[...]... Introduction There are long-standing but relatively disjoint traditions for discussing reduction, explanation, and causation in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind In philosophy of mind, the focus tends to be on the metaphysics of reduction, less on reductive explanation Similarly, the discussion of mental causation has focused more on intuitive notions of causal relevance than on notions of... phenomena and mechanisms even though not reducible to them As Kim observes, this raises many questions, among them the following: What really is a ‘‘reductive’’ explanation? And how are reduction and reductive explanation related to each other? Kim discusses these and related questions for the three principal types of reduction currently on the scene: bridge-law reduction, identity reduction, and functional... in a functional reduction does refer to such properties, but is a Introduction 3 definition, and definitions are not extra premises in explanatory deductions In contrast, the classic bridge-law model of reduction cannot satisfy this constraint on reductive explanation (Kim 2005, and Chapter 5 in this volume) Crucially, functional reduction would close the explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal... been more on theory reduction than reduction in terms of functionalisation and realisation Similarly, there has been less focus on the sense in which the causes retrieved in the special sciences convey causal relevance as well as on how they cohere with what fundamental physics has to say The papers published in this volume show very clearly that the debates on reduction, explanation, and causation will... philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, and that both disciplines have important lessons to learn by studying how reduction, explanation, and causation take place in such diverse empirical subjects as biology, medicine, neuroscience, and political science The chapters in this volume offer an astounding richness of argument and new perspectives on reduction, explanation, and causation that comfortably... for such explanations In contrast, functional reductions, on Kim’s view, deliver reductive explanations But do they reduce? Kim argues that if a property has been functionally reduced, its tokens can be identified with the tokens of their respective lowerlevel realisers Thus, functional reductions yield token reductions But what about the properties supposedly reduced through functionalisation? According... best explanation depends on the explanatory question and its context The argument builds on distinguishing different types of reductive explanation, and Lipton sides with Fodor (1974) and Kim (Chapter 5 in this volume) in emphasising that, in Lipton’s words, there can be reductive explanation without (type-identity) reduction For example, it is possible to have reductive mechanistic explanations of... by them all Introduction 11 Peter Lipton’s ‘CP Laws, Reduction, and Explanatory Pluralism’ (Chapter 6) explores the relationships between the notions of reduction, reductive explanation, and ceteris paribus laws Scientific explanations may be reductive, spanning levels, or they may be level-bound Lipton observes that there could be a presumption in favour of reductive explanations of high-level events... the questions arise how we can have distinct explanandum and explanans in reductive explanation, if our most clear model of reduction is identity, and conversely, how non-reductionism may be compatible with reductive explanation (Kim, Chapter 5 in this volume) Of course, the notion of supervenience is a philosophical term of art and it could well be thought that it would find no direct application in the... preconceived notions of reduction Bickle’s eye-opening case study is how in mice neuronal competition for participation in a memory trace is determined by relative CREB (i.e., calcium responsive element binding protein which is a gene expression transcription enhancer) function On the basis of this, and earlier work, he sets out two aspects of reductionist research in particular, namely that reduction . of reduction currently on the scene: bridge-law reduction, identity reduction, and functional reduction. Kim argues that bridge-law reduction gives us neither reduction nor reductive explanation. . h1" alt="" BEING REDUCED This page intentionally left blank Being Reduced New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation Edited by JAKOB HOHWY JESPER KALLESTRUP 1 1 Great Clarendon Street,. Reduction and Reductive Explanation: Is One Possible Without the Other?’ (Chapter 5) argues that only the functional model of reduction provides both reduction and reductive explanation. The