduponastrictobservanceoftheprinciplethatindeterminingallsuchquestions of sovereignty the interestsofthepopulationsconcernedmusthaveequ

im-al weight with the equitableclaims ofthegovernment whose title is to be de-termined

Russianterritoryand such a settlement ofall questions af-fecting Russia as will secure the bestandfreest cooperation of the other nationsoftheworldinobtainingforheranun-hamperedandunembarrassedopportu-nity

fortheindependent determinationofherownpoliticaldevelopmentandnationalpolicy and assure her of a sin-cerewelcomeintothesocietyof

freenationsunderinstitutionsofherownchoosing;and,morethanawelcome,as-

sistance also of every kind that she

mayneed and may herself desire The

treat-ment accordedRussia by her sister

na-tions in the months to come will be

theacid test of their good will, of their

com-prehension of her needs as

distinguishedfrom their own interests,

con-fidence amongthenationsinthelawswhich they

have themselves set and de-termined for

the government of their

re-lationswithoneanother.Withoutthishealin

g act the whole structure and va-lidity of

international law is forever im-paired

VIII AllFrench territory should be freed

andtheinvadedportionsrestored,andthewr

ong done to France by Prussia in 1871in

the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, whichhas

unsettled the peace of the world

fornearly fifty years, should

berighted,inorderthatpeacemay

oncemore

bemadesecurei n theinterest o f all,

IX A readjustment of the frontiers of

Italyshould be effected along clearly

recog-nizableli ne s ofnationality

X The peoples of Austria-Hungary,

whoseplace among the nations we wish

to seesafeguarded and assured, should be

ac-cordedthefreestopportunityofau-tonomousdevelopment,

XI Rumania,Serbia,andMontenegroshould

territoriesrestored; Serbia accorded free

and secureaccess to the sea; and the

relations of theseveral Balkan states to

one another de-termined by friendly

XII TheTurkishportionsofthepresentOttomanEmpireshouldbeassuredasecure

sovereignty, but the other nation-alitieswhich are now under Turkish ruleshould

be assured an undoubted securityof lifeand an absolutely unmolested op-portunityof

autonomousdevelopment,andtheDardanellesshould be perma-nently opened asafree passage to theships and commerce

underinternationalguarantees,XIII AnindependentPolish state shouldbeerected which should include theterrito-

riesinhabitedbyindisputablyPolishpopulations, which should be assured afree andsecureaccess to the sea, andwhosepoliticaland economic indepen-denceand territorial integrity shouldbeguaranteedbyi n t e r n a t i o n a l c o v e n

a n t XIV A general association of nations mustbeformed under specific covenants forthepurpose of affording mutualguaranteesof political independence andterritorialintegritytogreatandsmallstatesalike

Inregardtotheseessentialrectificationsofwrongand assertions of right we feel ourselvestobeintimatepartnersof

allthegovernmentsandpeoplesassociatedtogetheragainst theimperial-ists We cannot be separated in

Germangreatness,andthere is nothing in thisprogram that impairs it Wegrudge her noachievement or distinction of learn-ingorof pacificenterprise such as have madeher recordverybright and very enviable Wedonotwisht o i n j u r e h e r ort o block i na n y wayher

28 C H A P T E R2 HISTORY

legitimate influence or power We do not wish

tofight her either with arms or with hostile

arrange-ments of trade if she is willing to

associate herselfwith us and the other

peace-loving nations of theworld in covenants of justice

and law and fair deal-ing We wish her only to

accept a place of equalityamong the peoples of the

world—the new world inwhichwenow l iv e —

in s te a d ofaplaceofmastery

Neither do we presume to suggest to her

anyalterationor modification of her institutions

Butit is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessaryas a preliminary to any

intelligent dealings withheron our part, that we should

know whomher spokesmen speak for when they

speak to us,whether for the Reichstag majority or

for the mili-tary party and the men whose creed is

imperialdomination

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too crete to admit of any further doubt or question Anevident principleruns through the whole programI have outlined It is theprinciple of justice to allpeoples and nationalities, and theirright to live onequal terms of liberty and safetywith one another,whether they be strong or weak.Unless this princi-ple be madeits foundation nopart of the structureof international justice canstand Thepeople ofthe United States could actupon no other princi-ple; and to the vindication ofthis principle they areready to devote their lives,their honor, and every-thing that they possess.The moral climax of thisthe culminating and finalwar for human libertyhascome,and they are readytoputtheirownstrength, their own highest purpose,their own in-tegrity and devotiontothetest

con-TheSourcesofSovietConduct

The political personality of Soviet power as

weknow it today is the product of ideology and

cir-cumstances: ideology inherited by the present

So-viet leaders from the movement in which they

hadtheirpoliticalorigin,andcircumstancesof

thepower which they now have exercised for

nearlythree decades in Russia There can be few

tasks ofpsychological analysis more difficult than

to try totrace the interaction of these two forces and therelative role

of each in the determination of officialSoviet

conduct Yet the attempt must be made ifthat

conduct is to be understood and

intopower.Marxianideology,initsRussian-(a)that the central factor in the life of man, thefact

which determines the character of public Lifeandthe "physiognomy of society," is the systembywhichmaterialgoodsareproducedandex-

changed;(b)that the capitalist system of

produc-tionis anefariousonewhichinevitablyleadstotheexploitation

of the working class by the capital-owning class and isincapable of developing ade-quately theeconomicresourcesof society or ofdistributing fairly thematerial goods produced byhuman labor; (c) thatcapitalism contains the seedsof its own destructionandmust,in view of theinabilityof thec a p it a l -

o wn in g c l a s s t o a d j u s t i t s e l f

toeconomicchange,resulteventuallyandin-escapably in a revolutionary transfer of power

tothe working class; and (d) that imperialism, the

fi-nal phase of capitalism, leads directly to war

andrevolution

Now it must be noted that through all the years

ofpreparationfor revolution,the attentionof

thesemen, as indeed of Marx himself, had been

centeredlessonthefutureformwhichSocialism1would

takethanonthenecessaryoverthrow of rivalpower

which, in their view, had to precede the

in-troduction of Socialism.Their views, therefore,

onthepositiveprogramto beputintoeffect,oncepower

was attained, were for the most part

nebu-

expropriationoflarge private capital holdings there

was no agreedprogram.Thetreatmentof

thepeasantry,whichaccording to the Marxist

formulation was not ofthe proletariat, had always

been a vague spot in thepattern of Communist

thought; and it remainedan object of controversy

firsttenyearsof Communistpower

Thecircumstancesoftheimmediatepost-Revolution period—the existence inRussia of

civilwar and foreign intervention, together with the

ob-viousfact that the Communists represented

onlyatiny minority of the Russian people—

madethe establishment of dictatorial power a

"warCommunism"and theabrupt attempt to

eliminateprivate productionand trade had

unfortunate economic consequencesand caused

further bitterness against the new

revo-lutionaryregime While the temporary

relaxationof the effort to communize Russia,

represented bythe New Economic Policy, alleviated

some of thiseconomic distress and thereby served

its purpose,it alsomade it evident that the

"capitalistic sectorof society"was stillpreparedto

fromanyrelaxationofgovernmentalpressure,andwoul

d,if permittedtocontinuetoexist,alwaysconstitute a

powerful opposing element to the So-viet regime

and a serious rival for influence in

thecountry.Somewhatthesamesituationprevailed

with respect to the individual peasant who, inhisownsmallway,wasalsoaprivateproducer.Lenin, had he lived, might have proved agreatenough man to reconcile these conflictingforces tothe ultimate benefit of Russian society,though thisis questionable But be that as it may,Stalin, andthose whom he led in the struggle forsuccession toLenin's position of leadership, were notthe men totolerate rival political forces in the sphere

of powerwhich they coveted Their sense ofinsecurity wastoo great Their particular brand offanaticism, un•modified by any of the Anglo-Saxontraditions

ofcompromise,wastoofierceandtoojealoustoenvisa

ge any permanent sharing of power FromtheRussian-Asiatic world out of which theyhademerged they carried with them a skepticism

as tothe possibilities of permanent and peacefulcoexis-tence of rival forces Easily persuaded oftheir owndoctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on

allcompetingpower.Outside of the CommunistParty, Russian societywas to have no rigidity.There were to be no formsof collective humanactivity or association whichwouldnot bedominated by the Party.No otherforcein Russiansociety was to be permitted toachieve vitality orintegrity Only the Party was tohavestructure.Allelse was to be an amorphousmass.Andwithinthe Party the same principle wastoapply The mass of Party membersmightgothrough the motions of election, deliberation,de-

cisiona n d a c t io n ; b u t in t h e s e m o t i o n s t h e y wereto be animated not by their own individual willsbut by the

leadershipandt h e overbroodingpresenceof"theworld."

Let it be stressed again that subjectivelythesemen probably did not seek absolutism for itsownsake.T h e y doubtlessb e l i e v e d —

a n d f o u n d i t easytobelieve—thatthey alone knewwhat was goodfor society and thatthey wouldaccomplish

lengeable But in seeking that security of theirownrulethey were prepared to recognize norestric-tions, either of Godor man, on thecharacter oftheir methods And until such time asthat

thatgoodoncetheirpowerwassecureandunchal-securitymightbe achieved, t h e y placed f a r dow

no n t h e i r

scaleof operational

prioritiesthecomfortsandhappinessofthepeoplese

ntrusted totheircare

Now the outstanding circumstance

concerningthe Soviet regime is that down to the

present daythis processof political consolidation

has neverbeen completed and the men in the

Kremlin havecontinued to be predominantly

absorbed with thestruggle to secure and make

absolute the powerwhich they seized in

November 1917 They haveendeavored to secure

it primarily against forces athome, within Soviet

society itself But they havealso endeavored to

secure it against the outsideworld For ideology,

as we have seen, taught themthat the outside world was

hostile and that it wastheirdutyeventually tooverthrowthe

politicalforcesbeyond t h e i r borders.T h e p o w e

r f u l h a n d s of Russian history and tradition reached up to

sus-taintheminthisfeeling.Finally,theirownaggres-sive

intransigence with respect tothe outside

worldbegan to find its own reaction; and they

were soonforced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase [fromEdward

Gibbon,The Decline and Fall of the

RomanEmpire],"to chastise the contumacy" which

theythemselves had provoked It is an undeniable

priv-ilege of every man to prove himself right in thethesis that the

world is his enemy; for if he reiter-ates it

frequentiy enough and makes it the back-ground

of his conduct he is bound eventually to beright

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world

ofthe Soviet leaders, as well as in the character

oftheir ideology, that no opposition to them can

beofficially recognized as having any merit or

justifi-cation whatsoever Such opposition can

flow,

intheory,onlyfromthehostileandincorrigibleforces

of dying capitalism As long as remnants

ofcapitalism were officially recognized as existing

inRussia, it was possible to place on them, as an

in-ternal element, part of the blame for the

mainte-nance of a dictatorial form of society But

as theseremnants were liquidated, little by little,

this justi-fication fell away; and when it was

indicatedoffi-ciallythattheyhadbeenfinallydestroyed,itdisappear

ed altogether And this fact created oneof the

most basic of the compulsions which

cametoactupontheSovietregime:sincecapitalism

no

longer existed in Russia and since it could notbeadmitted that there could be serious orwidespreadoppositiontotheKremlinspringingsponta-neously from the liberated masses under its au-thority, it became necessaryto justify theretentionof the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capi-talismabroad

NowthemaintenanceofthispatternofSovietpower,namely, the pursuit of

unlimitedauthoritydomestically,a c c o m p a n i e d b y t

h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f mythofimplacableforeignhostility,hasgonef a r to s

thesemi-h a p e tthesemi-he a ctu al mac thesemi-hine ry of Sovietpowerasweknowittoday.Inte r nal organsofad-

ministrationwhichdidnotservethispurposewitheredonthevine.Organswhichdidservethispurposebecamevastlyswollen.The securityofSo-

vietpowerc a m e t o r e s t o n t h e i r o n d i s c i p l i n e o

f theParty,ontheseverityandubiquityofthesecretpolice,andontheuncompromisingeconomicmonopolismofthestate.T h e"organsof suppres-

sion,"inwhichtheSovietleadershadsoughtsecu-rity from rival forces, became in large measure

themastersofthosewhomtheyweredesignedtoserve.TodaythemajorpartofthestructureofSo-viet poweris committedtotheperfectionof

thedictatorshipandtothemaintenance oftheconceptof Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy low-

eringbeyondthewalls.Andthem il li onso f humanbeingswhoform thatpartoft h e structureofpower must defend at all costs thisconcept of Rus-sia'sp o s i t i o n , f o r w ithou t i t t h e y a r e t h e m s e

l v e s superfluous

As things stand today, the rulers can nolongerdream of parting with these organs ofsuppression.Thequest for absolute power,pursuednow fornearly three decades with a ruthlessnessunparal-leled (in scope at least) in modern times,has againproduced internally, as it did externally, its own re-action Theexcesses of the police apparatus havefanned thepotential opposition to the regime intosomethingfar greater and more dangerous thanitcouldhavebeenbeforethoseexcessesbegan.But least of all can the rulers dispense withthefictionb y

w h i c h themaintenanceofd i c t a t o r i a l